1
Complex 2030 A Preferred Infrastructure Planning
Scenario for the Nuclear Weapons Complex

• Getting the Job Done

• May 2006

2
Vision for the Future
We can, and will, change the size, the
composition, the character of our nuclear forces
in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold
War is over. I am committed to achieving a
credible deterrent with the lowest-possible
number of nuclear weapons consistent with our
national security needs, including our
obligations to our allies. President Bush,
May 2001
3
Enablers of Transformation
2001
2012
2012-2030
Future
Increased confidence in warhead designs and
demonstration of a responsive infrastructure will
enable a reduction in total stockpile size
4
Principles for Change

• Meet national security responsibilities to the
  current stockpile without interruptions.
• Preserve a premier science and technology base as
  essential to future nuclear capabilities.
• Demonstrate all phases of production required to
  maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
• In partnership with the DoD, transform the
  stockpile consistent with the Nuclear Posture
  Review through concepts such as a reliable
  replacement warhead (RRW). Balance current
  life-extension programs for legacy weapons with a
  transition to RRW concepts.
• Transform the complex to be more responsive and
  cost-effective. Start plans with an assumption
  that no additional new funds are available for
  transformation. Operations of the complex will
  be simplified and essential capabilities/capacitie
  s maintained.

5
Complex 2030 Scenario Version 8.1
6
Four Long-term Strategies and A Near-Term
Commitment

• In partnership with DoD, transform the nuclear
  stockpile
• Transform to a modernized, cost-effective nuclear
  weapons complex
• Create a fully integrated and interdependent
  nuclear weapons complex
• Drive the science and technology base essential
  for long-term national security
• Build confidence in the transformation process

7
Long-term Implementation Strategies

• In partnership with DoD, transform the nuclear
  stockpile.
• Transform to an RRW-stockpile by 2030.
• Transform to a modernized, cost-effective nuclear
  weapons complex.
• Go to a consolidated plutonium center by 2022
  with distributed modernization in place for
  remaining capabilities.
• Start NNSA scoping of a programmatic
  environmental impact statement on future complex
  alternatives in 2006.
• Consolidate CAT I/II special nuclear (SNM)
  materials no CAT I/II SNM at national labs in
  the long-term, fewer locations within production
  plants.
• Create a consolidated plutonium center for CAT
  I/II quantities of materials.
• Modernize remaining production capabilities in
  place (e.g., uranium at Y-12).

8
Complex 2030
1980
LLNL
KCP
NTS
LANL
Y-12
PX
SNL
SRS
Consolidated plutonium center
14 independent sites 12 Cat I/II SNM sites
Located at existing Cat I/II SNM site to be
determined
8 geographical sites - modernized -
reduced footprints 1 integrated network -
contracts consolidated - centralized
acquisition - shared facilities 3-4 Cat I/II
SNM sites
Stockpile size Dismantlements Complex square
footage
Legend
Cat I/II SNM
Other DOE Cat I/II SNM
8 independent sites 6-7 Cat I/II SNM sites
No Cat I/II SNM
9
Long-term Implementation Strategies

• Create a fully integrated and interdependent
  complex
• Manage risk
• Fewer, standard contracts
• Streamline processes and uniform business
  practices
• Drive the science and technology base essential
  for national security
• Define essential long-term capabilities
• Integrate with DOE Office of Science and enhance
  work-for-others
• Eliminate duplicative facilities and programs

10
Getting the Job Done Building Confidence in
the Transformation Process

• NNSA short term commitments
• Continue to deliver products to DoD.
• Eliminate backlog of surveillance units in FY
  2007.
• Accelerate dismantlement of retired weapons by
  49 from FY 2006 to FY 2007.
• Deliver B61-7/11 First Production Unit (FPU) in
  FY 2006.
• Deliver W76 FPU in FY 2007.
• Certify the W88 with a new pit and manufacture 10
  pits in FY 2007.
• Extract Tritium in FY2007.
• Support the science base by completing pit
  lifetimeestimates (2006), ASC Purple machine
  (2006), MESA (2008), DARHT (2008), and NIF
  (2010).
• Support an RRW decision by the Nuclear Weapons
  Council in Nov 2006.
• Implement starting actions to achieve Complex
  2030 infrastructure vision.

11
Key Transformation Activities Involving LLNL

• Support NNSA initiatives in partnership with the
  Department of Defense to transform the nuclear
  stockpile through the design and development of
  Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW)
• Remove CAT I/II SNM from LLNL by the end of 2014
  consistent with the availability of repository
  sites, and support the closure of Building 332.
• Transition large-scale hydrotesting to NTS and
  support closure of Site 300.
• Rely on capability computing at a single site at
  any one time (accessible complex-wide) and
  distributed capacity computing at multiple sites.
  
• Operate high-energy density physics facilities
  (e.g., NIF), as well as other major science
  assets, as national, shared user facilities.
• Establish a Supply Chain Management Center by end
  of 2007.
• Create a more integrated and interdependent
  system of laboratories, plants, and test sites.

12
Backup
13
Department of Defense (DoD)
Congress
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)
Others
Ourselves
November Retreat
Single-Minded Initial Scenario
Document Version
Process for Establishing a Preferred
Infrastructure Planning Scenario
V.0.0
January Process Input
V.1.0
V.2.0 V.3.0 V.4.0 V.5.0
Multi-Minded Middle Management
January Process Output
V.6.0
V.6.1 V.7.0
January Retreat
Department of Defense DNFSB National Security
Council Office of Management Budget Congress Oth
ers
Stakeholder Socialization
V.8.0. . V.XX.0
14
SEAB Task Force Recommendations NNSA 2030 Complex Recommendations
Design Reliable Replacement Warhead immediately Same
Accelerate dismantlements Same
Establish Office of Transformation Same
Create integrated, interdependent enterprise Same
Manage risks effectively with risk-informed decision making and cost-benefit analysis Same
Establish Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) by 2015 Establish distributed production centers of excellence and consolidate plutonium center at an existing Cat I/II SNM site by early 2020s
Consolidate all Category I/II Special Nuclear Material (Cat I/II SNM) to CNPC long-term Consolidate Cat I/II SNM to fewer sites and within sites remove from laboratories
15
Transform the Nuclear Stockpile
Legacy Stockpile Program of Record
Smaller but all Legacy Stockpile
Legacy Stockpile Program of Record
Smaller, Transformed, RRW Stockpile
Transformed, Smaller RRW Stockpile Component
reuse as near-term option with new components
later

• Things we will do
• Maintain the viability of legacy weapons until
  replaced. Assure confidence in the reliability,
  safety, security, and performance of the nuclear
  deterrent without underground nuclear testing.
• Accelerate dismantlement completion from 2034 to
  2023 of legacy weapons currently planned for
  retirement.
• Engage in partnership with the Department of
  Defense to deploy reliable replacement warhead
  (RRW) concepts. Work with DoD to modify legacy
  stockpile Program of Record
• Suggest limiting number of W76-1 warheads
  completed in the Life Extension Program (LEP).
• Suggest canceling the W80 LEP now and reducing
  warhead numbers.
• Suggest reducing the number of B61-7
  refurbishments and canceling the B61 non-nuclear
  LEP.
• Suggest canceling the W78 LEP.
• Implement a continuous design/deployment cycle
  that exercises the design and production
  capabilities and enables responsiveness of the
  nuclear weapons complex.
• Sustain capability to test.

16
Modernize the NuclearWeapons Complex (Nuclear
Issues)
Near-term NEPA process likely not required to
implement, i.e., this could be considered as the
no action alternative.
Go straight to Modernize in Place
Go fast to a Consolidated Nuclear Production
Center (CNPC)
Program of Record
Go to a consolidated plutonium center by 2022
with distributed modernization in place for
remaining capabilities
Near-term NEPA process likely required to
implement.
Go slower with a phased approach to a CNPC with
Interim Facilities
17
Modernize the NuclearWeapons Complex (Nuclear
Issues)

• Start scoping of a potential National
  Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process in 2006
  on future complex alternatives and siting
  decisions. In addition, begin independent
  business case assessments to support decisions.
• Reduce the number of sites with CAT I/II special
  nuclear materials (SNM)
• Eliminate need for CAT I/II SNM security at SNL
  by end of 2008.
• De-inventory CAT I/II SNM removed from LLNL by
  the end of 2014 (tied to CMRR). Move SNM in 2008
  or earlier.
• By 2022 LANL (the Laboratory) will not operate
  facilities containing CAT I/II quantities of SNM.
  The location and operator of the consolidated
  plutonium center will be determined following
  NEPA compliance actions.
• Upgrade Y-12 as the NNSA CAT I/II uranium center
• Complete HEUMF and plan/build a UPF with a
  baseline capacity of 125 units per year.
• Achieve significant reductions in Cat I/II SNM
  footprint at Y-12.
• Plan, construct, and start up a consolidated
  plutonium center at an existing CAT I/II site for
  long-term NNSA plutonium CAT I/II RD,
  surveillance, manufacturing, and
  storage/disposition operations.
• Complete the consolidated plutonium center with a
  capacity to support 125 RRW war reserve pits per
  year by 2022.
• Upgrade PF-4 to support an interim production
  rate of 30 to 50 RRW war reserve pits/year by
  2012.
• Complete CMRR with CAT I/II capability until 2022
  to support PF-4 and closure of LLNL B332 and LANL
  CMR.
• Upgrade Pantex throughput for increased
  assembly/disassembly operations. Use DAF as
  backup for weapon assembly/disassembly/dismantleme
  nt operations.
• Transition large-scale hydrotesting to NTS.
  Prepare LLNL Site 300 disposition plan in 2007.
• Retain tritium capabilities and consolidate RD.

18
Modernize the Nuclear WeaponsComplex
(Non-Nuclear Issues)

• Establish a Supply Chain Management Center by end
  of 2007.
• Create a smaller non-nuclear production facility
  that is occupied by 2012 for components that
  cannot be outsourced.
• Outsource synthesis and formulation of high
  explosive (HE) materials as practical, outsource
  or consolidate large-scale HE production
  pressing, and consolidate HE machining to Pantex.
  
• Consolidate HE RD and laboratory-scale testing
  (without Cat I/II SNM).
• Maintain secure transportation assets to support
  DOE-wide requirements.
• Rely on capability computing at a single site at
  any one time (accessible complex-wide) and
  distributed capacity computing at multiple sites.
  
• Operate high-energy density physics facilities
  (e.g., LANSCE, Omega, Z, and NIF), as well as
  other major science assets, as national, shared
  user facilities.
• Cease NNSA operations at Tonopah Test Range by
  end of 2009 through use of alternative, non-NNSA
  operated ranges and elimination of joint test
  assemblies containing SNM through alternative
  designs and/or test techniques.

19
Create a Fully Integrated and Interdependent
Complex

• Create a more integrated and interdependent
  system of laboratories, plants, and test sites.
• Use fewer, more standard, contracts to
  incentivize sharing of risks rewards across the
  complex and implement approaches that balance
  mission, safety and security.
• Use an independent, national-level organization
  to lead requirements development and cost
  estimating for construction projects and use a
  recognized contract management firm.
• Implement uniformity across the nuclear weapon
  complex in business practices, information
  management, program management, risk management,
  and RTBF.
• Ensure NNSA Leadership works in a uniform,
  integrated manner that balances competing
  priorities.
• Establish structure (e.g., systems engineering
  and integration contractor and clear
  roles/responsibilities) to balance competing
  priorities across missions, risks, program
  elements, and distributed sites.
• Implement an approach and culture that manages
  risk rather than seeks to eliminate it. Apply
  risk-informed decision-making to safety and
  security (both physical and cyber) decisions.
• Implement actions in response to Defense Science
  Board February 2006 recommendations.
• Ensure intellectual competition, peer review, and
  essential nuclear capabilities are sustained
  during consolidation of missions and elimination
  of redundancies.
• Implement predictive surveillance evaluations to
  reduce flight-test requirements.

20
Drive Science and Technology Base

• Establish a science and technology model by the
  end of 2007 that defines the needed capabilities
  required to sustain the stockpile in the long
  term.
• Recognize that Work for Others plays an essential
  role in maintaining capabilities required for the
  NNSA mission. Encourage stronger Work for Others
  in key mission areas.
• Manage the transition to a lower cost NNSA
  national laboratory complex. Develop a plan by
  the end of 2007 to eliminate duplicative
  facilities and programs and maintain key
  capabilities.
• Partner with the Office of Science and other
  leading national RD sponsors regarding the
  national laboratory complex. Define options and
  recommended path forward by the end of 2007.
• Develop jointly funded, integrated programs
  within NNSA and the DOE Office of Science that
  develop the leading edge science and engineering
  capabilities needed for national security.
• Implement joint planning between the Office of
  Science and NNSA starting a pilot in the FY 2008
  budget cycle.

21
Responsive Infrastructure Objectives

• Identify, understand, and fix stockpile problems
  in time to assure continued confidence in the
  reliability and safety of the stockpile.
• Dismantle warheads on a timescale consistent
  with policy requirements.
• Ensure warheads are available to augment the
  operationally deployed force on a timescale that
  supports DoD requirements.
• Design, develop, certify, and complete first
  production units of refurbished or replacement
  warheads on a frequency that both sustains the
  stockpile and exercises the supporting
  infrastructure and critical skills.
• Improve the capability to design, develop,
  certify, and complete production of new or
  adapted warheads in the event of new military
  requirements.
• Produce required quantities of warheads in time
  to meet military requirements.
• Demonstrate nuclear competencies that assure
  allies, dissuade adversaries, and ensure against
  technological surprise.
• Sustain readiness to conduct underground nuclear
  tests.
• Ensure an economically sustainable nuclear
  weapons enterprise.