Transforming Defense

1
Transforming Defense

• The Path Not Taken
• yet

• The Role of Defense in National Security
• The Management of Defense
• The Force

Vision Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage
Arthur K. Cebrowski Director, Force
Transformation 23 July 2003
2
Connecting the Present to Our Future

• Expanding Competition Power and
  Principle
• Strategic Posture Shrinking the Dysfunctional,
  Disconnected Gap of Globalization
• Operational Maneuver Creating a one-two
  punch
• Mapping Future Challenges Risk

• Issues
• How to make near-term actions robust across
  alternative futures?
• How to create on-ramps for capabilities?

3
Trends in Security Competition
4
Expanding Competition

• Policy Outcome f Power, Moral Principle,
  Strategic Interests

• U.S. power is unmatched
• Therefore, U.S. policy will be attacked through
  its moral principles (legitimacy, international
  law, etc.)
• If the frontiers of National Security can be
  everywhere and are not territorial borders but
  fault lines within societies, then
• The nexus of foreign and domestic security policy
  is intelligence
• We must be able to look and operate deeply within
  societies
• Assured Access includes the domains of political
  victory
• Speed of modern warfare creates a continuum, not
  a succession of phases

5
Security System Balance?
Major
Movements

• Strategic Maneuver/Balance
• Forces forward
• Strategic deploy from home
• Allies
• Operational Maneuver
• From forward garrison
• From the sea
• From strategic distances
• Deter Forward
• 2d derivative force
• Sustaining force
• Constabulary/Nation-building force

6
Strategic Posture Exporting
security

• The Red Zone Our Response

7
Global Trends Military
Response

• The Emerging American Military
• More expeditionary (including lighter, more
  lethal)
• More networked (more interoperability at the JTF
  level)
• Designed to leverage the exterior positions
  (precision from distance as sensors move in)
• Leverages increasingly persistent ISR
• Tighter sensor-shooter timelines (sensing, C2,
  fly-out)
• Values Information Superiority (information
  operations)
• Expanded unmanned capabilities(UAV, UCAV, UUV,
  robotics)

Information Age
Iraq 2
Globalization III
Globalization II
Iraq 1
Industrial Age
8
Global TrendsThreats
Strategic Response

• Strategic Capabilities
• More Preventative - Less Punitive
• Achieve unambiguous warning earlier
• More SOF-Like characteristics
• A Deter Forward Force
• An Intel/Surveillance-based force
• Coping with system perturbations

Information Age
Globalization III
Globalization II
-----Great Power War?----- -----Great Power War?----- -----Great Power War?----- -----Great Power War?-----
Political Ideology Hated Dictator Hated Dictator w/Nukes Nuclear Nationalists
Narco-terrorists Regional Terrorists International Terrorists SEI w/Bugs
Industrial Age
9
Top Level Issues Culture Values, Beliefs,
Attitudes
10
Candidates for Action Now
Identify
issues of regret

• Warfare Elements
• Fire - Non-lethals, Directed Energy, Redirected
  Energy
• Maneuver - Sea basing, vertical battlefield, lift
  for operational maneuver
• Protection - Urban Operations, Bug-to-Drug
  Cycle Time
• C2C Joint Interdependency vs. Interoperability
• ISR - Demand-centered Intel, Tactically
  Responsive Space
• Logistics - Joint demand-centered logistics
• Risk Management Areas (creating on-ramps)
• Joint ST
• Joint Experimentation
• Modern Warfare Modeling Tools
• People cost or resource
• Precision Deterrence

• Policy Outcome f Power, Moral Principle,
  Strategic Interests

11
Transforming Defense

• Surrogate Wars

gt

• System Perturbations and Consequences

gt
12
Evolution of Precision Strike Effectiveness
against fixed targets

• Then Now One-sixtieth the tonnage required to
  drop a bridge span

• Tons of bombs required to drop a bridge span (90
  confidence)

13
Evolution of Precision Strike Effectiveness
against mobile targets

• Then Now Sorties required to neutralize 10
  mobile armored battalions

• Damage 15 out of 30 armored vehicles per
  battalion

14
Evolution of Precision Strike Quantity of
bombs assigned for 90 Probability of Kill

• Then Now Over Three Orders of Magnitude
  reduction in weapons required to destroy a fixed
  target

176 Bombs88 F-4 Sorties400' CEP
9,000 Bombs1,500 B-17 Sorties3,300' CEP
2 Bombs1 F-16 Sortie10' CEP
1 Bomb1 B-2 Sortielt 10' CEP
1970s
1940s
2000s
1990s

• Advanced weapons systems armed with precision
  munitions are extremely accurate but are highly
  dependent on quality information

15
Paradigm Changes To Enable Precision
Deterrence
Precision Deterrence f Power, Moral Principle,
Strategic Interests Ours Ours Ours
Theirs Theirs Theirs

• Large Area Affected Makes up for Lack of Precise
  Weapon and Target Location
• Non-Linear Political Consequences
• Self Deterring

• Precise Weapon and Target Location Allows Focused
  Effects
• Militarily Relevant
• Operationally Useful

16
Deterrence is

• Context Dependent
• Highly reliant on intelligence
• A state of mind brought about by the existence of
  a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction
  relevant to those we wish to deter

• An Effects Based Operation
• Precision Deterrence creating a precise local
  effect in the cognitive domain
• Ways can be military, financial, economic or
  diplomatic
• The Duality of Means

Precision Deterrence must have a local effect
it can have a global impact
17
Military Options for Precision Deterrence

• Directed Energy Weapons
• Lasers
• Covert engagement at a safe distance
• All aspect engagement and re-targeting capability
• Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint
• Adjustable delivered energy
• High Powered Microwaves
• Deter belligerents
• Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint
• Deny an area to personnel
• Control crowds

• Non-Lethal Weapons
• Counter-Personnel
• Counter-Material
• Counter-Capability
• Need for decision space and time
• Ability to act while discriminating intent
• Increase engagement time and range
• Need to satisfy policy and operational
  constraints
• Target
• Non-combatants
• Own force

Operational Commonality?
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Precision Deterrence Issues
and Choices

• How do we balance local (tactical) deterrence and
  global (strategic) deterrence?
• What kind of JWAC-like process is required to
  create cognitive effects?
• Can our intelligence community identify that
  which our adversaries hold most dear?
• What are the new tools of deterrence that support
  our moral principles and strategic interests and
  how do they interact?
• What are the new concepts for deterrence?