Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy -Scheve and Slaughter Reviewed By: Amie Pittner Thomas Ford - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy -Scheve and Slaughter Reviewed By: Amie Pittner Thomas Ford

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Title: Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy -Scheve and Slaughter Reviewed By: Amie Pittner Thomas Ford


1
Labor Market Competition and Individual
Preferences Over Immigration Policy-Scheve and
SlaughterReviewed ByAmie PittnerThomas Ford
2
Research Question
  • What are the determinants of individual
    preferences on immigration policy?
  • Dependent Variable Individual Preferences
  • Explanatory Variables
  • Non-Economic
  • Economic

3
Author Motivation
  • Migration is recognized by the author as being an
    important issue both politically and
    economically.
  • Academic Debate
  • Different economic models make contrasting
    predictions about the nature of a wage-mediated
    link between skills and immigration policy
    preferences
  • Hecksher-Ohlin Model
  • Immigrants sometime have no effect on native
    wages
  • Factors Proportions Analysis
  • Immigrants pressure the wages of similarly
    skilled native workers nationwide.
  • Area Analysis Model
  • Immigrants pressure wages of similarly skilled
    workers only in gateway communities where
    immigrants settle.
  • Empirical Uncertainty
  • Uncertainty exists regarding whether individuals
    consider labour market competition when
    evaluating immigration policy.

4
Argument
  • There is a link between labor skills and
    preferences on immigration policy.
  • Impact on native market returns (explanatory
    variable) affects individual preferences towards
    immigration policy (dependent variable).
  • Proximity to high-immigration markets does not
    affect preferences.

5
Hypothesis
  • Scheve and Slaughter believe that the economic
    determinants of an individuals immigration
    policy preferences depend on how an
    immigration-induced shift in the U.S. relative
    endowment towards less-skilled workers affects
    that individuals factor income.
  • -preferences
    depend on how immigration will effect an
    individuals income.
  • Expects to find a pattern of more-restrictive
    preferences among those more effected by
    increased immigration inflows, mostly
    low-skilled/low wage workers. They also expect to
    find more open attitudes among highly-skilled/high
    wage workers because of the minimal effect the
    immigrants will have on them.

6
Research Design - Sample
  • Years 1992, 1994, 1996
  • Unit Individuals
  • Size NES Survey

7
Research Design - Measures
  • Dependent Survey Question
  • Do you think the number of immigrants from
    foreign countries who are permitted to come to
    the United States to live should be increased a
    little, increased a lot, decreased a little,
    decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?

8
Research Design - Measures
  • Independent Variables Economic
  • Weekly wages
  • Years of education
  • Independent Variables Non-Economic
  • Area of residence
  • Gender, age, race, ethnicity, immigrant status,
    party identification, political ideology

9
Empirical Results
1992 1994 1996
regressor Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 model 2 model 1 Model 2
Occupation Wage -0.349 (0.130) -0.811 (0.135) -0.541 (0.133)
Education Years -0.044 (0.010) -0.074 (0.011) -0.059 (0.012)
Gender -0.022 (0.048) -0.008 (0.046) 0.022 (0.056) 0.083 (0.054) -0.020 (0.060) 0.024 (0.057)
Age -0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
African- American -0.207 (0.080) -0.225 (0.080) -0.222 (0.091) -0.211 (0.092) -0.238 (0.096) -0.241 (0.097)
Hispanic -0.064 (0.111) -0.122 (0.110) -0.306 (0.136) -0.360 (0.137) -0.124 (0.120) -0.172 (0.121)
Immigrant -0.158 (0.066) -0.150 (0.066) -0.213 (0.076) -0.193 (0.076) -0.220 (0.087) -0.207 (0.087)
Party ID 0.003 (0.013) 0.008 (0.013) -0.006 (0.016) -0.002 (0.016) -0.023 (0.016) -0.016 (0.072)
Ideology 0.057 (0.020) 0.050 (0.020) 0.054 (0.028) 0.041 (0.029) 0.080 (0.025) 0.072 (0.025)
No. of Observations 2485 2485 1795 1795 1714 1714
10
Empirical Results
Uses estimates from Table 1 to calculate the
effect of changing skills and wages on
immigration policy preferences. Increasing
occupation wage and education years reduce the
probability of supporting restrictions.
Decreasing occupation wage and education years
increases probability of supporting restrictive
policies. Empirical evidence supports the
argument that there is a wage-mediated link
between skills and policy preferences. Found low
skilled-workers supporting restrictive policies
because of immigrations effect on income as
expected.
Increase Skill Measure Year Change in Probability of Supporting Immigration Restrictions.
Occupation Wage 1992 -0.086 (0.031)
Education Years -0.126 (0.029)
Occupation Wage 1994 -0.337 (0.050)
Education Years -0.112 (0.019)
Occupation Wage 1996 -0.201 (0.047)
Education Years -0.085 (0.017)
11
Criticisms
  • Doesnt consider the effects of illegal
    immigration on personal preference formation.
  • Doesnt consider that the determinants of
    individual preferences vary by country.
  • NES Survey

12
Contributions
  • Research has provided new evidence on the
    determinants of individual immigration policy
    preferences.
  • The results are important for consulting
    empirically useful models of the political
    economy of immigration policymaking in receiving
    states, particularly in mainstream redistributive
    politics over which political parties often
    contest elections
  • These findings also shed further light on both on
    how individuals form preferences over
    international economic policies and what these
    preferences imply for the domestic politics of
    countries with significant flows of goods,
    capital, and people across their borders.

13
The End
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