Heraclitus??:? You could not step twice into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you. ? - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

About This Presentation
Title:

Heraclitus??:? You could not step twice into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you. ?

Description:

23 (1) * cc ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:74
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 25
Provided by: exsi
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Heraclitus??:? You could not step twice into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you. ?


1
?? 23????? (1)
  • ????

???????
2
???????
  • ??????????????,???????,?????????????????
  • Heraclitus??? You could not step twice into the
    same river for other waters are ever flowing on
    to you. ?
  • (????,????????)

3
????(Personal Identity)
  • ???????????,??????,??????????,??????????,?????????
    ?????????????????????????????????????,????????????
    ???????????????????????,??????????????

4
  • ???,????????????????,?????????????,???????

5
?????
  • ??????????????????????,??????????????,??????????
    ?????,??????,?????????????????!?
  • ???????,?????????????,????????!????????,?????????
    ???????????????

6
????
  • ?????????????????????????,????,????,?????????
  • ?????????????,???????????????

7
?????
  • ??Personal Identity,???????????

8
??????????
  • What does it take for a person to persist from
    one time to anotherthat is, for the same person
    to exist at different times?
  • What sorts of adventures could you possibly
    survive, in the broadest sense of the word
    possible, and what sort of event would
    necessarily bring your existence to an end?
  • What determines which past or future being is
    you? Suppose you point to a child in an old class
    photograph and say, That's me. What makes you
    that one, rather than one of the others? What is
    it about the way she relates then to you as you
    are now that makes her you? For that matter, what
    makes it the case that anyone at all who existed
    back then is you?
  • This is the question of personal identity over
    time. An answer to it is an account of our
    persistence conditions, or a criterion of
    personal identity over time.

9
?????
  • Historically this question often arises out of
    the hope (or fear) that we might continue to
    exist after we diePlato's Phaedo is a famous
    example. Whether this could happen depends on
    whether biological death necessarily brings one's
    existence to an end.
  • Imagine that after your death there really will
    be someone, in the next world or in this one, who
    resembles you in certain ways. How would that
    being have to relate to you as you are now in
    order to be you, rather than someone else? What
    would the Higher Powers have to do to keep you in
    existence after your death? Or is there anything
    they could do? The answer to these questions
    depends on the answer to the Persistence
    Question.

10
????
  • ??1???????,?????????
  • ??2??????,?????????
  • ??3??????,?????????
  • ??4???????????????????

11
?????????
  • Scientists tell you that instead of having to
    travel by rocket, which would take many years,
    you can step into their machine here on earth and
    (so they claim) step out of a similar machine on
    the colonized planet a few hours later. What the
    machine does is conduct a complete scan of the
    state of every cell in your body, recording all
    this information on a computer (the nature of the
    scan being such that the cells are all destroyed
    by the process). The information is then
    transmitted in the form of a radio signal to a
    machine on the colonized planet, which will build
    a replica of you which is exact right down to the
    last details.

12
?????????
  • In the film Here Comes Mr. Jordan, a
    prize-fighter is taken to heaven because of a
    mistake in the heavenly records. His body has
    been crushed beyond repair in a plane crash, and
    he demands a new body so that he can continue his
    career. He is supplied with another body no one
    recognizes him, of course, but his own memories
    are intact, and he fulfills his dream of becoming
    world champion. All this is fantasy, to be
    surebut wouldnt you be as certain as the movie
    audience that it is still the same person with a
    different body? And even if you werent sure, he
    is sureand he knows, doesnt he?

13
?????????
  • Suppose when you awoke this morning your body
    looked quite unlike your body of yesterday. You
    now have an extra leg and feathers sprouting all
    over, and can emit only a few ostrich-like
    screeches and no words. Of course, nobody
    recognizes you everyone thinks youre someone
    (or something) else. But dont you know its
    still you, in spite of this unexpected
    transformation?

14
Numerical identity
  • The persistence question is about numerical
    identity. To say that this and that are
    numerically identical is to say that they are one
    and the same one thing rather than two.
  • This is different from qualitative identity.
    Things are qualitatively identical when they are
    exactly similar. Identical twins may be
    qualitatively identicalthere may be no telling
    them apartbut not numerically identical, as
    there are two of them thats what makes them
    twins.

15
  • A past or future person need not be, at that past
    or future time, exactly like you are now in order
    to be youthat is, in order to be numerically
    identical with you. You dont remain
    qualitatively the same throughout your life. You
    change you get bigger or smaller you learn new
    things and forget others and so on. So the
    question is not what it takes for a past or
    future being to be qualitatively just like you,
    but what it takes for a past or future being to
    be you, as opposed to someone or something other
    than you.

16
An insidious misunderstanding
  • Many people try to state the Persistence Question
    like this
  • (1) Under what possible circumstances is a person
    existing at one time identical with a person
    existing at another time?
  • In other words, what does it take for past or
    future person to be you? We have a person
    existing at one time and a person existing at
    another, and the question is what is necessary
    and sufficient for them to be one person rather
    than two.

17
Whats wrong with question (1)?
  • Question (1) is NOT the Persistence Question. It
    is too narrow. Why?
  • We may want to know whether you were ever an
    embryo or a fetus, or whether you could survive
    in an irreversible vegetative state or as a
    corpse. These are clearly questions about what it
    takes for us to persist, and an account of our
    identity over time ought to answer them.
  • Note that answers to such questions may have
    important ethical implications it matters to the
    morality of abortion, for instance, whether
    something that is an embryo or fetus at one time
    can be an adult person at another time, or
    whether the adult person is always numerically
    different from the fetus.

18
Whats wrong with question (1)?
  • Many philosophers define person as something
    that has certain special mental properties.
  • Locke, for instance, famously said that a person
    is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason
    and reflection, and can consider itself as
    itself, the same thinking thing, in different
    times and places.
  • Presumably this implies that something is a
    person at a given time if and only if it has
    those mental properties then. And neurologists
    say that early-term foetuses and human beings in
    a persistent vegetative state have no mental
    properties at all then.

19
Whats wrong with question (1)?
  • If anything like Locke's definition is right,
    such beings as early-term foetuses or human
    beings in a persistent vegetative state are not
    peoplenot at that time, anyway.
  • In that case we cannot infer anything about
    whether you were once an embryo or could come to
    be a vegetable by discovering what it takes for a
    past or future person to be you.

20
  • So rather than Question (1), we ought to ask what
    it takes for any past or future being, person or
    not, to be you or I
  • (2) Under what possible circumstances is a person
    who exists at one time identical with something
    that exists at another time (whether or not it is
    a person then)?
  • This is the Persistence Question.

21
???????
  • ????????,??????????,?????????????????,????????????
    ?????,???????,?????????????????????????????????,??
    ???????????,?????????,??????,??????????????,??????
    ?,??????????,??????????,????????????,??????????

22
????
?? ?? ???? ??/??
1-23 ??????Microsoft Office 2003?????,??Microsoft??????????46?52?65?????
2 ???????,???????,??????????????? ?,??,lt?????gt
2 You could not step on to you. Fragment 41 Quoted by Plato in Cratylus
6 ????????????????,??????? ????????????
8 What does it take for a person to personal identity over time. ??Susan Schneider,Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.68
23
????
?? ?? ???? ??/??
9 Historically this question Persistence Question. Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,??Susan Schneider,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.68, ???????46?52?65?????
11 Scientists tell you that instead of ..to the last details. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis,??John Hospers,???Routledge, 2013,p.192, ???????46?52?65?????
12 In the film Here Comes doesnt he? An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis,??John Hospers,???Routledge, 2013,p.188, ???????46?52?65?????
13 Suppose when you unexpected transformation? An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis,??John Hospers,???Routledge, 2013,p.187-188, ???????46?52?65?????
14 The persistence question what makes them twins. Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,??Susan Schneider,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.72, ???????46?52?65?????
24
????
?? ?? ???? ??/??
15 A past or future person need not be,something other than you Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,??Susan Schneider,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.72, ???????46?52?65?????
16 Many people try to state...person rather than two. Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,??Susan Schneider,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.73, ???????46?52?65?????
17 Question (1) is NOT ...from the fetus. Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,??Susan Schneider,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.73, ???????46?52?65?????
18 Many philosophers define...at all then. Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,??Susan Schneider,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.73, ???????46?52?65?????
19 If anything like Locke's...person to be you. Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,??Susan Schneider,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.73, ???????46?52?65?????
20 So rather than...Persistence Question. Science Fiction and Philosophy From Time Travel to Superintelligence,??Susan Schneider,???John Wiley Sons, 2010,ltPersonal Identitygt,??Eric Olson,p.73, ???????46?52?65?????
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com