Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan

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Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation
Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan

• Paul Staniland
• Department of Political Science, MIT
• MacMillan Center, Yale University
• United States Institute of Peace
• pstan_at_mit.edu

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The public is the most powerful weapon and it is
on our side - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993
Greater Kashmir
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The public is the most powerful weapon and it is
on our side - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993
the JKLF had an idea, but not a base
(interview, Kashmir, summer 2009)
by 1995, the JKLF as an armed group was no
longer a force to seriously reckon with, although
its agenda for a free, independent Kashmir still
fired the hearts of many, if not most, Kashmiris
(Sikand 2002)
Greater Kashmir
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not supported by a majority of Kashmiri Muslims
(Behera 2000)
The Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen
the most militarily well organized of all the
jehadi organizations in Pakistan and Kashmir
(Rana 2004)
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Who Cares? Effects of Insurgent Organization

• Victory and defeat in civil war
• Rape and mass killing
• Effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy
• Success and failure in peace negotiations

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Questions

• How do we conceptualize and measure cohesion?

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Questions

• How do we conceptualize and measure cohesion?
• How do insurgent groups build themselves in the
  midst of rebellion against capable states?

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Questions

• How do we conceptualize and measure cohesion?
• How do insurgent groups build themselves in the
  midst of rebellion against capable states?
• What explains consequent variation in insurgent
  cohesion across time and space?

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Findings

• Social networks matter more than popular support
  or ideological appeal
• Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin
  cohesion, not mass popularity, the people, or
  hearts and minds

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Findings

• Social networks matter more than popular support
  or ideological appeal
• Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin
  cohesion, not mass popularity, the people, or
  hearts and minds
• When fighting capable states, external aid
  bolsters insurgent cohesion
• Resource-richness need not lead to loot-seeking
  and indiscipline

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Research Design

• Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily
  capable, politically-resolved states
• Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations
  in
• Kashmir, 1988-2008
• Northern Ireland, 1962-2005
• Sri Lanka, 1972-2009

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Research Design

• Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily
  capable, politically-resolved states
• Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations
  in
• Kashmir, 1988-2008
• Northern Ireland, 1962-2005
• Sri Lanka, 1972-2009
• Sub-national comparisons
• Variation within the same war and society
• Cross-national comparisons

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Research Methods

• 13 months of fieldwork in N. Ireland, India,
  Indian-administered Kashmir, and Sri Lanka
• Interviews
• 130 current and former militants, politicians,
  government officials, journalists, academics,
  analysts, aid workers
• Written sources
• Internal documents and diaries
• Memoirs and oral histories
• Propaganda
• Journalism
• History and anthropology

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Defining and Measuring Cohesion

• Cohesion fighters and factions obey orders and
  rarely launch splits or violent internal
  challenges
• Focus on
• Internal Unrest splits, feuds, coups, defiance
• Internal Compliance fighters and leaders respect
  orders, peaceful leadership successions
• Measurement examine each group over time along a
  variety of indicators
• Frequency, Intensity, Issues, Autonomy

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Existing Theories

• Popular Support
• Political Economy
• State Policy

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Explaining Insurgent Cohesion

• Two key variables
• 1. Groups social base
• 2. Access to external state and diaspora support

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Explaining Insurgent Cohesion

• Two key variables
• 1. Groups social base
• 2. Access to external state and diaspora support
• Distinct types of insurgent organization emerge
• Cohesive
• State-Reliant
• Consensus-Contingent
• Factionalized

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Social Bases

• Pervasive social appropriation (McAdam et al.
  2001) of pre-existing networks

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Social Bases

• Pervasive social appropriation (McAdam et al.
  2001) of pre-existing networks
• These are insurgent social bases

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Social Bases

• Pervasive social appropriation (McAdam et al.
  2001) of pre-existing networks
• These are insurgent social bases
• Variation in social bases
• Embeddedness of insurgent leaders within local
  communities
• Pre-existing social links between different
  leaders

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Types of Insurgent Social Base

• Bonding Network robust pre-existing social
  relationships between local communities and
  insurgent leaders, and among leaders
• Historically-rooted overlap of local and
  extra-local social ties

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Types of Insurgent Social Base

• Bonding Network robust pre-existing social
  relationships between local communities and
  insurgent leaders, and among leaders
• Historically-rooted overlap of local and
  extra-local social ties
• Coalition Network weak pre-existing social
  relationships between local communities and
  insurgent leaders, and/or among leaders

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Social Bases and Organizations

• Bonding Network Social Integration
• Pre-existing structures of collective action hold
  together organization at the top and from below
• Elite Cooperation
• Local Incorporation

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Social Bases and Organizations

• Bonding Network Social Integration
• Pre-existing structures of collective action hold
  together organization at the top and from below
• Elite Cooperation
• Local Incorporation
• Coalition Network Social Division
• Median voter or mass appeal insufficient if
  lacking embedded links to community and between
  leaders
• Elite Distrust
• Weak Local Incorporation

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Effects of External Support
In capable-state context, external aid crucial
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Effects of External Support
In capable-state context, external aid crucial

• Aid leads to military strength
• High organizational capacity
• Resource centralization
• Fighters and factions join and remain

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Effects of External Support
In capable-state context, external aid crucial

• Aid leads to military strength
• High organizational capacity
• Resource centralization
• Fighters and factions join and remain

• Lack of aid leads to military weakness
• Low organizational capacity
• Resource diffusion
• Fighters and factions defect and dissent

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High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
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High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
Bonding Network
Low External Aid
Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate)
Coalition Network
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High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
Bonding Network
Low External Aid
Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate)
High External Aid
State-Reliant (Intermediate)
Coalition Network
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High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
Bonding Network
Low External Aid
Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate)
High External Aid
State-Reliant (Intermediate)
Coalition Network
Low External Aid
Factionalized (Fragile)
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Insurgency in Kashmir

• Territory divided between India and Pakistan
• Central to India-Pakistan wars and confrontations
• Insurgency, 1988-Present
• 70,000 dead
• Militancy has spilled out into broader
  subcontinent

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Major Areas of Insurgency
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Insurgents Fighting India in Kashmir

• Comparative Cases
• 6 indigenous Kashmiri organizations
• 3 Pakistani organizations
• Research
• 2 trips to Kashmir Valley (May 08 and July 09)
• Multiple trips to New Delhi
• Interviews with all sides of conflict
• Primary and secondary written sources in English
  and Urdu

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Two Empirical Puzzles

• Highly popular JKLF was the most fragmented,
  while far less politically popular Hizb the most
  cohesive
• Not a popularity contest

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Two Empirical Puzzles

• Highly popular JKLF was the most fragmented,
  while far less politically popular Hizb the most
  cohesive
• Not a popularity contest
• Pro-Pakistan groups varied in cohesion despite
  common sponsorship
• Not driven solely by Pakistani machinations

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My Argument Varying Social Bases

• Groups structurally able to mobilize different
  types of social networks/institutions in 88-91

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My Argument Varying Social Bases

• Groups structurally able to mobilize different
  types of social networks/institutions in 88-91
• Groups built around coalition networks were
  unable to channel and control Pakistani aid
  effectively
• JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF Harkat, Jaish - despite
  different popularity and ideologies - took
  broadly similar trajectories
• Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation

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My Argument Varying Social Bases

• Groups structurally able to mobilize different
  types of social networks/institutions in 88-91
• Groups built around coalition networks were
  unable to channel and control Pakistani aid
  effectively
• JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF Harkat, Jaish - despite
  different popularity and ideologies - took
  broadly similar trajectories
• Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation
• Groups built around bonding networks channeled
  command and material through robust, pre-existing
  social relationships
• Hizbul Mujahideen Lashkar

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Cohesive Hizbul Mujahideen (90-) Lashkar-e-Taiba (1987-) State-reliant JKLF (88-91) Ikhwan (91-95) MJF (89-96) Al-Umar (89-94) Harkat (80-99) Jaish (99-01)
Consensus-Contingent Hizbul Mujahideen (89) Factionalized JKLF (91-96) Ikhwan (95-98) Jaish (02-) Harkat (99-)
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JKLF Social Base

• Structure no routinized access to sources of
  collective action in Kashmir Valley
• Not linked to parties or religious authorities
• Result rapid, heterogeneous expansion
• Individuals and factions merge in and out of the
  JKLF at will
• No pre-existing social control mechanisms

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JKLF Fragmentation

• Pakistani support 1988-1990
• State-reliant group that attracts recruits and
  (some) compliance due to Pakistani aid

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JKLF Fragmentation

• Pakistani support 1988-1990
• State-reliant group that attracts recruits and
  (some) compliance due to Pakistani aid
• Loss of external support 1991-1996
• JKLF factionalized and internally-divided over
  numerous issues
• Splits (up to 20), feuds, fratricide
• High popular support insufficient to hold group
  together

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The JKLF had an idea, but not a base Interview,
Srinagar, July 2009
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Hizbul Mujahideen Social Base

• Non-violent Jamaat-e-Islami cadre party
• Overlap (since 1940s) of
• Traditional JI families
• Local party branches and schools
• Ijtimas, annual congregations, intermarriage
  across villages and over time
• Limited popular support
• incapable of reaching out to vast numbers of
  ordinary Kashmiris (Sikand 2002)

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Forging Hizb Cohesion

• Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989

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Forging Hizb Cohesion

• Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989
• High command and Shura Council dominated by
  Jamaatis
• Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991

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Forging Hizb Cohesion

• Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989
• High command and Shura Council dominated by
  Jamaatis
• Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991
• Local Jamaatis spread throughout Kashmir as
  fighters, recruiters, talent spotters
• Expands without fracturing

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Implications and Extensions

• Insurgency not about the median voter focus
  instead on social networks and institutions

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Implications and Extensions

• Insurgency not about the median voter focus
  instead on social networks and institutions
• No simple relationship between material variables
  and organizational outcomes
• Beyond greed (and narco-insurgency)

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Implications and Extensions

• Insurgency not about the median voter focus
  instead on social networks and institutions
• No simple relationship between material variables
  and organizational outcomes
• Beyond greed (and narco-insurgency)
• Next Steps
• Expanding empirics
• Studying change/evolution

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Q A
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The State Strategic Manipulator?

• Reasons for skepticism
• 1. Bad intelligence
• 2. Disconnect between military and political aims
• 3. State internally disorganized
• State more reactive than proactive

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The State Examples

• State does not drive fragmentation
• Tamil Jaffna 1980s
• Kashmir rural areas, early/mid-1990s
• PIRA and INLA splits from OIRA, late 60s/early
  70s
• State fails to fragment groups despite efforts
• PIRA in mid-1970s
• Hizb until 2000
• LTTE, 1972-2009 (Karuna split not exception)

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External Support Logics

• Exogenous external actors support groups for
  reasons largely unrelated to their prior cohesion
• Endogenous external actors support groups for
  reasons closely related to their prior cohesion
• Find empirical support for exogenous logic
  sponsors support groups with same war aims - even
  if fragmented or internally divided
• Early years marked by massive uncertainty -
  sponsors hedge by supporting groups with similar
  goals

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External Support Examples

• the role the Provisionals saw for themselves,
  defending nationalists in the North and defending
  the British Army, was far more in keeping with
  what people, especially Irish America,
  understood. Swan 2008, p. 223.
• like the Pakistan government, organizations such
  as the Jamaat of Pakistan are highly selective
  in which militants they support basically those
  that share their Islamic ideology and have the
  same aspirations for Kashmir. Malik 2002, p.
  298.

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Fine-Grained Measurement and Predictions
Frequency Intensity Autonomy Issues
Cohesive I Rare Low Low Political-Military
State-Reliant II Intermediate Low Low Distribution
Consensus-Contingent III Intermediate High High Political-Military
Factionalized IV Common High High Many
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Extending the Empirics Capable state ethnic
minority rebellion

• Turkey (Kurdish areas)
• Iraq (Kurdish/Shiite/Sunni)
• Russia (Chechnya)
• China (Tibet)
• Pakistan (NWFP/Sindh)
• India (Northeast/ Punjab)

• Indonesia (Aceh/Dar-ul Islam/East Timor)
• Anti-Soviet/German partisans
• Algeria (1992-)
• Thailand
• Palestinian territories
• Burma

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Other Resources?

• Do drugs, minerals, and other illicit flows have
  a similar effect as state/diaspora aid?
• Research agenda
• In India, Pakistan, and SE Asia, will examine
  groups with access to mineral and drug resources
• Two possibilities
• Different nature of resource flows (not top-down)
  may diffuse power and authority and lead to
  fragmentation, or
• Some groups may be able to harness these
  resources in a similar manner to external aid
• Initial sense heavily dependent on state power -
  when strong, constrains group behavior

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Types of Social Base
Strong Local Embeddedness Weak Local Embeddedness
Strong Leadership Ties Bonding Network Foco-ist Network (Coalition)
Weak Leadership Ties Parochial Network (Coalition) Anomic Network (Coalition)
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Where Do Social Bases Come From?

• Deeply historically-rooted
• Products of complex, contingent processes of
  social mobilization and state response in
  previous decades or centuries
• Sticky over time - facts on the ground by the
  time of a conflict, reproduced by family and
  social relationships and identities
• Not endogenous to onset of conflict in question
• Can be traced back decades or more prior to war
• Often originally non-militant or even apolitical

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Why These Scope Conditions?

• Civil wars vary dramatically
• Insurgent vs. Conventional
• Secessionist vs. Center-seeking
• Ethnic vs. Ideological
• Strong state vs. Weak state
• Democracy vs. Authoritarian
• I focus on one common context that poses a shared
  set of challenges to cohesion
• Tight scope, but lays basis for cumulative
  research within and across types of wars

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What is Cohesion?

• In this conceptualization, looks at both the
  structural integrity of the group and the
  commitment of individual members
• Not the same as success - can contribute, but is
  not a sufficient condition for victory
• Focused on insurgent organizations - not the same
  as ethnic group or opposition movement
  cohesion

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Overall Distribution of Cases
Cohesive PIRA (72-05) LTTE (83-09) Hizb (90-) LeT (87-) State-reliant Ikhwan JKLF (88-90) MJF Al Jehad Al-Umar EPRLF (87-90) TELO Jaish (99-01) Harkat (80-99)
Consensus-Contingent EPRLF (81-87) PIRA (1969-72) Official IRA (1962-76) LTTE (1972-83) Hizb (89) Factionalized INLA JKLF (91-96) PLOT Jaish (01-) EROS Ikhwan (95-) IPLO RIRA Harkat (99-)
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Social Ties Over Ideology

• we couldnt disagree with a word the man an
  OIRA representative said, all his arguments were
  totally right, totally justified. The
  Provisionals leadership was reactionary and
  Catholic, they went against what we believed in.
  But we just said Yeah, but whats my da and ma
  going to say if I go home and tell them Im going
  with the Reds? There was a real thing about the
  communist threat about that time. And family
  tradition counted for a lot. Devenport and
  Sharrock 1997, p. 69.
• the success of the Officials in hanging on to
  the Lower Falls is more a tribute to his
  Sullivans personality than to the popularity
  of his political message. Bishop and Mallie
  1987, p. 146.

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Guns and Money Over Ideology

• Northern Ireland
• Joe Cahill they wanted to know if we had guns
  for them. That was their main concern. . . they
  would not give up their allegiance to the
  Official IRA until they were certain they would
  get weapons. Anderson 2002, p. 188.
• PIRA recruit I never thought of joining the
  Stickies the Official IRA. I felt that Provies
  wanted to get the gear and that was good enough
  for me. Bishop and Mallie 1987, p. 153.
• Kashmir
• I agreed to send some of our boys to Pakistan
  for training in JKLF camps in handling
  sophisticated weapons as it would have helped us
  in our plans. Noorani in Thomas 1992, p. 263.
• Ghulam Rasool ShahWe took training from them
  JKLF, but made it clear that we stand for
  merging Kashmir with Pakistan. Profile in
  Passion, Newsline, Feb 2001, p. 34.

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The Importance of External Aid

• state support has had a profound impact on the
  effectiveness of many rebel movements. . . . out
  of the 74 post-Cold War insurgencies surveyed,
  state support, we believe, played a major in
  initiating, sustaining, bringing to victory, or
  otherwise assisting 44 of them. Byman et al
  2001, p. xiv.
• Without the constant supply of weapons, the IRA
  would be lost and the whole republican structure
  would quickly break down. Holland, p. 62.
• no militant group can operate for long in
  Kashmir without outside funding, training and
  arms. Malik 2002, p. 298.
• Lyall and Wilson III 2009, Johnston 2009,
  Salehyan 2009

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Does External Aid Lead to Thuggery?

• the IRAs resources, however dubiously or
  criminally attained, are overwhelmingly channeled
  back into mission-related activities. . . .
  group-oriented, nonpecuniary, and nonegoistic
  motivations have been key to both recruitment and
  retention. OLeary 2007, p. 207
• Our evidence of the rank-and-file terrorists
  does not support the view that they are mindless
  hooligans drawn from the unemployed and
  unemployable. Moloney 2002, p. 174 quoting
  British Army in 1978
• Hizb became a sophisticated political movement,
  not just a bunch of gun-toting thugs Joshi 1999,
  p. 86

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Sri Lanka

• 5 major Tamil militant groups, 1972-2009
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
• Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)
• Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
  (PLOT)
• Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front
  (EPRLF)
• Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students
  (EROS)
• Extreme variation on DV
• Argument
• LTTE Cohesive (caste/regional networks Indian,
  then diaspora support)
• TELO State-reliant on India
• EPRLF intermediate case (elements of both
  consensus-contingent and state-reliant at
  different points)
• PLOT and EROS Factionalized

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Jamaat-e-Islami

• the JI shows a uniform pattern a committed,
  hard core following that amounts to only a small
  fraction of the population. Thus, as a political
  party the JI has consistently fared poorly in
  electoral contests in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
  Kashmir, incapable of mustering more than a few
  percentage points of the popular vote.
  Nonetheless, all these JI branches have a
  long-standing reputation for committed cadres and
  organizational acumen
• - Bose 2007

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Trajectories of Militancy
Bonding Network Coalition Network
Significant External Support Cohesive I Disciplined and controlled in both war and peace - organizational weapon (Provisional IRA, LTTE, Lashkar-e-Taiba) State-reliant II Insurgent proxy armies propped up from afar rely on sponsor materiel for internal control (TELO, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Ikhwan)
Minimal External Support Consensus-contingent III Rely on norms and trust, but weak internal coercion and fighting power (Official IRA, EPRLF) Factionalized IV Deeply divided and fractious - split over numerous issues (INLA, PLOTE, IPLO)