The industrial gamma ray inspection: a global approach for a radiation protection issue

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The industrial gamma ray inspection a global
approach for a radiation protection issue

• Gonzague ABELA

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1 -  First descriptions of the gamma shooting

• An unknown nightly activity
• A  risky  activity
• Reliable materials

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A  simple  work it would be enough to follow
the good procedures
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2 The incidents analyse

• A strong media impact
• Different perception from the exposure levels
• Analyses focused on the operators

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3 - The discovery of a complex activity

• 3.1 Many stages

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Preparation Carrying out Feedback
- Knowledge of the site organisation - Work file Area plan, Work permit, Doses prediction - Link with other activities (insulation, scaffolding, brushing, shielding, drain circuits - Checking of the area -Take the camera out of the source storage Transportation on site Localization of the valve and location of the welding Information of the workers, supervision of the area Beaconing of the area Film installation Taking into account of the physical environment temperature, lighting, dose rate and accessibility Calculation of the exposure time and test radiography Monitoring of dosimetry Removing, .. Dosimetry ALARA
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The material necessary
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3.2 - Variabilities

• Preparation
• Variable Knowledge of NDT according to sites
• More or less detailed files an area plans
• Few or not detailed preliminary visits of the
  work area
• Preparation a more or less integrated stage, even
  very limited

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Variabilities

• Carrying out
• Implantation of the source storage
• Size of the exclusion area (negotiation,
  intrusion)
• Storage and transportation of the tooling
• Accessibility with the weldings
• Circuits full of water, positioning of the
  scaffolding, insulation removing.

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Variabilities

• Realization
• Alternations of waiting and of temporal pressure
  
• Material incidents
• Physical environments (dosimetry, contamination,
  lighting)
• Adjustment of the exposure times
• Incidents of development

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3.4 The difficulties

• The transport of the equipment
• Wearing of load
• Risks postures
• Night-work
• To fight against micro-phases of sleep
• The cost of vigilance
• Changes of rhythms

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4 - Another glance on incidents

•  Vigilance it is work  
• Multicausality of the accidents
• From lack of attention to lack of vigilance

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5 Area For Improvement Propositions

• Analyze accidents not to stick only at the
  individual level and the carelessness
• To limit the factors of degradation of vigilance
  to the levels
• Individual
• Organisational
• Technique

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Area For Improvement Propositions

• Organisation
• Inequalities of knowledge of trade NDT on the
  sites
• Unequal conditions of preparation
• Collectives of radiologists burst in perpetual
  recombining (which management by the companies?)
  
• Organisational insulation

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Area For Improvement Propositions

• Technique
• Redundancy of alarms
• The information given by the camera
• Revolutions counters
• Permanent locations of the weldings
• Means of fixing of the nozzles
• Means of handling and storage facilities
• Physical environments (lighting, dosimetry) the
  adaptation of the combinations (window, pockets
  etc.) Technique

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Area For Improvement Propositions

• Training
• Growing old Population
• Stabilization and transfer of know-how
• Setting in situation and taking into account of
  variabilities in the initial formations
• Places of training

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Area For Improvement Propositions

• Health and life with work
• a population "exposed" to difficult working
  conditions need for taking care of it
• An inventory of fixtures as regards health
  necessary
• Which taking into account of health in daily
• organisation of the companies
• The management of displacements and lodging
• Evaluation of the risks

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Area For Improvement Propositions

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A SFRP COFREND Working group

• Who ?
• Radiation Protection Specialists not only from
  NDT Cies, and Nuclear Industry (Oil industry, )
• Authority Body engineers
• NDT managers
• NDT operators
• Transport experts,
• 60 people

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A SFRP COFREND Working group

• What ?
• Applicable regulation
• Feedback experience from incidents, and its use
  http//relir.cepn.asso.fr/
• Technical training
• The material and associated equipments
• Dosimetry
• Help for a risk evaluation (Social,
  Oranisational, Human approaches)
• Self assesment guide
• Distribution of the responsabilities
• Transportation

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PRACTICE IN EDF storage

• Coordination is responsibility for the OPERATOR
• the source is put under the responsibility for
  the site

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PRACTICE IN EDF licence of gamma-ray inspection

• A licence of gamma-ray inspection identical on
  all the sites
• the description of the responsibilities is
  specified
• To aim at a licence of shooting to engage its
  responsibility

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PRACTICE IN EDF The "personal element"

• "engagements of the client of the site  
• 8 points to help the radiographer to prepare,
  perfom his job, and to support confidence to be
  able to identify and treat the variations

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PRACTICE IN EDF The plans of beaconing

• Standardized and filed plans of beaconing

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PRACTICE IN EDF The limitation of the zones of
beaconing

• The more reduced one zone of exclusion is, the
  more it is tight

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PRACTICE IN EDF The limitation of the zones of
beaconing
The european practices (EAN WG)
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PRACTICE IN EDF The sound alarm dosimeter
ALL the radiographers wear such dosimeter
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PRACTICE IN EDF The sentinel

• Put in the vicinity of the sources and camera
• Backgroud measurement
• Light switch on when the Dose Rate increases
• Light switch of when the Dose Rate decreases

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PRACTICE IN EDF a specific carriage
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PRACTICE IN EDF a specific beaconing
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Strong messages

• To take care of vigilance
• The risk of an organisational insulation
• A degradation of the working conditions of the
  radiologists

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