Week 7.1 Policy Transfer, Policy Learning, Policy Convergence, Policy Diffusion.

1
Week 7.1 Policy Transfer, Policy Learning,
Policy Convergence, Policy Diffusion.

2
Summary of previous lectures

• Biggest constraint on change is existing policy
  and power relations underpinning policy agreement
  
• Policy problems are produced/ framed, not
  selected
• Policy may be incremental with long periods of
  stability
• Comprehensive rationality assumption of central
  actor undermined by MLG discussion
• But potential for short bursts of intense
  policy attention and change.

3
What is Policy Transfer?

• Refers to the evidence for - and causes of -
  similarities in policy across regions.
• Can policy change be explained by a rational
  process of policy learning across states?
• Under what conditions?
• Or is the process inseparable from the wider
  political process?

4
What Is It? Convergence

• Starting point is evidence of similarities across
  countries policy goals, content, instruments,
  outcomes and/ or styles.
• It could mean independent problem solving based
  on parallel domestic pressures
• But Bennet suggests not calling this
  convergence
• Term suggests moving towards similarity

5
Policy Learning (Rose)

• Lesson-drawing across time (i.e. own experience)
  then bigger focus across space (other regions)
• Extent of learning varies
• Negative lessons also learned
• E.g. BSE countries learned from UKs mistakes

6
Policy Transfer

• Umbrella term with overarching definition the
  process by which knowledge about policies,
  administrative arrangements, institutions and
  ideas in one political system (past or present)
  is used in the development of policies,
  administrative arrangements, institutions and
  ideas in another political system (Dolowitz and
  Marsh)
• Learning is one type of transfer (voluntary)

7
Policy Diffusion

• Suggests more passive process?
• Refers to similar adoptions of policy without
  evidence of emulation? (link)
• Associated with analysis of US states
• Note that a precise definition of all 4 is
  elusive.
• Differences may not be significant (bar e.g.
  learning as a voluntary subset of transfer)

8
Who Does It?

• Usual Suspects within political systems -
  elected officials, political parties,
  bureaucrats/ civil servants, pressure groups,
  etc.
• Policy entrepreneurs consultants/ experts
  selling best practice (often inappropriately),
  NGOs, international policy communities and
  professionalisation
• Supra-national institutions EU, OECD, World
  Bank, UN. Note that national governments can
  perform this role with devolved authorities.
• Note importance of exporting (e.g. US) and
  importing regions (e.g. UK) although this can
  change (also NB within UK)

9
Why Transfer - Is it Voluntary?

• Remember the broader questions within political
  systems why change policy? Who decides? Who
  influences?
• These questions traditionally from within
• Additional discussion of the role of (external or
  internal) coercion
• Dolowitz and Marsh continuum of transfer

10

• Voluntary transfer following dissatisfaction
  with policy or a natural tendency to look abroad.
  
• A rational process?
• Note that transfer search can be used to
  legitimise existing policy.
• Direct Coercive transfer borrowing country
  influenced (effectively forced?) to adopt a
  policy.
• Role of World Bank in developing countries, but
  also EU in Europe. Influence of MNCs on
  regulations.
• Indirect Coercive transfer voluntary but driven
  by perceived need for region B to change policy
  because
• Region A is an important market for exports,
• They have a close working relationship,
• There is a need to keep up.
• Region As policies may also cause externalities
  a factor for Canada (US) and Wales (England).

11
Policy Transfer Continuum
12
Discussion of continuum

• Transfer may contain voluntary and coercive
  elements (implementation/ discretion?)
• Perceived need varies and is subject to internal
  political processes
• Appearance of coercion may help governments
  introduce unpopular policies

13
What is Transferred?

• Policy goals, structure and content
• Policy instruments or administrative techniques
  Institutions
• Ideology Attitudes Ideas
• Negative Lessons?
• Note that policies can be transferred even if
  ideology is different (e.g. Patient choice)
• Does it matter if the same policy outcomes are
  caused by different processes? (e.g. UK tobacco)

14
Degrees of Transfer - Rose

• Complete duplication only possible if similar
  starting points within countries (e.g. US states)
• Adaptation taking different laws/
  administration into account (NB cut-and-paste/
  Scottish example)
• Making a hybrid from borrowing and lending
  countries
• Synthesis of one or more programmes (eg new
  countries and electoral systems)
• Broad inspiration
• Repackaging?

15
Bear in mind

• Loose boundaries between categories
• All elements can be contained in one policy area
• Single transfer or over period of years
• Note extent of change regardless of transfer.
  Effect of transfer is total minus that which
  would have happened? E.g. if looking for
  practical help rather than solution.

16
From Where Are Lessons Drawn?

• Learning from the past in ones own region, then
  others
• Lessons likely to be drawn from other regions if
  there are shared policy conditions (particularly
  economic conditions)
• On geographical grounds (although proximity
  subject to choice and technological advance?)
• If there is a shared ideology (although remember
  Wales)

17
Attempt of and success of transfer affected by
range of factors

• If the policy is unique or based on inimitable
  conditions/ organisations
• Political structures e.g. note assumption of
  federal welfare policy that state/ local levels
  will supplement action
• Resources to implement (and capacity e.g.
  private sector)
• Simplicity of policy with clear cause/effect
• Knowledge gathered of policy and likely outcomes
• Interdependence (Wales Scotland and fur)
• When ideology/ values of importer/ exporter
  coincide
• Note links to rationality, incrementalism and
  implementation studies

18
Policy Transfer and Failure

• Discussion of implementation and policy failure
  qualifies idea of coercion e.g. with the EU
  there is discretion to implement directives.
  There is power to coerce national governments but
  how far down the line does this extend? (e.g. of
  WTD and doctors)
• Dolowitz and Marsh discuss failure in a different
  sense with 3 (non mutually exclusive) aspects
  (example of CSA). Note the links to rationality
  and implementation

19

• Uninformed transfer the borrowing country has
  incomplete information on key elements of success
  in lending country (e.g. the length of time to
  phase in policy the role of the courts in
  pressure release and ensuring discretion)
• Incomplete transfer when those key elements are
  not transferred
• Inappropriate transfer when not enough
  attention is paid to adaptation and/ or the
  original policy aims of the exporter e.g.
  addressing those in arrears rather than focussing
  on those who could afford to pay (to reduce PSBR)

20
Summary of previous lectures

• Biggest constraint on change is existing policy
  and power relations underpinning policy agreement
  
• Policy problems are produced/ framed, not
  selected
• Policy may be incremental with long periods of
  stability
• Comprehensive rationality assumption of central
  actor undermined by MLG discussion
• But potential for short bursts of intense
  policy attention and change.

21
Agenda-setting links to Transfer

• Important to look at source for new ideas, but
  these are subject to the same processes as any
  other policy
• Lessons are not just there they are subject
  to framing when reported (e.g. success of smoking
  ban in Ireland?).
• The focus of lessons (e.g. which countries are
  worthy of the effort?) is subject to competition/
  selection
• The pressure to learn will depend on the position
  of an issue on the policy agenda

22
Incrementalism links to Transfer

• Incrementalism focus of learning restricted to
  most similar regions? Other searches unrealistic
  given scope for radical change.
• Governments learn from own mistakes and make
  small adjustments. Outside searches are
  therefore not automatic
• Level of path dependence in transfer (e.g. Japan
  studied police in Germany after importing law and
  local government)

23
MLG links

• Adoption of policy in one level dependent on
  cooperation with another?
• Does harmonisation take place at central
  government level or sub-sectoral policy community
  level based on expertise?
• Example of harmonisation of clinical methods
  fostered by clinical links? (Although note role
  of e.g. Nice)
• Devolution makes measurement of transfer tricky
  potential to vary by policy area and level of
  government

24
Punctuated equilibrium links

• Lessons from elsewhere may be a powerful tool to
  challenge existing policy monopolies
• MLG link if case unsuccessful at one level of
  government it can be pursued at higher level and
  then transferred

25
Issues with transfer literature

• Can we distinguish these issues from broader
  literature?
• Definition of transfer/ lesson drawing is so
  broad is it measurable?
• How is transfer demonstrated?
• Can we explain transfer without the transfer
  literature?

26
Confusion of rational and voluntary?

• Dolowitz and Marshs Why Transfer continuum
  conflates 2 discussions of policy change
• Policy transfer can be entirely voluntary but not
  rational
• Note example of WFTC in notes (outdated
  information)
• Bounded rationality does not necessarily suggest
  coercion
• Note that DM use it to mean a perceived need to
  e.g. keep up. Maybe this means pressure for
  change and less time to learn?
• Surely this is different type of coercion than
  exerted by e.g. World Bank?

27
Who is coerced?

• E.g. imagine 2 advocacy coalitions one
  voluntary approach to tobacco, one public health
• Public health replaces voluntary as dominant
  coalition and successfully achieves policy change
• Is the government coerced? Surely depends on
  which coalition key decision-makers were part of?
  Or did they act as a referee selecting policy on
  basis of new evidence?
• Are we talking about coercion in terms of needing
  to address an issue/ make a decision rather than
  the decision itself?

28
Final note value of transfer?

• Context for domestic decision-making
• Challenges temptation to view policy change only
  in domestic context
• Key question in any policy discussion was
  transfer involved?