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Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A case study of new packaging for fresh beef

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Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A case study of new packaging for fresh beef Elizabeth Hoffman, Dale J. Menkahus, Dipankar Chakarvarta ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A case study of new packaging for fresh beef


1
Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in
Marketing ResearchA case study of new packaging
for fresh beef
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Dale J. Menkahus, Dipankar
    Chakarvarta, Ray A. Field, Glen D. Whipple
  • Marketing Science, 1993
  • Presented by Jong Min Kim

2
Introduction
  • Introduce a new tool for use in laboratory
    pretest markets
  • Illustrates its application in a laboratory
    pretest market for vacuum-packaged retail fresh
    beef
  • First step in research on how laboratory
    experimental auctions can contribute to marketing
    research

3
Laboratory Experimental Auction in Marketing
Research
  • Advantages
  • Allow an endogenous revelation of the prices
    consumers are willing to pay
  • yield simultaneous estimates of the of units of
    the product that may be sold
  • Data in lab. experimental auction pertain to
    actual purchases of the product
  • Disadvantages
  • Bidding mechanism does not naturally mimic how
    consumers reveal preference
  • Correspondence between the theoretical incentive
    compatibility of an auction mechanism and actual
    participant behavior
  • Consumers engage strategic learning strategies

4
Incentive-compatible Auctions
  • First-price, sealed-bid auction
  • The highest bidder purchases the object and pays
    his bid price
  • Dutch auction
  • The price starts out very high and is
    progressively lowered until one bidder signals he
    will purchase
  • English auction
  • Bidder keep raising the price until only one
    bidder is left, that bidder pays marginally more
    than the second-highest bidders last bid
  • Vickrey auction (uniform price, first-rejected
    bid auction)
  • second-price, sealed-bid auction English
    auction
  • incentive-compatible
  • English clock auction

5
Incentive-compatible Auctions
  • Do bidders bid their true values in
    incentive-compatible auctions?
  • The order of bids may very well represent the
    order of true vales (Coursey Smith, 1984)

6
Background on the Product
  • The market for the fresh beef
  • Differentiation in PACKAGING
  • Vaccum-skin packaging vs. overwrapped styrofoam
    tray
  • VS packaged beef has not sold well in limited
    supermarket tests at comparable prices
  • Basic goal of the research
  • determine the impact of information pertaining to
    the benefits of VS packaging on the consumer
    values

7
Experimental Design
  • 8 participants in each session
  • Auction mechanism
  • Fifth-price, sealed-bid auction, with specific
    instruction, to sell 4 packages of beef to four
    different consumers
  • 4 trials and six purchase auctions
  • 3 basic experimental treatments
  • No information about packaging
  • With information-Discussion of the benefits of
    new packaging was included in instruction
  • With information and Demonstration

8
Experimental Design
9
Experimental Results

lt lt
10
Confounding factors
  • Sequence of purchase auctions
  • Monitors
  • Time of day
  • Location
  • Order of presentation

11
Conclusion
  • Laboratory experimental auctions can provide
    information useful to marketing professionals
    (particularly when incorporated in a research
    program with other traditional techniques)
  • The challenge is to minimize both the incidence
    and impact of strategic behavior of bidders

12
Conclusion
  • Improve the behavioral properties of
    theoretically incentive-compatibility auctions
  • By using terminology that deemphasizes strategic
    behavior
  • By providing clear and concise explanations of
    the incentive compatibility rationale
  • By allowing subjects the opportunity to learn

13
Future Research
  • Direct comparison between an incentive-compatible
    laboratory experimental auction the other
    established laboratory pretest market model
  • Use of auctions in determining efficacy of
    potential advertising campaigns

14
Critique
  • This paper focuses more on illustration of the
    methodology - the specific results of the
    experiment were dealt less important
  • Problems regarding the revelation of true value
    still remain
  • Opens a way for implementing new methods, while
    contributing to marketing research

15
  • Thank you!
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