Lecture 8: pricing and Strategy

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Lecture 8 pricing and Strategy

• Advanced Micro Theory
• MSc.EnviNatResEcon.
• 1/2006
• Charit Tingsabadh

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Chapter 13

• Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition

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Table 13.1 Properties of Monopoly, Oligopoly,
Monopolistic Competition, and Competition
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Table 13.2 Profit Matrix for a Quantity-Setting
Game
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Figure 13.1 Competition Versus Cartel
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Figure 13.2 American Airlines Profit-Maximizing
Output
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Figure 13.2a American Airlines
Profit-Maximizing Output
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Figure 13.2b American Airlines
Profit-Maximizing Output
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Figure 13.3 American and Uniteds Best-Response
Curves
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Figure 13.4 Duopoly Equilibria
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Figure 13.4a Duopoly Equilibria
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Figure 13.4b Duopoly Equilibria
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Table 13.3 Cournot Equilibrium Varies with the
Number of Firms
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Figure 13.5 Stackelberg Game Tree
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Figure 13.6 Stackelberg Equilibrium
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Figure 13.7 Effects of a Government Subsidy on
a Cournot Equilibrium
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Figure 13.7a Effects of a Government Subsidy on
a Cournot Equilibrium
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Figure 13.7b Effects of a Government Subsidy on
a Cournot Equilibrium
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Table 13.4 Effects of a Subsidy Given to United
Airlines
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Page 458 Solved Problem 13.1
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Table 13.5 Comparison of Airline Market
Structures
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Figure 13.8 Monopolistically Competitive
Equilibrium
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Figure 13.9 Monopolistic Competition Among
Airlines
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Figure 13.9a Monopolistic Competition Among
Airlines
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Figure 13.9b Monopolistic Competition Among
Airlines
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Figure 13.10 Bertrand Equilibrium with Identical
Products
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Figure 13.11 Bertrand Equilibrium with
Differentiated Products
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Chapter 14

• Strategy

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Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game
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Solved Problem 14.1 (Page 483)
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Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent
Entry
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Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat
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Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry
and Stackelberg Equilibria
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Table 14.2 Entrants Best Response and Profit
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Figure 14.4 Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria
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Figure 14.5 Incumbent Commits to a Large
Quantity to Deter Entry
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Figure 14.6 Incumbent Loss if it Deters Entry
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Solved Problem 14.3 (Page 496)
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Figure 14.7 Investment Game Tree
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Figure 14.8 Raising-Costs Game Tree
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Application (Page 503) Evidence on Strategic
Entry Deterrence
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Figure 14.9 Advertising
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Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal Benefit of
Advertising
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Table 14.3 Advertising Game
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Cross-Chapter Analysis (Page 515) Magazine
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