Critically evaluate game theory as a method in analysing International environmental and/or natural resource agreements

1

1. Critically evaluate game theory as a method in
   analysing International environmental and/or
   natural resource agreements
2. Apply one of the methods presented during the
   lectures to some other environmental and/or
   resource problem
3. Discuss an international environmental or
   resource agreement of your choice
4. Discuss the main obstacles in achieving long-run
   international agreements

2

• Compute the symmetric 2-player and n player
  equilibrium in the first fisheries game. First
  solve 2-player game, then extend to n players.
  Compute equilibrium effort, stock and profit.
• Compute a 3-player asymmetric example for the
  first fisheries game. Analyse coalitional
  stability of this game.
• Compute a two-player Schäfer-Gordon model
  numerically for the non-cooperative, cooperative
  and the free-rider cases (one chooses the
  cooperative strategy and the other deviates using
  her best response). Parameters p1, q1, c10,
  K100, R0.6.
• a) Put the results in a fishers dilemma type of
  game matrix.
• b) What is the equilibrium in the game?

3

• 8. Show that increasing domestic taxes
  decreases domestic firm profits and increases
  foreign firm profits
• 9. Read the Finus 2007 article and discuss
  non-cooperative vs. cooperative membership
  models
• 10. Read the Munro article and discuss relevance
  of game theory to real-world policy-making in
  international fisheries