PowerPoint-esitys

1
Prof. Seppo Hentilä 14.3.2005 Finlands German
Policy in the framework of European Détente
2

• Difficulties of Finlands relations
• to divided Germany
• No other international controversy during
• the Cold War pulled Finland so tightly between
• the blocs as did the issue of a divided Germany
• --- until 1973
• walking on a tightrope, both ends of which
• seemed ending in Moscow
• deadlock without a way out
• etc.

3

• Research Problem
• Finlands relations to divided Germany in the
  framework of the Cold War, with a special
  emphasis on the Finnish - Soviet relations
• Arhcival Sources
• Auswärtiges Amt
• East German Foreign Ministry
• SED Politbüro
• Stasi Archives (BStU)
• Finnish Foreign Ministry
• Urho Kekkonens Archives

4
When Germany was divided in 1949 the West
recognised the Federal Republic of Germany, while
the East recognised the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) Until 1973 Finland was the only
country, which could not establish full
diplomatic relations with either of the two
German states Finlands German-policy dogma the
doctrine of non-recognition of divided states
5
The key of understanding of Finlands German
policy FCMA treaty, signed between Finland and
the USSR on April 6, 1948 --- to remain outside
the disputes between the superpowers If
any problem in the Cold War world the German
question was such a dispute and the the G. q.
brought the Cold War crisis to Finnish Soviet
relations
6
if Germany or some other state, allied to it
were to attempt to invade the Soviet Union
through Finlands territory Under Article 2 -
negotiations for Soviet assistance --- if Finland
was unable to resist the invader Germany defined
as Finlands and Soviet Unions potential common
enemy --- this explains the deadlock
7
In the first phase of the Cold War Finlands
space of freedom, given by the USSR, was
extremely narrow So Finland was not allowed to
join such organisations like Marshall-programme
(ERP), European Council, the OEEC or not even the
Nordic Council, founded in 1952 December 1955,
Bonn proclaimed the Hallstein Doctrine it would
regard recognition of the GDR as an unfriendly
act towards the Federal Republic of Germany
8
2. Sonderfall Finnland the most progressive
but the weakest To use an analogy from ice
hockey The West Germans had to watch in Finland
how the Soviet Red Machine was engaged in a
steamroller power play on the GDRs side, while
the Federal Republic itself was sitting on the
penalty box, unable to do anything but watch
helplessly how its interests were being
unscrupulously violated and how easy it was for
the GDR bug to infect the Finns Finland the
only place in the world, where West Germans had
to compete with the so-called GDR on equal
footing
9
From time to time the Soviet leaders proposed to
president Kekkonen that Finland should recognize
the GDR
10
The widest movement for the recognition of the
GDR was formed in Finland during the late
1960s Why and how did it manage? DDR-Kulturzen
trm Public opinion in Finland about the GDR?
11
Methods of persuasion Direct influence on the
political leadership and on the top of the civil
servants, improvement of the knowledge of the
citizens on the GDR and establishing contacts to
researchers and other experts The Finns should
be made to believe that the GDR was a socially,
economically and culturally important, rich and
progressive country, which was treated unfairly
by the international community
12
3. The framework of the ESC European Security
Conference --- Kossygin, summer 1966 Old soviet
idea since the 1950s Ambassador A. E. Kovalev,s
proposal to Kekkonen, April 1969 his government
hoped that the German question could be solved as
a part of a wide European arrangement
13
Additionally Kovalev hoped that the Finns would
actively participate to the preparations of the
ESC Kekkonen sceptical --- would this kind of a
conference have success and lead to some results?
Was afraid of failing just because of the
opposite opinions of the two German
states Finlands difficulty --- to prove her
credibly to the West that she was acting in
favour of her national interests and by no means
fulfilling the Soviet will
14
Finlands solution --- no preconditions, e. g.
the existence of two German states, and the
principle that the existing borders would be
unchangeable --- in addition the United States
and Canada should be called to the ESC Finlands
initiative for the CSCE, May 5, 1969 ---Finland
would suit better than any other European country
to host the conference --- Finland has good
relations to all countries, which are concerned
about the security in Europe, and its attitude to
the most vital security problem, namely to the
German question, has been highly acknowledged by
the different parts.
15
The motive of the CSCE initiative? Keijo
Korhonen, a former senior official at the
Foreign Ministry it was a driving anchor of
Finlands German policy --- the aim was to escort
Finlands policy of neutrality safely to the
harbour in this most difficult matter, nothing
else This was the marching order, and the CSCE
initiative was planned to be a tool of Finlands
policy of neutrality, and not a purpose as such.
16
4. Finland Fight for her Policy of
Neutrality since the Czechoslovakian crisis in
1968 the phrase Finlands policy of neutrality
was banned by the Soviet leaders to grip the
bull by the horns active and peaceful policy of
neutrality should be Finlands way in her
participation in the international politics
17

• Acts of Activity
• CSCE
• Nordek
• --- free trade agreement with the EEC
• Max Jakobsons canditature
• to the Secretary General of the UN
• Good Services to the international
• Commynity e.g. hosting
• the SALT talks in Helsinki

18
Ostpolitik of Chancellor Willy Brandt --- main
results in 1970 Kekkonen, too, began little by
little to believe that new initiatives in her
policy towards the divided Germany could be
possible Soviet Proposal for the Prolongation of
the FCMA treaty in 1970 with another 20 years,
although the term was not until 1975 --- why???
19

• In May 1971, a plan for possible later
• use was prepared --- Germany Package
• Establishing diplomatic relations on one hand
  between Helsinki and Bonn, and on the other hand
  between Helsinki and East Berlin
• Concluding a treaty of abstinence from violence
• Solving open economic and juridical questions,
  especially on the damages in Lapland, caused by
  the German troops in 19441945 and
• Recognising Finlands neutrality by both German
  states.

20
Challenges of the Germany Package to the Soviet
Union --- for example, an agreement to abstain
from the use of violence would have rendered null
and void the first article of the FCMA
treaty --- recognition of Finnish neutrality by
a state from the West and from the East
Risto Hyvärinen
The Timing Man - Väinö Leskinen
21
East German politburo on September 14th --- the
GDR would like to open the negotiations as soon
as possible The Federal Republic criticized the
Finnish proposal harshly and claimed that it was
favouring the GDR and the Finns were obviously
fulfilling the Soviet will On October 11, 1971
the GDR deputy foreign secretary Paul Scholz, in
the Headquaters, meeting his colleague N. V.
Rodionov
22
A wrong message to other socialist countries?
STOP! --- This quotation is one of the very few
documents we have to prove why the SU refused to
recognise Finlands policy of neutrality just
after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August
1968. Finlands example could be dangerous,
because the European allies of the SUnion would
appeal to it in order to achieve in their
relations to Moscow the same status as Finland
already had
23
5. Bonn blackmails with the CSCE
AA in February 1972 --- if Finland would hasten
to recognise the GDR before the German German
basic agreement (Grundlagenvertrag) would be
completed ---- that kind of mistake would bring
serious consequences --- harmful to Finlands
acceptability as the host of the CSCE summit
--- Federal Republic would never take part to a
conference in the capital of a country, in which
the GDR had an embassy with full diplomatic
rights.
24
Up until the early 1970s, Finland was indubitably
a more vexing issue for the FRGs foreign policy
than any other non-communist state --- it was
certainly the weakest link in the blockade of the
GDR based on the Hallstein Doctrine Conversely
--- it was the behaviour of the FRG that Finland
had good reason to fear above all, since the SU
might react to it by invoking the FCMA treaty --
this is what happened in 1958 and 1961 during the
two Berlin crises --- every time when something
happened in Germany, the Finnish Soviet
relations were shaken
25
As late as in May 1972, the foreign minister of
the FRG, Walter Scheel, warned Finland --- Bonn
would not accept that the CSCE preparations would
begin in Helsinki, if Finland continues on the
way of recognising the GDR Kekkonens comment
in his diary Bonn is blackmailing
26
Bonn was driving on two tracks at the same time
Publicly the FRG criticized Finland, but in
backstage the AA was sending opposite
messages --- Kekkonen got this kind of messages,
not only from Bonn but from Moscow and East
Berlin --- it was impossible the FRG to reject
the CSCE completely --- it would have given to
the SU a propaganda weapon and threatened to
isolate the FRG from the West --- thus Bonn had
to balance between slowing down the preparations
of the CSCE and keeping them alive at the same
time
27
Finland as victim of the Hallstein Doctrine ---
until the bitter end --- in 1967 the FRG
established diplomatic relations with Romania and
in 1968 it restored relations with Yugoslavia,
despite the fact that both already had relations
with the GDR ---this looser interpretation of
the Hallstein Doctrine did not appear to apply to
Finland --- as long as the Basic Treaty between
the two German states remained unsigned, the
Federal Republic did not want Finland to
recognise the GDR
28
6. Launching the Germany Package again Kekkonen
waited the answer from Bonn 10 months --- decided
to open the negotiations with the GDR in July
1972 Agreement between Finland and the GDR,
signed in September 1972 Only on one of the four
package points was agreed the diplomtic
recognition ---t he GDR promised to respect
Finlands striving to practice a policy of
neutrality Equal treatment of both German
states?
29
It would have been advisable to Finland to
abstain from doing anything at all --- just to
wait for the ratification of the
Grundlagenvertrag between two German states The
normalisation of the German question on the basis
of the two states model and as a part of the
European détente, was evident to come ---
recognised already in the treaty of 1970 by the
Governments of the SU and the FRG The most
evident reason was, however, in the summer 1972
the CSCE reason
30
Also the EEC reason got more and more wind to
sails, when the so called Zavidovo memorandum of
Kekkonens talks with the Soviet leadership on
August 12 18, 1972 leaked ten weeks later to
publicity --- or more exactly, it was
intentionally arranged by some leading Social
Democrats that it leaked to the Swedish newspaper
Dagens Nyheter --- the coupling of the Zavidovo
leak to the plan of securing Kekkonens
re-election with a special law and Kekkonens
threat to resign because of the leak?
31
In the publicity the CSCE reason appeared
constantly in a negative light because the Bonn
threatened Finland --- meaning just Finlands
suitability to the host of the CSCE
conference Finlands decision to recognise both
German states on Septemer 19, 1972 --- cold
reactions from Bonn SIC! --- negotiations on the
Package between Finland and the FRG had not even
begun
32
West Germans re-organising the negotiation table
at Dipoli in November 1972 in the first round of
the CSCE negotiations ---- R.D.A R.F.A.
instead of FRG GDR The action of the FRG was
consistent and successful the magic line was
signing of the basic treaty between the two
German states on December 21, 1972 --- then Bonn
did not protest any more, when the recognition
swell of the GDR began
33
The Highlight of Erichs Life
34
7. Some Conclusive Remarks Finlands Germany
Package --- a Success Story? --- yes, when we
take into account, how difficult and full of
risks the international situation was ---
simultaneous recognition of both German states,
as well as signing of equal treaties with
them --- any final solutions would not have
been made unilaterally with only one German state
35
Soviet pressure on Finland?
Of course --- but after Finland had launched the
CSCE initiative in 1969, the Soviet Unions
attitude was clear --- Finlands suitability
as a pacemaker in the CSCE process and as the
host for a possible summit was a much more
valuable issue than the recognition of the GDR
36
The Federal Republic
The FRG did not stand idly by, though its
activities were not visible and aggressive in the
same way as the ones of the GDR ---Defending
her most valuable national issue the
Re-Unification of Germany --- On the other
hand, Finlands Germany package and the CSCE
initiative were aimed at precisely the same as
Brandts Ostpolitik at easing tensions and
calming down the situation in the heart of Europe
37
For this reason, the Federal Republic was forced
to reassure Finland behind the scenes that its
publicly expressed criticism and its bullying
with the sanctions of the Hallstein Doctrine were
just a prank
38
What should we have to learn from this all? ---
the military articles of the FCMA meant that
Finlands German policy was by its very
definition subordinate to and dependent on
its relations to the SU --- on the other hand,
the Soviet policy towards Finland included
motives, which were more far reaching than
her relations to Finland --- in the Cold War
Finland did not wage a separate war against
the Soviet Union

Finland,s Finlandisation in the G. q.?