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Title: The New Complex Trial Protocol for Deception Detection with P300: Mock Crime Scenario and Enhancements


1
The New Complex Trial Protocol for Deception
Detection with P300 Mock Crime Scenario and
Enhancements
  • J. Peter Rosenfeld, John Meixner, Michael
    Winograd, Elena Labkovsky, Alex Sokolovsky,
    Xiaoxing Hu,Alex Haynes, Northwestern University

2
OLD 3-STIMULUS, P300-BASED CIT (GKT)
  • PROBE GUILTY KNOWLEDGE ITEM 5000
  • Press non-target button.
  • IRRELEVANT OTHER AMOUNT 200
  • Press non-target button.
  • TARGET OTHER AMOUNT 3000
  • Press target button.

3
Previous P300 DD protocols used Separate
Probe(P),Irrelevant(I) and Target(T) trials.
  • 80 to 95 correct detection rates.but.
  • Rosenfeld et al. (2004) and Mertens, Allen et
    al. (2008)These methods are vulnerable to
    Counter-measures (CMs)
  • via turning Is into covert Ts.

4
Old P300 Protocol
  • 1 of 3 Stimuli on each trial Probe (P), or
    Irrelevant(I), or Target (T). Subject presses
    either Target or Non-Target (NT) button. Both P
    and I can be Non-Targets. Special I is defined T.
  • This leads to 2 tasks for each stimulus
  • 1. implicit probe recognition vs.
  • 2. explicit Target/Non-Target discrimination
  • Possible Result Mutual Interference? more task
    demand ? reduced P300 to P. CMs hurt Old test.
  • A CM is an attempt to defeat the test by
    converting irrelevants into covert targets

5
How to do CMs
  • When you see a specific irrelevant, SECRETLY make
    some response, mental/physical.
  • After all, if you can make special response to
    TARGET on instruction from operator, you can
    secretly instruct yourself.
  • Irrelevant becomes secret target. It makes big
    P300. If P I, no diagnosis.

6
Results from Rosenfeld et al. (2004)
Farwell-Donchin paradigm (BAD and BCAD are 2
analysis methods.)
Diagnoses of Guilty
Amplitude Difference (BAD) method,p.1
Innocent Group
Guilty Group
CM Group
9/11(82)
1/11(9)
2/11(18)
Cross-Correlation(BC-AD) Method, p.1
6/11(54)
0/11(0)
6/11(54)

7
Results (hit rates) from Rosenfeld et al. (2004)
Rosenfeld paradigm
Week BAD BC-AD 1
no CM 12/13(.92) 9/13(.69) 2 CM
6/12(.50) 3/12(.25) 3 no CM
7/12(.58) 3/12(.25) Note BCD and BAD are 2
kinds of analytic bootstrap procedures.
8
Farwells response
9
What would have happened..
  • If somebody beat the test?
  • Would he pay the 100,000?
  • No worries about that if you are 100 confident
    that it cant happen (cuz you rigged it!)

10
Anyway, that was the abstract he sent to SPR 08,
published in the program which we all eagerly
awaited. But here is what was posted
11
NEW COMPLEX TRIAL PROTOCOL (ctp)
12
(No Transcript)
13
New Complex Trial Protocol (CTP)
  • 2 stimuli, separated by about 1 s, per trial,
  • S1 Either P or I..then..S2 either T or NT.
  • There is no conflicting discrimination task
    when P is presented, so P300 to probe is expected
    to be as large as possible due to Ps salience,
    which should lead to good detection 90-100 in
    Rosenfeld et al.(2008) with autobiographical
    information. It is also CM resistant. (Delayed
    T/NT still holds attention.)
  • I saw it response to S1. RT indexes CM use.

14
Main Study. Within-subject correct detections of
guilty subjects based on bootstrap comparison of
probe P300 against the average of all irrelevant
P300s over 3 weeks.
  • WEEK Hit Rate
    Hit Rate
  • Week 1 (no CM) 11/12 (92) 12/12(
    100)
  • Week 2 (CM) 10/11 (91) 11/12
    (92)
  • Week 3 (no CM) 11/12 (92) 12/12
    (100)
  • Main Study With false positive(FP) group.
  •  
  • Confidence.9
    Confidence.95
  •  
  • Test FPs Hits A
    FPs Hits A
  • Iall .08 .92 .95
    0 .92 .98
  • Imax 0 .92 .98
    0 .92 .98
  •  

15
EXP 1How does this CTP do in detecting
incidental mock crime details?
  • Subjects were divided into three groups (n12)
  • Simple Guilty (SG), Countermeasure (CM), and
    Innocent Control (IC)
  • All subjects first participated in a baseline
    reaction time (RT) test in which they chose a
    playing card and then completed the CTP using
    cards as stimuli.
  • SG and CM subjects then committed a mock crime.
  • Subjects stole a ring out of an envelope in a
    professors mailbox. Subjects were never told
    what the item would be, to ensure any knowledge
    would be incidentally acquired through the
    commission of the mock crime.
  • All subjects were then tested for knowledge of
    the item that was stolen. There were 1 P (the
    ring) and 6 I( necklace,watch,etc).
  • CM subjects executed covert assigned responses
    to irrelevant stimuli in an attempt to evoke
    P300s to these stimuli to try and beat the Probe
    vs. Irrelevant P300 comparison.

16
A CTP Trial
17
Results Grand Averages SG, CM, IC, all P
18
Guilty Diagnoses
  • Condition Detections Percentage
  • SG 10/12
    83
  • CM 12/12
    100
  • IC 1/12
    8

19
RTs to S1 (P or I)
20
Conclusions
  • As with autobiographical information, the CTP was
    found to be highly sensitive at detecting
    incidentally acquired concealed knowledge in a
    mock-crime scenario.
  • Detection rates using the CTP compare favorably
    to similar polygraph CITs. The main advantage of
    the CTP over the old P300 or polygraph CIT is its
    resistance to CM use. The traditional
    covert-response CMs used to defeat past P300 CITs
    were found to be ineffective against the CTP, and
    actually led to larger Probe-Irrelevant amplitude
    differences and detection rates.
  • CM use was also easily identified by a large
    increase in RT between the baseline and
    experimental blocks.

21
New study with autobiographical. Info, 2 mental
CMs to 4 irrelevants.
  • So now we have a 5-button box for the left hand.
    The subject is instructed to press, at random,
    one of the 5 buttons as the I saw it response
    to S1 on each trial with no repeats. T and NT
    (S2) stimuli and responses are as previously.
  • We also hoped that this would make CMs harder to
    do. It didnt, but we caught the CM users anyway.
  • We have done other studies with non-random,
    explicitly assigned responses also.

22
Design
  • Autobiographical information (birthdates) One P
    and 4 I (other, non-meaningful dates).
  • 3 Groups as before SG,CM, IC.
  • NEW mental CMs to only 2 of the 4
    Irrelevants Say to yourself your first name was
    the CM1, your last name as CM2. These are
    assigned prior to run.
  • Why 2 irrels? Meixner Rosenfeld(2010) showed
    countering all Irrels, not probe gives probe
    extra, special significance. They did a study
    with only 5 irrels, one of which was not
    countered. It had big P300. So doing CMs to all
    irrels is not a good strategy from perps
    perspective.
  • Why mental CMs? They should be faster and a
    bigger challenge for our CTP.
  • Only one block per group (no baseline).

23
Results Grand Averages (Pz, 2 uV/ division)
24
Detection rates
  • Group BT/Iall.9 BT/Imax.9
  • SG 13/13 (100) 13/13
    (100)
  • IC 1/13 (7.6) 1/13
    (7.6)
  • CM 12/12 (100) 10/12
    (83)
  • These are screened via RT, which still nicely
    represents CM use within a block.

25
RTs (to I saw it) in this study clearly index
use of CMs
26
New ERP P900the CM potential largest at Fz,
Cz (Pblack, Iallred, 2uV/division)
27
New study Effects of various numbers of CMs,
1-5, with 5 total stimuli
  • Elena Labkovsky Peter Rosenfeld

28
GAs SG, IN, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 CN groups
SG 1CM 2CM 3CM 4CM 5CM
29
(No Transcript)
30
A Mock Terrorism Study
  • John Meixner Peter Rosenfeld
  • How do you catch bad guys before crimes are
    committed, and before you know what was done,
    where, when?

31
(No Transcript)
32
A Mock Terrorism Application of the P300-based
Concealed Information Test Department of
Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL
60208-2700
33
Table 1. Individual bootstrap detection rates.
Numbers indicate the average number of iterations
(across all three blocks) of the bootstrap
process in which probe was greater than Iall or
Imax. Blind Imax numbers indicate the average
number of iterations in which the largest single
item (probe or irrelevant) was greater than the
second largest single item. Mean values for each
column are displayed in bold above detection
rates.
Iall Iall Imax Imax Blind Imax Blind Imax
Guilty Innocent Guilty Innocent Guilty Innocent
1000 648 985 287 985 603
1000 610 999 416 998 602
955 598 889 476 892 649
996 611 898 430 893 605
994 150 946 17 943 689
909 475 698 284 761 547
945 600 677 365 702 536
997 555 959 250 961 569
999 586 908 217 907 565
985 690 888 382 886 706
912 390 667 129 698 650
903 644 837 215 842 702
966 546 863 289 872 619
12/12 0/12 12/12 0/12 10/12 0/12
AUC 1.0 AUC 1.0 AUC 1.0 AUC 1.0 AUC .979 AUC .979
34
So.
  • CTP is a promising, powerful paradigm, against
    any number of CMs, mental and/or physical and RT
    reliably indicates CM use. The new P900 might
    also.
  • jp-rosenfeld_at_northwestern.edu

35
So far, all CMs are done separated from and
before I saw it response.
  • Separated or split away from are called
    splitting CMs.
  • What happens if subjects are instructed to do CM
    and I saw it response at the same time? They
    lump these acts together. This is called Lumping
    CMs.

36
Heres what happens P3 still detects (83) P vs
Iall (b), but RT no longer indicates CMs!!
37
Note that this means you can no longer screen
irrelevant comparison waves associated with large
RTS.
  • Xiaoxing Hu to the rescue! (with Dan Hegeman and
    Elizabeth Landry).
  • He simply increased irrelevants from 4 to 8,
    which should increase demand and RT

38
Here are RT results with 8 irrels and 2,4,6
lumping CM groups here combined
39
RTs sorted by lumping CM groups.
40
Tabulated datathe more CMs you do, the harder
the task, the more likely that RT will expose
even lumping CM use
41
P300 still catches CM users
42
We were actually able to do some screening with
6-CM subjects which improved hit rate to 77, A
to .91
43
  • Remember, Allen Hu gave the CMs to Ss in advance
    and let them rehearse.
  • And his subjects were geniuses, like you all

44
  • So we are now working with 10 Irrelevant items
    and 3,5,7 CMs.

45
BUT
  • it is obvious that having to formon the spot--
    and hold 6 CMs for 6 of 8 Irrels in your head as
    must happen in the field--is probably too hard
    for most bad guys to do.
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