Title: The New Basel Capital Accord: Potential Effects on lending rates in New Zealand
1The New Basel Capital Accord Potential Effects
on lending rates in New Zealand
- Slides prepared by Kurt Hess, University of
Waikato Management SchoolHamilton, New Zealand
2Basel I
Basel on the Rhine RiverRetrieved from
http//www.basel.ch 21 September 2004
3Basel II
BIS Building in Basel, Aeschenplatz 1Retrieved
from http//www.basel.ch 21 September 2004
4Basel III
Basel FasnachtRetrieved from http//www.fasnacht.
ch 21 September 2004
5Basel II Impact on Lending Rates
- Motivation / Literature
- System of Risk Weighting underBasel I vs. Basel
II Capital Accord - Loan Pricing by Banks
- Traditional method
- Pricing in a Modigliani Miller world
- Conclusions
6Motivation
- Uncertainty as to what will be the impact of new
regulatory framework which has lead to
speculation among media commentators. - Some of the comments and conclusions relating to
revised risk weightings under Basel II did not
seem convincing.
7Motivation
As a generality, lending to mid corporates
represents a higher level of risk than lending to
their FTSE counterparts. This means mid
corporates will tend to attract the higher risk
weightings, making them the first to suffer from
any financing restrictions placed on their
provider by Basel II. Wilcox in Accountancy, 1
May 2003
8Motivation
Proposed changes to the Basel Capital Accord
(called Basel II) indicate that banks will have a
greater incentive to lend to the residential
housing market. Brian Gaynor in NZ Herald
article titled Aggressive banks drive housing
boom,27 September 2003
9Literature / Studies
- Numerous studies and articles related to Basel II
and it potential impact. - Most important, quantitative impact study (QIS)
with the participation of more than 350 banks in
43 countries (May 2003) explores impact on
capital requirements under the new regime.
10Literature / Studies
QIS Contributions to Change in Standardised
Approach
Relieve for retail
New operational risk category
Basel Committee, May 2003, Quantitative Impact
Study 3 Overview of Global Results, page 5
11Literature / Studies
- Research on possible systemic impacts like the
suspected procyclicity of the new regulation, for
example - Borio, Fufine, Lowe (2001)
- Allen Saunders (2002)
- Special issues of academic journals related to
Basel II - Journal of Financial Intermediation, May 2002
- Journal of Banking and Finance, April 2004
12Research Question
- How will the revised risk weights affect lending
to the various industry sectors? Will there be an
impact on relative lending rates?
13Basel II Impact on Lending Rates
- Motivation / Literature
- System of Risk Weighting underBasel I vs. Basel
II Capital Accord - Loan Pricing by Banks
- Traditional method
- Pricing in a Modigliani Miller world
- Conclusions
14Basel I Risk Weightings
Current Weighting under Basel I
Example Calculation of Risk Weighted Assets ANZ
Bank (NZ Operations) year per 30/9/2003
15Basel I Problems / Effects
- Insufficient granularity and risk sensitivity
- Asymmetry between risk profile, economic capital
and regulatory capital - Arbitrage of regulatory capital
- Asset securitisation
16Basel II Pillars
- Pillar 1
- Minimum capital requirements
- Pillar 2
- A supervisory review process
- Pillar 3
- Market discipline (risk disclosure)
17Basel II Pillars
Pages in New Basel Capital Accord (issued June
2004)
18Basel II Risk Weighting Options
- Credit Risk
- Standardised Approach
- Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB)
- IRB Foundation- banks estimate PD only
- IRB Advanced- banks estimate PD, LGD, EAD,
Effective Maturity - Operational Risk - two options
19Risk Weights Basel I vs. II
For categories relevant for NZ registered banks
(1)
Exposure Category Basel I Basel II
Cash, short-term claims on NZ government and RBNZ 0 0
Claims on NZ government with maturities more than one year 10 10
Claims on NZ banks and local authorities 20 20 to 100 depending on credit rating
Basel II Standardized Approach
20Risk Weights Basel I vs. II
For categories relevant for NZ registered banks
(2)
Exposure Category Basel I Basel II
Loans to rated companies (corporates) AA- to AA A- to A BB- to BBB Less than BB- Unrated 100 2050100150100
Loans collateralised with residential real estate 50 35
Retail type lending (e.g. credit cards, small business loans) 100 75
Relieve for retail
21Risk Weights Basel I vs. II
For categories relevant for NZ registered banks
(3)
Exposure Category Basel I Basel II
Past due loans w/o proper provisions 100 150
Residual and low-rated tranches retained in asset securitizations 100 350 and more
Basel II Standardized Approach
22Basel II Impact on Lending Rates
- Motivation / Literature
- System of Risk Weighting underBasel I vs. Basel
II Capital Accord - Loan Pricing by Banks
- Traditional method
- Pricing in a Modigliani Miller world
- Conclusions
23Traditional Loan Pricing (1)
Bank Deposit Funding Cost 4.00 Average costs of deposits non-capital funding sources
Risk premium for expected losses 0.50 To compensate for expected credit losses
Credit administration 0.70 To pay for the banks operational expenses
Total pre-capital charge price 5.20
Capital charge 0.64 From next slide 0.64 as a percentage of a 100 loan
Total post-capital charge loan price 5.84 Pre-capital charge price plus capital charge
24Traditional Loan Pricing (2)
Calculation of Capital Charge
Minimum capital adequacy ratio 8 Minimum capital adequacy ratio for tier 1 2 capital
Risk weight 50 for residential mortgages under Basel I
Capital required per 100 of loan 4.00
Cost of capital 20 Assumption on average return demanded by the banks capital investors
Excess over bank funding costs () 16 20 minus 4 (4 deposit funding costs)
Excess over bank funding costs () 0.64 16 of 4.00
25Traditional Loan Pricing
- A decrease in the risk weight as foreseen under
New Accord would affect loan pricing under this
traditional scheme
50
35
Risk Weight
0.64
0.45
Capital charge
5.84
5.65
Loan Price
26Loan Pricing in MM World
- Fundamentally credit risk of loan does not change
if funding mix is change - What changes is the return required by the
provider of the equity capital. - Leaving the required return constant under
traditional scheme is thus flawed.
27Loan Pricing in MM World
- Modigliani Miller (1958) propositions without
taxes - Proposition ICapital structure does not
matter - Proposition IIRisk to equity holders rises
with leverage
28Loan Pricing in MM World
Hypothetical Loss Distribution Mortgage Loan
Portfolio
Hypothetical example assumes Poisson distribution
for 200 loans with a probability of default 2.5
(intensity 5) and loss given default of 20.
29Loan Pricing in MM World
30Loan Pricing in MM World
r WACC is constant and given by
where B is the amount of funds obtained from
bank deposits, E the amount of equity
capital. rB required return on the deposits
(gross deposit funding costs) rE required return
on equity capital (cost of equity)
31Loan Pricing in MM World
Cost of equity (rE) then becomes as a function of
leverage l which is defined as the percentage of
the loan funded though deposits
32Loan Pricing in MM World
Basel I weight 50 leverage96 Basel II weight
35 leverage97.2
33Conclusion
- Revised risk weights under Basel II are sometimes
instinctively being blamed for expected impacts
on relative credit availability/lending rates to
various borrower segments.
- This paper argues that
- Regulatory capital under Basel I should never
have been the basis for allocating economic
capital to loans and pricing in the first place.
34Conclusion
- This paper argues that
- (If anything) Basel II will drive lenders to
allocate capital more in line with actual risk of
the loan as regulatory and economic capital will
be better aligned under the New Accord.
As a consequence, not revised risk weights but a
correction of erroneous thinking could bring
about some changes to internal loan allocation
and pricing systems.
35Basel Melbourne Transport