BotMiner: Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic for Protocol- and Structure-Independent Botnet Detection - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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BotMiner: Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic for Protocol- and Structure-Independent Botnet Detection

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Title: BotMiner: Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic for Protocol- and Structure-Independent Botnet Detection


1
BotMiner Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic
for Protocol- and Structure-Independent Botnet
Detection
  • Presented by D Callahan

2
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Botnet problem
  • Challenges for botnet detection
  • Related work
  • BotMiner
  • Motivation
  • Design
  • Evaluation
  • Conclusion

3
What Is a Bot/Botnet?
  • Bot A malware instance that runs autonomously
    and automatically on a compromised computer
    (zombie) without owners consent
  • Profit-driven, professionally written, widely
    propagated
  • Botnet (Bot Army) network of bots controlled
    by criminals- A coordinated group of malware
    instances that are controlled by a botmaster via
    some CC channel
  • Architecture centralized (e.g., IRC,HTTP),
    distributed (e.g., P2P)
  • 25 of Internet PCs are part of a botnet! (
    - Vint Cerf)

4
Botnets are used for
  • All DDoS attacks
  • Spam
  • Click fraud
  • Information theft
  • Phishing attacks
  • Distributing other malware, e.g., spyware

5
How big is the Bot Problem?
  • Computers were used for fun, now they are
    platforms
  • Current top computing platforms
  • http//www.top500.org/list/2008/11/100
  • Storm worm-1-50 million computers infected
  • -Massive computing power
  • -Incredible bandwidth distributed world wide
  • -Is the storm over?

6
Conflicker according to McAfee
  • When executed, the worm copies itself using a
    random name to the Sysdir folder.
  • obtains the public ip address of the affected
    computer.
  • Attempts to download a malware file from the
    remote website
  • Starts a HTTP server on a random port on the
    infected machine to host a copy of the worm.
  • Continuously scans the subnet of the infected
    host for vulnerable machines and executes the
    exploit.

7
Challenges for Botnet Detection
  • Bots are stealthy on the infected machines
  • We focus on a network-based solution
  • Bot infection is usually a multi-faceted and
    multi-phased process
  • Only looking at one specific aspect likely to
    fail
  • Bots are dynamically evolving
  • Static and signature-based approaches may not
    be effective
  • Botnets can have very flexible design of CC
    channels
  • A solution very specific to a botnet instance
    is not desirable

8
Existing Techniques
  • Traditional Anti Virus tools
  • Bots use packer, rootkit, frequent updating to
    easily defeat Anti Virus tools
  • Traditional IDS/IPS
  • Look at only specific aspect
  • Do not have a big picture
  • Honeypot
  • Not a good botnet detection tool

9
Related Work
  • Binkley,Singh 2006 IRC-based bot detection
    combine IRC statistics and TCP work weight
  • Rishi Goebel, Holz 2007 signature-based IRC
    botnickname detection
  • Livadas et al. 2006, Karasaridis et al. 2007
    (BBN, ATT) network flow level detection of IRC
    botnets (IRCbotnet)
  • BotHunter Gu etal Security07 dialog
    correlation to detect bots based on an infection
    dialog model
  • BotSniffer Gu etal NDSS08 spatial-temporal
    correlation to detect centralized botnet CC
  • TAMD Yen, Reiter 2008 traffic aggregation to
    detect botnets that use a centralized CC
    structure

10
Motivation
  • Botnets can change their CC content (encryption,
    etc.), protocols (IRC, HTTP, etc.), structures
    (P2P, etc.), CC servers, infection models

11
Botnet again
  • A coordinated group of malware instances that
    are controlled by a botmaster via some CC
    channel
  • We need to monitor two planes
  • C-plane (CC communication plane) who is
    talking to whom
  • A-plane (malicious activity plane) who is
    doing what

12
Botminer Framework
13
C-Plane clustering
What characterizes a communication flow (C-flow)
between a local host and a remote service?
ltprotocol, srcIP, dstIP, dstPortgt
14
  • Temporal related statistical distribution
    information in
  • BPS (bytes per second)
  • FPH (flow per hour)
  • Spatial related statistical distribution
    information in
  • BPP (bytes per packet)
  • PPF (packet per flow)

15
Two-step Clustering of C-flows
  • Why multi-step?
  • Coarse-grained clustering
  • Using reduced feature space mean and
  • variance of the distribution of FPH, PPF, BPP,
    BPS for each C-flow (248)
  • Efficient clustering algorithm X-means
  • Fine-grained clustering
  • Using full feature space (13452)
  • Whats left?

16
A-plane Clustering
  • Capture activities in what kind of patterns

17
Cross-plane Correlation
  • Botnet score s(h) for every host h
  • Similarity score between host hi and hj
  • Hierarchical clustering
  • Two hosts in the same A-clusters and
  • in at least one common C-cluster are
  • clustered together

18
Results
19
False Positive Clusters
20
Botnet detection
21
Overview
22
Conclusion
  • Botminer
  • - New botnet detection system based on
    Horizontal correlation
  • - Independent of botnet CC protocol and
    structure
  • -Real-world evaluation shows promising results
  • -while it is possible to avoid detection of
    BotMiner the efficiency and convenience of the
    BotNet will also suffer
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