Configurations of politico-administrative roles in organisation of public administration reforms. (Inductive approach )

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Configurations of politico-administrative roles
in organisation of public administration reforms.
(Inductive approach )

• Georg Sootla
• Professor of Public Policy
• Tallinn University

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Why inductive approach

• Deductive theories are not exclusive and focus on
  selected dimensions of reform process
• Shifts in understanding policy process
  (P.Sabatier vs. W.Parsons)
• Reform as story to understand it as systemic
  phenomena

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Variables

• Institutional environment
• Actor and possible ways of interactions
• Division of labor along politico/administrative
  lines

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1. Institutional environment

• Triggers external pressure accidental events
• Conceptual background explicit choice based on
  core values non-understanding hidden agenda
• Political support over-politicized vs. lack on
  any interest

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2. Actors

• From corporation of political elites
• Weakly structure or even informal but powerful
  actors (PHARE experts)

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3. A-P-R

• Problem of political vs. administrative
  coordination (as deductive variables)

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Main patterns of reform organization

• 1. professional-technocratic configuration
• 2. politico-administrative balance
• 3. interagency conflict
• 4. politicised reform configuration
• 5. rational actor configuration
• 6. bureaucratic reform configuration

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1. Professional-technocratic configuration

1. Issue is considered as purely technical
2. Low political sensitiveness of main issue
3. Absence of clear political/ conceptual focus and
   choice
4. Main actor outside experts/academicians
5. Main actors do not favour (neglect) civil service
   in the policy process
6. Issue is initiated by external pressure or
   benchmark

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Professional technocratic configuration 2

• 7. Implementation issues are secondary or out of
  consideration or taken for granted
• 8. Civil servants tend to become veto player
• 9. Late inclusion of other P/A actors
  (ministries, agencies) and constituencies, who
  become restrictive/ destructive variable

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2. Politico-administrative balance

• Issues of implementation are at the first site or
  policy seek answer to very practical problems
• Clear leading agency -- Ministerial or
  interministerial commission -- which can raise
  above the ministerial specific interests
• Main micro-triggers and pressures to foster
  reform activities from implementation
  controversies
• More attention to conceptual issues but absence
  of mechanisms of involvement of conceptual
  debates

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Politico-administrative balance 2

• 5. Low intensity of party competition on that
  issue may be problems to rise new issues into
  political agenda
• 6. Civil servants
• 6.1.           as main source of policy advice
• 6.2.           gradual substitution of
  politicians by key civil servants in
  decision-making at commission
• 6.3.           high level of cooperation between
  civil servants from different ministries at
  commission work integration of all actors into
  coherent network

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Bureaucratic reform configuration

• Low interest of politicians
• Main triggers are practical issues
• Focus on piecemeal solutions of certain issues,
  general picture could be clear but does not play
  definitive role
• Sectoral autonomy could promote very close
  professional cooperation or could foster also
  interagency conflict

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Bureaucratic reform configuration 2

• 5. Very open and inclusive / network type of
  policymaking
• 6. Especially crucial importance of political
  links with agenda-setting locus
• 7. Solution of practical issues at implementation
  began gradually to reveal crucial conceptual
  problems and political choices, which could
  trigger debates and interagency conflicts

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Interagency conflict configuration

• Conceptual controversies raise at the forefront
• conceptual positions become to back clear
  interests, but still low intensity of party
  political interests
• Agencies started to focus on their own dimension
  of reform,
• 3.1.  all started to develop their own
  configurations of reform management
• 3.2.   different and high variety of
  configurations of reform management
• 4. Attempt to involve the same persons
  especially among higher civil service into
  decision arenas increase internal controversies
  and conflicts at the level of working groups

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Interagency conflict configuration 2

• 4. Interagency conflict has raised on political
  level
• 4.1.           Decision-making capacity of
  ministerial commission low because key ministers
  out of commission
• 4.2.           MC cannot never become as the lead
  agency
• Conflict over Civil service issues starts to
  block also other central reforms (local
  government, central institutions).

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Politicised reform configurationl (rational
choice explanations)

• Trigger and conceptual directives from political
  corporation (cohesiveness needed)
• Temporal coincidence of strategic interests of
  key actors (political corporation and local
  government leaders
• Exclusive style of policy making
• Civil servants as technical support structure at
  best
• Top CS out of game

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Politicised reform configuration 2

• 5. Destabilisation of implementation structure
  (lead agency)
• 6. Loss of interest in reform immediately after
  adoption of Act
• 7. Considerable reshaping power balance along in
  the power vertical
• 8. Considerable controversy (unbalance) basic
  values inside institutions

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Political rational actor configurationl

• Very clear political initiative (coalition
  agreement) and will, collegial cabinet
• Development of clear comprehensive programme,
  i.e. conceptual starting points, which were
  backed by political agreements (also with
  Parliament factions at the stage of elaboration).
• Lead agency as Complex network , which includes
  ministerial committee assisted by administrative
  support structure (Office of PA Development).
• Leading agency as arm length to Commission but
  not as coordinator of interministerial actions
  (commissions, working groups).

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Political rational actor configuration 2

• 5. Attempt to receive expert advice from outside
  of civil service (PA Reform Council)
• 6. Very sophisticated (multilevel) and coherent
  system of preparation/ implementation from
  Cabinet to regional committees
• 7. Inability to develop similar structure in the
  dimension of Central Administration and Civil
  service reforms which failed at the outset
• 8. Developing political support from below
  through political trade-offs

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In conclusion

• Reforms are far from being linear hand having
  certain logic, model of management
• Inductive approach makes it possible
• -- to find probable points of breakthrough and
  failure
• -- to generate non-controversial styles of
  communication between actors
• Politico-administrative balance as a key for
  consistency of reforms