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Sustainability Comes to Equity Compensation

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Title: Sustainability Comes to Equity Compensation


1
Sustainability Comes to Equity Compensation
  • Athanasia Karananou, Investor Engagements, United
    NationsPrinciples of Responsible Investing
    Initiative (UK)
  • Fred Whittlesey, Principal Consultant,
    Compensation Venture Group, SPCA Certified B
    Corporation (US)
  • Brit Wittman, Director, Executive and Equity
    CompensationIntel Corporation (US)

2
Discussion Topics
  • What is sustainability?
  • The global movement
  • Executive compensation meets ESG
  • Equity compensation and stakeholders
  • The United Nations PRI
  • Intels Compensation Programs
  • Conscious Compensation in startups

3
What is Sustainability?
4
What is Sustainability?
  • Conscious Capitalism
  • ESG (environment, social, governance)
  • CSR (corporate social responsibility)
  • Responsible Investing
  • Social Impact
  • Triple Bottom Line

5
Is Anyone Taking This Seriously?
  • You know about ISS
  • What about ISS SRI?
  • You know about the FASB
  • What about the SASB?
  • You know about ISSs EPSC
  • What about GIIRS?
  • RobecoSAM Sustainability?
  • Dow Jones Sustainability Index?

6
Is Anyone Taking This Seriously?
  • socially responsible investors have dual
    objectives financial and social. Socially
    responsible investors invest for economic gain,
    as do all investors, but they also require that
    the companies in which they invest conduct their
    business in a socially and environmentally
    responsible manner.
  • In voting their shares, socially responsible
    institutional shareholders are concerned not only
    with sustainable economic returns to shareholders
    and good corporate governance but also with the
    ethical behavior of corporations and the social
    and environmental impact of their actions.
  • Generally, we take as our frame of reference
    policies that have been developed by groups such
    as the Interfaith Center on Corporate
    Responsibility, the General Board of Pension and
    Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church,
    Domini Social Investments, and other leading
    church shareholders and socially responsible
    mutual fund companies. Additionally, we
    incorporate the active ownership and investment
    philosophies of leading globally recognized
    initiatives such as the United Nations
    Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP
    FI), the United Nations Principles for
    Responsible Investment (UNPRI), the United
    Nations Global Compact, and environmental and
    social European Union Directives.
  • Source Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
    2015 SRI Proxy Voting Guidelines

7
Is Anyone Taking This Seriously?
  • Socially responsible shareholder resolutions are
    receiving a great deal more attention from
    institutional shareholders today than in the
    past. In addition to moral and ethical
    considerations intrinsic to many of these
    proposals, there is a growing recognition of
    their potential impact on the economic
    performance of the company. Among the reasons for
    this change are
  • The number and variety of shareholder resolutions
    on social and environmental issues has increased
  • Many of the sponsors and supporters of these
    resolutions are large institutional shareholders
    with significant holdings, and therefore, greater
    direct influence on the outcomes
  • The proposals are more sophisticated better
    written, more focused, and more sensitive to the
    feasibility of implementation
  • Investors now understand that a companys
    response to social and environmental issues can
    have serious economic consequences for the
    company and its shareholders.
  • Source Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
    2015 SRI Proxy Voting Guidelines

8
The PRI at a glance
  • Launched in April 2006 at the NYSE, the
    Principles for Responsible Investment has

9
The PRI The six principles
10
This is about being a better investor
Performance not philanthropy
risk managementnot breach of fiduciary duty
The high-sustainability companies dramatically
outperformed the low-sustainability ones in terms
of both stock market and accounting
measures Harvard Business School
As we note above, the links between ESG factors
and financial performance are increasingly being
recognised. On that basis, integrating ESG
considerations into an investment analysis so as
to more reliably predict financial performance is
clearly permissible and is arguably required in
all jurisdictions. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
Returns not sacrifice
DIVERSE APPROACHESnot just excluding unethical
investments
There are positive, strongly statistically
returns associated with going long good corporate
governance firms and shorting those with poor
governance. Yale School of Management
We believe that ESG analysis should be built
into the investment processes of every serious
investor and into the corporate strategy of every
company that cares about shareholder
value. Deutsche Bank
11
An inevitable agenda gathering momentum
12
The Signatories
  • The current 1,359 signatories include
  • Asset owners
  • BP Pension Fund (UK)
  • BT Pension Scheme (UK)
  • Harvard University Endowment (US)
  • Marks Spencer Pension Scheme (UK)
  • Pension Fund City of Zurich (CH)
  • Petros (BR)
  • Skandia (SW)
  • University of California (US)

13
The Signatories
  • The current 1,359 signatories include
  • Investment Managers
  • ABN AMRO Bank NV (NL)
  • Allianz Global Investors (DE)
  • BayernInvest Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH
    (DE)
  • BNP Paribas Investment Partners (FR)
  • ING Investment Management (NL)
  • JP Morgan Asset Management (US)
  • The Vanguard Group (US)
  • UBS Global Asset Management (UK)

14
The Signatories
  • The current 1,359 signatories include
  • Professional Service Partners
  • Aon Hewitt (UK)
  • Bloomberg LP (US)
  • Glass, Lewis, Co LLC (US)
  • GMI Ratings (US)
  • Institutional Shareholder Services-ISS (US)
  • McGraw Hill Financial (US)
  • Mercer Investments (CA)
  • MSCI (US)
  • Thomson Reuters (US)
  • Towers Watson (US)

15
How the PRI supports signatories
16
Investor engagements collaborative investor
initiatives
17
Should ESG issues be linked to pay?
  • Opportunities
  • Aligning pay and long-term strategy sustained
    shareholder value
  • Long-term thinking is rewarded
  • ESG value drivers risks new business
    opportunities cost savings
  • Challenges
  • Lack of universal standards for companies and
    consultants
  • Risk of creating perverse incentives vs. holistic
    approach
  • Different performance metrics to compete
    complexity

18
PRI initiative Integration of ESG issues into
executive pay
  • Recommendations for companies
  • Adopt a clear process for identifying appropriate
    ESG metrics to be linked to pay
  • Link these appropriate ESG metrics to reward
    systems in a way that they form a meaningful
    component of the overall remuneration framework
  • Endeavour to clearly and concisely disclose the
    rationale, method and challenges presented by the
    incorporation of ESG metrics into executive pay

PRI Guidance to help investors engage in dialogue
with companies on how to integrate ESG issues
into executive pay in a meaningful way (2012)
19
Executive compensation meets ESG
  • Review of 84 companies in utilities and
    extractives

20
Executive compensation meets ESG
  • Investors also asked
  • What is the proportion of incentives awarded for
    ESG performance?
  • Approx. 10
  • In determining payouts, are factors considered
    retrospectively or are they preset at the
    beginning of the performance cycle?
  • Fewer than half of executive pay plans are based
    on pre-set targets
  • Are ESG factors incorporated into the measurement
    of corporate goals and/or individual objectives?
  • Far more likely to be measured relative to
    corporate-level targets
  • Are ESG factors a precondition for a portion of
    the incentive award to vest? Can ESG factors
    reduce awards otherwise earned? 
  • Yes, but rarely

21
Executive compensation meets ESG
  • Type of ESG issues linked to pay by sector

22
Executive compensation meets ESG
  • Are companies linking the right issues?
  • Safety was by far the most prevalent ESG factor
  • Safety is a key issue for the industry. However,
    no other ESG factor was employed by almost half
    of companies reviewed. Is there excessive focus
    on just one issue?
  • Climate (i.e. carbon emissions) was the least
    prevalent ESG factor
  • This was despite many references to climate
    related issues as a material risk by the
    companies own sustainability reporting. Is there
    a disconnect between companies own reporting and
    selecting appropriate issues to link to pay?
  • Approximately 30 use integrated ESG metrics
  • While the use of integrated ESG scorecard factors
    addresses a broad range of ESG performance in
    some cases, these factors typically lack
    transparency, specificity, or disclosed
    performance metrics, thereby diluting their
    incentive value

23
Executive compensation meets ESG
  • What will investors be asking going forward?
  • Investors will be encouraging companies that do
    not incorporate ESG issues into executive pay to
    consider doing so, or explain why not appropriate
  • For companies that do incorporate ESG factors,
    investors will expect disclosure of clear
    targets, performance against targets and link to
    pay-outs, as well as discussion of material
    issues and progress towards goals
  • Given the long-term nature of ESG issues,
    investors will be inviting more companies to
    incorporate ESG factors into LTIPs or even
    moving away from traditional structures but
    ensuring an appropriate long-term time horizon
  • Investors will also expect any discretionary
    power of the compensation committee to be applied
    for downward adjustments to account for unusual
    events or unintended consequences, and that
    awards are subject to claw-back provisions

24
Executive Compensation Meets ESG
  • Not a new issue Equity Residential 2011
    shareholder proposal (3.7 yes)
  • RESOLVED That the shareholders of Equity
    Residential (Equity or Company) request the
    Boards Compensation Committee, when setting
    senior executive compensation, include
    sustainability as one of the performance measures
    for senior executives under the Companys annual
    and/or long-term incentive plans. Sustainability
    is defined as how environmental, social and
    financial considerations are integrated into
    corporate strategy over the long term.
  •  
  • British utility company National Grid announced
    last year it would partly base executive
    compensation on meeting targets for reducing
    carbon emissions. In addition, Xcel Energy in its
    2009 proxy statement discloses that certain
    annual incentive payments are dependent on green
    house gas emission reductions alongside the
    weight given to meeting earnings per share
    targets. Also, Intel Corporation calculates every
    employees annual bonus based on the firms
    performance on measures that include energy
    efficiency, completion of renewable energy and
    clean energy projects, and the companys
    reputation for environmental leadership.

25
Executive Pay and Shareholders
  • How do companies protect shareholders through
    executive pay design?
  • Burn rate/value transfer limitation
  • Vesting schedules
  • Performance conditions
  • Stock ownership guidelines
  • Clawbacks

26
Equity Compensation and Stakeholders
  • Long history of shareholder-focused
    concernsassuming these affect shareholder value
  • Dilution
  • Executive pay
  • Board independence
  • Share plan design

27
Equity Compensation and Stakeholders
28
Intels Compensation Programs
  • Annual Cash Incentive all employees (currently
    107k) participate in program
  • Payout is based half on financial metrics and
    half on operational metrics
  • Operational metrics change annually but have/do
    include
  • Environmental/sustainability goals (energy
    consumption carbon-footprint reduction
    recycling)
  • Conflict-free sourcing
  • Employee population diversity and inclusion

29
Intels Compensation Programs
  • Stock Program Summary Employee Perspective
  • Virtually all (98) employees participate
    annually
  • For Exec Population (top 350) equity is
  • 60 performance-based RSUs rTSR to basket of 15
    high-performing peers 3-year cycle more
    leverage up than down (but w/threshold max)
  • 40 time-based RSUs quarterly vesting over 3
    years
  • This population also has holding requirements
    (total share, not per grant)
  • Broad-based population equity is exclusively
    time-based RSUs, vesting annually over 4 years
  • Additionally, Intel has a Qualified Stock
    Purchase Plan with high participation worldwide

30
Intels Compensation Programs
  • Stock Program Summary Stockholder perspective
  • Annual dilution commitment of lt2 currently
    running closer to 1
  • Return to shareholders every 2 years for
    authorization approval

31
Conscious Compensation in Startups
  • Linked to concepts of Conscious Capitalism
  • Parallel thinking with strategy for investors,
    customers, suppliers, governance, and staffing
  • Contrary to the legacy startup model of pay

32
How Would Sustainable Equity Look?
  • All-employee participation
  • Dynamic dilution measurement, not burn
  • An equity grant size ratio (vs. CEO)
  • Longer vesting schedules
  • Required holding periods
  • ESG performance measures for all
  • Other ideas?

33
Contact Information
  • Athanasia KarananouUnited NationsPrinciples for
    Responsible Investmentathanasia.karananou_at_unpri.o
    rg
  • Fred WhittleseyCompensation Venture Group,
    SPCfred_at_compensationventuregroup.com
  • Brit WittmanIntel Corporationbrit.wittman_at_intel.
    com
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