NYU Abu Dhabi Conference on Education Media and Human Development. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 39
About This Presentation
Title:

NYU Abu Dhabi Conference on Education Media and Human Development.

Description:

Title: If You Pay Peanuts do You Get Monkeys? A Cross Country Comparison of Teacher Pay and Pupil Performance. Author: UQTE004 Last modified by – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:100
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 40
Provided by: UQTE6
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: NYU Abu Dhabi Conference on Education Media and Human Development.


1
NYU Abu DhabiConference on Education Media and
Human Development.
  • Quantitative Analysis of Education Policy in the
    UK
  • Peter Dolton
  • Royal Holloway College, University of London and
  • Centre for Economics of Education, London School
    of Economics
  • Peter.Dolton_at_lse.ac.uk

2
Im giving education just one more try if I
fail again, Im entering politics!
3
Outline
  • Examples of Analysis (and failures of analysis)
    of Policy in the UK (and data).
  • My take on the causal v observational debate
    - IDENTIFICATION
  • Brief follow up on the Andreas Scheicher
    presentation on a paper I am writing.

4
Examples of Key Education Policy Reform Questions
  • What are effects of National Curriculum from
    1988?
  • What has been the effect of the Literacy and
    Numeracy Hour?
  • What is the effect of National KS tests at age
    7,11, 13, 16, 18
  • Have educational standards been rising
  • Has publication of school results encouraged
    competition?
  • What has been the effect of the Introduction of a
    School Teacher Performance threshold on pay in
    2000?

5
(No Transcript)
6
Some outputs are easier to observe than others!
7
Recent Policy Questions
  • Effect of Class size on outcomes
  • Why boys are doing so much worse than girls.

8
(No Transcript)
9
The proportion of boys and girls achieving 5 good
GCSEs
Source DfES (2003)
10
Data to Answer these Questions
  • Administrative Data on
  • National Pupil Database on every child with all
    their scores on all KS tests.
  • Database of Teacher Records.
  • School level data on performance in KS tests.
  • Assorted other Admin data on House Prices, (Land
    Registry), Deprivation etc

11
Other Data Sources
  • Loads of good surveys cohort data etc
  • BUT

12
  • NO LINK BETWEEN ADMIN DATA
  • Hence impossible to find out which teacher taught
    which class.

13
Some Real Effects of these Policies Which we
dont need data to tell us.
  • Teaching to the test to push up school scores.
  • Educational improvement by government edict.
  • Squashing of teacher initiative to teach 9/11
    example.

14
IDENTIFICATION
  • OLS observational
  • RCT causal
  • Many other techniques
  • Panel, Longitudinal, Cohort, Spatial
  • Statistical Matching
  • Difference-in-Differences
  • Regressional Discontinuity Design
  • Instrumental Variables - LATE

15
  • Often involve the creative use of
  • Some administrative change or rule like
    Miamonides Rule (Angrist and Lavy)
  • Changes in Policy

16
  • Above techniques may give us as close an estimate
    of causal effects as you are going to get with
    RCTs.

17
If You Pay Peanuts do You Get Monkeys? A Cross
Country Comparison of Teacher Pay and Pupil
Performance.
  • Peter Dolton1Oscar D. Marcenaro-Gutierrez2
    1 Royal Holloway University of London Centre
    for Economic Performance, LSE. 2 University of
    Malaga.

18
UK ADVERT Make a Difference Become a
Teacher!!!!
19
To save democracy, is it? I have been hurling
stones thinking its about teachers pay!
20
What Makes a Good Teacher??
  • Not sure we really know the answer
  • BUT

21
(No Transcript)
22
1. Central Motivation
  • Why do teachers in Holland Earn 4 times teachers
    in Israel (after allowing for PPP adjustments)?
  • Kids in some countries do 2-6 times as well as
    kids in other countries.
  • Is there a link between these 2 facts
  • If we take relative salary as a measure of
    teacher quality, is it the case that kids perform
    better?

23
Motivation contd
  • Think of two possible basic causal mechanisms
  • You pay teachers better gives them an incentive
    to work harder and be more effective in teaching
    kids.
  • You pay teachers better and this raises the
    status of the job and induces more able young
    people to want to be teachers in the future.

24
3. Data
  • We have new data to do this with
  • OECD data on teachers salaries
  • PISA, TIMSS data on pupil performance.
  • PISA 2000, 2003, 2006 for Maths, Science and
    Reading
  • TIMSS 1995, 1999, 2003 Maths and Science

25
Data contHow do we measure teacher salary?
  • In terms of real PPP
  • Relative to countrys standard of living - In
    terms of PPP divided by GDP per head.
  • Relative point in the income distribution of the
    country. (Assuming Income is lognormal, and we
    have Gini coeff and Ave earnings)

26
Figure 1.a. Actual and fitted Upper Secondary
school teachers salaries after 15 years
experience in 2007 PPP (2005)
27
Figure 1.c. Actual and fitted Upper Secondary
school teachers salaries after 15 years
experience relative to the earnings distribution
of the whole population (2003)
28
Teacher Salaries
  • We also have data on
  • Starting
  • After 15 years
  • At top of scale.
  • AND
  • Primary
  • Lower Secondary
  • Upper Secondary

29
Figure 2. Relative position (percentile) of
teachers salaries in the earnings distribution
of the popn (Upper Secondary Education)
30
Data Conclusions
  • Most countries pay their teachers between
    50-75ile.
  • Some countries have flat career salaries
  • Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Peru
  • Other significant advancement
  • Austria, Belgium, France etc
  • Some countries teacher wages are falling back
  • Indonesia, Chile, Thailand, Australia
  • Others teachers are being paid better
  • Brazil, Czech, Uruguay

31
Figure 3.a. Standardised Average Scores (8th
grade students) by country (2006)
32
Figure 4. Scores percentile at 8th grade
students as a function of teachers salaries
after 15 years experience.
33
4. Econometric Estimation
  • Teacher Salaries -gt function of
  • Supply of Teachers
  • Demand for Teachers
  • Production Function for Pupil Outcomes
  • function of Teacher Hours,
  • Pupil Teacher Ratios
  • Educational Expenditure
  • GDP Growth

34
4. Econometric Estimation Identification
  • Use panel data therefore
  • With fixed country effects we are arguing that
    there are not systematic influences on pupil
    outcomes which are
  • Not measured i.e. in u
  • and correlated with teacher earnings.
  • Then identification of causal effects would
    rely on changes.

35
Controls
  • Teaching Hours
  • Pupil/Teacher ratios
  • Fraction of Women
  • GDP growth
  • Educational Expenditure
  • Growth in size of teacher cohort.
  • Growth in size of pupil popn

36
5. Results
  • Teachers salaries vary across country
  • -ve With supply
  • ve with Pupil/teacher ratios
  • -ve with size of pupil cohort.

37
(No Transcript)
38
Marginal Effects
  • 5000 or 15 rise in teachers earnings
  • OR
  • 5 shift up the wage distribution for teachers
  • will mean .20 of a SD in test score and hence
    around 8 rise in student performance.

39
6. Implications
  • If we wish to improve pupil scores we need to
  • Pay teachers more further up income distn
  • Reduce pupil/teacher ratios
  • To reduce inequality of student performance we
    need
  • Reduce pupil/teacher ratios
  • NOT Increase teaching hours as ambiguous effect.
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com