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Title: Approaching Counter Terrorism: The Global War on Terror and the Problem of Metrics


1
Approaching Counter Terrorism The Global War on
Terror and the Problem of Metrics
  • Michael Stohl
  • Department of Communication
  • University of California, Santa Barbara
  • March 2007

2
Determining the metrics of success
  • Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning
    or losing the global war on terror. Are we
    capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading
    more terrorists every day than the madrassas and
    the radical clerics are recruiting, training and
    deploying against us?
  • Donald Rumsfeld October 16, 2003

3
NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
  • We have significantly degraded the al-Qaida
    network. Most of those in the al-Qaida network
    responsible for the September 11 attacks,
    including the plots mastermind Khalid
    ShaykhMuhammad, have been captured or killed. We
    also have killed other key al-Qaida members, such
    as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the groups operational
    commander in Iraq who led a campaignof terror
    that took the lives of countless American forces
    and innocent Iraqis

4
State Department Annual Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2005April 2006
  • In 2005, we saw indications of
  • An increasing AQ emphasis on ideological and
    propaganda activity to help advance its cause.
    This led to cooperation with al-Qaida in Iraq,
    the organization led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and
    with AQ affiliates around the globe, as well as
    with a new generation of Sunni extremists
  • The proliferation of smaller, looser terrorist
    networks that are less capable but also less
    predictable

5
  • An increased capacity for acts of terror by local
    terrorists with foreign ties (demonstrated in the
    July 7 London bombings)
  • An increase in suicide bombings. The July 7
    London bombing was the first such a ttack in
    Europe (three of the four terrorists were
    second-generation British citizensof South Asian
    descent) we also noted a marked increase in
    suicide bombings in Afghanistan
  • The growth of strategically significant networks
    that support the flow of foreign terrorists to
    Iraq.

6
Starting points
  • Terrorism is the purposeful act or the threat of
    the act of violence to create fear and/or
    compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of
    the act or threat.

7
Counterterrorism
  • At home, counterterrorism policy and actions must
    respond to the acts or the threats of the act of
    violence, reduce the risk of future acts, reduce
    fear in the audience of the risk of future acts
    and maintain the support and trust of the home
    audience.

8
Counterterrorism abroad
  • Abroad, counterterrorism policy and actions must
    respond to the acts or the threats of the act of
    violence, reduce the risk of future acts, reduce
    fear in the audience of the risk of future acts
    and maintain the support and trust of that
    audience.

9
Success in Counterterrorism
  • The Bush Administration Approach

10
Bush Administration
  • Most popular approach
  • Body counts, scorecards, events and risks
  • Announce the counterterrorism measures taken

11
Security Attacks
  • At home
  • Since 9/11 no further attacks on U.S. soil

12
Body Counts and Scorecards
  • 2/3rds of the al Qaeda leadership has been
    captured
  • 3400 arrested
  • 200 million in assets frozen
  • Bases in Afghanistan destroyed.

13
NSCT, September 5, 2006
  • Most of those in the al-Qaida network responsible
    for the September 11 attacks, including the
    plots mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have
    been captured or killed. We also have killed
    other key al-Qaida members, such as Abu Musab
    al-Zarqawi, the groups operational commander in
    Iraq who led a campaign of terror that took the
    lives of countless American forces and innocent
    Iraqis.

14
Disruption and Risk
  • liberty.gov disrupted 150 terrorist plots around
    the world and at
  • Bush at the National Endowment for Democracy
    October 2005, ten plots disrupted.
  • Cole (2006) argues that this number is very much
    in dispute.

15
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
September 5, 2006
  • to win the War on Terror, we will
  • Prevent attacks by terrorist networks
  • Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue
    states and terrorist allies who seek to use them
  • Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of
    rogue states
  • Deny terrorists control of any nation they
    would use as a base and launching pad for terror
    and
  • Lay the foundations and build the institutions
    and structures we need to carry the fight forward
  • against terror and help ensure our ultimate
    success.
  • Advance effective democracies as the long-term
    antidote to the ideology of terrorism

16
NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
  • There is a broad and growing global consensus
    that the deliberate targeting of innocents is
    never justified by any calling or cause.
  • Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism,
    with unprecedented cooperation on law
    enforcement, intelligence, military, and
    diplomatic activity.
  • We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and
    help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by
    enhancing our counterterrorism architecture
    through the creation of the Department of
    Homeland Security, the Office of Director of
    National Intelligence, and the National
    Counterterrorism Center.

17
Some alternatives to consider
  • We are fighting this war on three distinct
    fronts the home front, the operational front and
    the strategic-political front.
  • John Lehman, August 31, 2006

18
Byman (2003)
  • five genuine measures of success by which to
    evaluate counterterrorist operations
  • the freedom terrorists have to operate (their
    secure geographic zone),
  • a high level of domestic support for
    counterterrorist operations,
  • the disruption of the adversarys command and
    control structure,
  • terrorist recruitment,
  • terrorist attacks.

19
Morag (2005 319-310)
  • seven parameters, three categories
  • human life (reduction in civilian casualties
    among both Israelis and Palestinians),
  • economic resources (minimization of the negative
    economic impact on Israel),
  • Political resources (Israeli social cohesion,
    international and domestic support for the
    Israeli government, and the extent of weakening
    of international and domestic support for the
    Palestinian leadership).

20
Raphael Perl (200511)
  • Measuring trends.
  • 1. Terrorist infrastructure.
  • Is their leadership being weakened is their
    recruitment base,
  • network, or target list growing?
  • 2. Terrorist tactical and strategic goals
  • 3. Capabilities
  • What are the capabilities of a terrorist group to
    inflict serious damage?
  • Are they increasing or decreasing?

21
Peter Probst (2005)
  • Statistical analysis as used by the government to
    assess terrorism and counterterrorism efforts
    remains primitive and, too often, dangerously
    misleading. We measure what can easily be
    quantified rather than what is truly meaningful.
    We strive to capture extremely complex phenomena
    in a simple sound bite, reinforced by seemingly
    compelling but simplistic statistical comparisons
    and then wonder why our instant analysis has
    failed to comport with reality, leaving us
    embarrassed and scratching our heads. Numbers, as
    we use them, provide a false sense of
    objectivity, accuracy and precision, too often
    leaving the decision makers frustrated and angry.
    And, too often, leaving the public with the
    feeling that somehow they have been conned.

22
How should we approach the establishment of
metrics
  • Theoretically and conceptually based
  • Tied to the concepts that are most meaningful for
    understanding terrorism and counter terrorism
  • Understand the purpose of the metrics

23
How should we approach the establishment of
metrics
  • Importance of Validity and Reliability of
    measures
  • Construct validity
  • Convergent and discriminant validity
  • Internal and External Reliability
  • Multiple measures

24
Key considerations
  • Security
  • The Opponent
  • The Counterterrorist Organization
  • Audience(s)
  • Fear
  • Trust
  • For each of the concepts we need not only define
    but operationalize and measure over time

25
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26
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27
Body Counts and Scorecards
  • Increase or decrease of terrorist attacks
  • Increase or decrease of risk of future attacks
  • Increase or decrease in terrorists, terrorist
    groups, range of operation, safe havens, state
    support
  • Increase or decrease in the capacity of the
    organization (s), and network
  • Increase or decrease in supporters, sympathizers,
    acquiescers
  • Or a simple scorecard http//www.angelfire.com/ult
    ra/terroristscorecard/index.html

28
Rand/ MIPT DataInternational Deaths by Region
29
Rand/ MIPT DataDeaths by Region, domestic
30
International terrorism 2001-2005
  • Incidents up in the Middle East and either flat
    or down almost everywhere else
  • Deaths up in the Middle East and Europe pretty
    flat everywhere else

31
Domestic terrorism2001-2005
  • up in the middle east
  • up in Russia and Chechnya
  • South America Colombia accounts for 90 of the
    deaths since 2001
  • Eastern Europe Russia and Chechnya account for
    96 of deaths since 2001
  • Africa Uganda accounts for 56 of the deaths in
    Sub Saharan Africa,
  • Darfur, Congo, etc. dont show up

32
More or less terrorism?where?
  • National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC
    http//www.tkb.org/NCTC/Home.jsp),
  • In 2004 there were more than three times as many
    incidents (651/208) and three times as many
    persons killed (1907/625) in what they define as
    significant international terrorism than in 2003
  • Data impossible to assess for 2005 because of
    change in reporting

33
More or less terrorism when?Interrupted Time
Series
34
Total Terrorist Incidents MIPT 09/12/1997 -
09/10/2001 
35
Total Terrorist Incidents MIPT09/12/2001 -
09/10/2005 
36
do these metrics help us know if
  • There is a greater or lesser chance of a
    terrorist attack today in the United States than
    there was when the baseline point was
    established?
  • There is a greater or lesser chance of a
    terrorist attack against American targets abroad
    than there was at the baseline point?
  • George Tenets testimony to the Intelligence
    committees in February 2004
  • Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 9/11
    remain within Al Qaedas reach.

37
Capacity of the Opponent
  • Capability
  • Size, structure, support, sympathy
  • Geographical scope and range
  • Tactical and strategic

38
The Opponent
  • Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it
    does not end there. It will not end until every
    terrorist group of global reach has been found,
    stopped and defeated.
  • George W. Bush September 20, 2001
  • The Network of Terror Implications

39
To study terrorist networks we need to know
  • What is a network?
  • Who is in the network? What are its boundaries?
  • What relations are encompassed in the network?
    How are nodes connected?
  • What are the relevant structural properties?
  • What types of ties are there?
  • How are networks embedded within society?
  • What network processes are associated with
    structure?
  • Stohl and Stohl (2007, forthcoming)

40
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41
Size and Structure of Al Qaeda
  • Estimates of the number of persons who passed
    through the Al Qaeda training camps have ranged
    as high as 25,000-30,000 dispersed to cells in
    more than sixty countries.
  • There is no easy way to determine the size of
    Al-Qaeda, the number and scale of its affiliates
    and proxies or who its donors, active supporters
    and potential sympathizers are. Local governments
    often do not know, deliberately conceal, or may
    at times exaggerate the Al-Qaeda presence in
    their countries.
  • Trends? -if we dont know the baseline it is
    difficult to determine if Al Qaeda or the Global
    Network of Terror is larger of smaller since a
    particular point in time.

42
Size and Structure of Al Qaeda
  • In the aftermath of the Afghanistan war the
    incentive to demonstrate success led to more
    conservative descriptions of organizational size,
    connections and possibilities. For example in
    June 2002, Johnson, Van Natta and Miller (2002)
    of the New York Times reported,
  • that senior officials suggest that although
    sworn members of Al Qaeda were estimated to
    number no more than 200 to 300 men, officials say
    that at its peak this broader Qaeda network
    operated about a dozen Afghan camps that trained
    as many as 5000 militants, who in turn created
    cells in as many as 60 countries.

43
Status of Al Qaeda Jenkins (in Fallows)
  • The Taliban were dispersed, and al-Qaedas
    training camps in Afghanistan were dismantled.
  • Al-Qaeda operatives by the thousands have been
    arrested, detained, or killed. So have many
    members of the crucial al-Qaeda leadership circle
    around bin Laden and his chief strategist, Ayman
    al-Zawahiri.
  • it has become harder for the remaining al-Qaeda
    leaders to carry out the organizations most
    basic functions
  • Because of increased intelligence efforts by
    the United States and its allies, transactions of
    any typecommunications, travel, money
    transfershave become more dangerous for the
    jihadists. Training and operations have been
    decentralized, raising the risk of fragmentation
    and loss of unity. Jihadists everywhere face the
    threat of capture or martyrdom.

44
Status of Al Qaeda
  • Their command structure is gone, their Afghan
    sanctuary is gone, their ability to move around
    and hold meetings is gone, their financial and
    communications networks have been hit hard,
  • Seth Stodder, a former official in the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

45
Status of Al Qaeda
  • The al-Qaeda that existed in 2001 simply no
    longer exists.
  • In 2001 it was a relatively centralized
    organization, with a planning hub, a propaganda
    hub, a leadership team, all within a narrow
    geographic area. All that is gone, because we
    destroyed it.
  • Where bin Ladens central leadership team could
    once wire money around the world using normal
    bank networks, it now must rely on couriers with
    vests full of cash.
  • Kilcullen in Fallows

46
Status of Al Qaeda
  • The essence of the change is this because of
    al-Qaedas own mistakes, and because of the
    things the United States and its allies have done
    right, al-Qaedas ability to inflict direct
    damage in America or on Americans has been
    sharply reduced.
  • Fallows, September 2006
  • How does he know this?
  • Does the preceding tell us this?

47
The Counterterror Organization
  • Building Support Amongst Diverse Audiences

48
Capacities of the CounterTerrorist Organization
(and organizational network)
  • Core membership
  • Members, geographic dispersion, deviations and
    trends
  • Support structures, resources, geographic
    dispersion, deviations and trends
  • Zone of operations, geographic dispersion,
    deviations and trends

49
Size of counterterrorism coalition
  • Nous sommes tous Américains Le Monde, September
    12, 2001

50
Size of counterterrorism coalition
  • What do these numbers signify?
  • The members of NATO and the Rio Pact invoked
    these treaties mutual defense clauses for the
    first time. Subsequently, sixteen of the 19 NATO
    members engaged in the Afghan theater. The UN
    Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
    1373 requiring all UN members to freeze terrorist
    financing, improve border security, clamp down on
    the recruitment of terrorists, share information,
    and deny terrorists any support or safe haven.
    In September and October of 2001 there was clear
    international community support for the United
    States and for a collective response to the
    problem of terrorism. A total of 136 countries
    offered a range of military assistance to the
    United States, including over flight and landing
    rights and accommodations for U.S. forces.

51
Size of counterterrorism coalition
  • The initial cooperation led to an aggressive
    international law enforcement effort which had
    resulted in detention of approximately 3,000
    terrorists and their supporters in more than 100
    countries and in the freezing of 124 million in
    assets in some 600 bank accounts around the
    world, including 36 million in the United States
    alone.
  • If these numbers decline what is this evidence
    for?

52
Perceptions of Fear and Security
53
Hoffman, 2006
  • The tragic loss of innocent life in any attack
    linked to al Qaeda is calculated by its
    masterminds to rekindle worldwide the same
    profound fears and anxieties that the attacks on
    9/11 ignited. Al Qaedas stature and reception in
    parts of the world today is a product of the
    extraordinary success achieved and attention
    generated by the attacks that day.

54
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55
Metrics of Counterterrorism
  • Thus metrics are needed to evaluate
  • if different publics feel more or less secure,
  • have a more or less favorable attitude towards
    their governments,
  • and have a more or less favorable or unfavorable
    attitude towards the terrorists or the countries
    allied against them and so on.

56
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57
Attitude towards government
58
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60
Perceptions of Fear and Security
61
Perceptions of Fear and Security
62
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64
U.S. PRESIDENT / NATIONAL ELECTION / EXIT POLL
2004
65
Measuring the support of publics in friendly (and
unfriendly) states
  • Global Audiences and Global Messages
  • Multiple message sources

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69
Lessons from the Battle of Algiers
  • As the flier inviting guests to the Pentagon
    screening declared ''How to win a battle against
    terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children
    shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant
    bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population
    builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The
    French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but
    fails strategically. To understand why, come to a
    rare showing of this film.'
  • NYTimes September 7, 2003

70
  • Will this operation produce more bad guys than
    it takes off the street by the way it is
    conducted
  • Major General David Patreus, Commanding General
    101st Airborne Division, Summer 2003
  • (Quoted in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, Penguin 2006, p.
    231)
  • Currently, Lt. General and Commanding General
    American Forces in Iraq

71
South China Morning Post March 7,2007
  • Trigger-happy West risks fostering Taliban or
    worse

72
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73
The Great Divide How Westerners and Muslims View
Each OtherEurope's Muslims More Moderate ( Pew
released 06.22.06)
74
Mickolus, Measures for determining support for
terrorists by governments
  1. permitting safe havens or bases,
  2. permitting training on local soil.
  3. general training by the government
  4. making large monetary contributions
  5. provisioning arms
  6. providing nonlethal operational assistance
  7. providing direct financing and training for
    specific operations.
  8. providing weapons for specific operations.
  9. adding to terrorist demands during an incident.
  10. making payment of insurance/bonuses to terrorists
    after the fact.

75
The Audience (Public) Support Opposition
Continuum
  • Active support
  • Passive support
  • Acquiescence
  • Passive opposition
  • Active opposition
  • Goal- move your audience towards active
    opposition to the terrorists, hope to obtain
    acquiescence or passive oppostion

76
Backlash and Burnout
  • Increasing the difficulty of terrorist operations
    within the communities they purport to represent
  • Increasing the incentives for terrorists to
    disengage and move activities to the non-violent/
    political realm

77
Support within the Muslim Community (Pew, Summer
06)
78
Support within the Muslim Community (Pew, Summer
2006)
79
Larger Strategic Implictions
  • three kinds of American reactionthe war in Iraq,
    the economic consequences of willy-nilly spending
    on security, and the erosion of Americas moral
    authoritywere responsible for such strength as
    al-Qaeda now maintained.
  • David Kilcullen in Fallows, September 2006

80
George W. Bush July 11, 2005 FBI Academy,
Quantico, Virginia
  • We're fighting the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan
    and across the world so we do not have to face
    them here at home.

81
Counterterrorism consequences
  • The final destructive response helping al-Qaeda
    has been Americas estrangement from its allies
    and diminution of its traditionally vast soft
    power. Americas cause is doomed unless it
    regains the moral high ground,
  • Sir Richard Dearlove, the former director of
    Britains secret intelligence agency, MI-6, told
    me

82
Consequences of the Counterterrorist Strategy
  • The jihadist regime in Iran feels no reservation
    about flaunting its policy to go nuclear, and it
    unleashed Hezbollah, its client terrorist
    organization, to attack Israel.
  • In Somalia a jihadist group has seized control of
    the government. In Pakistan, Islamists are
    becoming more powerful, and attacks within India
    are increasing.
  • Governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt,
    Algeria and Jordan are under increasing Islamist
    pressure.
  • In the Pacific, North Korea now feels free to
    rattle its missile sabers, firing seven on
    America's Independence Day.
  • China is rapidly building its 600-ship navy to
    fill the military vacuum that we are creating in
    the Pacific as our fleet shrinks well below
    critical mass. Not one of these states believes
    that we can undertake any credible additional
    military operations while we are bogged down in
    Iraq.
  • John Lehman, August 2006

83
Successful Counterterrorism Concepts and
Measures Required
  • Reduce attacks
  • Reduce the risk of further attack
  • Reduce fear
  • Increase the confidence of the audience(s) of
    the act or threat that they will be protected and
    the recognition that the multiple audiences must
    be considered.
  • Decrease the support for the violence by the
    supporters, sympathizers and potential supporters
    of the act or threat.
  • Decrease acquiescence of the audience(s)
  • Reduce the recruitment of new terrorists
  • Increase backlash against the terrorists
  • Increase burnout of the terrorists

84
  • Thank you

85
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
September 5, 2006
  • to win the War on Terror, we will
  • Prevent attacks by terrorist networks
  • Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue
    states and terrorist allies who seek to use them
  • Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of
    rogue states
  • Deny terrorists control of any nation they
    would use as a base and launching pad for terror
    and
  • Lay the foundations and build the institutions
    and structures we need to carry the fight forward
  • against terror and help ensure our ultimate
    success.
  • Advance effective democracies as the long-term
    antidote to the ideology of terrorism

86
NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
  • We have deprived al-Qaida of safehaven in
    Afghanistan and helped a democratic government to
    rise in its place. Once a terrorist sanctuary
    ruled by the repressive Taliban regime,
    Afghanistan is now a full partner in the War on
    Terror.
  • A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis
    is aggressively prosecuting the war against the
    terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to
    secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq, now
    a new War on Terror ally in the heart of the
    Middle East.

87
NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
  • There is a broad and growing global consensus
    that the deliberate targeting of innocents is
    never justified by any calling or cause.
  • Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism,
    with unprecedented cooperation on law
    enforcement, intelligence, military, and
    diplomatic activity.
  • We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and
    help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by
    enhancing our counterterrorism architecture
    through the creation of the Department of
    Homeland Security, the Office of Director of
    National Intelligence, and the National
    Counterterrorism Center.

88
NSCT, September 5, 2006 Successes
  • Overall, the United States and our partners have
    disrupted several serious plots since September
    11, including al-Qaida plots to attack inside the
    United States.
  • Numerous countries that were part of the problem
    before September 11 are now increasingly becoming
    part of the solution and this transformation
    has occurred without destabilizing friendly
    regimes in key regions.
  • The Administration has worked with Congress to
    adopt, implement, and renew key reforms like the
    USA PATRIOT Act that promote our security while
    also protecting our fundamental liberties.

89
Requirements for successful counterterrorism
  • Security
  • The Opponent
  • The Counterterrorist Organization
  • Audience(s)
  • Fear
  • Trust
  • And remember that counterterrorism policy must be
    linked to the larger domestic and international
    political strategic situations
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