Title: The application of the Li doctrine in cases involving multiple parties: American Motorcycle Associat
1The application of the Li doctrine in cases
involving multiple parties American Motorcycle
Association v. Superior Court (California Supreme
Court, en banc, 1978)
- Since Li involved only a single plaintiff and
single defendant, its innovation of a comparative
fault principle resulted simply in an allocation
of fault between the plaintiff and defendant,
proportionately diminishing plaintiffs recovery
(damages) to reflect the defendants contribution
to plaintiffs injuries - The Court specifically reserved ruling on the
issue of the application of the comparative fault
principle in cases involving multiple parties
2The facts
- Gregos, a teenager, was permanently paralyzed as
a result of a motorcycle accident during an event
sanctioned, and conducted by The Viking
Motorcycle Club, and the American Motorcycle
Association - He filed a civil action against both
associations, seeking damages, and alleged that
the negligence of defendants in designing,
managing and supervising the race were the
proximate cause of his injuries - Defendants alleged as an affirmative defense that
Gregos parents were negligent in their
supervision of their son, and expressly consented
to his participation in the event with actual
knowledge of the extent of his training in the
operation of a motorcycle - Defendants sought pursuant to the California
Code of Civil Procedure to file a
cross-complaint, seeking indemnification from
Gregos parents
3History The origin of the principle of joint
several liability
- Under common law principles, where two or more
negligent parties cause an indivisible injury,
they are jointly and severally liable to the
injured party for the amount of his damages.
Plaintiff is not required to prove that either
tortfeasors conduct was the sole proximate cause
of his injury - The principle had its earliest recognition in
cases where two or more parties acted in concert
reflecting the conception that all participants
in a conspiracy or partnership were equally
responsible for the acts of each member
4Other early applications of the original theory
of joint several liability
- The emergence of the doctrine of vicarious
liability (respondeat superior) Imputation of
fault based upon relationship or control
(principal-agent employer-employee) when the
agent or employees negligent act or omission
occurred within the scope of the relationship,
e.g., within the scope of employment (a topic to
be expanded upon in the course on Agency) - Application of the doctrine in cases involving
joint owners of property who have a common duty
toward third parties
5A new innovation of the doctrine after Li
- The abatement of the all or nothing aspect of
the contributory negligence doctrine to
ameliorate its inequitable consequences to
plaintiff does not suggest the abatement of the
principle of joint and several liability - Even after Li, each negligent party whose conduct
is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury to
plaintiff should logically remain individually
responsible to plaintiff for that injury
6Innovation of the rule as to the right of
indemnity or contribution
- Prior to Li, in a case involving multiple
tortfeasors, the allocation of damages among
defendants was accomplished by applying a rule of
contribution or indemnity - Indemnity was concerned with the question whether
the liability of one negligent defendant should
be shifted entirely to another negligent
defendant (The doctrine had its most popular
application in cases involving a so-called
passive tortfeasor and a so-called active
tortfeasor) - The more modern principle of contribution
suggests the sharing of liability (for
plaintiffs loss) between or among multiple
tortfeasors in the nature of an equitable
indemnity doctrine
7Equitable apportionment of liability and the
recognition of comparative indemnity
- Li introduces the concept of apportionment of
liability, previously unrecognized by California
common law - This concept of apportionment of liability
suggests that - When plaintiffs injury remains indivisible, each
defendant whose negligence is a proximate cause
of that injury remains responsible to plaintiff
because it is not possible to determine whether a
particular defendants negligence would have
caused the injury thus no defendant has an
equitable claim to be relieved of his
responsibility to plaintiff - This is logical, and sound from a policy
standpoint even where plaintiff is himself
negligent, because plaintiffs duty is to use
reasonable care for his own protection, while
defendants negligence represents a lack of due
care for the safety of others however, - The principles of equity which underlie the
comparative fault rule support the recognition of
a rule of partial or comparative indemnity,
allowing for the filing of a cross-complaint by
a named/joined defendant against previously
unjoined alleged tortfeasors (tortfeasors not
joined by plaintiff in his complaint) - The failure to recognize such a rule would
prejudice the ability of injured parties to
recover adequate compensation for their loss
8The rule as applied
- On remand, under the principle announced, the
American Motorcycle Association may file a
cross-complaint joining Gregos parents under the
California Code of Civil Procedure, and alleging
entitlement to partial indemnification from them - AMA must allege and prove that Gregos parents
were negligent in their supervision of their son,
and that their negligence was a proximate cause
of his injuries - If it is proven that they were negligent, AMA
will be entitled to comparative indemnity
9The dissent
- Justice Clark argued that the principle of
comparative fault announced in Li is not properly
reflected in the majoritys holding - To illustrate
- In a case where a plaintiff is 30 at fault, and
defendants are respectively 60 and 10 at fault,
plaintiff could recover 70 of his damages from
the defendant who is only 10 at fault if the
more culpable defendant is unable to pay - In the same case, plaintiff could be encouraged
to settle for a lesser amount with the defendant
who is 60 at fault (if he has some ability to
pay), and recover from the less culpable
defendant all damages up to 70 - not recovered
from the defendant who settles such an
application of the rule to settlements unfairly
pressures the less culpable defendant to offer a
settlement in excess of his real share of
liability - The rule as announced is based on the equities
which exist in cases involving truly innocent
plaintiffs and does not include a true
consideration of cases involving plaintiffs who
are, in fact, at fault
10Notes and commentary on the rule
- Some jurisdictions describe the rule as one of
comparative contribution, rather than comparative
indemnity, suggesting the apportionment of fault
principle - In some jurisdictions, a defendant may be subject
to liability for the share of plaintiffs damages
attributable to another defendant, only if that
defendant is unable to pay damages - California, by statute and other jurisdictions
have modified the instant case to apply the
rule to allow for joint and several liability
only for economic damages (e.g., lost income,
medical expenses), and not to non-economic
damages (e.g., pain suffering, loss of
consortium) - In some jurisdictions, plaintiff is obliged to
join any and all defendants who are responsible
for his injury in such jurisdictions,
plaintiffs damages may ultimately be reduced by
any amount attributable to a defendant who is not
joined - Restatement of Torts (Third), Apportionment of
Liability endorses a principle of comparative
contribution, even in intentional tort cases - - See R.3d, Apportionment of Liability,
Section 1, Comment C
11The policy debate
- The continued evolution of the principle of joint
and several liability in the post-Li era is
influenced by the competing questions whether the
rule - Is necessary to provide full and fair recovery to
persons injured as a result of the negligence of
others, or - Unfairly supports the disproportionate liability
of so-called deep pocket defendants