Opening Markets and Keeping Them Open: A Contract and Antitrust Model - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Opening Markets and Keeping Them Open: A Contract and Antitrust Model

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... C.R.S. Reciprocal compensation--required ... remedial authority to discourage breach Intercarrier compensation must be efficient Access Charges--Paid by ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Opening Markets and Keeping Them Open: A Contract and Antitrust Model


1
Opening Markets and Keeping Them Open A
Contract and Antitrust Model
  • Ray Gifford, Chairman
  • Colorado Public Utilities Commission

2
Opening Markets
  • Eliminate entry and exit barriers
  • Deregulate retail prices
  • Correct price signals imperative to development
    of competitive market
  • Enforce interconnection and unbundling
    requirements of 1996 Telecom Act
  • Rationalize wholesale and retail pricing

3
Contract Rights
  • Interconnection Agreement
  • subject to traditional contract analysis
  • Commission must have full remedial authority to
    discourage breach
  • Intercarrier compensation must be efficient
  • Access Charges--Paid by interexchange carriers to
    carriers for originating and terminating calls,
    40-15-102(25), (28), C.R.S.
  • Reciprocal compensation--required by 47 U.S.C.
    252(d)(2) for local calls

4
Getting it Wrong
  • Access
  • Above cost for local loop cost support
  • Promotes recovery of fixed cost through
    usage-sensitive charge
  • Cross-subsidy from toll users to local users
  • Incorrect price signals distorts market
    development
  • underpayment for fixed costs overpayment for
    variable costs

5
Getting More Wrong
  • Recip Comp
  • To the extent cost-based, makes sense following a
    cost causation model
  • Inherent difficulties of pricing correctly
  • Commission can unintentionally create opportunity
    for regulatory arbitrage
  • ISP Recip Comp
  • Distorts business plans
  • artificial inducement to acquire only terminating
    traffic
  • disincentive to enter residential market
  • Cross-subsidy
  • from ratepayers to ISPs, their customers and ISP
    CLECs
  • Facsimile of real competition
  • not consumer welfare enhancing

6
Getting It Right--Model 1
  • Truly cost-based pricing
  • Three-phase pricing for access and recip comp
  • phases set-up, capacity, usage-sensitive
  • BUT
  • impossibility of getting the price right
  • information cost (metering and billing) is not 0,
    and is dead weight loss
  • regulatory caprice and temptation
  • requires rate rebalancing

7
Getting It Right--Model 2
  • Universal bill and keep for access and recip
    comp
  • ease of administration
  • forces Commissions toward second best efficiency
    for retail pricing
  • Bill and keep assumes
  • very small short run and long run costs for
    traffic termination and origination on modern
    network
  • information cost of metering traffic is dead
    weight loss
  • Would allow carriers to negotiate other
    arrangements and rates
  • BUT
  • systematic undercompensation of carriers in
    access and recip comp
  • forces retail rate rebalancing

8
Antitrust Monitor
  • Now
  • Commission oriented to regulating monopolies
  • certification
  • operating areas
  • tariffing
  • price regulation
  • provider of last resort
  • universal service
  • Absent legislative command, none of these roles
    is warranted in a competitive market

9
State as Mini-FTC
  • search and mitigate residual market power
  • FCC should go no further on UNEs and pricing than
    antitrust essential facilities doctrine would
    warrant
  • Intervention and regulation of telecommunications
    market must be warranted based on established
    antitrust principles
  • Costs of regulatory intervention must exceed
    consumer welfare loss from persisting market power

10
Carrier Dispute Forum
  • Specialized, rapid and expert resolution of
    disputes between carriers
  • full panoply of contract and antitrust remedies
  • Alternatives
  • courts, private arbitration
  • less fear of capture or systematic bias, but less
    expertise and slower

11
Consumer Ombudsman
  • Rapid, decisive and punitive actions against
    carriers committing consumer fraud
  • Monitor, mediate and aggregate consumer claims
    against carrier
  • Enforce quality of service standards for captive
    customers

12
The Goals
  • Commissions role recedes to that of referee
    instead of prescriptive bully
  • Proper price signals for consumer welfare
    enhancing--not producer allocating-- competition
  • Get Commission out of the pricing business absent
    market power problem
  • Commission stops saying maybe, but gives yes or
    no answers so business plans can be made.
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