ARE PARLIAMENTARY SISTEMS BETTER?

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ARE PARLIAMENTARY SISTEMS BETTER?

• JOHN GERRING
• STROM C. THACKER
• CAROLA MORENO

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RESEARCH QUESTION

• Are parliamentary or presidential systems
  superior?
• Which method of structuring the executive leads
  to better governance?
• It could be that neither system is better overall.

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• The only consequential difference between these
  two constitutional molds is that one system
  (presidentialism), by virtue of greater
  institutional fragmentation, offers greater
  resistance to change (Tsebelis, 2000).
• Indeed, presidentialism and parliamentarism are
  unified labels for variegated realities.
• It could be that the performance of the executive
  is contingent on cultural,socioeconomic,and
  historical factors that vary from country to
  country and from period to period. If so,
  parliamentarism may be more appropriate in some
  contexts and presidentialism, in others.

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• Our concern here is with construction of the
  executive and its possible role in achieving good
  governance.
• Given a modicum of multiparty competition, what
  are the policy effects of different executive
  structures?
• In attempting to judge this matter,we observe
  three broad policy areas
• political development
• economic development
• human development
• composing a total of 14 specific outcomes
  understood as indicators of good or bad
  governance across these various dimensions

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THEORETICAL DEBATE

• Parliamentary systems foster stronger political
  parties,more centralized and party-aligned
  interest groups, a more centralized
  decision-making process, and more centralized and
  hierarchical administrative structures.

• Presidentialism fosters a more personalized and
  free-floating style of leadership centered on
  individual politicians and smaller, less
  established organizational entities.

• Yet,none of these proximate causal effects has
  clear-cut implications for the quality of
  governance in a polity.

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• Partisans of separate powers prize the diffusion
  of power, whereas parliamentarists prize its
  unification.
• Arguments of debate
• PARTY ORGANIZATION
• INTEREST ORGANIZATION
• BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION
• TRANSPARENCY
• INFORMATION
• ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
• POLITICAL CHANGE
• INSTITUTIONALIZATION
• CONTESTATION CONSENSUS
• DECISIVENESS OF THE EXECUTIVE

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• QUESTION OF PARTY ORGANIZATION.
• There is general agreement that the existence of
  an independently elected executive with strong
  policy-making prerogatives weakens party
  cohesion. But there is intense disagreement over
  whether strong (cohesive) political parties
  foster good governance.
• Supporters of the responsible party government
  model view strong political parties as the
  linchpin of democratic accountability and
  effective governance.
• Critics of this ideal point out that undue
  partisanship may blind voters and legislators to
  the public interest and may prevent them from
  reaching compromise.
• QUESTION OF INTEREST ORGANIZATION.
• A separate powers system is generally thought to
  encourage the formation of a highly fragmented,
  non-party-aligned (independent) interest group
  community. The concept of separate powers is thus
  a key feature of interest group pluralism
  (positive/negative ramifications), whereas
  parliamentarism is a key feature of corporatism.

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• QUESTION OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION Lines of
  bureaucratic accountability are more complicated
  in a separate powers system because bureaucrats
  have two masters their nominal chief executive
  and the controllers of the budget.
• Defenders argue that bureaucratic accountability
  is ensured through multiple principals,semi-indepe
  ndent agencies carrying strict and highly
  specific mandates,and overlapping jurisdictions
  such that bureaucrats check and balance each
  other.
• Opponents of bureaucratic fragmentation point out
  that it hinders cooperation among agencies, is
  less efficient, leads to problems of
  micro-management, erodes principal-agent
  accountability.
• QUESTION OF TRANSPARENCY.
• Advocates of separate powers underline the fact
  that a direct vote for the chief executive leads
  to a transparent relationship between elections
  and electoral outcomes.
• Advocates of parliamentarism point out that
  postelection coalition negotiations affect only
  those circumstances in which no single party is
  able to gain a majority of the legislature

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• QUESTION OF INFORMATION
• Advocates of presidentialism rightly point out
  that the division of power between executive and
  legislature creates an information-rich
  environment. Each branch has an incentive to
  investigate the other branch each also has an
  incentive to publicize information favorable to
  the achievement of its political power and policy
  preferences.
• Advocates of parliamentarism counter that more
  information does not always lead to better
  governance. (too much or, misleading
  information). If members of the two branches are
  constantly attacking each other, engaged in
  vituperative campaigns, then the resulting
  information will not serve as a useful check
  against bad policies. It will instead enhance
  citizen apathy and alienation.

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• QUESTION OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY.
• Advocates of separate powers see greater
  accountability at the local level between
  constituents and their individual
  representatives, whose positions are distinct
  from their parties.
• Advocates of parliamentarism see greater
  accountability at the national level between
  constituents and their political party, since
  accountability arises from the concentration of
  authority in a single set of hands (the ruling
  party or coalition and its leadership).
• However, strict accountability between elected
  officials and voters may not lead to better
  governance outcomes. Insofar as votersdemands
  are unrealistic, short-sighted, or simply
  wrong-headed, it may be useful for government
  officials to find ways to mask their
  responsibility for unpopular measures.

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• QUESTION OF POLITICAL CHANGE.
• Advocates of separate powers often emphasize the
  virtues of political stability. Only where
  institutions are constitutionally separate can
  the government attain credible commitment to a
  set of policies.
• By contrast, advocates of parliamentary rule
  emphasize the problem of the status quo. For
  them, the chief political problem is to adapt to
  changing demands and changing circumstances.
• QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION.
• Parliamentarism fosters a highly
  predictable,institutionalized form of politics
  and policy making in which participants are part
  of the establishment.
• By contrast, presidentialism fosters a more
  personalized form of political behavior in which
  presidents,legislators,interest group leaders,and
  even bureaucrats all enjoy a degree of
  independence from the institutions of which they
  are nominally members. Each may play the role of
  policy entrepreneur. Each may also play an
  oppositional role. Under the influence of the
  media, this political structure may lead to
  greater political conflict than what would be
  expected in a parliamentary system, where
  negotiated settlements are the norm.

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• QUESTION OF CONTESTATIONCONSENSUS.
• In a separate powers system, conflict is endemic
  and continual. Each branch is assumed to
  represent a somewhat different constituency or
  the same constituency in different ways. Yet,
  because a higher threshold of consensus is
  necessary for agreement on any policy measure, it
  might be said that consensus is mandated by a
  separate powers constitution.
• By contrast, power in a parliamentary system is
  temporarily monopolized by a single party or
  coalition. Other groups may voice their
  opposition, but they have no formal mechanism by
  which they might affect policy outcomes.
  Consequential conflict is thus episodic,
  occurring during elections but not in between.

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• QUESTION OF DECISIVENESS IN THE EXECUTIVE.
• To some, this is a sign of danger, of corruption
  an invitation to the abuse of power.
• To others, energy in the executive is a sign of
  state capacity.
• In sum, academics and policy makers seem to agree
  on one thing only Constitutional structures
  matter. They disagree on how constitutional
  structures, such as the separation of powers,
  affect the quality of governance in a democracy.

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• There are strong theoretical grounds justifying
  both sides of the argument. Each virtue of
  presidentialism/ parliamentarism can also be seen
  as a vice, depending on ones theoretical lens.
  They are mirror images of each other.
  Alternatively, arguments for each side may cancel
  each other out.
• the authors propose here to reverse the
  conventional sequence of scientific inquiry.
  Rather than theorize first, then test, they
  propose to test first, in the hopes that fruitful
  theorizing will follow. (Persson and Tabellini)

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CLASSIFYING EXECUTIVE TYPES

• Parliamentarism
• a system of government in which the executive
  (the prime minister and cabinet collectively,
  the government) is chosen by and responsible to
  an elective body (the legislature), thus creating
  a single locus of sovereignty at the national
  level.

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• Presidentialism
• a system where policy-making power is divided
  between two separately elected bodies
• the legislature
• the president selected by direct popular
  election, (though it may be filtered through an
  electoral college) The president is actively
  engaged in the making of public policy and, in
  this sense plays a political role.

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• Between these polar types we find various
  admixtures, known generically as semipresidential
  polities
• parliamentarypresidential distinction as a
  continuum with two dimensions
• degree of separation (independence) between
  president and parliament (unity parliamentary,
  separation presidential) and whether there is
  any separation at all
• relative power of the two players (the more power
  the president possesses, the more presidential is
  the resulting system).

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• The authors capture this complex reality with a
  three-part coding scheme named parliamentarism.
• 0 presidential
• 1 semipresidential
• 2 parliamentary

UNITY
HIGH
2
1
PPM
LOW
0
2
1
PP
LOW
HIGH
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• The authors are concerned with not only a
  countrys current status but also its
  institutional history it takes time for
  institutions to exert an appreciable effect on
  governance outcomes
• To represent this historical component, they
  created a new variable, drawing on the annual
  scores for parliamentarism. Since history matters
  but recent history matters more. Thus, they
  calculate a weighted sum of the annual scores of
  each of the underlying explanatory factors,
  beginning in 1901 and ending in the observation
  year. Weights capture long-term historical
  patterns while giving greater weight to more
  recent years

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• Country years figure in this weighted summation
  process so long as a country surpasses a minimum
  threshold of democracy during that year
• They include a country year in the analysis so
  long as it obtains a score greater than zero, on
  a scale ranging from 10 to 10, on the Polity2
  measure of democracy

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DEPENDENT VARIABLES

• They identify a set of outcome indicators that
  are _measurable
• _valid cross-nationally
• _reasonably clear in their normative
  implications
• They include as wide an array of governance
  outcomes as possible
• those that are survey based (soft) and
  those that are directly measurable (hard)
• those that measure processes
• those that measure policy effort or policy
  outcomes

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• 14 outcome measures that can be divided into
  three policy areas
• POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
• TWO MEASURES OF CORRUPTION CONTROL
• one from Political Risk Services
• one from the World Banks governance indicators
• A MEASURE OF BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY
• from political risk services
• THREE WORLD BANK INDICATORS
• government effectiveness
• political stability,
• rule of law

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• ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
• FOUR INDICATORS BASED ON THE WORLD BANKS WORLD
  DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
• number of telephone mainlines per 1,000
  inhabitants
• import duties
• trade openness
• level of prosperity within a country
• ONE BASED ON EUROMONEY
• country risk ratings to measure the overall
  investment climate

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• HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
• THREE VARIABLES BASED ON THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT
  INDICATORS
• infant mortality rate
• estimates of life expectancy
• illiteracy

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WHAT IS GOVERNANCE?

• GOVERNANCE CONSISTS OF THE TRADITIONS AND
  INSTITUTIONS BY WHICH AUTHORITY IN A COUNTRY IS
  EXERCISED, INCLUDING
• the process by which governments are selected,
  monitored and replaced
• the capacity of the government to effectively
  formulate and implement sound policies
• the respect of citizens and the state for the
  institutions that govern economic and social
  interactions among them
• Governance matters 2009

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The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project

• This project reports aggregate and individual
  governance indicators for 212 countries and
  territories over the period 19962008, for six
  dimensions of governance
• VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
• POLITICAL STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE
• GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS
• REGULATORY QUALITY
• RULE OF LAW
• CONTROL OF CORRUPTION

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• Voice and Accountability measures the extent to
  which countrys citizens are able to participate
  in selecting their government, as well as freedom
  of expression, freedom of association, and a free
  media
• Political Stability and Absence of
  Violence/Terrorism measures the perceptions of
  the likelihood that the government will be
  destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
  violent means, including domestic violence and
  terrorism
• Government Effectiveness measures the quality of
  public services, the quality of the civil service
  and the degree of its independence from political
  pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
  implementation, and the credibility of the
  governments commitment to such policies

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• Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the
  government to formulate and implement sound
  policies and regulations that permit and promote
  private sector development
• Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents
  have confidence in and abide by the rules of
  society, in particular the quality of contract
  enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well
  as the likelihood of crime and violence
• Control of Corruption measures the extent to
  which public power is exercised for private gain,
  including petty and grand forms of corruption, as
  well as capture of the state by elites and
  private interests.

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• The aggregate indicators combine the views of a
  large number of enterprise, citizen and expert
  survey respondents in industrial and developing
  countries.
• The individual data sources underlying the
  aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse
  variety of survey institutes, think tanks,
  non-governmental organizations, and international
  organizations.

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EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

• The method of analysis is largely contingent on
  the nature of the evidence at hand
• Where comparable time-series data are available,
  they employ a timeseriescross-section format
  even if it is subject to simultaneous spatial and
  temporal difficulties.
• But a unit-based fixed-effect research design to
  address spatial issues is not applicable, because
  the causal variable, parliamentarism, does not
  sufficiently vary from year to year

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• To mitigate sample heterogeneity they employ
• a set of regional fixed effects
• a geographically weighted version of the
  dependent variable.
• With respect to temporal issues, they employ
• a statistical correction for first-order
  autocorrelation
• a time-trend variable to control for possibly
  spurious correlations between heavily trended
  dependent and independent variables.

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• They include all the standard controls plus some
  not-so-standard ones
• Since a countrys regime history is likely to
  influence the quality of governance they include
  a variable that captures the cumulative
  democratic history of each country over the
  course of the 20th century.
• A countrys level of economic development is also
  likely to be strongly associated with good
  governance. They control for this, by including
  GDP per capita and measure this once, in 1960 to
  alleviate concerns about endogeneity between GDP
  and various outcomes

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• regional controls for Africa, Asia and Latin
  America / Caribbean
• significant period of socialist rule will have
  positive effects on human development and
  negative effects on political and economic
  development indicators
• having an English legal origin promotes good
  governance
• Latitude, ethnic (and linguistic)
  fractionalization,
• large population, distance from the nearest
  financial center and so on

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• They conducted two tests for each dependent
  variable
• The first is a full model, including all
  variables discussed above.
• The second is a reduced-form model, omitting most
  controls that do not pass the threshold of
  statistical significance in the expected
  direction.
• Geography-weighted control and the time-trend,
  democracy stock, and GDP-per-capita variables
  were maintained in all models, regardless of
  statistical significance, because of the
  expectation that these variables would capture
  important and otherwise unobserved effects

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ROBUSTNESS

• The authors analyse some robustness issues
• THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
  PARLIAMENTARISM
• In their codings, the authors recognise three
  levels full presidentialism, semipresidentialism,
  full parliamentarism. This imposes an interval
  measurement onto a set of ordinal distinctions,
  an imposition that could result in significant
  measurement error. But it is unlikely that
  another method of coding would bring results
  significantly different from this analysis

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• MANY COUNTRIES WITH PARLIAMENTARY RULE ARE IN
  WESTERN EUROPE
• Confounding factor. Authors ran test including
  then a dummy variable for Western Europe results
  for parliamentarism remained quite robust
• ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES
• Number of years that each country has enjoyed
  national sovereignty, alternative measures of
  fractionalization (ethnic, linguistic,
  religious), etc.
• THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARISM AND GOOD
• GOVERNANCE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE CONDITIONAL ON
  THE INCLUSION OF PARTICULAR CONTROL VARIABLES IN
  THE GENERAL MODEL.

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• INCLUSION OF OBSERVATIONS DURING YEARS WHEN A
  COUNTRY IS ONLY MARGINALLY DEMOCRATIC
• Authors adopted a fairly low threshold for
  democracy, assuming that a minimal level of
  multiparty competition is sufficient to set in
  motion whatever causal effects parliamentarism
  might have on the quality of governance.
• But it is possible that the effects of
  parliamentarism in a marginally democratic
  society are different from the effects in a fully
  democratic society then greater weight is
  carried in the analysis by countries that have
  been democratic over a longer stretch of time
  the results reflect a sample weighted toward
  countries that are strongly democratic.

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• POSSIBLE INTERACTION EFFECTS
• It could be that parliamentary, as well as
  presidential, systems work differently in
  polities with different electoral system types or
  across unitary and federal systems. No
  significant interaction effects with
  parliamentarism found
• POSSIBLE SELECTION EFFECTS
• The assignment of the treatment in
  observational research is not random. Perhaps,
  parliamentary systems are more likely to be
  adopted where prospects for good governance are
  more propitious. In this case, our key variable
  serves as a proxy for other, unmeasured factors.
  To neutralize this potential identification
  problem, the authors employed a series of
  instruments for parliamentarism in two-stage
  least squares estimations. Results largely robust

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• In any case, the authors think it unlikely that
  the choice of constitutional institutions
  reflects a countrys future prospects for
  good/bad governance.
• Whether a country becomes parliamentary or
  presidential depends partly on a countrys
  colonial heritage, on its size and demographics,
  and on patterns of government that obtain in a
  regional or historical context.
• However, these exogenous influences are
  relatively easy to model and so appear as
  controls in all their regression tests.

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• Constitution makers generally have notoriously
  short horizons of time.
• Then, since the type of constitution to which a
  country arrives is the product of a highly
  contingent political battle, the authors think it
  reasonable to regard a countrys choices among
  constitutional institutions as a largely
  stochastic phenomenon with respect to the
  outcomes of interest in this study longterm
• patterns of good or bad governance.

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CONCLUSIONS

• Some may ask why governance matters so much.
• The WGI found that a country improving its
  quality of governance can in the long term
  quadruple the income per capita of its
  population, and similarly reduce infant mortality
  and illiteracy.
• And the direction of causality goes from better
  governance to higher incomes, and not vice versa.

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• In other words, governance is not a 'luxury' good
  that only wealthier countries can afford is not
  the automatic result of development.
• To the contrary, it requires continuous political
  will and commitment, and difficult work
• Governance is not the only thing that matters for
  development , but it is a very important factor
  deserving policymakers attention

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CONCLUSIONS

• To the extent that the nature of the executive
  makes a difference, parliamentary systems offer
  significant advantages over presidential systems.
  
• In most policy areas, particularly in the areas
  of economic and human development, parliamentary
  systems are associated with superior governance.
• But which are the specific causal mechanisms by
  which the structure of the executive might
  influence policy outcomes?

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• PLAUSIBLE REASONS WHY PARLIAMENTARISM MIGHT LEAD
  TO BETTER GOVERNANCE
• Stronger political parties
• corporatist interest organization
• tighter principalagent relationships within the
  various arms of the bureaucracy,
• Centralized (national-level) electoral
  accountability,
• the capacity for flexible policy making,
• a more institutionalized political sphere
• decisive leadership.
• But what make parliamentarism a vehicle for good
  public policy (distinguishing it from
  presidentialism) is its capacity to function as a
  COORDINATION DEVICE

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• Coordination problems thus involve a conflict
  between the part and the whole, between
  individual/group rationality and collective
  rationality.
• When compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism
  offers better tools for resolving these sorts of
  difficulties because parliamentarism integrates a
  diversity of views while providing greater
  incentives for actors to reach agreement.

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• In parliamentary systems, debate occurs in a
  highly institutionalized fashion within parties,
  within committees, within leadership groups,
  across parties, within the cabinet, etc.
• By contrast, in presidential systems most of
  these
• units have greater independence, and those
  without independence (such as the cabinet) have
  very little power.
• IN THIS HIGHLY FRAGMENTED INSTITUTIONAL SPHERE
  AGREEMENTS MAY IMPOSE HIGHER TRANSACTION COSTS
  THAN IN A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

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• Parliamentarism should be more successful than
  presidentialism in coordinating diverse views and
  interests, all other things being equal, and in
  solving institutional conflicts.
• This should help to account for the higher
  quality of governance observed in parliamentary
  systems.

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