Title: Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Process Calculus for Security Protocol Analysis
1Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Process Calculus
for Security Protocol Analysis
- John Mitchell
- Stanford University
- P. Lincoln, M. Mitchell,
- A. Ramanathan, A. Scedrov, V. Teague
2Outline
- Some discussion of protocols
- Goals for process calculus
- Specific process calculus
- Probabilistic semantics
- Complexity probabilistic poly time
- Asymptotic equivalence
- Pseudo-random number generators
- Equational properties and challenges
3Protocol Security
- Cryptographic Protocol
- Program distributed over network
- Use cryptography to achieve goal
- Attacker
- Intercept, replace, remember messages
- Guess random numbers, do computation
- Correctness
- Attacker cannot learn protected secret or cause
incorrect protocol completion
4IKE subprotocol from IPSEC
- A, (ga mod p)
- B, (gb mod p)
, signB(m1,m2) signA(m1,m2)
A
B
Result A and B share secret gab mod p Analysis
involves probability, modular exponentiation,
digital signatures, communication networks,
5Simpler Challenge-Response
- Alice wants to know Bob is listening
- Send fresh number n, Bob returns f(n)
- Use encryption to avoid forgery
- Protocol
- Alice ?? Bob nonce K
- Bob ?? Alice nonce 5 K
- Can Alice be sure that
- Message is from Bob?
- Message is in response to one Alice sent?
6Important Modeling Decisions
- How powerful is the adversary?
- Simple replay of previous messages
- Decompose, reassemble and resend
- Statistical analysis, timing attacks, ...
- How much detail in model of crypto?
- Assume perfect cryptography
- Include algebraic properties
- encr(xy) encr(x) encr(y) for
- RSA encrypt(k,msg) msgk mod N
7Standard analysis methods
- Finite-state analysis
- Logic based models
- Symbolic search of protocol runs
- Proofs of correctness in formal logic
- Consider probability and complexity
- More realistic intruder model
- Interaction between protocol and cryptography
Easy
Hard
8Comparison
Hand proofs
?
?
High
Poly-time calculus
Spi-calculus
Athena
Paulson
?
Sophistication of attacks
?
?
?
NRL
?
Bolignano
BAN logic
?
Low
FDR
Murj
?
?
Low
High
Protocol complexity
9Outline
- Some discussion of protocols
- Goals for process calculus
- Specific process calculus
- Probabilistic semantics
- Complexity probabilistic poly time
- Asymptotic equivalence
- Pseudo-random number generators
- Equational properties and challenges
10Language Approach Abadi, Gordon
- Write protocol in process calculus
- Express security using observational equivalence
- Standard relation from programming language
theory - P ? Q iff for all contexts C , same
- observations about CP and CQ
- Context (environment) represents adversary
- Use proof rules for ? to prove security
- Protocol is secure if no adversary can
distinguish it from some idealized version of the
protocol - Great general idea application is complicated
11Probabilistic Poly-time Analysis
- Add probability, complexity
- Probabilistic polynomial-time process calc
- Protocols use probabilistic primitives
- Key generation, nonce, probabilistic encryption,
... - Adversary may be probabilistic
- Express protocol and spec in calculus
- Security using observational equivalence
- Use probabilistic form of process equivalence
12Secrecy for Challenge-Response
- Protocol P
- A ? B i K
- B ? A f(i) K
- Obviously secret protocol Q
- A ? B random_number K
- B ? A random_number K
- Analysis P ? Q reduces to crypto condition
related to non-malleability Dolev, Dwork,
Naor - Fails for RSA encryption if f(i) 2i
13Specification with Authentication
- Protocol P
- A ? B random i K
- B ? A f(i) K
- A ? B OK if f(i) received
- Obviously authenticating protocol Q
- A ? B random i K
- B ? A random j K i , j
- A ? B OK if private i, j match
public msgs
14Nondeterminism vs encryption
- Alice encrypts msg and sends to Bob
- A ? B msg K
- Adversary uses nondeterminism
- Process E0 c?0? c?0? c?0?
- Process E1 c?1? c?1? c?1?
- Process E
- c(b1).c(b2)...c(bn).decrypt(b1b2...bn, msg)
- In reality, at most 2-n chance to guess n-bit key
15Semantics
Nondeterministic Semantics
Prove initial results for arbitrary scheduler
16Methodology
- Define general system
- Process calculus
- Probabilistic semantics
- Asymptotic observational equivalence
- Apply to protocols
- Protocols have specific form
- Attacker is context of specific form
- Induces coarser observational equivalence
- This talk general calculus and properties
17Outline
- Some discussion of protocols
- Goals for process calculus
- Specific process calculus
- Probabilistic semantics
- Complexity probabilistic poly time
- Asymptotic equivalence
- Pseudo-random number generators
- Equational properties and challenges
18Technical Challenges
- Language for prob. poly-time functions
- Extend work of Cobham, Cook, Hofmann
- Replace nondeterminism with probability
- Otherwise adversary is too strong ...
- Define probabilistic equivalence
- Related to poly-time statistical tests ...
19Syntax
- Bounded ?-calculus with integer terms
- P 0
- cq(n) ?T? send up to q(n)
bits - cq(n) (x). P receive
- ?cq(n) . P private channel
- TT P test
- P P parallel
composition - ! q(n) . P bounded
replication
Terms may contain symbol n channel width and
replication bounded by poly in n
20Probabilistic Semantics
- Basic idea
- Alternate between terms and processes
- Probabilistic evaluation of terms (incl. rand)
- Probabilistic scheduling of parallel processes
- Two evaluation phases
- Outer term evaluation
- Evaluate all exposed terms, evaluate tests
- Communication
- Match send and receive
- Probabilistic if multiple send-receive pairs
21Scheduling
- Outer term evaluation
- Evaluate all exposed terms in parallel
- Multiply probabilities
- Communication
- E(P) set of eligible subprocesses
- S(P) set of schedulable pairs
- Prioritize private communication first
- Choose highest-priority communication with
uniform (or other) probability
22Example
- Process
- c?rand1? c(x).d?x1? d?2? d(y). e?x1?
- Outer evaluation
- c?1? c(x).d?x1? d?2? d(y). e?x1?
- c?2? c(x).d?x1? d?2? d(y). e?x1?
- Communication
- c?1? c(x).d?x1? d?2? d(y). e?x1?
Each prob ½
Choose according to probabilistic scheduler
23Example (again)
c?rand1? c(x).d?x1? d?2? d(y). e?x1?
Outer Eval
Each with prob 0.5
c?2? c(x).d?x1? d?2? d(y). e?x1?
c?1? c(x).d?x1? d?2? d(y). e?x1?
Comm Step
Choose according to probabilistic scheduler
24Complexity results
- Polynomial time
- For each process P, there is a poly q(x) such
that - For all n
- For all probabilistic schedulers
- All minimal evaluation contexts C
- eval of CP halts in time q(nC)
- Minimal evaluation context
- C c(x).d(y) c?20? d?7? e?492?
25Complexity Intuition
- Bound on number of communications
- Count total number of inputs, multiplying by
q(n) to account for ! q(n) . P - Bound on term evaluation
- Closed T evaluated in time qT(n)
- Bound on time for each comm step
- Example c?m? c(x).P ? m/xP
- Substitution bounded by orig length of P
- Size of number m is bounded
- Previous steps preserve occurr of x in P
26Outline
- Some discussion of protocols
- Application of process calculus
- Specific process calculus
- Probabilistic semantics
- Complexity probabilistic poly time
- Asymptotic equivalence
- Pseudo-random number generators
- Equational properties and challenges
27How to define process equivalence?
Problem
- Intuition
- Prob CP ? yes - Prob CQ ? yes lt
? - Difficulty
- How do we choose ??
- Less than 1/2, 1/4, ? (not equiv relation)
- Vanishingly small ? As a function of what?
- Solution
- Use security parameter
- Protocol is family Pn ngt0 indexed by key
length - Asymptotic form of process equivalence
28Probabilistic Observational Equiv
- Asymptotic equivalence within f
- Process, context families Pn ngt0 Qn ngt0
Cn ngt0 - P ?f Q if ? contexts C . ? obs v. ?n0 . ? ngt
n0 . - ProbCnPn ? v - ProbCnQn ?
v lt f(n) - Asymptotically polynomially indistinguishable
- P ? Q if P ?f Q for every polynomial f(n)
1/p(n) - Final defn gives robust equivalence
relation
29Outline
- Some discussion of protocols
- Application of process calculus
- Specific process calculus
- Probabilistic semantics
- Complexity probabilistic poly time
- Asymptotic equivalence
- Pseudo-random number generators
- Equational properties and challenges
30Compare with standard crypto
- Sequence generated from random seed
- Pn let b nk-bit sequence generated from n
random bits - in PUBLIC ?b? end
- Truly random sequence
- Qn let b sequence of nk random bits
- in PUBLIC ?b? end
- P is crypto strong pseudo-random generator
- P ? Q
- Equivalence is asymptotic in security parameter n
31Desired equivalences
- P (Q R) ? (P Q) R
- P Q ? Q P
- P 0 ? P
- P ? Q ? CP ? CQ
- P ? ? c. ( clt1gt c(x).P) x ?FV(P)
- Warning hard to get all of these
32How to establish equivalence
- Labeled transition system
- Allow process to send any output, read any input
- Label with numbers resembling probabilities
- Simulation relation
- Relation ? on processes
- If P Q and P P, then exists Q
- with Q Q and P Q
- Weak form of prob equivalence
- But enough to get started
33Hold for uniform scheduler
- P (Q R) ? (P Q) R
- P Q ? Q P
- P 0 ? P
- P ? Q ? CP ? CQ
34Problem
- Want this equivalence
- P ? ?c. ( clt1gt c(x).P) x ?FV(P)
- Fails for general calculus, general ?
- P d(x).eltxgt
- C ?d.( dlt1gt d(y).elt0gt )
35Comparison
?d.( dlt1gt d(y).elt0gt ?c. ( clt1gt c(x).P) )
left
clt1gt
?d.( dlt1gt d(y).elt0gt d(x).eltxgt )
P
right
clt1gt
left
right
left
elt0gt
elt0gt
elt1gt
elt0gt
elt1gt
Even prioritizing private channels, equivalence
fails
36Paradox
- Two processors connect by network
- Each does private actions
- Unrealistic interaction
- Private coin flip in Beijing does not influence
coin flip in Washington
37Solutions
- Modify scheduler
- Process private channels left-to-right
- Each channel random send-receive pair
- Restrict syntax of protocol, attack
- C P C ?c. ( clt1gt c(x).P)
- for all contexts C that
- do not share private channels
- do not bind channel names used in
Modification of scheduler more reasonable for
protocols
38Current State of Project
- Framework for protocol analysis
- Determine crypto requirements of protocols
- Precise definition of crypto primitives
- Probabilistic ptime language
- Process framework
- Replace nondeterminism with rand
- Equivalence based on ptime statistical tests
- Methods for establishing equivalence
- Develop probabilistic simulation technique
- Examples Diffie-Hellman, Bellare-Rogaway,
39Compositionality
- Property of observational equiv
- A ? B C ? D
- AC ? BD
- similarly for other process forms
40Zero-Knowledge Protocol
P
V
- Witness protection program
- Q(x) iff ? w. P(x,w)
- Prove ?? w. P(x,w) without revealing w
41Identify Friend or Foe
- Sequential
- One conversation at a time
- Concurrent
- Base station proves identity concurrently
M
V
A
Base
S
prover
verifiers
Are concurrent sessions still zero-k ?
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