PME Issues Globalised Security and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century Dr Michael Evans - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 43
About This Presentation
Title:

PME Issues Globalised Security and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century Dr Michael Evans

Description:

Title: European Cooperative Security: Is Europe experiencing a security dilemma? Author: Bree Larkham Last modified by: Dr Michael Evans Created Date – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:358
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 44
Provided by: Bree162
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: PME Issues Globalised Security and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century Dr Michael Evans


1
PME Issues Globalised Security and Military
Education and Training in the 21st CenturyDr
Michael Evans
2
US Hart-Rudman Commission New World Coming
  • Many of the fundamental assumptions that
    steered us through the chilly waters of the Cold
    War require rethinking. The very facts of
    military reality are changing, and that bears
    serious and concentrated reflection
  • New World Coming American Security in the
    21st Century (Phase 1 Report, 1999)

3
From Long Peace to Long War
  • In the 21st century there is a novel setting
    of diffusion and diversification of weapons of
    mass destruction, percolating global turbulence,
    and widespread fear of terrorism
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice Global
    Domination or Global Leadership (2004)

4
Challenging the Profession of Arms Old and
New in Globalised Security
  • Globalised strategic transition in new millennium
    transcends nation and region
  • PME and training challenges affect all militaries
  • Arrival of two world strategic universe means
    that countries must prepare for old
    (state-centric) and new (multi-centric)
    challenges

5
Two-Part Presentation
  • Part One examines main features of evolving
    globalised security environment
  • Part Two concentrates on implications of
    globalised security for PME and training
  • Part Two focus on three particular areas
    strategic art military jurisdiction and
    integrated skill-sets

6
  • Globalised Security and 21st Century Strategic
    Trends

7
Two Worlds ofWorld Politics
  • A bifurcated conflict environment
  • Two worlds of world politics (state-centric and
    multi-centric and their interaction)
  • Complexity created by imposition of multi-centric
    (non-state) on to state-centric (state-on-state)
  • Rapid compression and interconnectedness of
    change between the two worlds

8
A Non-Western View An Intertwined World
  • The international security issue has become
    increasingly diversified, traditional security
    factors and non-traditional ones have become
    intertwined
  • Jiefangjun Bao (Chinese PLA), February 2002

9
Globalisations Four Strategic Changes
  • From territoriality towards connectedness
  • Blurring of state-society, foreign-domestic
    policy distinctions
  • Rise of calculus of strategic risk-analysis
  • Blurring of near and far merging modes of
    conflict and rise of full-spectrum strategy

10
1. From Territoriality to Connectedness The New
Geography of National Security
  • Globalisation creates supra-territorial space
  • Rise of non-state (multi-centric) actors cuts old
    link between sovereignty and national security
  • Societal vulnerability because of permeable open
    societies
  • Lawrence Freedmans demilitarisation of
    inter-state relations and parallel trend towards
    non-state warfare

11
2. Risk The Rise of Strategic-Risk Analysis
  • Cold War an age of predictable threat
  • Globalised security era an age of unpredictable
    risk
  • Threat focuses on tangibles intentions and
    capabilities of conventional adversaries
  • Risk focuses on intangibles probabilities and
    consequences stemming from unconventional
    adversaries
  • Iraq 2003 a product of risk-analysis

12
Rumsfeld on Strategic Risk
  • There are known knowns there are things we know
    we know. We also know there are known unknowns
    that is to say we know there are some things we
    do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns
    the ones we dont know we dont know
  • Donald Rumsfeld, US Defense Secretary, February
    2002

13
The Anatomy of Risk
  • Risk-strategy concerned with rogue and failed
    states
  • In conventional threat analysis Afghanistan less
    a threat than Haiti
  • But Afghanistan a high-risk failed state
  • Risk-analysis focuses on consequences not
    capabilities from rogues to refugees to viruses
    to nuclear devices

14
Risks in A World Without Precedent
  • This world is without precedent. It is as
    different from the Cold War as it is from the
    Middle Ages. Tomorrows wars will not result from
    the ambitions of States but from their weaknesses
  • Philippe Delmas, The Rosy Future of War
    (1995)

15
3. Blurring of the Far and the Near National
Security Policy
  • Globalised security creates blurred distinctions
    between state and society and between foreign and
    domestic policies
  • Rise of cohesive national security policies to
    meet spectrum of threat and risk
  • Need for a mixture of expeditionary forces and
    homeland security to reconcile the far and the
    near

16
4. Need for Full-Spectrum Strategy
  • Globalised security blurs conventional and
    unconventional modes of conflict
  • Need for full-spectrum strategy
  • 2005 US National Defense Strategy traditional,
    irregular, catastrophic and disruptive categories
    of threat may intersect
  • Deadly cocktails possible (eg irregular Islamist
    jihad plus catastrophic WMD)

17
  • Globalised Security Implications for Military
    Education and Training

18
The Main Challenge Different Times, Different
Enemies
  • The enemies of yesterday were static,
    predictable, homogeneous, rigid, hierarchical,
    and resistant to change. The enemies of today are
    dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, fluid,
    networked, and constantly evolving
  • Brian Michael Jenkins, Redefining the
    Enemy, RAND Review (Spring 2004)

19
Cold War Legacy An Operational Approach to War
  • Cold War era marginalised military influence in
    strategy-formulation
  • Professional embrace of operational level of war
    and operational art
  • Accelerated by precision revolution after 1970s
  • Operational approach dominant in conduct of Iraq
    and Afghanistan wars

20
A Non-political Military Art?
  • The operational art appeals to armies it
    functions in a politics-free zone and it puts
    primacy on professional skills
  • Hew Strachan, Making Strategy
    Civil-Military Relations after Iraq, Survival
    (Autumn, 2006)

21
The Paradox of the Operational Level of War
  • Operational level often encourages cult of
    battlefield artisanship
  • Prefers aesthetic symmetry of similar enemy and
    focuses
  • Operational craftsmanship over strategic
    coherence
  • Lost victories of Iraq (1991 and 2003) and of
    Afghanistan (2002)

22
Coherence and Design The Need to Create
Strategic Artists
  • Military must improve knowledge of the strategic
    level of war
  • Need for commanders to concentrate on mastering
    strategic art in 21st century
  • Strategic art mastery of the principles of
    coherence, integration and unity of effort in
    relating military power to political purpose
  • Pressing need in PME for creating better
    strategic artists who concentrate upon control
    over victory in the pattern of conflict

23
PMEs Objective in the New Millennium
  • To produce a strategically-astute and
    operationally-expert officer who can function in
    both the counsels of state and on the joint,
    multinational and interagency battlespace of the
    21st century

24
Three Key PME Requirements
  • Rediscover strategy and improve conceptual
    understanding of relationship between policy,
    strategy and operations
  • Refine a realistic concept of military
    jurisdiction to enhance above
  • Create better integration of educational and
    training skill-sets to maximise professional
    mastery of war

25
1. Rediscovering Strategy Parameters of Policy,
Strategy and Operations
  • Among practitioners, politicians often conflate
    strategy with policy objectives (focusing on what
    the desired outcome should be, simply assuming
    that force will move the adversary towards it)
    while soldiers often conflate strategy with
    operations (focusing on how to destroy targets or
    defeat enemies tactically, assuming that positive
    military effects mean positive policy effects
  • Richard K. Betts, The Trouble with Strategy
    Bridging Policy and Operations, JFQ Winter
    2001-02

26
The Lost Meaning of
Strategy
  • Serves as a bridge between political objectives
    and military operations
  • But often neglected leading to failure to connect
    ends (objectives), ways (methods) and means
    (resources)
  • Example of Iraq in 2003 failure of systemic
    strategic design
  • Strategy must integrate policy and operations not
    separate them

27
Civil-Military Integration to Meet Conflict and
Confrontation
  • Cold War conflation of civilian policy with and
    military operations with strategy must change
  • Need for greater civil-military integration in
    age of two worlds of world politics
  • Rise of Rupert Smiths conflicts and
    confrontations over classical warfare

28
Civil-Military Separatism The Huntington Model
  • Classic exposition in Samuel P. Huntingtons The
    Soldier and the State (1957)
  • Study reflects Westphalian warfare strategy
    begins when diplomacy ends
  • Armies mobilised across territorial frontiers

29
Inadequacy of the Huntington CMR Model
  • Model no longer reflects interactive threat-risk
    conflicts of 21st century
  • Military force not autonomous but used in complex
    multinational and interagency frameworks
  • Major intellectual challenge for military
    professionals to bring greater coherence to
    strategy in order to improve link between
    politics and operations

30
Mastering Eliot Cohens Unequal Dialogue
  • Need for robust civil-military engagement
  • Clemenceau was right war is too serious to be
    left to generals
  • But corollary is without military involvement to
    shape strategy war will not be prosecuted
    effectively
  • In 21st century need for improved uniformed
    knowledge of strategy

31
Challenge of Teaching Strategy in PME
  • Guide should be intellectual pragmatism
  • Remember Dr Johnsons advice always temper the
    splendours of ornamental erudition with practical
    application
  • Need to create blend of strategic
    leader-theorist-practitioner and avoid
    Clausewitzs pretensions of false genius and
    fruitless scholarliness
  • Teaching should serve as primer for mental
    preparation of commanders mind

32
2. Refining Military Jurisdiction
  • Better strategic art linked to tailoring PME and
    training to realistic parameters of professional
    jurisdiction
  • Modern spectrum of conflict has expanded
    boundaries of professional jurisdiction
  • Huntingtons concept of the autonomous manager
    of violence and MacArthurs no artifice under
    the name of politics difficult to uphold

33
Jurisdiction during Kosovo
  • The old separations in time between the
    military and the political and between echelons
    of military command were no longer the same . . .
    What we discovered increasingly during Kosovo
    was that the political and strategic levels
    impinged on the operational and tactical levels .
    . . Sometimes even insignificant tactical events
    packed a huge political wallop. This is a key
    characteristic of modern war
  • General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War
    Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat (2001)

34
An Alchemical Blend of Multiple Archetypes
  • Military jurisdiction confronted not just by
    politics but by multiple civilian agencies
  • Includes journalists, aid workers, security
    contractors
  • Military professional at once anthropologist,
    police officer and diplomat and warfighter

35
Jurisdictional Boundaries and Warrior
Knowledgeof Strategy
  • Jurisdictional expansion must be tempered by the
    uniqueness of the profession of arms
  • Unique skills of warrior must not be diluted
  • One jurisdictional area that does require
    expansion improved knowledge of strategy

36
Future Operational-Strategic Preparation in JPME
  • Cold War PME formula of twenty year stairway
    process of PME
  • Globalised security conditions may expose
    officers to operational-strategic responsibility
    much earlier
  • Need to consider glide path model of PME
  • Need to construct continuum of PME knowledge by
    move from phased to continuous learning model
  • As much philosophy as program

37
3. Integrated Skill-Sets and Future Education,
Training
  • The ideal one trains for certainty one
    educates for uncertainty
  • But education and training are difficult to
    separate
  • Technical training an essential foundation of
    military expertise

38
Training and Education as Siamese Twins
  • Intertwining of training and education apparent
    even at strategic level of war
  • Training and education are to military profession
    what surgery and anatomy are to the medical
    profession
  • Symbiosis between the practical and the abstract
  • Educated strategic artist must first be a trained
    operational expert

39
Theory and Practice in Military Problem-Solving
  • Close linkage between education and training
    reflected in many contemporary military problems
  • Levels of war debate on networked battlespace
  • Future of the operational art
  • Reconciling indirect high-level command with
    direct low-level control

40
  • Conclusion

41
Ages of War
  • Every age has its own kind of war, its own
    limiting conditions, and its own peculiar
    preconceptions, its own theory of war
  • Carl von Clausewitz, On War

42
Future Military Effectiveness and PME
  • Cold War PME legacy of operational artistry and
    civil-military separatism in increasingly
    policy-operations inadequate
  • PME must give greater attention to conceptual
    integration of policy, strategy and operations
  • Overarching aim to merge the narrow 20th century
    operational artist into a broader 21st century
    strategic artist

43
QUESTIONS?

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com