Attacks and Improvements to an RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol and its Extensions - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Attacks and Improvements to an RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol and its Extensions

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Title: Slide 1 Author: TAN Chia-Zhi Last modified by: aaa Created Date: 5/18/2005 3:13:04 AM Document presentation format: On-screen Show Company: SMU – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Attacks and Improvements to an RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol and its Extensions


1
Attacks and Improvements to an RFID Mutual
Authentication Protocol and its Extensions
Second ACM Conference on Wireless Network
Security (WiSec 09)
  • Shaoying Cai1 Yingjiu Li1
  • Tieyan Li2 Robert H. Deng1

1Singapore Management University 2Institute for
Infocomm Research (I2R) March 16-18, 2009,
Zurich, Switzerland
2
Overall
RFID Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost Tags
B. Song and C. J. Mitchell (WiSec 08)
Tag impersonation attack
Song-Mitchell Protocol
Server impersonation attack
RFID Tag Ownership Transfer B. Song (RFIDsec 08)
Songs Secret Update Protocol
De-synchronization attack
3
Outline
  • RFID Background
  • Attacks and Improvements to
  • the SongMitchell Protocol
  • Attacks and Improvements to
  • the Songs Secret Update
    Protocol
  • Conclusions

4
Radio Frequency Identification System
Components Tag, Reader, Back-end database
Characteristics Wireless connection ( tag ??
reader ) Limited
capability of the tags

Attacker Model Active attacker
100 meters
Tag
Reader
Backend Server
Attacker
5
Privacy and Security Concerns of Mutual
Authentication Protocol
  • Tag information privacy
  • Tag location privacy
  • Resistance to server\tag impersonation attack
  • Resistance to replay attack
  • Resistance to de-synchronization attack
  • Forward and backward security

6
Privacy Concerns of Ownership Transfer
  • New owner privacy
  • Old owner privacy
  • Authorization recovery

7
Song-Mitchell Mutual Authentication Protocol
ti h(si)
Identification
Implicit tag authentication
Update
Server authentication
Update
8
Server Impersonation Attack
r1
M1 , M2
M3
Em, you are valid.
M1 , M3
Im server
r1
Result ?
M1, M2
M3
9
Result of Server Impersonation Attack
(si,ti)new, (si,ti)old
Ti
Server
t
Search database, Search Search. But,
r1
M1 , M2
Its me, Ti. I was changed by Attacker.
Who are you?
10
Tag Impersonation Attack
Im server
Ti
r1
M1, M2
Yeah, you are Ti.
Im tag Ti
r1
Result ?
M1, M2
M3
11
Vulnerability Analysis

gtgt
S gtgt l/2 SR SL
12
Modified Song-Mitchell Protocol

13
Song's secret update protocol
ti ? ti
14
De-Synchronization Attack
Update Tis secret to ti

Ti
r1 , M1, M2
Ti
r1 , M1 , M2
r2, M3
Updates to ti
15
Modified Tag Update Protocol
16
Conclusions
Song-Mitchell mutual authentication protocol
Server impersonation attack
Tag impersonation attack
Tag secret update protocol
De-synchronization attack
17
Discussion
  • Performance

F denotes a computationally complex function such
as hash and keyed hash, and k is an integer
between 1 and 2N
  • Formal Proof

Will be given in our future work.
18
Q A?
19
Thank you!
  • Shaoying Cai
  • sycai_at_smu.edu.sg
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