The Orientation step of the OODA loop and Information Warfare

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The Orientation step of the OODA loop and
Information Warfare

• Lachlan Brumley, Carlo Kopp and Kevin Korb
• Clayton School of Information Technology,
• Monash University, Australia
• Email lbrumley_at_csse.monash.edu.au,
  carlo_at_csse.monash.edu.au,
• korb_at_csse.monash.edu.au

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Overview

• Boyd's OODA loop model
• Expanded model of the Orientation step
• Information Warfare and Orientation
• Case studies of Deception and Self-deception

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Boyds OODA loop model

• Name originates from the loops steps
• Observation
• Orientation
• Decision
• Action
• Describes the decision-making process of an
  individual or organisation
• Models a feedback loop between the decision-maker
  and their environment

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Boyd's OODA loop model
Orientation
Observation
Perceived Model of the world
Decision
Actions
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Orientation step

• Contains a method that combines
• New information
• Previous experience
• Cultural traditions
• Genetic heritage
• Analysis and synthesis methods
• to produce an updated model of the world.

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Orientation step

• However there is no description of how this
  process operates
• We now describe a model of the internal processes
  of the Orientation step

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Proposed Orientation Step Actions

• Recognise known objects, events and relationships
• Analyse new information with known processing
  methods
• Evaluate the completion of aims and develop new
  aims
• Determine what actions may be performed how they
  will affect the world

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OODA loop with expanded Orientation step

• Observation
• Orientation
• Identification
• Interpretation
• Aims Derivation
• Options Generation
• Decision
• Action

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Expanded Orientation step
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Expanded Orientation step
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Expanded Orientation step
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Expanded Orientation step
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Expanded Orientation step
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Expanded Orientation step
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Expanded Orientation step
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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IW attacks that affect Orientation

• Deception
• Deception attacks provide false information that
  is accepted as true, before being used as input
  to decision-making
• Self-deception
• Self-deception occurs when an individual believes
  something to be true, despite evidence that
  disproves it

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Deception Attack
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Deception Attack
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Deception Attack
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Deception Attack
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Deception Attack
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Deception Attack
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Deception Attack
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Self-deception

• The word Self-deception suggests that it is a
  reflexive deception
• Self-deception is defined as an intentional
  misinterpretation in order to support a desired
  but unsupportable belief (Szabados 1974)

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Self-deception
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Self-deception
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Self-deception
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Self-deception
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Self-deception
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Self-deception
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Self-deception
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Examples

• Demonstrate where deception and self-deception
  cause errors in the Orientation step of the OODA
  loop
• Deception Operation Fortitude
• Self-deception Challenger Disaster

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Operation Fortitude

• Deception plan for the D-Day landings during
  World War II
• Deceived the Germans as to the target of the
  invasion and the time of the invasion

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Operation Fortitude
Orientation
Observation
Identification
German Intelligence agencies correctly perceive
information from various sources (Radio
intercepts, aerial photo-reconnaissance, spies).
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Operation Fortitude
Orientation
Observation
Identification
German Intelligence agencies incorrectly identify
the corrupt signals as those of a real army, that
intends to invade at Calais.
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Operation Fortitude
Orientation
Observation
Identification
German Intelligence agencies Interpret that the
main target of the Allied invasion will be Calais.
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Operation Fortitude
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Germany updates its Aims to include defending
Calais from the expected Allied invasion.
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Operation Fortitude
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Germany determines it has the option to reinforce
the defenses at Calais, which it believes will
defeat the invasion.
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Operation Fortitude
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Germany decides it will to move its troops to
reinforce Calais, to defeat the expected Allied
invasion.
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Operation Fortitude
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Germany reinforces Calais, in expectation of an
Allied invasion.
Perceived model of the world
Interpretation
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Challenger Disaster

• The space shuttle Challenger disintegrated
  shortly after takeoff due to an O-ring failure,
  caused by the low temperature at the time of the
  launch
• The self-deception in this disaster was performed
  by Morton Thiokol management
• They were warned that the O-rings were damaged
  more during low temperature launches, however
  they misinterpreted the damage as proof of a
  safety factor

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Challenger Disaster
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Managers correctly perceive warnings from
engineers about O-rings.
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Challenger Disaster
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Morton Thiokols managers correctly Identify the
damage to the O-rings.
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Challenger Disaster
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Morton Thiokols managers intentionally
misinterpret damage to the O-rings as proof of
their safety. This is self-deception.
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Challenger Disaster
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Morton Thiokols managers Aim to approve the
launch if it is safe. Since they misinterpreted
the warnings about the O-rings, they believe it
is safe.
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Challenger Disaster
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Morton Thiokols managers determine that their
available Options are to approve or forbid the
launch. They expect the outcomes to be a
successful launch or an unhappy customer.
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Challenger Disaster
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Morton Thiokols managers now Decide to approve
the launch of the shuttle.
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Challenger Disaster
Orientation
Observation
Identification
Morton Thiokols managers give NASA approval to
launch Challenger.
Interpretation
Perceived model of the world
Aims Derivation
Options Generation
Action
Decision
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Conclusion

• Orientation step details the updating of the
  decision-maker's model of the world and as such
  is a target for IW attacks
• Described a model of the internal processes of
  the Orientation step
• Difference between Deception and Self-deception

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Questions?