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Title: The Academy of Economic Studies Doctoral School of Finance and Banking


1
The Academy of Economic StudiesDoctoral School
of Finance and Banking
  • Monetary Policy Rules Evaluation using a Forward
  • Looking Model for Romania

MSc student Murarasu Bogdan Coordinator
Professor Moisa Altar
2
I motivate the importance of my topic by the
following remark of
  • John Taylor (1998) researchers first build a
    structural model of the economy, consisting of
    mathematical equations with estimated numerical
    parameter values. They then test out different
    rules by simulating the model stochastically with
    different policy rules placed in the model. One
    monetary policy rule is better than another
    monetary policy rule if the simulation results
    show better economic performance.

3
CONTENTS
  • Policy evaluation with a forward looking model
  • Estimation (calibration) of the model
  • Klein algorithm (generalized Schur decomposition)
  • Central banks loss function and the optimization
    problem
  • Optimal monetary policy rules

4
The forward looking model
  • Coats, Laxton, and Rose (2003) argued that in
    order to support the policy decisions necessary
    to respect a target for inflation, the framework
    had to be forward-looking and capable of dealing
    with the process of controlling inflation.

(1)
  • Another specification of the system includes the
    real effective exchange rate in the IS curve.
    Taking into consideration that are no great
    differences between the two cases regarding the
    methodology and even the main results, I will
    describe the procedure I follow referring to
    first model.
  • This model introduces two layers of complexity
    1. agents actions depend upon expected future
    output and inflation which may cause the
    existence of zero or many reduced form equations
    2. the system must be solved for simultaneity.

5
Estimation vs. Calibration
  • Problems
  • data are very limited, both in terms of the
    coverage and the duration of series
  • data sample is very short and describes a period
    of major structural change in the economy and
    major change in policy regimes

These are reasons to expect very imprecise
identification of the parameters from any
estimation.
  • Solutions
  • I chose a full information method of estimation
    (3SLS) in order to solve for simultaneity
  • after estimation I kept the coefficients that
    were statistically or economically significant
  • I applied a kind of calibration for the
    coefficient from the Phillips curve which
    is statistically and economically inconsistent

6
Data used in estimation
  • The model is fitted to quarterly data for the
    Romanian economy for 1998Q1 2006Q2, subject to
    the restriction that the coefficients of the
    policy rule minimize a quadratic loss function.

deviation of inflation from its target
(inflation is measured as a percentage change of
headline CPI, quarter-over-quarter, at annual
rates and is seasonally adjusted using Demetra
(Tramo-Seats))
For the interest rate gap I applied a
Hodrick-Prescott filter to the data and I
computed the gap as a deviation from the trend.
7
Structural parameters
  • quality of the instruments in 3SLS estimation

8
The stability of the coefficients from the two
curves across the interval of variation of
9
Structural system is written in Klein format as
(1)
is a vector of predetermined variables

the forward looking or non-predetermined
variables
Reduced form of the system (Klein(2000) algorithm)

10
Klein algorithm (generalized Schur decomposition)
  • solves systems of linear rational expectations
  • the system need to be solved distinctly for the
    predetermined variables (or backward-looking in
    the language of Klein) and non-predetermined ones
    ( or forward looking variables)
  • infinite and finite unstable eigenvalues are
    treated in a unified way
  • preferable from a computational point of view to
    other similar numerical methods

11
  • for the pair of square matrices from
    the equation (1) the orthonormal matrices and the
    upper triangular matrices exist
    such that
    (2)
  • The generalized eigenvalues of the system are the
    ratios where and are
    the diagonal elements of and
  • The decomposition matrices can be transformed so
    that the generalized eigenvalues are arrayed in
    ascending modulus order (stable eigenvalues come
    first corresponding to backward looking variables
    and unstable come next corresponding to forward
    looking variables)

12
Solutions
(3)
(4)
13
Reduced form
  • Now I have the structural system (1) written in
    the reduced form as
  • is a
    vector of predetermined variables

(5)
  • Taking into account equation (5) we can recover
    the covariance matrix of structural errors from
    the covariance matrix of reduced form errors with
    the relationship

14
Loss function
  • The central bank chooses the values for the
    coefficients from the reaction function that
    minimize the loss function
  • is a matrix of policy weights that represent
    the relative importance to the central bank of
    stabilizing inflation, output and interest rate
    (stabilization objectives).
  • These weights range between zero and one and sum
    to one in order to determine whether the
    performance of the policies is sensitive to
    policy objectives (represented by the weights
    assigned to stabilize inflation, output and
    respectively interest rate).
  • By minimizing the loss function I also obtain
    optimal values for the coefficients of the
    reaction function

15
Computation of the loss function
Because the reduced form errors are linear
combinations of the serially uncorrelated
structural errors, they are serially uncorrelated.
16
Correlograms and serial correlation LM test for
the structural errors
  • Tests for no autocorrelation of the residual
    (residual from IS curve)
  • Tests for no autocorrelation of the residual
    (residual from Phillips curve)

17
Alternative policy rules
  • The interest rate rules proposed by John Taylor
    are the most used ones. Taylor Rule with Interest
    Rate Smoothing
  • Original Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1993) assigns exact
    coefficient values that describe Federal Reserve
    policy
  • Optimal Taylor Rule but chooses the
    values for and that minimize the
    loss function of the central bank
  • Taylor Backward-Looking Rule, where lagged values
    of output and inflation replace the current
    values of the two variables
  • Full State Rule (respond to all, rather than a
    subset, of the variables in the state vector)
  • Woodford (2002) attributes to Goodhart a simple
    rule where the central bank responds only to
    deviations of the inflation rate from its target
    value and choosing an optimal value
    for
  • Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) suggest that
    forecast-based rules are optimal for a central
    bank with a quadratic objective function

18
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19
Results
  • Table 1 reports the policy rule that achieved the
    lowest loss level for each set of policy
    objective weights considered.

Taylor Rule with Interest Rate Smoothing
Goodhart Rule
Expected Inflation Rule
In the case where NBR gives an important weight
to inflation stabilization, as this is its
primary objective and output represents an
important but secondary objective, the Taylor
Rule with Interest Rate Smoothing is the best
rule to adopt.
20
Relative performance of the rules
The figure shows that the Taylor Rule with
Interest Rate Smoothing performs at all times
better than the Taylor Backward Looking Rule.
When the NBR is preoccupied by the stability of
output then it has to respond currently to output
gap and not with a lag.
21
Taylor with Interest Rate Smoothing vs. Full
State Rule and Goodhart Rule
The figure shows the superiority of the Taylor
rule against the rule which takes into
consideration the entire state vector. This rule
performs better than the Taylor type rule only
when the stability of inflation is the only
objective of the central bank.
The figure shows that this simple rule can
perform better than the Interest Rate Smoothing
Rule when the output weight is small and also
that the performance of this rule is not
sensitive to weight assigned to interest rate
stabilization.
22
Full State Rule vs. Expected Inflation and
Taylor Backward Looking vs. Optimal Taylor
  • the central bank should not adopt a policy rule
    in which the nominal rate of interest responds
    only to changes in the current expectation of
    future inflation
  • the conclusion is that the central bank performs
    better if it conditions its policy on current
    rather than lagged economic variables

23
Impulse responses to positive demand shock for
four policy rules, namely Taylor Rule with
Interest Rate Smoothing Full State Rule
Backward Looking Rule and Goodhart Rule
  • Taylor Rule with Interest Rate Smoothing
  • Full State Rule
  • Backward Looking Rule
  • Goodhart(interest conditioned on current
    inflation)

24
Impulse responses to positive demand shock of
expected inflation and output
Taylor Rule with Interest Rate Smoothing Full State Rule
  • Backward Looking Rule
  • Goodhart Rule

25
It is clear that the Taylor Rule with Interest
Rate Smoothing achieves a much more stable output
gap and inflation, in spite of a relatively small
increase in the nominal interest rate. This is
achieved by credibly committing to a fixed
coefficient rule that conditions the short-term
interest rate to current economic variables and
to lagged interest rate.
Conclusions
  • Taylor Rule with Interest Rate Smoothing responds
    better to economic conditions in Romania
  • A central bank like ours, which takes care mostly
    about stabilizing inflation and is concerned
    about the economic stability, should control the
    interest rate using a Taylor Rule with Interest
    Rate Smoothing.
  • Paper provides evidence on the practical
    importance to a central bank of analyzing the
    performance of the commitment mechanism
  • In future work, I intend to compare the
    performance of fixed coefficients rules to
    unconstrained optimal commitment policy and
    discretionary policy, two alternatives proposed
    by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).

26
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27
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