Maritime Homeland Defense / Security Mine Countermeasures

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Maritime Homeland Defense / Security Mine
Countermeasures
Navy Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare CommandA
Warfare Center of Excellence

• Presented to the 2011 Spring Regional Conference
• of the Mine Warfare Association
• 11 May 2011

Mr. Marvin Heinze NMAWC Maritime Homeland Defense
This brief is Unclassified
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Our Discussion Today

• Mission / Requirements
• Capability / Capacity
• Exercises
• Preparation
• Related efforts

This slide is Unclassified
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Mine Warfare in the United StatesIt happens

• Lake Ponchartrain, 2004
• Floating IED discovered ivo visiting dignitary
• Sacramento River, 1980
• Patriotic Scuba diver closes the shipping
  channel
• Chesapeake Bay, June 1942
• U-701 lays 15 magnetic mines
• 3 ships sunk
• 2 ships damaged

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MHD MCM Policy / Mission

• DoD is the lead MOTR agency for mine
  countermeasures in the Maritime Domain
  (NSPD41/MOTR)
• Navy has DoD maritime mine countermeasure
  capability, implying
• MCMRON and MCM forces will be needed to counter
  mine and UWIED threats
• No civil authority MCM capability
• Specific domestic MCM Mission not defined
• Interagency equities and priorities
• CONPLANs have general mission
• DHS will plan for the prevention and detection
  of sea mining(MOTR)

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USN MIW Operational Framework
VCOM NMAWC MIW Battle Staff
COM NMAWC VCOM NMAWC USW COE
(ASW MIW)
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
SMCM Class Advocate
COMCMRON SEVEN
COMCMRON FIVE
COMCMRON TWO
Deployable staff supports NCC MIW operations and
training
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MHD/S MCM Response Capability

• AMCM
• MH-53E in NORVA
• Limited capability
• Confined water
• Deployable

• Command and Control
• MIWC in San Diego
• MCM CDR in San Diego
• Rapidly deployable

-
-

• SMCM
• Ships in San Diego
• Long response times
• Limited capability
• Confined water

• UMCM
• UUVs, Divers, MMS
• EOD PLT, MMS PLT
• Neutralization
• UUV PLT
• Rapidly deployed
• Confined water Capable

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Todays MHD/S MCM Response Capacity

• Follow on
• Leadership
• NMAWC VCOM and staff
• Aircraft
• 4 - 6 MH 53E
• Various MCM equip
• Ships
• 2 - 4 Avenger class SMCM
• Marine Mammals
• MK 7/8 MMS
• 6 dolphins

• Initial
• Leadership
• MIWC LNOs
• COMCMRON staff
• UUVs
• 2 X UUV PLT
• Mk 18 UUVs
• Divers
• 2 X EOD MCM PLT
• 1 X VSW Dive PLT

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Experimentation / Exercises in MHD/S MCM

• 2008-2009
• 4 events in 2 years
• Change detection
• Experimentation
• Low Frequency Broad Band
• Synthetic Aperture Sonar

• 2010
• Bay Shield 10
• MCM CDR Training (MHS)
• Frontier Sentinel 10
• MCM CDR Training (MHD)
• Experimentation

• High clutter limits current mine hunting
  effectiveness
• Improving change detection techniques and
  procedures
• Use of data fusion center
• Advanced new sonar technologies
• LFBB Sonar for detection of buried mines
• Synthetic aperture sonar for improved target
  discrimination
• MHD MCM CDR training

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Exercise Bay Shield 10 Quick Look

• NMAWC OBJECTIVES
• Integrated training for MCMRON 2/DIV
• MCM planning and execution using Port Folder and
  change detect tactics
• Exercise MCM Force in MHS Mission
• Conduct MCM Ops within a multi-agency Unified
  Command structure

2 Mines Found
Areas of MCM ops

• Others
• Large number of contacts overwhelm mine hunting
  capacity
• Incident Command System proficiency needed
• Limited UCP secure comms

• Goods
• USCG/USN interaction and integration
• MCMRON 2/NMAWC engagement with the COTP/UCP
• Valuable CONUS MCMC training for MCMRON 2/ DIV 31
  
• Preparations for Frontier Sentinel

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Frontier Sentinel 10 Overview25 May 11 Jun 2010
PURPOSE Bilateral homeland defense/ security
exercise to conduct information / intelligence
sharing, conduct mine countermeasures
operations, conduct sea trial experimentation,
conduct bilateral maritime defense planning and
response to synchronize the operational planning
process.
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Frontier Sentinel 10 Participants
US Navy COMSECONDFLT NMAWC COMCMRON
TWO ONR HM14 DET NOMWC EODMU ONE SIX US
Coast Guard SECTOR Hampton Roads DOG (MSRT,
MSST) Canadian Navy JTF Atlantic 2 x MCDV Fleet
Diving Unit

• NMAWC OBJECTIVES
• Exercise TF 25 in MHD mission
• Train MCMRON TWO
• Conduct Sea Trial Experiments
• Improve confined waterways TTP

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Trident Fury 2011Esquimalt, Canada

• Overview
• What TF11 is a Bi-Lateral exercise involving US
  and Canadian Forces.
• Where Esquimalt Harbor, Esquimalt Approaches
  and Constance Banks
• - When 02-13 May 2011

• Objectives
• - Conduct Bi-Lateral MCM operations
• - Conduct integrated MCM operations
• - Exercise interagency interoperability
• Improve confined waters MCM tactics
• Evaluate MCMRON2 as MCMC
• Assess MCM capability and capacity

Participating Forces

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Homeland Defense Port Surveys and MIW Port
Folders
Baseline Survey Port Folders

• Quick response guide for MCMC
• Port folders cover 17 DoD ports
• all complete as of Dec 2010
• bi annual updates started
• Posted on Enterprise Knowledge Management (eKM)

Bottom Sediments
Bottom Roughness
Doctrinal Bottom
Clutter Density
Change Detection
Results
Baseline imagery
New imagery

• Port Folders accelerate port opening
• Change Detection reduces the number of contacts
  requiring identification
• Change detection results
• Eliminates 35-55 of mine-like objects
• Reduces clearance time by 30

Contact in new imagery needs to be prosecuted
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Related MHD MCM efforts

• Naval Postgraduate School
• 2008 -A Systems Approach to Defeating MIEDS in
  US Ports
• Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
  Committee
• 2009 -MIEDs in Ports and Harbors study
• Center for Naval Analysis
• 2008 -Mine Warfare Homeland Defense and
  Security
• 2011 - Mine Clearance in support of Homeland
  Security
• NORTHCOM Capabilities Requirements Division
• 2011 Maritime Mine Countermeasures Study

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MHD MCM way ahead

• Better define specific requirements
• Defense
• Whole of government
• Improve confined waters equipment
• Neutralization UUV
• One pass Detect to Engage
• Determine best MHD employment of MCM Mission
  package
• Assist DHS efforts to prevent mining
• Better threat awareness
• Effective surveillance
• Cooperative efforts with port entities

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• Questions?

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Mine Warfare Direct Costs
USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS SADAF 02- Moored Contact
USS TRIPOLI LUGM I- Moored Contact
Mine Cost Ship Damage 1,000 57 Million
Mine Cost Ship Damage 1,000 10 Million
USS PRINCETON MANTA- Bottom Influence
Mine Cost Ship Damage 10,000 100 Million
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Mine Warfare Indirect Costs

• Economic/Political Effects
• 90 US trade transits US ports
• Significant cost
• Global Commerce Effects
• 33 World trade transits US ports
• Significant effect on trade
• Power projection
• 90 of military sustainment by sea
• Significant effect on defense operations