Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Division of Nuclear Installation Safety

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Department of Nuclear Safety and
SecurityDivision of Nuclear Installation Safety

• IAEA SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME FOR NPPS
  WORLDWIDE
• Mamdouh El-Shanawany
• Head of Safety Assessment Section

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Hierarchy of the Safety Standards
Under its mandate the IAEA has developed a
logical framework of objectives and principles of
nuclear reactor safety.

• Safety Fundamentals
• Set out general principles for protecting people
  and the environment
• Safety Requirements
• Establish requirements what has to be done
  (shall) to apply these principles in meeting
  objectives
• Safety Guides
• Set out recommended ways (should) of meeting
  the requirements

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Examples of Safety Standards

• Fundamental Safety Principles
• SF-1
• The IAEA Safety Assessment for Facilities and
  Activities Requirements
• GS-R-Part4
• The Safety of Nuclear Power Plant Design
• NS-R-1

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Specific Safety Requirements
General Safety Requirements
Part 1 Governmental and Regulatory Framework
1. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations
Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety
2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 2.1 Design
and Construction 2.2 Commissioning and Operation
B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants
Part 3 Radiation Protection and Safety of
Radiation Sources
Part 4 Safety Assessment
3. Safety of Research Reactors
Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste
4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
5. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities
Part 6 Decommissioning and Termination of
Activities
6. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
Part 7 Emergency Preparedness and Response
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IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

• IAEA has statutory obligation to develop
  international standards of safety
• Article III.A.6 of Statutes
• To establish or adopt standards of safety for the
  protection of health and minimization of danger
  to life and property
• To provide for the application of these standards

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IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

• Safety Standards represent international
  consensus on the best practices to achieve a high
  level of safety

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IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

• Utilization by Member States
• Formally adopted (i.e. China, Netherlands)
• Direct use of standards to establish regulation
  (i.e. Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, India,
  Korea, Russian Federation)
• Used as reference for review of national
  standards (by all States also by Industry).

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IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES

• Peer reviews performed upon request of Member
  States.
• Assess compliance with Safety Standards and
  provide recommendations for improvements.
• Results publically available (unless formally
  requested by Member State).

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IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES

• Guidelines based on best international practices
  and feedback from long experience
• Phased approach
• Self assessment
• Preparatory mission
• Main mission
• Follow-up mission
• Modular approach to meet needs of Member States

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IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES

• Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
• International Probabilistic Safety Assessment
  Review Team (IPSART)
• Review of Accident management Program (RAMP)
• Safety Assessment and Design Safety Review
  Service (SADRS)
• Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR)
• International seismic safety centre Services
  (ISSC)
• Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
• Peer Review of Operational safety Performance
  Experience (PROSPER)
• Safety aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO)
• Safety Culture Assessment Review Team (SCART)
• Integrated safety Assessment of Research Reactors
  (INSARR)
• Safety assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities during
  operation (SEDO)

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IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES

• Customers of safety review services
• 50 Regulators
• 50Industry

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OSARTobjectives of the OSART programme

• to provide the host country (regulatory
  authority, plant/utility management and
  governmental authorities) with an objective
  assessment of the status of the operational
  safety with respect to international standards of
  operational safety and performance
• to provide the host plant with recommendations
  and suggestions for improvement in areas where
  performance falls short of IAEA Safety Standards
  and international best practices

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Objectives of the OSART programme

• to provide key staff at the host plant with an
  opportunity to discuss their practices with
  experts who have experience of other practices in
  the same field
• to provide all Member States with information
  regarding good practices identified in the course
  of the review
• to provide experts and observers from Member
  States and the IAEA staff with opportunities to
  broaden their experience and knowledge of their
  own field.

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Standard OSART review scope 9 areas

• Management, organization and administration (MOA)
• Training and qualification (TQ)
• Operations (OP)
• Maintenance (MA)
• Technical support (TS)
• Operational experience feedback (OE)
• Radiation protection (RP)
• Chemistry (CH)
• Emergency planning and preparedness (EPP)
• ( Commissioning COM for pre-operational OSART)
  

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Customized OSART review scope

• Customized review scope core areas selected
  optional areas
• New optional areas in development
• Long Term Operation
• Transition from Operations to Decommissioning
• Probabilistic Safety Assessment Applications
• Accident Management

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OSART missions 2006, 2007

• 2007
• Finland, Loviisa
• Korea, Yongwang
• Belgium, Tihange
• Germany, Neckarwestheim
• Ukraine, Khmelnitsky
• France, Chinon

• 2006
• Lithuania, Ignalina
• Slovakia, Mochovce
• Ukraine, S. Ukraine 3
• France, St. Laurent

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OSART missions 2008, 2009

• 2008
• Sweden, Forsmark
• Russia, Balakovo
• USA, Arkansas
• France, Cruas
• Ukraine, Rovno 3,4

• 2009
• Japan, Mihama
• Sweden, Oskarshamn
• France, Fessenheim
• Spain, Vandellos 2
• Ukraine, S. Ukraine 1,2
• China, Ling Ao 3,4
• Limited scope
• Pre-operational

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OSART PROGRAMME 2006-2009
21 OSART missions Western Europe 9 Central
Europe 3 Eastern Europe 5 Asia
3 North America 1 South America 0 Africa
0
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OSART Missions for Russian NPPs

• A number of OSART missions were requested by
  Russian NPPs during the period 19891993, which
  are listed below
• Plant Reactor type Year
• Gorky (Pre-operational) district heating NP 1989
• Novovoronezh 3/4 VVER 440/179 1991
• Kola 1/2 VVER 440/ 230 1991
• Smolensk 3 RBMK 1000 1993
• All of these missions were combined review of
  design and operational safety, not the current
  standard OSART programme.

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OSART missions for Russian NPPs

• More recently, the Russian NPPs management
  requested full OSART and follow up for two more
  plants
• Plant Reactor type OSART OSART FU
• Volgodonsk VVER-1000 2005 2007
• Balakovo VVER-1000 2008 2010

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OSART missions for Russian NPPs

• The following points were noted from overall
  assessment of the results of OSART missions to
  Volgodonsk and Balakovo NPPs
• Evidence of significant efforts were spent by the
  plants to prepare for the OSART
• Relatively low number of areas for improvement
• Most areas for improvements are suggestions, only
  a few recommendations
• Relatively high number of good practices
• During the OSART Follow-up missions the team
  observed that
• A high ratio of issues fully resolved, the rest
  progressing satisfactorily towards completion,
  with no issues having insufficient progress
• The plants responded with corrective actions not
  only to recommendations and suggestions but also
  to encouragements, which is the lowest category
  of advice
• The corrective actions were applied not only at
  the plant hosting the OSART but across the fleet
  of Rosenergoatom.

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OSART missions for Russian NPPs

• Future plans for OSART missions in Russia are
  being considered. There is an agreement with the
  utility Rosenergoatom to organize an OSART
  mission to a Russian NPP site every three years
• Plant Reactor type Year
• Smolensk RBMK 2011
• Kola VVER 440/213 2014
• By completing these reviews the OSART programme
  will then have cover all major reactor designs
  operated in Russia.

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IAEA Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR)
May 2010
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Nuclear Installation Safety Generic Reactor
Safety Reviews (GRSR)

• The IAEA is assisting Member States in their new
  reactor design assessments by carrying out
  reviews of reactor design safety cases with focus
  on completeness and comprehensiveness of the
  safety case using selected and applicable IAEA
  Safety Fundamentals and Requirements.

.
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Generic Reactor Safety ReviewObjectives

• The aims of the review are to
• Determine whether the reactor design safety case
  follows the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles,
• Determine whether the selected safety
  requirements defined in GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 are
  being addressed in the design safety case and
  identify any that have been omitted,
• For those requirements that are addressed, form a
  view on whether they are being addressed in a way
  that is consistent with the spirit of the IAEA
  requirements,
• For the safety requirements that are not being
  addressed or are partially addressed, form a view
  on their relative significance and highlight
  their importance to safety.
• Identify if the supplied documentation includes
  proper references/evidence as technical
  supporting information.

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Generic Reactor Safety ReviewArea and Scope

• The review focuses on
• A. Completeness
• Does the documentation provide a complete
  overview of the safety case or are there gaps?
• if so are these made explicit and is there any
  indication of what is being done to fill them (NB
  this applies to both the safety of the design and
  the safety case itself)?
• Is evidence provided that substantiates the
  safety claims and arguments being made?
• B. Comprehensiveness
• Are all modes of operation covered, e.g. outages,
  refuelling, maintenance, start-up, shutdown?
• Are all features of the facility included e.g.
  fuel stores, spent fuel storage, auxiliary
  systems, steam turbines?
• Are lifetime issues covered e.g. ageing
  management provision for maintenance, repair,
  replacement with respect to radiological
  risks/doses decommissioning radioactive waste
  minimisation in maintenance, repair and
  replacement?

Assisting Member States to implement the IAEA
safety standards
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Generic Reactor Safety Review Safety
Fundamentals and Safety Requirements
Safety Standards used in IAEA generic evaluation
of safety of new reactor designs
Fundamental Safety Principles, SF-1
Safety Standards against which the reviews are
conducted
Safety Assessment Requirements, GS-R-4
Design Safety Requirements NS-R-1
Supporting guidance documents
Design Safety Guidelines
Safety Assessment Guidelines
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IAEA Safety Requirements andGeneric Reactor
Safety Review
LICENSING
FUTURE STATE
MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
LICENSING
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS REQUIREMENTS
REVIEW
REVIEW
MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
HARMONIZING SAFETY ASSESSMENTS
GLOBAL NUCLEAR SAFETY REGIME
REVIEW
FUTURE MDEP CONTRIBUTION
MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
REVIEW
LICENSING
LICENSING
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Generic Reactor Safety Review Report Contents

• The Executive Summary
• General Reporting
• Description of the reviews scope, objectives,
  implementation, and safety requirements selected
  for the review
• Review Results
• General comments on the quality and completeness
  of the documents screened
• A review of selected design features with
  observations and recommendations highlighting
  specific findings on technical topics (e.g.
  safety functions, reactor core and associated
  features, reactor coolant system, containment,
  IC, human factors defence in depth, use of PSA
  and DSA, etc.)
• Review Sheets for each Safety Requirement
• Detailed screening comments on each requirement
  and sub-paragraph of GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 reviewed

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Generic Reactor Safety Review 2006-2009
Activities
ACR 1000 - AECL AP1000 - Westinghouse EPR -
AREVA ESBWR GE Hitachi ATMEA 1 AREVA
MHI APR1400 KHNP
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Generic Reactor Safety Review 2006-2009
Activities
2006-2007 - Concept Development and Planning
2007-2009 GRSR Reviews Conducted

• UK HSE Screening of Four New Reactor Safety
  Cases submitted for the consideration of the
  UK Health and Safety Executive/ NII against
  DS348 ACR1000, AP1000, ESBWR, EPR
• (initiated September 2007 completed March
  2008)
• ATMEA1 Screening of Conceptual Design Safety
  File and its innovative features against
  DS348 and NS-R-1 of new AREVA-MHI Reactor ATMEA1
  
• (initiated 10 December 2007 completed June
  2008)
• AP1000 Screening of AP1000 Safety and
  Environmental Report and its innovative
  features against DS348 and NS-R-1
• (initiated 13 February 2008 completed January
  2009)
• APR1400 Screening of KHNP APR1400 Safety and
  Environmental Report against GS-R- Part 4 and
  NS-R-1
• (initiated 15 October 2008 completed August
  2009)
• Projects in the planning stages
• APR1000 Screening of the Korean APR1000 has been
  requested and initial discussions with KEPCO
  are ongoing.

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• IAEA
• INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY CENTRE
• (INSC)

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BACKGROUND

• There are 436 nuclear power reactors in operation
  worldwide, and over 50 reactors are under
  construction.
• Large number of countries without any previous
  nuclear experience considers implementation of
  nuclear power programmes in the next decade.
• Safety assessment capacity is the primary means
  for decision-making in support of design,
  licensing and operation activities.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
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• Safety Assessment provides the foundation for
• SUCCESSFUL DESIGN,
• LICENSING, AND
• OPERATION
• The development of an efficient and competent
  safety infrastructure in all Member States with
  nuclear power programmes or planning deployment
  of nuclear power system for the first time is a
  must!
• A significant element of the safety
  infrastructure is the safety assessment
  capability
• there is no safety without safety assessment!

Safety cannot be assured without robust safety
assessment
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• Hence comes the need to increase global safety
  assessment capacity for new nuclear power plant,
• and the need to assist Member States in the
  applications of integrated safety assessment
  approach in order to reach informed safety
  decisions based on IAEA safety standards.
• The IAEA is establishing the International
  Nuclear Safety Centre (INSC).

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
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OBJECTIVES of INSAC 1/2
Implementing integrated and harmonized methods
and approach to safety assessment of nuclear
installations and to assist in its
applications. The INSC framework and platforms
will be used to 1. Support safety standard
preparation through providing for technical
bases 2. Provide comprehensive IAEA advisory
and review services
Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
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OBJECTIVES of INSAC 2/2
3. Support Member States in safety capacity
building, maintenance and knowledge
management 4. Provide networking systems and
facilitate effective knowledge and information
sharing and collaboration.
Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
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EXPECTED RESULTS

• The INSAC will harmonise safety assessment
  competency and capacity building efforts.
• It will provide leadership and management of
  safety assessment methodologies based on an
  integrated structured approach.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
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Examples PERFORMANCE MEASURES

• The number of developed Technical Documents and
  Guides related to the interpretation of safety
  assessment requirements. Development and
  application of Generic Reactor Safety Review
  methodology,
• Development and application of methods/guidance
  documents for- Integrated Risk Informed
  Decision Making process,- Safety Performance
  Indicators and applications, - Safety Goals
  and its applications.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
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PERFORMANCE MEASURES

• Implementation of integrated safety review
  services of safety assessment approach developed.
  Number of advisory service conducted per year
• Development of safety assessment knowledge
  requirement implementation of capacity
  building. Number of training courses and
  workshops prepared and conducted per year
• Development and use of e-platform such as CASAT.
  To foster collaboration and network platform
  promoting harmonization of nuclear safety
  assessment concepts and approaches worldwide in
  operation. Web-bases system setup for
  collaboration and networking, data base for
  training and methods validation.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
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Concluding Remarks

• The IAEA is willing and ready to support safety
  enhancements through the establishment and
  application of Safety Standards, Safety Review
  and Advisory Services and International
  Instruments.
• The IAEA is successfully performing safety
  assessments of new reactor designs using the
  current Safety Standards.
• Current Safety Standards are a first basis for
  harmonization.
• All IAEA publications are available at
• http//www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/pub
  lications.asp