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Humanitarian action and peace operations in Africa David Ambrosetti (CNRS

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Title: Humanitarian action and peace operations in Africa David Ambrosetti (CNRS


1
Humanitarian action and peace operations in
AfricaDavid Ambrosetti(CNRS Université Paris
Ouest Nanterre)
2
  • I Africa, a cradle of the humanitarian action
    and peace operations
  • II Effects and stakes of this international
    interventionism

3
I Africa, a cradle of the humanitarian action
and peace operations
  • A) Two founding  episodes  in current
    humanitarian action Biafra and Ethiopia
  • B) UN peace operations and Africa

4
A) 1. Biafra (1967-1970)
  • Nigeria Abuja Ibo
  • Lieutenant-colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu
  • Joint Church Aid 55 000 tons of supplies
  • International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    22 000 tons
  • Bernard Kouchner Médecins sans frontières (1971)
  • Jacques Foccart Nuclear test in Reggane (déc.
    1960)
  • Félix Houphouët-Boigny Léopold Sédar Senghor
    (Sénégal)
  • Markpress (Genève)

5
2. Ethiopia (1984-1985)
  • Wollo (nord) charity business Bob Geldof
  • Band Aid (nov. 1984) Live Aid (juil. 1985)
  • 1 200 000 tons of aid
  • The Derg Mengistu Haïle-Mariam
  • Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front
  • Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
  • Forced displacements of 600 000 persons, 200 000
    died

6
B) UN peace operations and Africa
  • 1. ONUC a turn
  • 2. The post Cold War renewal (1988-1993)
  • 3. Blazing failures and withdrawal (1993-1999)
  • 4. The current unprecedented rise of UN peace
    operations (2000 decade, till now)

7
1. The ONUC (1960-1964)
  • Congo-Léopoldville / République démocratique du
    Congo (RDC) / Zaïre (Congo-Kinshasa)
  • Patrice Lumumba Katanga Moïse Tshombé
  • Dag Hammarskjöld ( en sept. 1961)
  • Resolution 143 of the UNSC ? withdrawal of
    Belgian forces
  • 19 500 personals
  • 30 contributor states (Africa and Asia)

8
2. The end of the Cold War and the renewal of
peace operations (1988-1993)
  • Perestroïka
  • Namibia Angola Mozambique
  • Somalia Restore Hope (UNITAF / Dec. 92- March
    93) et ONUSOM II (ONU / March 93 March 95)
  • 28 000 personals
  • Mohamed Farah Aideed
  • June 1993 (24 Pakistani blue helmets)
  • 3 October 1993 (18 US Marines and one UN
    Malaysian)
  • US Congress (Jesse Helms)
  • Boutros Boutros-Ghali UN Secretary-General
  • Kofi Annan Deputy-UNSG Chief of the DPKO

9
3. Blazing failures and withdrawal (1993-1999)
  • MINUAR in Rwanda (5 October 1993)
  • General R. Dallaire
  • Michael Barnett US delegation to the UN
  • President J. Habyarimana ( 6 April 1994)
  • Rwandan Patriotic Front (P. Kagamé)
  • Hutu Power Col. Théoneste Bagosora
  • Resolution 925 withdrawal of 2 000 Blue Helmets
    in the heart of the genocide ( g -word)
  • 500 000 to one million died
  • Then Bosnia - Zaïre 1996-1997
  • Withdrawal 70 000 UN personals in 1993, 13 000
    in February 1998. Budget decline (from 3,6
    billion to 1 billion )

10
4. The current unprecedented rise (decade 2000)
  • Lakhdar Brahimi report (July 2000)
  • Peace building, even state building
  • Security Sector Reform
  • Regionalization (African ownership)
  • UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1999-2005)
  • UK leader, rescuing the UN in May 2000
  • Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
  • President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah

11
  • African dossiers some 70-75 of the UNSC
    agenda
  • In 2010, Africa
  • half of the UN operations deployed around the
    world (8 out of 16)
  • three-quarters (73 500) out of the 100 000
    personals in uniform deployed around the world
  • Sudan alone a third (30 000, 20 000 for Darfur
    and 10 000 for South Sudan)
  • DRC 20 000 Liberia 11 000 Côte-dIvoire
    8500
  • Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (3 major troop
    contributors) 28 of the total
  • 9 African states among the 20 major contributors
  • Negligible financial contributions Zambia and
    Somalia 0,001 of the UN budget each South
    Africa 0,29

12
II Effects and stakes of this international
interventionism
  1. Some figures a call for modesty
  2. Strategic learning from African actors
  3. The  Africanization  of peace and security
    matters in Africa towards a new peace and
    security architecture in Africa

13
A) Some figures a call for modesty
  • 1. The decrease of death tolls due to armed
    violence in Africa
  • Human Security Center Death tolls related to
    armed conflicts regularly increased from 1960 to
    1990. Decreasing since then.
  • In 1960, Africa 68 of the total of people
    killed in armed conflicts around the world
  • 13 in 2005 (African bank for development).
  • Proposed causes transformations of the forms of
    violence and improvement of sanitary conditions
    and humanitarian relief.

14
2. Engaged means remain modest
  • Multidimensional operations, very intrusive
  • ? Security Sector Reform (Sierra Leone, RDC,
    Liberia, Côte-dIvoire)
  • But limited means
  • UN peace operations 7,7 billion per year
    around the world UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (750
    million per year in 2002 for 17 500 personals
    in uniform)
  • Comparison arms trade around the world 30
    billion per year and the total of state
    military budgets around the world 800 billion
    per year.
  • 20 000 personals in uniform to cover the whole
    Darfur (size of France, very divided habitat,
    rudimentary or inexistent infrastructures)
  • Weak strategic commitment, short-term objectives,
    improvisation, personal professionalization
    improved but still insufficient
  • ? scandal of sexual abuses (Sierra Leone,
    Liberia, DRC)

15
B) Strategic learning from African actors
  • Commitment of African states in peace operations
  • Access to foreign currencies, opportunities for
    training (Burundi), risky military kept away,
    multilateral visibility as a regional power
  • Sidelining and direct opposition strategies
  • Political weakness of international forces
    rapidly analyzed and exploited (Somalia 93,
    Rwanda 94, Sierra Leone 2000, UA au Darfur
    2004-2007)
  • Obstacles, UN (Western) personal expelled
    (Eritrea and the border commission for Badme 2005
    Sudan and Jan Pronk 2006 Chad et MINURCAT
    2010)
  • Medias, humanitarian action and military
    strategies
  • Kamajors and LURD (Danny Hoffman)

16
C) The  Africanisation  of peace and security
in Africa
  • 1. Context
  • Pan-African Movement ? Organization of the
    African Unity (OAU, May 1963)
  • Bilateral interferences from ex colonial powers ?
    20 French armed operations from 1963 to 1983.
  • First OAU peace operation in Chad in 1981.
    Withdrawn in June 1982 on a failure.
  • OAU Mechanism for prevention, management and
    resolution of conflict in 1990 (military
    observation missions in Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros)
  • Continental integration weakened by a rapid
    process of sub-regional cooperation ? seven
    regional organizations in Africa today
  • ? ECOMOG by ECOWAS in Liberia (1990-1997) and
    Sierra Leone (1991-1999)

17
2. The African Union (AU) in 2002
  • Innovations
  • Inspired by the European Union (Commission) and
    the UN (PSC)
  • Article 4 of the constitutive Act
  • Department of Peace and Security
  • Operations in Burundi, Darfur and Comoros
  • The African Stand By Force and the Continental
    Early Warning System (AU and the five Regional
    Economic Communities) in progress

18
3. Limits
  • External
  • Strong commitment of foreign partners
  • Peace Facility of the EU, then the Europe /
    Africa Partnership in Lisbon, financial support
    from the G8 ?  a rush among donors   in the
    context of a new scramble for African mineral
    resources
  • Donor conditionality strong presence of foreign
    (Western) experts in Addis Ababa surrounding
    these projects
  • AU used in a ad hoc way, selectivity according to
    the interests of the foreign powers with
    important projection forces in Africa (US,
    France, UK)
  • Reluctance to provide the African forces with
    better military equipment
  • Internal
  • Weak political commitment of the African states ?
    only when competition for regional hegemony
  • Military contributors Nigeria, Rwanda, South
    Africa, Uganda
  • Financial contributors Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya
  • Difference to make between  Africanization  and
     ownership  (Benedikt Franke)
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