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Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control

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Title: Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control


1
Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control
Yanjiang Yang (I2R, Singapore)
Yingjiu Li (SMU, Singapore)
Jian Weng (Jinan Univ. China)
Jianying Zhou (I2R, Singapore)
Feng Bao (I2R, Singapore)
2
Content
  • Introduction
  • Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control
    Concept
  • Proposed Scheme
  • Conclusion

3
Introduction
Project Summary - why should it be done?
  • Inference problem has been a long standing issue
    in database security
  • Sensitive information beyond one's privileges can
    be inferred from the unsensitive data to which
    one is granted access.
  • Access control cannot solve the inference problem
  • The set of queries whose responses lead to
    inference is said to form an inference channel

4
Introduction Con.
  • Inference Control
  • to prevent the formation of inference channels
  • Auditing is a special kind of inference control
    technique that audits queries in order to ensure
    that a user's current query, together with his
    past queries, cannot form any inference channel

5
Introduction Con.
Project Summary - why should it be done?
  • Inference Control
  • What forms an inference channel depends closely
    on the data to be protected and the protection
    objective
  • Our concern in this work is the inference
    channels that result in identifying the subjects
    contained in the database
  • An example is a database of medical records for
    individuals
  • explicit identifying information
  • Non-identifying attributes such as age, ZIP code,
    DoB are not personally identifiable

6
Introduction Con.
Project Summary - why should it be done?
  • Inference Control
  • An example is a database of medical records for
    individuals
  • explicit identifying information
  • individual attributes such as age, ZIP code, DoB
    are not personally identifiable
  • each of them alone usually does not contain
    sufficient information to uniquely identify any
    individuals, thereby should not be classified as
    sensitive.
  • However, a combination of some/all of these
    non-sensitive attributes may be uniquely
    identifiable, thus forming an inference channel.

7
Introduction Con.
Project Summary - why should it be done?
  • Inference Control
  • Inference control in this context works by
    blocking users who access the database from
    obtaining responses of the queries that cover all
    the attributes necessary to complete an inference
    channel.

8
Introduction Con.
Project Summary - why should it be done?
  • Query Privacy
  • Users who access database also have privacy
    concern
  • Exposure of what data a user is accessing to the
    database server may lead to the compromise of
    user privacy
  • It is desirable that inference control is
    enforced by the server in a way that query
    privacy is also preserved
  • The two objectives are conflicting to some extent

9
Introduction Con.
Project Summary - why should it be done?
  • Private Inference Control
  • Woodruff and Staddon (Private Inference Control.
    In Proc. ACM CCS 04) are the first to propose
    private inference control to attain both
    objectives
  • Unfortunately, practical deployment of private
    inference control may encounter an enormous
    obstacle
  • database server knows nothing about user queries,
    so users can easily exploit by issuing useless
    queries

10
Introduction Con.
Project Summary - why should it be done?
  • Private Inference Control
  • Unfortunately, practical deployment of private
    inference control may encounter an enormous
    obstacle
  • database server knows nothing about user queries,
    so users can easily exploit by issuing useless
    queries
  • It is a well known fact that inference control
    (even without privacy protection) is extremely
    computation intensive
  • This kind of DoS attacks are expected to be
    particularly effective in private inference
    control.

11
Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control
Concept
Project Summary - why should it be done?
  • Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control
  • The intuition is to force users not to make
    queries that form inference channels otherwise,
    penalty will incur on the querying users
  • users are obliged to enforce costly inference
    control by themselves before making queries -
    Self-Enforcing

12
Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control
Concept
  • Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control
  • In our proposed scheme, penalty is instantiated
    to be a deprivation of the access privileges of
    the violating users.
  • If a user makes an inference-enabling query, then
    the user's access right is forfeited and he is
    rejected to make queries any further

13
Proposed Scheme
  • We incorporate access control into inference
    control, and base access control on one-time
    access keys
  • a user is able to get the access key for next
    query only if his current query is inference-free
  • We extend Woodruff and Staddon's scheme

14
Proposed Scheme Con.
  • The inference control rule is that for any
    record, the user cannot get all its attributes
  • suppose the database has n records, each record
    has m attributes

15
Proposed Scheme Con.
  • User lthQuery Ql ltHom_Enc(il), Hom_Enc(jl)gt
  • The server selects a random Kl1, and generates
    l -1 shares, s1, s2, , sl-1, forming a (l
    -m1)-out-of-(l -1) sharing of Kl1 using a
    secret sharing scheme
  • The server computes e1 Hom_Enc((i1-il)s1), e2
    Hom_Enc((i2- il)s2), , el-1 Hom_Enc ((il-1
    il)sl-1) using the user's previous queries.
  • The user decrypts e1, e2, , el-1, if the user's
    query sequence thus far does not complete
    inference channel, the user can recover at least
    l m 1 shares, thus reconstructing Kl1.

16
Proposed Scheme Con.
  • The remaining steps are largely Woodruff and
    Staddon's scheme, with Kl1 being the random
    number in theirs.
  • We Discussed Various Issues to Improve the Above
    Basic Scheme
  • Penalty Lifting
  • Allow for Repeat Queries
  • Stricter Query Privacy

17
Conclusion
  • DoS Attacks Are Particularly Effective in Private
    Inference Control Systems
  • We Were Motivated to Propose Self-Enforcing
    Private Inference Control
  • The Intuition is to Force Users to be Cautious in
    Making Queries, as Penalty Will be Inflicted Upon
    Users Who Make Inference-Enabling Queries.
  • We Presented A Concrete Scheme

18
Q A
Project Summary - why should it be done?
THANK YOU!
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