Israeli-Egyptian (in)security: The Yom Kippur War

1
Israeli-Egyptian (in)security The Yom Kippur War
2
Timeline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Peace
Process

• 1917- Balfour Declaration The British Balfour
  Declaration promised to create a Jewish homeland
  in the region comprising the ancient Land of
  Israel
• By British Foreign Secretary-Lord Arthur Balfour,
  his letter to the British Head of Zionism view
  favor the establishment in Palestine of a
  national home for the Jewish people

3

• 1920-1947 British Mandate Established by the
  League of Nations
• The emergence of Zionist (Zionism- Jewish
  nationalist movement to establish Jewish
  state-Land of Israel) state in Palestine which
  became unstoppable following the Holocaust
  committed by Nazi Germany against the Jews of
  Europe in the WWII/ support by international
  community as sympathy towards the Jews
• Competition over territory is the core of the
  conflict between Palestinians and Israeli Jews.

4

• UN Partition Plan 1947-
• UNGA resolution 181-Partition plan was opposed by
  Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries

5

• 1948-war of 1948David Ben-Gurion, Israels first
  Prime Minister, proclaimed the independence of
  the new State of Israel on May 14, 1948. The
  following day, Arab armies from Egypt,
  Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq attacked the
  new Jewish state.
• Armistice boundaries were established and
  remained until 1967.
• This was the first Arab-Israeli war,

6
(No Transcript)
7

• Militarily-authoritarian Arab regimes
• Arab states in the region aim legitimize their
  positions and regimes in post-colonial era
• Israel was an opportunity to do that

8

• Israels main foreign policy focus maintenance
  of its security
• Possessed the most lethal military forces in the
  Middle East
• Established intelligence service Mossad and
  Shabak-guardian of Zionist cause/watching Arab
  neighbors and being ready to take pre-emptive
  actions against them
• Egypt was the leading country to Israelis
  existence

9

• Arab states foreign policy Israel as challenge
  to their regimes
• Oppose to Israel for any cost (priority of
  competition for regional leadership rather than
  defending the Palestine)
• 1948 war caused Palestinian refugee crisis
  created internal problems for neighboring
  countries

10

• 1967- The Six-Day War / The 1967 Arab-Israeli War
  
• Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq moved their armies
  to Israels borders. Egypt closed the
  international water way, the Straits of Tiran, to
  all Israeli shipping, an act of war according to
  international law. These actions were accompanied
  by publicly stated intentions by Arab leaders to
  destroy Israel. After weeks of fruitless
  diplomacy, Israel launched a preemptive strike
  against the Arab armies mobilized on its borders,
  and a six-day war ensued between Israel and
  Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq.

11

• Israeli encouragement by US support!!
• US underwrote Israeli war plans by agreeing to
  the following support of Israeli at the UN,
  backing Israeli in the event of Soviet
  intervention, military support.
• Acting pre-emptively, Israeli had secured a
  comprehensive victory through element of surprise
  and technologically superior forces

12
(No Transcript)
13

• As a result of the war, Israel captured the
• West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan
• the Golan Heights from Syria
• the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt
• Israel offered to return land it captured in
  exchange for peace treaties and recognition of
  its right to exist.

14

• Israeli gained strategic place in territories in
  the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza Strip
  and the Golan Heights.
• Victory brought also complacency and the prestige
  of military

15

• Result of war and failure to return Palestinian
  lands within the Arab countries
• Dissatisfaction of domestic publics which
  questioned the legitimacy of regimes
• Egypt defeat prompted to reevaluate of the
  status of their military strength and tactics
• Lessons were learned!
• New strategies and plans with Arab countries to
  defeat Israel in order to respond domestic
  pressure and maintain power of their regimes

16

• Israels devastation of Arab armies in 1967,
• Establishment of superiority of Israeli military
• Result of the war forced Egyptian leaders to
  question Egypts position in the region and
  internationally.

17

• The Events/international actions leaded 1973 war
• Palestinian leadership by Yasser Arafat
  (Palestinian Liberation Organization-PLO) forced
  to move its command structure from Jordan to
  Lebanon
• Changing Jordans view towards Arab-Israeli war,
  Palestinian parties aimed to overthrow the
  Jordanian Monarchy and replace it with more
  radical front against Israel but it turned to the
  Jordanian Civil War

18

• The Events/international actions leaded 1973 war
• Break-up the Arab solidarity, Jordans domestic
  considerations were driving factors of its
  foreign policy than pan-Arab loyalties
• PLO brought Lebanon into the conflict which
  created potential for Syria-Israel disagreement
• Death of President Nasser of Egypt- who
  negotiated successfully ceasefire with Israel

19

• Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on Yom Kippur,
  the holiest day of the Jewish year.
• Why did Egypt attacked Israel in 1973?
• Why did Israel not take actions to prevent the
  attack from taking place?
• Did Egypt intend to impose defeat of Israel or
  force Israel to the negotiating table for
  political reasons?

20

• 1973- The October War / Yom Kippur War / 1973
  Arab-Israeli War
• Why did Egypt decided to go war against Israel in
  1973? Without Jordan and wider Arab Alliance? Was
  it more Egyptian to revenge their earlier defeat?
  Was it recapture lost territories or fighting on
  behalf of Palestinians?
• As being aware of rising threat Why did Israel
  choose to inaction rather than pre-emptive strike
  like 1967

21

• Egypt desire to get revenge of 1967 defeat
• Bad economy-lack of US investment
• Desire to increase weakening popularity of regime
  and strength by fighting against Israel
• Possibility to involve in war against Israel if
  Syria choose to launch pre-emptive strike
• Egyptian leader Sadat statements in 1971 for his
  intention to go war although he seeks to
  negotiate with Israel via US national security
  advisor, Henry Kissinger (1973)

22

• Desire to regain lost territories (Golan Heights
  and Sinai) and difficulties to reach diplomatic
  outcome, left only military solution
• Israeli intelligence service gained information
  about war preparation in Egypt and Syria months
  before the war then Why did Israel choose to
  inaction
• Answer is overconfidence/arrogance/ incredibility
  of Arab revival
• Advise given by US- encourage Israel to remain
  unwilling to comprise on diplomatic solutions

23

• As a result of overconfidence of 1967 victory and
  superpower support Israeli foreign policy makers
  did not take the threats against them seriously
  in the early 1970s
• But also unwillingness to see the fact by
  Israel's Egypt expel Soviet advisors which was
  perceived by Israel as no invasion which requires
  external professional advice, also Sadats
  deception and secrecy to deploy forces and 6
  October was the Jewish religious holiday of Yom
  Kippur and also period of Ramadan

24

• Israeli belief that low possibility of attack in
  their own religious day
• Israeli analysts failure to understand opponents/
  unwillingness to see threat rising from Arab
  states
• Red-team thinking-failure to understand acting
  as an opponent would act
• Not desiring war- leading policy makers being
  unable to visualize war

25

• Final event- when Israeli annexed a large area of
  Sinai and US did not do anything to prevent it.
• Egypt and Syria believed that Israel could forced
  to return the lost territories only by military
  forces and also force US to involve in the
  conflict for negotiating return of Sinai and
  Golan Heights.

26
(No Transcript)
27

• 6 October 1973
• Sadats limited strategic objective failed to
  exploit Israel's weaknesses of fighting on two
  fronts.
• Short Arab success-Israels counter attack-
  Israeli managed to push Egypt forces across the
  Suez Canal and then occupy West Bank.

28

• So Arab-Israeli conflict is not only about
  Palestinians
• Palestinians are used by Arab states and Israel
  for their own national interest in the region!!!

29

• Camp David Accords The American-sponsored talks
  paved the way to the peace treaty signed in 1979.
  
• Why did Egypt under Sadat undertake a policy
  shift after the Yom Kippur war?
• No single reason explains why Egypt changed its
  policy toward Israel following the Yom Kippur
  war.
• First explanation cognitive explanations as a
  person Sadat saw himself Egyptian rather than
  Arab which gave him flexibility to negotiate a
  settlement for the interest of Egypt

30

• Second explanation class-based politics within
  Egypt
• Demands of Egypts expanding bourgeoisie/policy
  shift that maximized their class interest by
  realigning Egypt with US.
• Third explanation involvement of external
  forces, US desire to end Arab-Israeli dispute in
  order to promote its economic interests in the
  region, US influence on the action of IMF pushed
  Egypt policy shift

31

• Policy Shift as a result of three explanations
• Socio economic problems within the Egypt,
  re-alignment with US, and pursue Egypt First
  policy at the expense of Arab Unity
• Foreign policy shift as a result of domestic need
  to maintain the regime

32

• Sadats foreign policy was successful from two
  ways
• First allow him claim victory for regaining
  control of Sinai
• Second it normalized trade with Israel and US,
  IMF grant loans to the government to improve
  socio-economic problems of Egypt's population
• Financial benefits as a result of military cuts,
  revenue improved employment, reduce
  socio-economic tension and increase regime
  security.

33

• 17 September 1978 , Camp David Accords signed,
  followed by Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of
  March 1979
• This was called as Cold Peace and this peace
  remained until the fall of H. Mubarak regime in
  2011
• Involvement of Muslim Brotherhood, anti-Israeli
  slogans being a common feature of the
  demonstrations across the country

34

• Deterioration of relations with Israel following
  the storming of the Israeli embassy in Cairo, on
  9 September 2011.

35

• Localization of foreign policy
• Regional security system dominated in the Middle
  East
• Israels foreign policy-primacy to maintain its
  national security (especially after the
  Holocaust)
• Foreign policy of Arab countries union against
  the presence of Israel, conflict with Israel was
  one of the defending Arab nationalist pride in
  post-colonial age
• Through Zionism Arab nationalism had emerged as
  the major political force

36
Conclusion

• The case study illustrates that foreign policy
  decisions are not always dictated by logic of
  facts.
• Egypt's increasing military preparation and
  Israel remained uninterested in pre-emptive
  action
• Foreign policy should not match with sentiments
  of a countrys rhetoric/ policy shift in Egypt
  and established peace treaty with Israel

37

• Failure to find a resolution acceptable to all
  parties involved in Palestinian-Israeli
  /Arab-Israeli conflict.
• New developments/changes in the Middle East
  following the Arab Spring
• New regime in Egypt
• conflicting Baath regime of Syria
• Palestinian demand for the statehood in UN
  General Assembly in 2011

38

• Deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relation
  Turkeys support for Palestinians and flotilla
  crisis
• US support for democratization process in Arab
  states
• Discoveries of hydrocarbons in the eastern
  Mediterranean/ energy insecurity/ possibility to
  trigger existing or new conflicts in the region

39

• Latest development in the region since 2010
  proves that insecurity in the Middle East remain
  as global security as it was during the Yom
  Kippur war.