INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM (IBF) INTRODUCTION

1
INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM(IBF)INTRODUCTIO
N
2
Pre-IBF Background

• 1920-es first ITF-ISF coordination around ILO
  maritime meetings
• Up to late 1940-es relationship restricted to
  ILO business
• 1948 ITF FOC Campaign
• 1978 - ISF/ITF Understanding on wage rates for
  non-dom seafarers on national flag ships (under
  UK pay parity regime)
• 1990-es ITF-ISF consultations (inability to
  engage in pay negotiations no mandate to discuss
  wages on behalf of national federations some
  national owners associations without sufficient
  constitutional status decisions not compulsory
  upon members)
• 1993 ISFs London Committee for Asian Crews
  changes name to IMEC, focuses on ITF FOC
  standards
• 1994 IMEC involved in ITF negotiations in India
  and Philippines
• 1997 ISF rejects ITF pay increase and
  negotiations. IMEC takes over.
• 2000 ITF - IMEC Joint Negotiating Forum IMEC
  Model TCC Agreement
• (with the ITF Benchmark still set unilaterally
  by ITF)

3
Year 2003Expectations out of the new system
For the ITF
For the Employers

• Continuity of agreements
• Real counterpart
• in place of internal argument
• Compliance / enforcement
• New mechanisms to amicably settle with companies
• More vessels under ITF agreements
• Inspectors to concentrate on other targets
• Global scale
• New areas of cooperation / mutual interest

• Continuity of agreements
• Equal participation in discussion in place of
  take-it-or-leave-it offers
• Competitive benefits / advantage for members
• Recognition of training and other costs
• More members to join
• Mechanisms to amicably resolve problems with
  Inspectors / affiliates
• Global scale
• New areas of cooperation / mutual interest

4
Creation of the IBF May 2003, Yokohama

• Parties ITF and JNG (IMMAJ IMEC)

5
Parties to the IBF, as of 2013
International Bargaining Forum

ITF
JNG
IMEC
ITF maritime affiliates worldwide
ISEG (IMMAJEvergreen)
KSA
6
IBF Settlements (pay, contractual and
partnership issues)

• November 2003 (San Francisco)
• October 2005 (Tokyo)
• September 2007 (London)
• October 2009 (Manila)
• July 2011 (Miami)

Model Ship (Bag) methodology wages company
and union funding vertical horizontal
distribution parameters complex central-to-local
transformations
No pay negotiations DER (SEPF/SPF)
New methodology only wages and union funding
(part A) each specific local agreement
affected
7
Pay Outcomes

• 2003 - 8 on IBF Model Ship for two years 2004
  and 2005
• 2005 - 5 on Model Ship in 2006, plus further 5
  in 2007.
• Also extra 10 to ITF WFF in
  2006, plus additional 10 in 2007.
• 2007 - 8 on Model Ship for two years 2008 and
  2009.
• (Further extended throughout
  2010 and 2011)
• 2011 - 2 in 2012 2.5 in 2013 and 3 in 2014.
• Applicable only upon part "A" of
  the scale

Contractual amendments to terms and conditions
envisaged by
CBA Special Agreement and Employment Contract
Partnership all MOU issues, incl. ILO IMO
piracy, disputes,
training, welfare, manning agents, PI, joint
secretariats,
data exchange, administration and etc
8
OTHER FEATURES

• POSSIBILITY OF HIGHER REBATE FROM ITF WFF
• AS INCENTIVE TO ENROLL MORE VESSELS
• (total number of fleets to increase 2 in
  2012 2 in 2013 and 1 in 2014)
• MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR NEW JNG MEMBERS / NEW IBF
  AGREEMENTS
• INDEXATION OF COMPESATION LEVELS
• ALL CBAs SUBJECT TO APPROVAL
• JOINT CBA VETTING MECHANISM
• JOINT WARLIKE OPERATIONS AREAS COMMITTEE / SOS
  CAMPAIGN
• JOINT OPERATION OF TRAINING AND WELFARE FUNDS
• CONSTANT INTER-SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

9
Balancing between market and policy(ITFs
view, as example)
Benefits of having real counterparts guarantee
of implementation argument outside ITF Dangers
external market supply-and-demand rules

• What is artificial / excessive
• from employers point of view
• Ratings wages and compensations could be
• lower.
• Some CBA benefits beyond PI coverage.
• Wish to negotiate with labor supply only.
• Why pay beneficial unions and ITF?
• Why pay for DER needs?
• No need for MOUs,
• talk onboard conditions only

• What is insufficient
• from the ITF point of view
• Ratings wages slow increase
• No uniform benchmarks
• Officers beyond the ITFs scope
• CBA could be better
• MOU cooperation could be more

• Balanced outcome
• Ratings level maintained despite market and
  crisis and, steadily, increased.
• Officers wages still not reflected fully, but
  minimum figures guaranteed.
• ITF Beneficial Ownership and other policies
  recognized and working.
• Improving wages, CBA and MOU slow and difficult,
  but happens regularly.
• No cuts or downgrading once a level is achieved.
• Vetting complicated by the variety, but possible.

10
IBF bargaining process

• Central negotiations
• Claims consideration settlement
• Amicable
• Prior paperwork / correspondence
• Thorough discussion (working groups experts)
• Secretariats
• Argument / Persuasion
• Reference to objective data
• Invite third-parties and sources
• Counter-proposal
• Counter-balance against other issues
• Compromise
• Local / National negotiations
• Implementation of central outcome in existing
  agreements
• Considerable flexibility

11
INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM 10 YEARS EFFICIENT!
IBF