Levels,%20Reduction%20vs.%20emergence

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Levels,Reduction vs. emergence
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• Any science - theories at each of several levels
  because most complex systems observed -
  constructed in a hierarchy of levels
• Interaction between elements at any single level
  - described without specifying any but very
  general properties of the elements at the next
  level below, and without considering dynamics at
  the next level above.
• Ex - A car Mechanisms, Sub-mechanisms, quantum
  level (Herbet Simon 2007)

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• Levels
• Explanation of cognition in micro- (neural
  states) and macro-levels (mental phenomena)
• 2 types of interactions
• Intralevel (horizontal) interactions - components
  at same level
• Interlevel (vertical) interactions - the
  relationship between levels
• Levels ontological, organizational (mechanisms
  or systems), epistemological or description or
  analysis.

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• David Marr - Three Levels of Description
• Computational level
• - What information is computed and why
• What the system is capable of doing
• Deep Blue and Kasparov equivalent (Dawson 2007)
  
• Representation and algorithm (software)
• - What program is used
• What are the symbols, how are processed
• Deep Blue and Kasparov - different
• Hardware

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• Ex Linguistic understanding
• Task Identify syntax and meaning corresponding
  to speech sounds.
• Algorithm What kind of computation and
• mental representations?
• Implementation Which part of the brain?

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• Ontological levels - radical E
• Organizational levels modest E
• Levels of analysis - specific value E
• - Analytical levels partially depend upon
• viewing nature as organized into parts andwholes.
  (McCauley 07)

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• 3-levels versus more-levels
• Understanding cognition Understanding brain at
  different levels Levels of organization (Gordon
  Shepherd)
• Levels of the brain
• Whole brain
• Large systems and pathways in the brain (e.g.
  sensory pathways)
• Properties of specific centers local circuits
• properties of neurons (single cell recording)
• structures within neurons (dendrites/axons)
• Individual synapses molecular properties of
  membranes and ion channels (Dawson 2007)

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• Using principles of organization and scale,
  Churchland and Sejnowski 1992
• 7 sub-levels within neuroscience
• molecules
• synapses
• neurons
• networks
• maps
• sub-systems
• central nervous system overall

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• Ontologically different levels radical E ?
  Dualism Rejected ? Anomalies
• ?
• Humans Limited knowledge (McGinn 89)
• Distinction ontology-epistemology (levels of
  analysis and epistemic emergence - weak and
  strong)
• Organizational levels (related to layered view of
  nature)

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• Smolensky (88) - Connectionism
• 3 levels of analysis conceptual (symbolic,
  subconceptual, neuronal)
• Relationship between sub-symbolic-symbolic levels
  (similar to relationship between micro-macro)
• - Conceptual phenomena necessary conceptual
  (symbolic) level Macro-description of cognition
• - Sub-conceptual phenomena necessary
  sub-conceptual level micro-description of
• cognition

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• Mental Rs Processes Not supported by the
  same formal entities
• Nets - 2 levels
• 1) Formal, algorithmic specification of
  processing mechanisms
• 2) Semantic interpretation
• ? Must be done at 2 levels of description
  (Smolensky 1991)

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• 1 nivel Procesele mentale reprezentate de
  nivelul de descriere numerice a unit-lor,
  legat-lor, ecuatii de evolutie activarilor (NU
  interpretare semantica) (Smolensky)
• 2 nivel Activitati la nivel larg permit
  interpretari, dar patt-le astfel fixate nu sunt
  descrieri clare a procesarii
• Metrica semantica a sistemului impune o
  similaritate pt. continut acolo unde exista o
  similaritate pt. vehicul (patter-ri similare).
  (Clark)

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• Each hidden unit Microfeature
• MicrofeatureUnintelligible (interpretation
• depends upon its context other microf-s
  simultaneously present)
• A collection of microfeatures (number of
  different hidden units) can represent a concept
  that could be represented by a symbol in a
  symbolic model
• Symbolic account of a network is only an
  approximate account (Dawson 2007)

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• The Massive Redeployment Hypothesis
• (Horst 2007, p. 164)
• Localism - meta-analysis of over one hundred fMRI
  studies by Michael Anderson (forthcoming)
• Neural correlates of performance of some
  cognitive task and identified, through
  subtraction analysis, areas of brain that were
  differentially active during task

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• Authors Regions identified were memory
  regions, attention regions, depending on
  nature of task studied
• Anderson
• Most regions studied - utilized in multiple
  tasks, and indeed multiple types of tasks (e.g.,
  attention and memory)
• Most tasks involved multiple Brodmann areas (see
  Table 8.2).

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• ? Cognitive tasks not stand in a one-to-one
  relation with Brodmann areas, but in a
  many-to-many relationship (Figure 8.3).
• ? A massive redeployment of preexisting brain
  areas to obtain new functionality.
• Anderson Evolutionary history, brain areas
  redeployed (originally modular units)
• Evolution - a new strategy for acquiring new
  functionality Redeploying existing
  functionality in ensembles of neural areas
  working together (Not genetical mutations)

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• 2. Reduction (R) vs. Emergence (E)
• The history of E1 complicated, many
  interpretations2
• E Vertical relationships low-level high-level
  properties
• Reduction or emergence - what is reduced or
  emerge to what property or level
• 1 Kim Since around 1990, the idea of
  emergence has been making a big comeback, from
  decades of general neglect and disdain - analytic
  philosophy.
• 2 Kim Emergence is very much a term of
  philosophical trade it can pretty much mean
  whatever you want to mean

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• Reduction (R) (van Gulick 2001)
• Ontological R (objects, properties, events ...)
• elimination
• identity
• composition
• supervenience
• realization

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• Epistemological R (concepts, theories, models,
  frameworks)
• Replacement
• TheoreticalDerivational (Logical Empiricist)
• A priori Conceptual Necessitation
• Expressive Equivalence
• TeleoPragmatic Equivalence

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• Ernest Nagel 61/79 Logical empiricists
• Reduction of scientific theories whole sciences
• Logical derivation bridge principles
• Constraint (1) Derivability of reduced
• theory from reducing theory
• Constraint (2) Connectability
• Homogeneous R of a theory and heterogeneous
  reduction of a theory or a science

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• Wisatt (76)
• Intralevel relations Relations over time
  between successive theories in some science
• vs.
• Inter level relations Cross-scientific
  relations between theories that reign at the same
  time at different analytical levels in science
• ? Methodological ontological implications for
  theories and sciences contrast
• vs.
• Anti-R Multiple realizability irreducibility
  of conscious experience (McCauley 07)

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• van Gulick E Xs are more than just Ys and
  that Xs are something over and above Ys.
• E features - beyond the features of parts from
  which they emerge metaphysical E (it refers
  to the relation between real things) or
  epistemic E (cognitive explanatory relations
  about real world items). (van Gulick 2001)
• Ontological and epistemological E - people many
  times conflate them. (Silberstein and McGeever
  1999 OConnor and Wong 2002)

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• Some properties combinations of parts at same
  level.
• E properties - different from ? parts ? Novelty
• Crane novel properties of object- determinable
  properties whose determinates are not had by all
  of the objects parts.
• Ex Surface colour and wetness
• Or E properties of whole - supervenient
  properties of parts
• Such properties over and above" physical
  properties

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• 2.1 Ontological emergence
• (1) Specific value E Whole and parts - features
  of same kind, different specific subtypes/values
• (Ex A bronze statue molecular parts - common
  property Mass)
• (2) Modest kind E whole - features different in
  kind from those of its parts (Ex Color, life)
• (3) Radical kind E The whole - features
• Different in kind from parts
• Of kind whose nature and existence is not
  necessitated by the features of its pars
  macro-laws influence micro-laws/entities (van
  Gulick)

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• Ontological E - world Layered view of nature
• Ontologically emergent properties are not
  determined or reducible to basic properties.(ex.
  QM)
• Ontological E - Controversial

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• Strong E property High-level phenomenon arises
  from a low-level domain, but truths concerning
  that phenomenon - not deducible even in principle
  from truths in low-level domain. (Chalmers 2006)
  
• If strong E phenomena - Not deducible from laws
  of physics ? New laws of nature for
• consciousness
• Colorblind scientist zombies
• Consciousness - supervenes on neural states

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• Epistemological E
• Epistemic E - Incapacity explain/predict property
  of whole system in terms of its parts
• Property of whole - determined by properties of
  parts
• Epistemic E - Weak and strong E (Gulick)
• Property Epistemological E - determined
  to/deducible from intrinsic properties of
  fundamental entities that compose objects

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• Difficult to explain/predict such a property in
  terms of its fundamental constituents
• Epistemologically E properties - novel at level
  of description
• High-level phenomenon Weak E to low-level when
  that phenomenon is unexpected in accord with
  laws from low-level (Chalmers 2006)
• Unexpected - E properties - somehow deductible
  from low-level properties

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• Ex Game of life, connectionist networks,
  evolution (for intelligent creatures), high-level
  patterns CA.
• Weak E
• High-level properties of system are not of any of
  its parts
• Deductibility without reducibility

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• OConnor and Wong (2002)
• Predictive E properties Features of complex
  systems - not predicted despite knowledge of
  features laws of parts
• Irreducible-Pattern E properties laws
  Features of complex systems governed by true,
  lawlike generalizations within a special science
• Irreducible to fundamental physical theory for
  conceptual reasons
• Macroscopic patterns - Not captured in concepts
  laws physics

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• Stephan (2002, 1998) Weak, synchronic, and
  diachronic E
• Weak E Properties of system - E if they belong
  to the system as a whole, but not to the parts of
  that system ? Property reductionism
• System as a whole?parts organization
• Ex. Connect. nets self-organization and
  artificial intelligence

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• Diachronic E Novelty unpredictability of the
  system that evolves
• Difference weak-diachronic E Unpredictability
  of properties
• Difference diachronic-synchronic E
  Irreducibility of properties
• If one property/entity not existed before and
  suddenly comes into existence ? Diachronically new

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• Synchronic novelty is time independent
• These 2 irreducibilities ? Downward causation or
  epiphenomenalism
• Irreducible property
• Does not follow from the behavior of the systems
  parts that has this property
• Does not follow from the behavior of the systems
  parts in constellations simpler than the system
• Ex Qualia Synchronic E properties

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• Nonreductive physicalism (Davidson, 1970 Putnam,
  1972 1978 Fodor, 1974 Boyd, 1980 Searle,
  1992 Van Gulick, 1992) (in Gulick 2001)
• vs.
• Left (dualists - Chalmers, 1996 Hasker 1999) and
  right (reductive physicalists such as Kim, 1989)
• Fodor autonomy of the special sciences
• vs.
• Old unity of science view (Oppenheim and Putnam,
  1958) all true theories must ultimately be
  translatable into language of physics - rejected

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• CURRENT OPTIONS ON MIND/BODY PB.
• Reduction 10 versions (see Figure 3)
• Emergence 10 versions (see Figure 7)
• Other Options
• Mainstream Nonreductive physicalism
• More radical Fundamental Dualism
• - Property
• - Substance
• Pan (Proto-) Psychism
• Dual Aspect Monism (Spinoza, Strawson)
• Multi-Revolutions View (Penrose, McGinn)