Title: Approaching Counter Terrorism: The Global War on Terror and the Problem of Metrics
1Approaching Counter Terrorism The Global War on
Terror and the Problem of Metrics
- Michael Stohl
- Department of Communication
- University of California, Santa Barbara
- March 2007
2Determining the metrics of success
- Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning
or losing the global war on terror. Are we
capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading
more terrorists every day than the madrassas and
the radical clerics are recruiting, training and
deploying against us? - Donald Rumsfeld October 16, 2003
-
3NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
- We have significantly degraded the al-Qaida
network. Most of those in the al-Qaida network
responsible for the September 11 attacks,
including the plots mastermind Khalid
ShaykhMuhammad, have been captured or killed. We
also have killed other key al-Qaida members, such
as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the groups operational
commander in Iraq who led a campaignof terror
that took the lives of countless American forces
and innocent Iraqis
4State Department Annual Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2005April 2006
- In 2005, we saw indications of
- An increasing AQ emphasis on ideological and
propaganda activity to help advance its cause.
This led to cooperation with al-Qaida in Iraq,
the organization led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and
with AQ affiliates around the globe, as well as
with a new generation of Sunni extremists - The proliferation of smaller, looser terrorist
networks that are less capable but also less
predictable
5- An increased capacity for acts of terror by local
terrorists with foreign ties (demonstrated in the
July 7 London bombings) - An increase in suicide bombings. The July 7
London bombing was the first such a ttack in
Europe (three of the four terrorists were
second-generation British citizensof South Asian
descent) we also noted a marked increase in
suicide bombings in Afghanistan - The growth of strategically significant networks
that support the flow of foreign terrorists to
Iraq.
6Starting points
- Terrorism is the purposeful act or the threat of
the act of violence to create fear and/or
compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of
the act or threat.
7Counterterrorism
- At home, counterterrorism policy and actions must
respond to the acts or the threats of the act of
violence, reduce the risk of future acts, reduce
fear in the audience of the risk of future acts
and maintain the support and trust of the home
audience.
8Counterterrorism abroad
- Abroad, counterterrorism policy and actions must
respond to the acts or the threats of the act of
violence, reduce the risk of future acts, reduce
fear in the audience of the risk of future acts
and maintain the support and trust of that
audience.
9Success in Counterterrorism
- The Bush Administration Approach
10Bush Administration
- Most popular approach
- Body counts, scorecards, events and risks
- Announce the counterterrorism measures taken
11Security Attacks
- At home
- Since 9/11 no further attacks on U.S. soil
12Body Counts and Scorecards
- 2/3rds of the al Qaeda leadership has been
captured - 3400 arrested
- 200 million in assets frozen
- Bases in Afghanistan destroyed.
13NSCT, September 5, 2006
- Most of those in the al-Qaida network responsible
for the September 11 attacks, including the
plots mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have
been captured or killed. We also have killed
other key al-Qaida members, such as Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, the groups operational commander in
Iraq who led a campaign of terror that took the
lives of countless American forces and innocent
Iraqis.
14Disruption and Risk
- liberty.gov disrupted 150 terrorist plots around
the world and at - Bush at the National Endowment for Democracy
October 2005, ten plots disrupted. - Cole (2006) argues that this number is very much
in dispute.
15National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
September 5, 2006
- to win the War on Terror, we will
- Prevent attacks by terrorist networks
- Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue
states and terrorist allies who seek to use them - Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of
rogue states - Deny terrorists control of any nation they
would use as a base and launching pad for terror
and - Lay the foundations and build the institutions
and structures we need to carry the fight forward - against terror and help ensure our ultimate
success. - Advance effective democracies as the long-term
antidote to the ideology of terrorism
16NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
- There is a broad and growing global consensus
that the deliberate targeting of innocents is
never justified by any calling or cause. - Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism,
with unprecedented cooperation on law
enforcement, intelligence, military, and
diplomatic activity. - We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and
help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by
enhancing our counterterrorism architecture
through the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security, the Office of Director of
National Intelligence, and the National
Counterterrorism Center.
17Some alternatives to consider
- We are fighting this war on three distinct
fronts the home front, the operational front and
the strategic-political front. - John Lehman, August 31, 2006
18Byman (2003)
- five genuine measures of success by which to
evaluate counterterrorist operations - the freedom terrorists have to operate (their
secure geographic zone), - a high level of domestic support for
counterterrorist operations, - the disruption of the adversarys command and
control structure, - terrorist recruitment,
- terrorist attacks.
19Morag (2005 319-310)
- seven parameters, three categories
- human life (reduction in civilian casualties
among both Israelis and Palestinians), - economic resources (minimization of the negative
economic impact on Israel), - Political resources (Israeli social cohesion,
international and domestic support for the
Israeli government, and the extent of weakening
of international and domestic support for the
Palestinian leadership).
20Raphael Perl (200511)
- Measuring trends.
- 1. Terrorist infrastructure.
- Is their leadership being weakened is their
recruitment base, - network, or target list growing?
- 2. Terrorist tactical and strategic goals
- 3. Capabilities
- What are the capabilities of a terrorist group to
inflict serious damage? - Are they increasing or decreasing?
21Peter Probst (2005)
- Statistical analysis as used by the government to
assess terrorism and counterterrorism efforts
remains primitive and, too often, dangerously
misleading. We measure what can easily be
quantified rather than what is truly meaningful.
We strive to capture extremely complex phenomena
in a simple sound bite, reinforced by seemingly
compelling but simplistic statistical comparisons
and then wonder why our instant analysis has
failed to comport with reality, leaving us
embarrassed and scratching our heads. Numbers, as
we use them, provide a false sense of
objectivity, accuracy and precision, too often
leaving the decision makers frustrated and angry.
And, too often, leaving the public with the
feeling that somehow they have been conned.
22How should we approach the establishment of
metrics
- Theoretically and conceptually based
- Tied to the concepts that are most meaningful for
understanding terrorism and counter terrorism - Understand the purpose of the metrics
23How should we approach the establishment of
metrics
- Importance of Validity and Reliability of
measures - Construct validity
- Convergent and discriminant validity
- Internal and External Reliability
- Multiple measures
24Key considerations
- Security
- The Opponent
- The Counterterrorist Organization
- Audience(s)
- Fear
- Trust
- For each of the concepts we need not only define
but operationalize and measure over time
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27Body Counts and Scorecards
- Increase or decrease of terrorist attacks
- Increase or decrease of risk of future attacks
- Increase or decrease in terrorists, terrorist
groups, range of operation, safe havens, state
support - Increase or decrease in the capacity of the
organization (s), and network - Increase or decrease in supporters, sympathizers,
acquiescers - Or a simple scorecard http//www.angelfire.com/ult
ra/terroristscorecard/index.html
28Rand/ MIPT DataInternational Deaths by Region
29Rand/ MIPT DataDeaths by Region, domestic
30International terrorism 2001-2005
- Incidents up in the Middle East and either flat
or down almost everywhere else - Deaths up in the Middle East and Europe pretty
flat everywhere else
31Domestic terrorism2001-2005
- up in the middle east
- up in Russia and Chechnya
- South America Colombia accounts for 90 of the
deaths since 2001 - Eastern Europe Russia and Chechnya account for
96 of deaths since 2001 - Africa Uganda accounts for 56 of the deaths in
Sub Saharan Africa, - Darfur, Congo, etc. dont show up
32More or less terrorism?where?
- National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC
http//www.tkb.org/NCTC/Home.jsp), - In 2004 there were more than three times as many
incidents (651/208) and three times as many
persons killed (1907/625) in what they define as
significant international terrorism than in 2003 - Data impossible to assess for 2005 because of
change in reporting
33More or less terrorism when?Interrupted Time
Series
34Total Terrorist Incidents MIPT 09/12/1997 -
09/10/2001
35Total Terrorist Incidents MIPT09/12/2001 -
09/10/2005
36do these metrics help us know if
- There is a greater or lesser chance of a
terrorist attack today in the United States than
there was when the baseline point was
established? - There is a greater or lesser chance of a
terrorist attack against American targets abroad
than there was at the baseline point? - George Tenets testimony to the Intelligence
committees in February 2004 - Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 9/11
remain within Al Qaedas reach.
37Capacity of the Opponent
- Capability
- Size, structure, support, sympathy
- Geographical scope and range
- Tactical and strategic
38The Opponent
- Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it
does not end there. It will not end until every
terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated. - George W. Bush September 20, 2001
- The Network of Terror Implications
39To study terrorist networks we need to know
- What is a network?
- Who is in the network? What are its boundaries?
- What relations are encompassed in the network?
How are nodes connected? - What are the relevant structural properties?
- What types of ties are there?
- How are networks embedded within society?
- What network processes are associated with
structure? - Stohl and Stohl (2007, forthcoming)
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41Size and Structure of Al Qaeda
- Estimates of the number of persons who passed
through the Al Qaeda training camps have ranged
as high as 25,000-30,000 dispersed to cells in
more than sixty countries. - There is no easy way to determine the size of
Al-Qaeda, the number and scale of its affiliates
and proxies or who its donors, active supporters
and potential sympathizers are. Local governments
often do not know, deliberately conceal, or may
at times exaggerate the Al-Qaeda presence in
their countries. - Trends? -if we dont know the baseline it is
difficult to determine if Al Qaeda or the Global
Network of Terror is larger of smaller since a
particular point in time.
42Size and Structure of Al Qaeda
- In the aftermath of the Afghanistan war the
incentive to demonstrate success led to more
conservative descriptions of organizational size,
connections and possibilities. For example in
June 2002, Johnson, Van Natta and Miller (2002)
of the New York Times reported, - that senior officials suggest that although
sworn members of Al Qaeda were estimated to
number no more than 200 to 300 men, officials say
that at its peak this broader Qaeda network
operated about a dozen Afghan camps that trained
as many as 5000 militants, who in turn created
cells in as many as 60 countries. -
43Status of Al Qaeda Jenkins (in Fallows)
- The Taliban were dispersed, and al-Qaedas
training camps in Afghanistan were dismantled. - Al-Qaeda operatives by the thousands have been
arrested, detained, or killed. So have many
members of the crucial al-Qaeda leadership circle
around bin Laden and his chief strategist, Ayman
al-Zawahiri. - it has become harder for the remaining al-Qaeda
leaders to carry out the organizations most
basic functions - Because of increased intelligence efforts by
the United States and its allies, transactions of
any typecommunications, travel, money
transfershave become more dangerous for the
jihadists. Training and operations have been
decentralized, raising the risk of fragmentation
and loss of unity. Jihadists everywhere face the
threat of capture or martyrdom.
44Status of Al Qaeda
- Their command structure is gone, their Afghan
sanctuary is gone, their ability to move around
and hold meetings is gone, their financial and
communications networks have been hit hard, - Seth Stodder, a former official in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
45Status of Al Qaeda
- The al-Qaeda that existed in 2001 simply no
longer exists. - In 2001 it was a relatively centralized
organization, with a planning hub, a propaganda
hub, a leadership team, all within a narrow
geographic area. All that is gone, because we
destroyed it. - Where bin Ladens central leadership team could
once wire money around the world using normal
bank networks, it now must rely on couriers with
vests full of cash. - Kilcullen in Fallows
46Status of Al Qaeda
- The essence of the change is this because of
al-Qaedas own mistakes, and because of the
things the United States and its allies have done
right, al-Qaedas ability to inflict direct
damage in America or on Americans has been
sharply reduced. - Fallows, September 2006
- How does he know this?
- Does the preceding tell us this?
47The Counterterror Organization
- Building Support Amongst Diverse Audiences
48Capacities of the CounterTerrorist Organization
(and organizational network)
- Core membership
- Members, geographic dispersion, deviations and
trends - Support structures, resources, geographic
dispersion, deviations and trends - Zone of operations, geographic dispersion,
deviations and trends
49Size of counterterrorism coalition
- Nous sommes tous Américains Le Monde, September
12, 2001
50Size of counterterrorism coalition
- What do these numbers signify?
- The members of NATO and the Rio Pact invoked
these treaties mutual defense clauses for the
first time. Subsequently, sixteen of the 19 NATO
members engaged in the Afghan theater. The UN
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1373 requiring all UN members to freeze terrorist
financing, improve border security, clamp down on
the recruitment of terrorists, share information,
and deny terrorists any support or safe haven.
In September and October of 2001 there was clear
international community support for the United
States and for a collective response to the
problem of terrorism. A total of 136 countries
offered a range of military assistance to the
United States, including over flight and landing
rights and accommodations for U.S. forces.
51Size of counterterrorism coalition
- The initial cooperation led to an aggressive
international law enforcement effort which had
resulted in detention of approximately 3,000
terrorists and their supporters in more than 100
countries and in the freezing of 124 million in
assets in some 600 bank accounts around the
world, including 36 million in the United States
alone. - If these numbers decline what is this evidence
for?
52Perceptions of Fear and Security
53Hoffman, 2006
- The tragic loss of innocent life in any attack
linked to al Qaeda is calculated by its
masterminds to rekindle worldwide the same
profound fears and anxieties that the attacks on
9/11 ignited. Al Qaedas stature and reception in
parts of the world today is a product of the
extraordinary success achieved and attention
generated by the attacks that day.
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55Metrics of Counterterrorism
- Thus metrics are needed to evaluate
- if different publics feel more or less secure,
- have a more or less favorable attitude towards
their governments, - and have a more or less favorable or unfavorable
attitude towards the terrorists or the countries
allied against them and so on.
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57Attitude towards government
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60Perceptions of Fear and Security
61Perceptions of Fear and Security
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64U.S. PRESIDENT / NATIONAL ELECTION / EXIT POLL
2004
65Measuring the support of publics in friendly (and
unfriendly) states
- Global Audiences and Global Messages
- Multiple message sources
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69Lessons from the Battle of Algiers
- As the flier inviting guests to the Pentagon
screening declared ''How to win a battle against
terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children
shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant
bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population
builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The
French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but
fails strategically. To understand why, come to a
rare showing of this film.' - NYTimes September 7, 2003
70- Will this operation produce more bad guys than
it takes off the street by the way it is
conducted - Major General David Patreus, Commanding General
101st Airborne Division, Summer 2003 - (Quoted in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, Penguin 2006, p.
231) - Currently, Lt. General and Commanding General
American Forces in Iraq
71South China Morning Post March 7,2007
- Trigger-happy West risks fostering Taliban or
worse
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73The Great Divide How Westerners and Muslims View
Each OtherEurope's Muslims More Moderate ( Pew
released 06.22.06)
74Mickolus, Measures for determining support for
terrorists by governments
- permitting safe havens or bases,
- permitting training on local soil.
- general training by the government
- making large monetary contributions
- provisioning arms
- providing nonlethal operational assistance
- providing direct financing and training for
specific operations. - providing weapons for specific operations.
- adding to terrorist demands during an incident.
- making payment of insurance/bonuses to terrorists
after the fact.
75The Audience (Public) Support Opposition
Continuum
- Active support
- Passive support
- Acquiescence
- Passive opposition
- Active opposition
- Goal- move your audience towards active
opposition to the terrorists, hope to obtain
acquiescence or passive oppostion
76Backlash and Burnout
- Increasing the difficulty of terrorist operations
within the communities they purport to represent - Increasing the incentives for terrorists to
disengage and move activities to the non-violent/
political realm
77Support within the Muslim Community (Pew, Summer
06)
78Support within the Muslim Community (Pew, Summer
2006)
79Larger Strategic Implictions
- three kinds of American reactionthe war in Iraq,
the economic consequences of willy-nilly spending
on security, and the erosion of Americas moral
authoritywere responsible for such strength as
al-Qaeda now maintained. - David Kilcullen in Fallows, September 2006
80George W. Bush July 11, 2005 FBI Academy,
Quantico, Virginia
- We're fighting the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan
and across the world so we do not have to face
them here at home.
81Counterterrorism consequences
- The final destructive response helping al-Qaeda
has been Americas estrangement from its allies
and diminution of its traditionally vast soft
power. Americas cause is doomed unless it
regains the moral high ground, - Sir Richard Dearlove, the former director of
Britains secret intelligence agency, MI-6, told
me
82Consequences of the Counterterrorist Strategy
- The jihadist regime in Iran feels no reservation
about flaunting its policy to go nuclear, and it
unleashed Hezbollah, its client terrorist
organization, to attack Israel. - In Somalia a jihadist group has seized control of
the government. In Pakistan, Islamists are
becoming more powerful, and attacks within India
are increasing. - Governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt,
Algeria and Jordan are under increasing Islamist
pressure. - In the Pacific, North Korea now feels free to
rattle its missile sabers, firing seven on
America's Independence Day. - China is rapidly building its 600-ship navy to
fill the military vacuum that we are creating in
the Pacific as our fleet shrinks well below
critical mass. Not one of these states believes
that we can undertake any credible additional
military operations while we are bogged down in
Iraq. - John Lehman, August 2006
83Successful Counterterrorism Concepts and
Measures Required
- Reduce attacks
- Reduce the risk of further attack
- Reduce fear
- Increase the confidence of the audience(s) of
the act or threat that they will be protected and
the recognition that the multiple audiences must
be considered. - Decrease the support for the violence by the
supporters, sympathizers and potential supporters
of the act or threat. - Decrease acquiescence of the audience(s)
- Reduce the recruitment of new terrorists
- Increase backlash against the terrorists
- Increase burnout of the terrorists
84 85National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
September 5, 2006
- to win the War on Terror, we will
- Prevent attacks by terrorist networks
- Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue
states and terrorist allies who seek to use them - Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of
rogue states - Deny terrorists control of any nation they
would use as a base and launching pad for terror
and - Lay the foundations and build the institutions
and structures we need to carry the fight forward - against terror and help ensure our ultimate
success. - Advance effective democracies as the long-term
antidote to the ideology of terrorism
86NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
- We have deprived al-Qaida of safehaven in
Afghanistan and helped a democratic government to
rise in its place. Once a terrorist sanctuary
ruled by the repressive Taliban regime,
Afghanistan is now a full partner in the War on
Terror. - A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis
is aggressively prosecuting the war against the
terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to
secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq, now
a new War on Terror ally in the heart of the
Middle East.
87NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
- There is a broad and growing global consensus
that the deliberate targeting of innocents is
never justified by any calling or cause. - Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism,
with unprecedented cooperation on law
enforcement, intelligence, military, and
diplomatic activity. - We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and
help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by
enhancing our counterterrorism architecture
through the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security, the Office of Director of
National Intelligence, and the National
Counterterrorism Center.
88NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
- Overall, the United States and our partners have
disrupted several serious plots since September
11, including al-Qaida plots to attack inside the
United States. - Numerous countries that were part of the problem
before September 11 are now increasingly becoming
part of the solution and this transformation
has occurred without destabilizing friendly
regimes in key regions. - The Administration has worked with Congress to
adopt, implement, and renew key reforms like the
USA PATRIOT Act that promote our security while
also protecting our fundamental liberties.
89Requirements for successful counterterrorism
- Security
- The Opponent
- The Counterterrorist Organization
- Audience(s)
- Fear
- Trust
- And remember that counterterrorism policy must be
linked to the larger domestic and international
political strategic situations