Institutional set-up for fighting corruption in India: Recent changes and their effectiveness

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Institutional set-up for fighting corruption in
IndiaRecent changes and their effectiveness
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Relevant constitutional provisions

• Police State subject. Any criminal offence
  committed in a state can only be investigated by
  the agencies of state govt.
• Criminal law Concurrent subject. Both the
  central state governments have jurisdiction
• Implies the central govt. agencies have to take
  concurrence of the state government for
  investigating a corruption offence

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Anti- corruption institutions of the central
government

• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1987
• Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
• Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)
• Chief Vigilance Officers (CVO s) in various
  ministries and organizations
• Civil service conduct rules

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Prevention of Corruption Act, 1987

• Existed earlier, revised in 1987
• A very broad definition of public servants, to
  whom it applies
• In case of conviction, imprisonment from 6 months
  to 7 years
• Any one with assets disproportionate to his
  income commits criminal misconduct
• Members of legislatures are covered, according to
  the Supreme Court

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Central Bureau of Investigation

• A police organization
• Can take up investigation of an offence only if
  the concerned state government permits it to.
• In practice, blanket permission by the states to
  investigate corruption offences by central
  government employees

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Central Bureau of Investigation (continued)

• Supreme Court/High Courts often ask CBI to
  investigate particular cases, under PIL
• Initially set up as an anti-corruption agency.
  Now takes up all sorts of case-heinous crimes,
  terrorism etc.
• Most of the senior officers drawn from state
  governments for 5 years

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Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

• Set up in 1964 as the apex organization for
  maintaining probity in public life
• Causes complaints to be enquired into
• Monitors/conducts disciplinary proceedings
  involving corruption
• Prior to 1998, not much teeth
• Advising not binding on the government, however
  disagreement cases mentioned in annual report,
  placed before parliament

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Chief Vigilance Officers (CVO s)

• Each ministry/organization has a CVO, appointed
  after clearance from the CVC
• The CVO reports (for most matters) to the CVC
• Monitors and takes action on irregularities in
  the organization, and reports them to the CVC
• All cases of suspected corruption referred to him

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Conduct Rules (some examples relating to the
higher civil service)

• Intimation about all moveable/immoveable property
  required at the time of joining civil service
• No acquisition of immoveable property without
  previous knowledge of govt.
• Every transaction exceeding Rs. 15000 (300) to
  be informed of within a month
• Annual return in respect of immoveable property

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Conduct Rules (continued)

• Can accept gifts from friends and relatives on
  special occasions, within Rs. 5000 (100)
• No speculation in stocks/shares
• And no conduct unbecoming of a government
  servant

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Set-up in the state governments

• Parallel to the central government
• Role of CBI played by vigilance wing of the state
  police
• Role of CVC by the state vigilance
  bureaus/ombudsman
• No functionary equivalent to CVO s of the central
  government

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Major problems prior to 1998

• CBI not really independent. The govt. could bring
  in new officers, or shift out inconvenient ones,
  at will
• Nothing at the disposal of CVC to enable it to
  exercise authority. It could not ask the CBI to
  investigate an alleged offence
• Single Directive No investigation could be
  started against officers above a certain level

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Major problems (continued)

• Sanction for prosecution permission of
  government needed before actual trial began. No
  time limit.
• Slow investigation (sometimes)
• Slow disposal of cases in courts the guilty
  never got punished

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Supreme Court directions

• Directions issued in a public interest case,
  seeking investigation against certain high
  functionaries of the government
• Recommendations of a govt. committee adopted by
  the court
• CVC to be made statutory
• Single directive struck down (violated the
  fundamental right to equality)

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Supreme Court directions (continued)

• Time limit fixed for sanction for prosecution
• CBI to report to CVC for corruption cases
• Chief Vigilance Commissioner to be appointed by a
  committee with the leader of opposition as a
  member
• CBI Director, and other senior officers to be
  appointed (deputed) by a committee headed by the
  CVC

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Supreme Court directions (continued)

• CVC could now cause specific complaints to be
  investigated by CBI
• Fixed tenure of 2 years for Director, CBI
• Independent prosecution agency to be set up
• In general the CBI to be freed from extraneous
  influence of any kind

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Present status of implementation of Supreme
Courts directions

• Except for the giving of statutory status to the
  CVC, all other directions have been implemented
• A bill to confer statutory status on the CVC is
  pending in parliament

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Effect of the changes?

• The CBI definitely has much more independence.
  There have been instances of the govt. wanting to
  shift out officers but not succeeding
• The CVC now plays a more important role. It has
  the services of CBI at its disposal
• However, there is not much change in the disposal
  of work by the CBI. Not much change in the
  investigations completed

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Effect (continued)

• There is no significant improvement in the no. of
  CBI cases disposed of in courts
• The major cases are still not disposed of for
  eg. Bofors, HDW Submarine case etc.
• No changes in states. Far more important as the
  states employ a lot more civil servants

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What more needs to be done

• Similar changes are required in the states. The
  situation there is much more alarming. For
  example the average conviction rate in
  anti-corruption cases there 30, compared to
  CBIs 70
• The Supreme Court had asked the center to advise
  the states in this regard. The advice has not
  been heeded

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What more needs to be done (continued)

• The procedure for disciplinary proceedings needs
  much simplification. At present there are
  multiple stages and too much opportunity to the
  accused to defend himself
• In cases of promotion, the procedure for
  vigilance clearance should be clearly defined

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What more needs to be done (continued)

• Urgent need to set up special courts. States
  have to do this
• The rule that those whose performance is not up
  to the mark can be retired after 50 should be
  used to weed out the corrupt

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• THE END