Title: Heterogeneity, incentives and sustainable water use
1Heterogeneity, incentives and sustainable water
use
- Karina Schoengold
- David Zilberman
- Renan Goetz
2Population trends and water
- Global world population have grown from
- 1Billion people in 1800 to
- 2.5 Billion in1950 to
- 6 Billion in 2000 to ?
- 11 Billion ? 17 Billion ? 6 Billion in 2100
- With population growth came
- Increase in water use per Capita
-
3Heterogeneity and conflict
- Some countries (Canada) are water rich-
- Other (Jordan) are water poor
- -but even Canada has deserts
- Provides opportunity to trade
- Diversity of interest drought prevention vs.
flood control - Conflicts about irrigated agriculture
- In dry regions
- Agricultural may use up to 80 of water-
- Environment and urban sector are expanding their
demand
4Benefits of irrigation
- Irrigation allowed us to overcome population
growth - Irrigated land has increased from 50 mha
(million hectares) in 1900 to 267 mha today. - Between 1962 and 1996 the irrigated area in
developing countries increased at 2 annually. - The 17 irrigated land is producing 40 of
global food - The value of output of irrigated cropland is
about 625/ha/year (95/ha/year for rain-fed
cropland and 17.50/ha/year for rangelands). - The high productivity of agriculture slowed
expansion of deforestation.
5Perception water supply crisis
- Water consumption in 2000 is 4-5 times as in 1950
- Most the obvious sources for diversion are
used - We will need more water to accommodate more
people - There is appreciation for environmental services
of water -
6More bad news
- The capital costs of water projects have been
underestimated. A recent study of 81 dams found
that the average cost overrun was 56 - Environmental cost - lose of habitat
- Increase of water and land salinity
- Soil Salinity reduce productivity of 20 of
irrigated land 1.5 million hectares of these
lands are deserted annually - Water logging Costs 11Billion annually
- Ground water depletion
- 8 of Indias food produced with depleted
aquifers - In 1973 3 of India's groundwater pumped below 10
meters in 1994 46.
7Social Concerns
- Water born diseases
- kill 4-5 million annually
- Displacement
- 40 80 million people has been displaced
1950-99. - International conflicts and water supply.
8Sustainability and management
- .There is a perception of water supply crisis,but
we have a water management crisis. - Improved policies and incentives can address
water supply and quality concern and lead to
sustainability - Sustainability- Environmental quality levels
and natural resource resource stocks are above
target levels
9Causes Solutions of water situation
- Water institution respond to scarcity and
political economy - We will argue that changes in conditions requires
institutional transition - Economics is crucial in transition design,yet it
has been under used - Heterogeneity is essential feature of water
system and should be integrated in analytical
framework
10Factor affecting the emergence of water
Institutions
- Water institutions are affected by
- Water Scarcity
- Government ability to tax and finance projects
- Policy objectives-growth vs. environmental
quality - Water abundance
- Financially weak government
- Desire for growth lead to Water rights (prior
appropriation) - Water abundance
- Financial resources availability
- Desire for growth lead to Public supply projects
subsidies
11The emergence of water Institutions
- Water scarcity leads to water trading
- Financial crunch leads to Privatization of
supplies - Environmental concerns lead to Water quality
regulations Environmental purchasing funds - Equity concerns leads to regulated
pricingsubsidies
12The Tricky Transitions
- Transition from water rights to water market
- Introduction of water quality regulations
- Introduction of new innovations is very
challenging - Economists and scientist can recommend but
- Politician have to deliver
- Understanding of policy process can lead to
effective designs
13Transitions are not alike
- Timing, History,Transaction cost , Political
economy and preferences affect transitions - Transition may be gradual-the transition towards
water trading in most locations takes years - Yet Crises trigger transitions
- Depletion of ground water leads to surface water
projects - San Fernando valley flood led to building dams
upstream - Long Draughts lead to migrations (American
Indians), storage (Joseph and Pharaoh) - Systems are rigid - a threshold have to be
crossed (Dixit Pyndick) to overcome political
economy constraints (Rausser Zussman) and
transition costs (Shah Zilberman) to introduce
change
14Economics based approach to water management
reformleading to sustainability
- We will present incentives and policies to
improve - Water project design
- Water pricing allocation and conveyance
- Micro level choices
- Water quality
15I.Improved water projects design
- Rely on social benefit cost analysis
- Consider projects with positive expected NPV
resources should be valued by their societal
value - Capital subsides and under-costing the
environment lead to oversized projects - Learning is crucial-delay is worth while-invest
when it is optimal not at first moment when NPV
is positive - Project design should include nonstructural
solutions-bring the economists and biologists to
the design process - Consider future costs water logging cost and
drainage
16Benefit cost analysis and project design
- Water projects make fortunes and political
careers-too importance to leave to economics.
Some yield high returns most do not - Budgetary constrains led to economic scrutiny in
U.S.-projects require to pass benefit cost tests - The application of benefits cost analysis reduced
the number of new projects and reduced delivery
of political pork - Politicians and interest groups are working to
exempt projects from benefit cost requirement
17Despite formal requirement to use benefit cost
analysis- projects are not efficient Economics is
not used for projects design Under emphasis on
non structural solution Need more ex post studies
on return from projects.
18Beyond benefit cost analysis
- Projects assessment should not only decide if to
build or not but also when to do it, - Adaptive learning (AL)Allow flexibility to
resolve uncertainty about preferences or
technologies-delayed decisions allow learning - Care is especially important in cases of
irreversibility - Projects should be apart of a multi tool
strategy. - Incentives(water price) may be used to reduce
project size or delay its start. - For unique and new problems-Investment in
appropriate RD may lead to projects
19II.Improve water allocation and pricing
- The price of water is elusive
- The actual prices of water (whenever they exist)
tend to be different from efficient pricing - Both actual and efficient prices vary depending
on - Time (within season and between season)
- Location
- Quality
- Use
- Institutions
20(No Transcript)
21Elements of the economics of water systems
- Benefits (Marginal benefitsdemand)
- Private cost extraction
- Conveyance cost
- Externality cost
- Future value of water inventory
22MPCMCCMECMFC
P R I C E
MPCMCCMEC
A
MCMCC
B
MPC
M
N(subsidized
Quanitity
Optimal Vs subsidized water - water is over used
and under paid
23Optimal pricing
- Price
- Marginal extraction cost
- Marginal conveyance cost
- Marginal environmental cost
- Marginal storage cost
-
24Implication of optimal pricing in Ag
- Subsidies are not accidental, removal is painful
- Optimal pricing will reduce water use resulting
in - Adoption of conservation technologies
- Transfers to cities-lower prices in cities
- Reduction in acreage of low value crops
- More environmental benefits
- Less water projects constriction over time
- More stable systems
25Pricing under small provider
- Provider ignores environmental costs and dynamic
pricing-over-supplies - Need for intervention to prevent over provision
- Extra water tax to account for environment
storage - Regulatory limit on amount consumed with tradable
permits - Buy back of water for environmental purposes
26Current failures of water pricing
- Current pricing systems aimed at cost recovery
not efficiency - Recovery of operation and maintenance costs
ranges from a low of 20-30 percent in India and
Pakistan to a high of close to 75 percent in
Madagascar - The most common pricing systems are per-acre
fees. Subsidies of 50 are common - System like tiered pricing providing some
subsidies but relying on social marginal cost
will lead to optimality
27Improved Conveyance water allocation
- Poor management of irrigation systems leads to
conveyance losses of up to 50 percent - Improved canal and varying price with distance
will improve efficiency -require new institutions - Canals are public goods. Private users tend to
under investment in canal maintenance - A water utility determines simultaneously optimal
water pricing and investment in conveyance
28Spatial impacts of optimal conveyance
Water use basic conveyance
Water use improved conveyance
Distance from source
- Optimal conveyance policy will
- increase utilized acreage and water use in
agriculture - Charge downstream farmer higher water prices
which will lead to conservation - Empirical simulation find that optimal conveyance
loss to be negligible
29Conveyance I
Suppose Marginal productivity of water per acre
is 10-2X Where X is water per acre We have 2
parcels of land locations 1 and 2 Water use at
destination X1 and X2 Initial conveyance lose in
location 2 is 50 pay for 2 units at source for
each unit consumed at 2 Each unit consumed at
location 2 requires 2 units at source D110-2X1
DEMAND LOCATION 1 D215-X21 DEM AND
LOCATION 2 IN TERMS OF WATER AT SOURCE
X212X2 MC OF WATER AT SOURCE .25(X1X21)
30Conveyance II
SX1X21 P IS PRICE AT SOURCE
P10-2S
FINDING AGGREGATE DEMAND FOR P5 S2.5 FOR P0
S7.5 AGRREGATE DEMADN IS P7.5-S .25S
HENCE S6 P1.5
P5-X21
S
PRODUCTION AT LOCATION 1 IS 4 WATER PRICE
1.5 PRODUCION AT LOCATION 2 IS 2WATER PRICE IS 3
31NO CONVEYANCE LOSE
SX1X21 P IS PRICE AT SOURCE AND LOCATION 2
P10-S
AGRREGATE DEMADN IS P10-S .25S HENCE
X1X24 S8 P4 ( 10-2X110-2X2)
S
PRODUCTION AT LOCATION 1 IS 4 WATER PRICE
2 PRODUCION AT LOCATION 4 IS 2 WATER PRICE IS 2
32COMPARISON
- NO CONVEYANCE LOSS
- P1P22
- Q1Q24
- 50 CONVEYANCE LOSS
- P1 1.5 Q14
- P23 Q22
BETTER CONVEYANCE INCREASES PRODUCTION BENFIT
DOWNSTREAM PRODUCERS DAMAGES UPSTREAM PRODUCERS (
PAY MORE FOR WATER)
33Water rights systems
- Water is allocated according to water right
systems that are queuing system based on
location or seniority - Prior appropriation allocates water according to
- Use it or loss it
- First in use first in
- Water use permits operate as queuing systems as
well - Trading is restricted with other rights systems
34FROM PRIOR APPROPRIATION TO MARKET
WATER SUPPLY
GAIN FROM TRADING
PRICE AFTER TRADING
TOTAL DEMAND
DEAMND OF INITIAL WATER USERS
35TRANSITION FROM QUEUING TO MARKETS
- D1 INITIAL DEAMDN 10-X TOTAL WATER SUPPLY 10
INITIAL SURPLUS 50 - D2 LATER DEMAND 10-.5X
- PRICE IS 5, WHERE 10-.5105
- SURPLUS IS 75
- IN CASE OF TRANSFERABLE RIGHTS
- SENIOT RIGHT OWNERS WILL SELL HALF THEIR WATER
AND MAKE 25 THEIR SUPLUS 62.5 - JUNIOR RIGHTS WILL HAVE 12.5 IN SURPLUS
- IN CASE FO GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
- GOVERNEMENT WILL MAKE 50
- SENIOR AND JUNIOR RIGHTS WELFARE AT 12.5
36Transition from queuing to market
- Reform A transition to trading where water is
priced according to opportunity cost - It require transaction and transition cost
- Gain from trade increase with scarcity
- Trading is desirable when gain gt transaction cost
- Trading lead to conservation of water among
sellers
37The gains/loses from trade
- Trading may be introduced in crisis
situations-requires monitoring, expanded canal
system - Trading may be small but critical to adjust to
shortages - Trading may have negative third party effect-less
runoff to environment groundwater replenishment - Reform allows new entrants to markets-new crop-
- Grapes in Chile
- Golf courses (high value farming)
- Purchases for environmental purposes
38water trading design issues
- Should permanent sales be allowed? Or should the
trade be in rights (water rent) rights? - Who will sell- the state or historical owners?
- What about Export outside the basin?
- Should the sales be of of effective or applied
water?
Effective water
Applied water
Field
Residue go to Third parties
39Emerging arrangements
- Transferable rights-annual sales of water is
easy-permanents sales of rights is facing
constraints - annual upper bound on exported volume from a
region - Only 70-85 of applied water can be sold-to
compensate third parties
40Pricing and information
- Pricing is perfected with volumetric monitoring
- Pricing should change by time and sometimes by
crop and location to reflect - conveyance cost
- environmental side effects
- Without volumetric measurement-Per acre fees may
vary by season / crop. - Prices should reflect costs of side effects of
water - use of greener/cleaner application
technologies should be rewarded
41Improve ground water management
- India increased pumping by 300 since 1951-86
- Farmers should pay user fee( to reflect future
scarcity)- - Fuel for irrigation should not be subsidized.
- Elimination of fuel subsidies and user fee will
raise ground water pumping-leading to reduced
acreage and conservation - Tiered pricing may address equity issues
- Monitoring of pumping is needed-may need
regional ground water authorities.
42Conjunctive use of surface and ground water
- Precipitation is random-reliance on rainfall or
surface water(river flow) lead to instability - The marginal value of water varies across season-
high at dry seasons - Low at wet season
- Gain from storage
- Ground water can serve storage facility
- Water in ground has value that depends on
- Variability of supply
- Stock in ground
43Reflection-reform will increase ag water
prices Ag can survive with higher pricing- but it
will have to changes- Reform requires Reliable
information-facts not guesses Good
economics Effective administrators Sophisticated
legal understanding Excellent political
skillleadership Patience
44 III.Conservation technologies
- Technologies that increase input use efficiency-
the input actually consumed by crops - Input use efficiency-depends on technology and
specific situation - The residue of unused input may be a source of
environmental concern - Residue Actual input (1 - input use
efficiency) - Smaller residue reduces environmental damages
45Basic model
- YabE-cE2 E effective water
- EqiX qiirrigation effectiveness technology i
- Profit(i)Max p (ab qiX -c qiX qiX) -wX-Ki
- Ki-fixed cost technology i
- Xi(p b qi-w)/p c qi2
- Adoption occur at lower q if 0 ltq lt1
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47Example-irrigation(hypothetical/ California)
- Increase yield, reduce water reduce drainage,
costs more - Low cost version (bucket drip, bamboo drip)
exists - Impact greater/adoption higher on lower quality
lands-sandy soils steep hills -
technology Irrigation efficiency Water/ drainage Yield (cotton) Fixed cost/yr
traditional .6 4.0/1.6 1200 500
sprinkler .8 3.2/.64 1325 580
drip .9 2.7/.27 1400 650
Labor intensive conservation technologies
available to Poor farmers. More needed to be
invented
48Policies to introduce conservation technologies
- Real pricing accounting for environmental cost
- Technology subsidies
- Effective extension
49Common Theme Research and learning
- We operate with much ignorance- need to learn and
adapt - Water policy requires constant leaning of both
natural phenomena and human learning - With GIS and new information tools we can improve
policy design - Crucial - is policy maker education and
interdisciplinary dialogue
50Specifics cases
Economics principle for policy reform are
valuable, but their application is subject to
objections
- Case studies may illuminate factor affecting
water policy reform
51Lessons of California Response to 1988-92 Draught
- Water storage matters. The storage facilities
enabled California to survive the 3 early years
of the drought with minimal impacts or changes,
and the later years with mild effects. - Multiple Responses to Reduced Water Supply.
- 1/3 from ground water pumping,
- 1/3 from conservation (adoption of drip etc),
- 1/3 from land fallow.
52More lessons
- Conservation makes a difference.. After 1992,
- more than 50 of tree crops in the state used
drip, - sprinkler in cotton and alfalfa exceeded 40 in
major areas. - Trading was introduced through water bank
53California Water Trading institutions
- The water bank-bought water in north sold it in
south - Sustains perennial crops -allows their expansion
- provides water rights owners higher incomes.
- The operation of the bank is optional
- only during draught years.
- Options sold annually
54Cal water institutions
- The electronic water Market in the central valley
- Electronic matchmaking of buyers and sellers
- Districts facilitates trades-gradually installs
volumetric pressurized system - Disclosure of prices is optional
- Purchasing fund for environmental water
- The value of water to fluctuate, may vary from
5 to 200 / AF.
55VI. Incentive for water environmental quality
- Introduce fee for quality-when measurable
- Polluter pay principle -make pollution control
worth while - Zero pollution is frequently sub optimal-use
tradable permits in emission-to reach target - Information is crucial-effective policy requires
monitoring and valuation of environment - When actual emission is unobservable-tax
according to activities.Organic pay less than
chemical farming - Minimize use of direct control-allow flexibility
- Use carrot - payments for environmental services
56Categories of Environmental Services (ES)
- Pollution Prevention. Farmers may be paid to
modify environmental damaging activities and
engage in sustainable practices(farmers may have
implicit historical rights to pollute that have
to be bought). - Conservation. of natural resources, life styles,
ecosystems etc. Including forest resources and
wetland, agricultural communities ( slow urban
sprawl), traditional varieties and species, etc. - Amenity creation-restoration and built up of
natural resources Include clean up activities,
planting of forests, restoration of wetlands etc.
57The dimensions of wetland services
Local National International
Wildlife habitat Public Private Public Public
Flood control Public Private Public Private Public Private
Water purification Private Public Public Private
Aesthetic value Public Private Public Public
Recreation Private Private Private
Existence Public Public Public
58Mechanism to obtain ES
- Aggregate targets of ES with Tradable permits
- No reduction target led to wetlands banking in
U.S. - Kyoto targets may be attained by CO2
Sequestration - Purchasing Funds-raise public private funds to
target buy assets or pay for ES - Nature conservancy buys lands development right
- USCRP pays for farmland use modification for a
period - Utilities pay for carbon sequestration in Costa
Rica Iowa - Incentives-payments for ES, penalties for damages
- Direct controls
- Zoning restricting land use to certain
activities - Permittingconditional approval of development
activities
59Institutional setup to create ES
- Private parties may invest in excludable amenity
creating ES (habitat to birds or fish,recreation
area) - NGOs may finance and control specialized ES
- National Local governments may
- Pay directly for or subsidize private provision
of amenity creating ES - Establish legal framework to require generation
of resource conserving or pollution preventing
ES - Global ES may be generated controlled by
- International agreements (Kyoto, Debt for nature)
- Voluntary agreements initiated by NGOs
60Take home messages
- Use Benefit cost to establish project
- Take the option to wait and learn
- Make the price right
- It must not be uniform
- Allow trading
- Trading appropriate when gain gttransaction cost
- Polluter should pay-when feasible
- Beneficiates pay for environmental services
- Consistent Risk management-same value of life
saved
61Conclusions I
- Water resources management reform can increase
economic and environmental benefits - Irrigation crucial to food production-some
systems are not sustainable because of over
pumping - There is much potential to increase water
productivity through incentives - A priority is to increase trading within regions
and to improve maintenance-through institutional
changes - Irrigation technologies and improvement in
varieties are another sources of improved water
productivity in agriculture.
62Conclusions II
- Water development needs will be determined by
population growth - Development proposals should be scrutinized by
social-cost benefit tests - Pollution pays will be used to reduce pollution
- Consumer pays should be used to control)
- Public pay for conservation and public good
activities - Monitoring and knowledge make policy effective
- Political will is crucial to utilize new
knowledge
63About sustainability
64THE PROBLEM
- LARGE SCALE POVERTY IN MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRY
- NEED TO UPGRADE AND IMPROVE STANDARD OF LIVING OF
BILLIONS - GROWING ENVIORONEMNTAL CONCERNS
- CLIMATE CHANGE
- LOSE OF BIODIVERSITY
- DEPLTED FISHERIES
- DEGRADED WATER REOURCES
65Perceived Causes of environmental crisis
- POPULATION GROWTH- IT IS A CAUSE BUT ALSO A BY
PRODUCT OF HUMAN SUCCESS IN CONTAINING DISEASE
AND FEEDING OURSELVES - OVER CONSUMPTION
- TECHNOLOGY AND MODERN SCIENCE
- REGULATION
66Basic point
- technology and science can serve for better or
worse- it is the role of incentives policies and
institutions to steer science and society to a
greener future - we have progressed- but we need to make the extra
step to take advantage of our capacity
67Sustainability climate change
- Need conservation adaptation
- Sustainability requires peace-
- people who are threatened and starved do not
preserve -pay for preservation - Sustainability requires global solutions
- We need creative incentives and take advantage of
technology - Sustainable water management is part of a
sustainable future