Space Weather Architecture Study Phase I Decision Coordination Group Briefing

1
Space Weather Architecture Study (Phase I)
Decision Coordination Group Briefing

• Draft
• Lt Col Rick Strathearn

2
Organization Participants Phase I

• DSWA
• DDRE
• NAVSPACECOM
• NOAA - OAR
• NOAA - SEC
• NOAA - NESDIS
• NPOESS - IPO
• FAA
• NASA - HQ
• NASA GSFC
• NASA JPL
• USGS
• DoE (LANL)
• NSF

• Joint Staff
• USSPACECOM
• AFSPC
• Air Staff
• Army Staff
• CNO Staff
• USMC Staff
• NRO
• SMC
• ONR
• NRL
• AFRL
• BMDO
• DUSD (Space)
• SMDC
• AFOSR

3
What is Space Weather?
Conditions on the sun and in the solar wind,
magnetosphere, ionosphere, and thermosphere that
can influence the performance and reliability of
space-borne and ground-based technological
systems as well as endanger human life and health
- Space Weather Terms of Reference 1998
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION ENERGETIC CHARGED
PARTICLES GEOMAGNETIC STORMS CHARGED PARTICLE
CURRENTS ELECTRON DENSITY SCINTILLATION NEUTRAL
DENSITY AURORA SOLAR RFI
SOLAR ACTIVITY
ALTITUDE (KM) 10,000 1,000
100 10
MAGNETOSPHERE
THERMOSPHERE
4
Solar Cycle
Observed
Sunspots
Projected
19
20
21
22
Cycle 18
23

• Solar Max 2000
• First for numerous new satellites
• Largest number of satellites exposed to severe
  Space Weather
• Severe storms occur 5 times per year at solar max
  and average 2 per year over whole solar cycle

Disruptive Sun
Quiet Sun
5
Criteria for Proceeding to Phase II

• Are National Security objectives impacted by
  Space Weather (SWx)?
• Does the Evolved Baseline provide required
  capability?
• Are the projected technologies available to
  provide required capability?
• Can Phase II provide viable SWx architecture
  alternatives?

6
Operational Impact IntegrationMethodology
Systems
Historical Impacts Quantitative Analysis

Qualitative Analysis
Phenomenon I II III IV XV
Scintillation
Density
Radiation
Neutral Density
Aurora
RFI
Missions
Capabilities
7
Ionospheric Scintillation
Undisturbed Ionosphere
Ionospheric Turbulence
0
-4
-8
-12
Signal to Noise Ratio (dB)
-16
Scintillation Onset
-20
-24
-28
-32
Time 5 Min Increments
8
OPERATIONAL UHF SATCOM OUTAGE
Historical Example
FLTSATCOM (23o W) 250 to 300 MHz

• 621 Air Mobility Operations Group (AMOG)
• Apr 97 Mission C2 operations
• Transport aircraft inbound to Zaire
• Tactical Air Control Center - Scott AFB
• Forward Operating Base - Ascension Island
• Primary communications UHF SATCOM

TACC
Zaire
Ascension
SATCOM OPERATORS LOG 0010 hrs Began
transmitting several messages. One message took
35 minutes to get through and two others took up
to 1 hour. Normal transmission takes 5 minutes
maximum. 0230 hrs ...I can receive just fine
but cant transmit out. Still trying to send out
original 4 messages. 0247 hrs I got a message
out after trying for 2 hours and 40 minutes...
9
Effective Blue Counterfire Missions
Potential Mission Effects due to UHF
Communication Delays

• Severe scintillation for a Persian Gulf Fire
  Support Scenario
• Severe scintillations cause delays greater than 3
  minutes for 33 of the call for fire messages

JHU/APL Analysis
Communications Delay
10
GPS Impacts
Historical Examples

• 1995 - Loss of lock on 5 dual frequency receivers
  at Millstone radar during major storm (Kp5)
• 1997 - 2 day FAA performance review had an
  anomaly at 4 of 5 stations lasting up to 13 min

• Analysis of measured scintillation (October
  1996), would have caused loss of lock on all but
  two satellites

11
GPS Quantitative Analysis

• Air campaign analysis
• Cases included no scintillation, jamming,
  scintillation with jamming
• Employed PGMs, GPS guided munitions, and
  stand-off weapons
• Mission effectiveness was impacted by severe
  scintillation in a jamming environment
• Scintillation induced state changes in GPS
  receivers can adversely affect precision systems
• Precision approach and landings
• Surveillance and targeting

AFRL Analysis
12
Ionospheric Scintillation Findings

• Mainly impacts systems operating in UHF and lower
  frequencies
• Scintillation causes
• UHF Satcom loss of lock-on by receiver causes
  delay of message traffic causing time-critical
  mission loss
• GPS loss of lock-on by receiver to one or more
  satellites
• Degrades PNT accuracy, especially if available
  satellites falls to less than 3
• Combinations of jamming or terrain masking can
  reduce margin further
• Radar increased system noise level reducing the
  number of hits above threshold interfering with
  acquisition, track and target classification
• Ionospheric scintillation problems often
  attributed to unknown causes
• Documented ionospheric scintillation outages are
  sparse
• Growth in UHF Satcom will increase potential
  impact

13
Ionospheric Electron Density

• Ionospheric signal bending, retardation
  absorption
• Primarily affects systems operating at less than
  3 GHz

X
Apparent Location
True Location
Ionosphere
14
HF Communications
15
FREQUENCY (MHz)
10
USEABLE FREQUENCY WINDOW
MAXIMUM USEABLE FREQUENCY
5
LOWEST USEABLE FREQUENCY
SHORTWAVE FADE (SWF)
0
00
24
18
12
06
SOLAR FLARE
TIME
Historical Examples - March 1989 Storm

• HF Radios (hi lat) 2-3 day outages
• HF Radios (low lat) 20 hour outage

• DoD SW radios - 7 day outage
• DoD MARS radio outages up to 24 hours

15
HF Communications
Representative example
Ionospheric Absorption

• U.S. Forces 20 km inland (no line of sight
  communications)
• Fire support request via HF voice to ship at a
  range of 90 km

90 km (50 nmi )
Fire Support Ship
Forward Element with HF Radio
Impact

• HF communications will be out for a half hour to
  several hours due to a Class X flare (5 per month
  _at_ solar max)
• Significant degradations on HF communications are
  expected for Class M flares (75 per month _at_ solar
  max)

JHU/APL Analysis
16
Space Surveillance/ISR/BMD Radar Track Accuracy
Ionospheric Electron Density Correction
Meters
Real-time Measurement
Climate Model

• Ionospheric electron density uncertainty is
  dominant limit to track accuracy in Spacetrack
  radars
• Using real-time measurement of the ionosphere can
  yield significant improvements

Lincoln Lab Report
17
Ionospheric Electron Density Findings

• Electron density uncertainty can be the major
  source of error in systems operating below 3 GHz
  (geolocation, strategic and tactical radars, and
  single frequency GPS)
• Increases in electron density due to solar flares
  can absorb HF over the entire sunlit hemisphere
• Future systems
• HF radio will continue to be used during periods
  of satcom saturation and by allies and
  adversaries
• Future groundbased radars will become more robust
  as they move to X-band
• Spacebased radars operating at UHF or even VHF
  will have impacts
• Realtime measurement of electron density or model
  improvements will mitigate impacts

18
Radiation Effects on Spacecraft

• Deep and Surface Charging
• Caused by low high energy particles
• Discharges cause upset/burnout

Solar Activity

• Surface Damage
• Caused by low energy particles, UV X-Rays
• Degradation of thermal control material
• Damage to solar cells

Cosmic Radiation

• Single Event Effects (SEE)
• Caused by high energy particles
• Memory changes
• False sensor readings
• Processor latch-up
• Burnout

• Significant Events
• Solar Max - Once per week
• Solar Min - Twice per month

19
Satellite Impacts Caused by Space Weather
Significant recent spacecraft anomalies
(1997) Jan - Telestar 401 loss due to energetic
electrons Apr - TEMPO2 - 20 power loss due to
energetic electrons Nov - GOES 8 9 - bad
sensor readings due to geomagnetic storm

• Total Mission Loss
• 13 satellites in last 16 years - 8 were first of
  a series
• Mission Degradation
• Redesigns of subsystems required on 12 satellites
  in last 20 years
• Solar panels or power supplies limited life of 21
  satellites in past 10 years

20
Satellite Impacts Caused by Space Weather (cont)

• Non-Mission Impacts
• Bit flips, logic errors, memory resets
• 1000s of cases (100s sometimes peculiar to
  specific satellite subsystem)
• 6000 entries in NOAA, USAF, and NASA unclassified
  databases covering 25 years
• Approx 20 of these anomalies are mission
  degradations or losses
• Databases are not comprehensive and lack details

21
Spacecraft Charging Example

• 3 TEMPO satellites launched (GEO Comm)
• New technologies were used
• Higher voltage solar arrays (100V)
• Higher power - 10-11 kW
• New material - Gallium Arsenide

First Launch - 5 Mar 97 Charging - 11 Apr
97 Charging - 11 Dec 97 Lost 22 power on 2
birds Cost 225M ea Ins Claim of 20M on 1 sat

• Nine month study identified voltage as the
  problem to be reengineered - 40 engineers working
  the problem since April 97

• Follow-ons must be re-engineered before next
  launch

22
Space Surveillance/ISR/BMD SBIRS-High Satellite
Outage

• TMD Simulation
• Launch point prediction
• 300 km Range TBM

• Failure of a single SBIRS-High satellite can
  significantly
• degrade state vectors and launch and impact
  point predictions
• DSP experience indicates the possibility of
  SBIRS-High Failures
• DSP-7 satellite loss
• DSP 1971-1985, 16 occasions of SEUs leading to
  lost data

Aerospace Analysis
23
Radiation Findings

• Need better knowlege of space radiation
  environment
• Rapidly determine cause of failures (environment
  or attack)
• Formulate spacecraft design rules
• Manage operations
• Better tracking of anomalies could improve
  mission performance
• Radiation can cause a range of effects from total
  loss to increased satellite operation time
• For some constellations, single satellite loss
  can have major performance degradation
• Radiation occurs most frequently at solar max,
  but can occur at any point
• Block changes, introduction of new technologies
  and use of commercial systems causes uncertainties

24
Space WeatherAtmospheric Neutral Density

• Satellite Drag
• During the Mar 89 geomagnetic storm, 1320
  satellites could not be tracked for 2 or more
  consecutive days
• BMD
• Interceptor range diminished with higher drag

25
Aurora

• Aurora ovals extend from 70 deg N latitude to
  as far South as 40 deg N latitude during severe
  geomagnetic storms.
• Aurora Impacts
• Signal to noise problems for SBIRS-LEOcaused by
  IR emissions
• Scintillation for GPS
• Radar clutter for BMD

26
Solar Radio Frequency Interference

• SATCOM Radar RFI occurs when
• Sun in field of view of the receiver
• Solar radio burst at appropriate frequency and
  sufficient intensity

RADAR INTERFERENCE
SATCOM INTERFERENCE
RADIO BURST

• Duration and Frequency of Solar Radio Bursts
• Lasts a few minutes to tens of minutes
• Few events/year during Solar Min
• Hundreds of events/year during Solar Max

27
Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives Are
Impacted by Space Weather
Comm
Power
PNT
ISR
BMD
ManFlt
28
Summary of Operational Impacts

• DoD missions dependence on space assets is
  increasing
• Communications, PNT, ISR, BMD
• Use of commercial space may increase
  vulnerability
• All DoD mission areas can be affected by SWx
• SWx impacts
• Primary Ionospheric electron density and
  scintillation, and space radiation
• Other Neutral density, auroral emissions, solar
  radio noise
• SWx impacts on operations are not well reported
  and documented

29
Criteria for Proceeding to Phase II

• Are National Security objectives impacted by
  Space Weather (SWx)?
• Does the Evolved Baseline provide required
  capability?
• Are the projected technologies available to
  provide required capability?
• Can Phase II provide viable SWx architecture
  alternatives?

30
Current Space Weather Baseline
31
Evolved Space Weather Baseline(Enhanced System
Provides Improved Performance)
1998 Current Capabilities
2010 Evolved Capabilities
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
1998
GOES YohKoh ACE DSP GPS/NDS Classified POES/
DMSP(5D-2)
GOES (Enhanced) ACE Follow-On DSP GPS/NDS Classif
ied POES/DMSP(5D-3) (Enhanced) NPOESS
(Enhanced) IMAGE/STEREO/COSMIC C/NOFS
(Proposed) CEASE (Proposed)
Space-Based Data Sources
SEON National Solar Observatories InternationalSo
lar Observatories Ionospheric Observatories USGS
Magnetometer Riometer/Neutron Monitor
SEON (Enhanced) National Solar Observatories Inter
nationalSolar Observatories Ionospheric
Observatories USGS Magnetometer Riometer/Neutron
Monitor SCINDA (Proposed)
Ground-Based Data Sources
USAF/SEOC NOAA/SEC Archival Centers
USAF/SEOC NOAA/SEC Archival Centers
Centers
32
Assessment of Space Weather Requirements vs
Capability
33
Assessment of Space Weather Requirements vs
Capability
34
US Space Weather Investment (Yearly Average)
35
The Cost of Space
1B
13B
6B
20B Yearly Space Investment by DoD and NASA
36
Evolved Baseline Findings

• Current Joint DoD NOAA support capability is
  limited
• Ground space-based space weather observations
  are sparse
• Support models tools are inadequate
• Todays support focuses on HF comm, anomaly
  resolution, and warnings
• Some improvement expected 2010
• Enhancements in space weather observations and
  improvements in models
• Significant shortfalls remain in warning/forecast
  capability
• Support to user remains inadequate
• Users of systems are often unaware of the
  potential impacts of space weather
• User Requirements documentation is inadequate
• SWx support less than 1 of the DoD NASA space
  budget

37
Criteria for Proceeding to Phase II

• Are National Security objectives impacted by
  Space Weather (SWx)?
• Does the Evolved Baseline provide required
  capability?
• Are the projected technologies available to
  provide required capability?
• Can Phase II provide viable SWx architecture
  alternatives?

38
Potential Benefit Ionospheric Electron Nowcast

• Possible Concept
• Real time measurements, using GPS ground- or
  space- based receiver network
• Benefit
• Up to 5X improvements in geolocation, radar, and
  single frequency GPS accuracy

50
40
30
TEC (1016 electrons/m2)
20
10
0
39
Potential Benefit Ionosphere Scintillation
Forecast

• Benefit
• Forecasts of MILSATCOM and GPS outages due to
  ionosphere scintillation
• Possible Concept
• Constellation of LEO satellites with
  multi-frequency beacons (UHF, L- and S- bands) to
  network of ground receivers

Red - Complete Outage Yellow - Limited Comm
40
Potential Benefit On-orbit Radiation Forecast

• Benefit
• Forecast of significant space weather effects,
  allowing satellite operators to anticipate and
  cope
• Possible concept
• Operational detection of Earth directed Coronal
  Mass Ejections

Solar Mass Ejection Imager
41
Potential Benefit Satellite Radiation Nowcast

• Benefit
• Direct, on-board radiation sensing will enable
  rapid assessment of failures
• Also assists in attack detection
• Possible concept
• Small, light, low power multifunction sensor
  packages for environmental sensing and attack
  reporting

42
Potential Benefit Spacecraft Charging Mitigation

• Benefit
• Eliminates subsystem failures due to arcing
  caused by spacecraft charging
• Possible concept
• Improved on-board charge control system
  dissipates electron build-up

43
Technology Findings

• Multipoint measurements are key
• Space Weather is data starved
• Provide improved initialization models for
  specification and forecast
• Basic research is needed
• Improve understanding of physics (coupling)
• Required for coupled models
• Promising Technologies can meet future needs
• Spacecraft resistance to space environments
• Communications effects/outage prediction and
  mitigation
• Investments required may depend on architectural
  alternatives selected

44
Criteria for Proceeding to Phase II

• Are National Security objectives impacted by
  Space Weather (SWx)?
• Does the Evolved Baseline provide required
  capability?
• Are the projected technologies available to
  provide required capability?
• Can Phase II provide viable SWx architecture
  alternatives?

45
Proven DODSA Architecture Development Process
Integration Panel
Integration Panel
Integration Panel Selects Final Axes
Alternatives
Consensus Building Architecture Selection
DCG Brief
Cost Team
Design Team
Analysis Team
Phase one Products
I
III
Teams Determine Axes and Define Candidate
Architecture Alternatives
Determine system and technology trades Define and
Assess Selected Alternatives
46
Potential SWx Architecture Trades

• Operational Trades

• Systems Trades

Real Time
Anticipate Exploit
Central Processing
Observation
Fore- casting
Defines
Cope Avoid
Organic Processing
Non-Real Time
Survive the Environment
Cost is treated as an independent variable (CAIV)
47
Potential System Technology Trades
Trade
Example

• Adapt existing systemor build new
• Groundbasedor spacebased sensors
• Mitigationor forecast

• Use of Iridium or new satellite as an ionospheric
  scintillation beacon
• Advanced ground network or GPS occultation
  measurement on SBIRS
• Increase GPS power or implement scintillation
  forecast system

48
Potential Payoff
PROBLEM Loss of SATCOM link
RESPONSE Mitigation of Ionospheric Effects
CAUSE Enemy, Equipment, or Environment?
Jamming or attack
Change Frequency, Data Rate
Equip. failure Radiation effect
Use Alternative Links
Scintillation Effects
Wait for Disturbance to Pass
Knowledge of space environment permits optimal
response
49
Space Weather ADT Phase II Overview
50
Decision Criteria Review

• National Security objectives are impacted by
  Space Weather (SWx)
• The Evolved Baseline does not provide required
  capability
• The projected technologies are available to
  provide required capability
• Phase II can provide viable SWx architecture
  alternatives

51
Conclusions Recommendations

• Conclusions
• Space environmental support provides a service to
  the DoD
• Expect an increasing need for SWx support in the
  future
• Evolved Baseline will not get us there
• New technology and architecture alternatives can
  provide opportunities for better SWX support
• Phase II needed to orchestrate future SWx support
• Recommendations
• Approve continuation into Phase II
• Continue to provide study support

52
Back-Up Slides
53
Scintillation Vulnerability

• Regions susceptible to high scintillation
• Equatorial geomagnetic latitudes
• Scintillation can cause intermittent interference
  from minutes to hours
• Greatest variability occurs at solar max from
  sunset to midnight at equinox
• High geomagnetic latitudes
• Scintillation can cause intermittent interference
  from hours to days
• Greatest variability occurs at solar max in
  winter during geomagnetic storms

54
Scintillation Vulnerability (backup)
Julian Day 110 Time 18 hr Z Zenith Angle
94 Subsolar Point 11.2N, -90.3E
Latitude (N)
Magnetic Equator
Anomaly Region
-180
-120
-60
0
60
120
180
Longitude (E)
55
Historical RFI Events

• Solar events of 6-20 Mar 89 caused RFI
• Severely degraded communications between Falcon
  AFS and Kwajalein on 10 Mar
• Very high noise levels on VHF receiver at Ft
  Huachuca on 8-9 Mar
• Disruption of satellite data reception at Kelly
  AFB on 16 Mar
• Radar systems reported over a dozen interference
  events during the period

56
Space Weather Profile
Average Investment 138M/yr.
Average Investment 70M/yr.
57
Observations Findings (Cont.)

• SWx Architecture Development Team
• Interest and support from SWx research and
  operational community has been excellent
• Phase I provides excellent foundation for
  follow-on work
• Phase II could take advantage of excellent work
  to date and address the shortcomings above