Competition Strategy between Proprietary and Open Source Software and Intensity of Piracy Monitoring ?????????????????????????????????? ???????? ?????????????????????????? - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Competition Strategy between Proprietary and Open Source Software and Intensity of Piracy Monitoring ?????????????????????????????????? ???????? ??????????????????????????

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Title: Competition Strategy between Proprietary and Open Source Software and Intensity of Piracy Monitoring ?????????????????????????????????? ???????? ??????????????????????????


1
Competition Strategy between Proprietary and Open
Source Software and Intensity of Piracy
Monitoring?????????????????????????????????????
????? ??????????????????????????
2
Market Share for Top Software Web Servers across
All Domains August 1995 - October 2006
Source Netcraft October 2006 Web Server Survey.
3
Market Share of Operating Systems Used by
Computers Running Public Internet Web Sites, June
2001
  • Source Netcraft June 2001 Web Server Survey.

4
Objectives
  • ????????????????????????????????? Bertrand
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ??????
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????
    ???????? ???????????????????????????????????????
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?????????????????????????????????

5
Network Externalities
  • Network Externalities ???? ???????????????????????
    ?? ??????? ???????????????????????????????????????
    ?????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
    ???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
    ???????????????? ??????????????????????
    (expectation) ????????????????????????????????????
    ??

6
Theoretical Model
  • General Setting and
  • Assumptions

7
Software Providers
  • High-type market
  • 0 1
  • Commercial Software (C) OSS (O)
  • Low-type market
  • 0 1
  • Pirate software (P) OSS (O)

8
Equilibrium of the model
  • Two-stage game
  • Stage 1 ?????????????????????????????????
  • Stage 2 ??????????????????????????????????? ??
    ????????????????? (pC,pO)
  • Backward Induction

9
Consumers Decision
Linear City of High Type Market
10
Consumers Decision (cont.)
Linear City of Low Type Market
11
  • Assumption 1 The network externalities parameter
    is in the range of

12
Firms Decision
  • Commercial firm
  • Reaction function
  • Reaction function

13
Firms Decision (cont.)
  • OSS provider
  • Reaction function

14
Reaction Functions of Commercial and Open Source
Software
15
Range of Benefit of Using OSS (b)
16
Proposition 1 ??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????
17
Comparative Statics Analysis
18
Effects of an increase in after sale services


19
Shift in Reaction Functions of Commercial and OSS
as after Sale Services Increases in Case of Weak
Network Effects
20
Shift in Reaction Functions of Commercial and OSS
as after Sale Services Increases in Case of
Strong Network Effects
21
Proposition 2
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ???????????????? ????
  • ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?????????????????????????????????????????????

22
Effects of an increase in benefit of using open
source software

23
Effects of an increase in degree of network
externalities
  • ???????????????????????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?????????????????

24
Summary of Comparative Statics
  • Note denotes that the sign is depending on
    degree of
  • combined network externalities either it is
  • or

25
Conclusions
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?????????????
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
    ????????????????????????????????????????????????

26
Conclusions (cont.)
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?????????????
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ???????? ??????????????????????????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?

27
Shortcoming and Limitations
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?????????????
  • ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
    ?????????? ???? switching cost ??? lock-in effect
  • ???????????????????????????????????????????

28
Thank You
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