Kant - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 23
About This Presentation
Title:

Kant

Description:

Apperception, Synthesis, and Objectivity ... Synthetic Unity of Apperception (PNSUA) ... The analytic unity of apperception presupposes a synthetic unity, as ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:124
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 24
Provided by: J273
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Kant


1
Kants Transcendental Idealism according to
Henry E. Allison
  • Itzel Gonzalez
  • Phil 4191
  • March 2, 2009

2
Overview
  • Henry E. Allison (biographical facts)
  • Ch.7 The Transcendental Deduction from Kants
    Transcendental Idealism An Interpretation and
    Defense
  • Introduction
  • Sec. 1 Apperception, Synthesis, and Objectivity
  • Sec. 2 The Problem of Subjective Unity
  • Sec. 3 Imagination, Perception, and Experience
  • Conclusions

3
Henry E. Allison
  • Currently, he is an Emeritus Professor at the
    University of Boston
  • He published the 1st edition of Kants
    Transcendental Idealism in 1983 (the 2nd (ours)
    in 2004)

4
Introduction
  • He focuses on the B-edition of Kants
    Transcendental Deduction (B-Deduction)
  • And claims Kants central problem in it to be
    the demonstration of a connection between the
    intellectual and sensible conditions of human
    cognition. (159) That is, he maintains Kants
    worry to be the existence of a correspondence
    between the deliverances of sensibility and the a
    priori rules of thought.
  • Further, Henry, in agreement with Dieter Henrich,
    claims that Kant, as a solution, attempts to
    establish the necessity of the categories.

5
Introduction (cont.)
  • Also, like Henrich, he claims that Kant divides
    the argument in the B-Deduction for the necessity
    of the categories into 2 parts
  • The 1st being meant to assert the necessity of
    the categories with respect to objects of
    sensible intuition in general (that is, any
    sensible content must be subject to the
    categories if it is to be brought to the unity of
    consciousness)
  • The 2nd being meant to argue for the necessity
    of the categories with respect to human
    sensibility and its objects (160)

6
Introduction (cont.)
  • According to Allison, Henrich, asserts that the
    1st part of the B-Deduction affirms the validity
    of the categories under a restricting condition
    that is then removed in the second part. (161)
  • However, Allison finds questionable Henrichs
    claim that the 1st part of the Deduction
    effectively demonstrates that the
    categoriesapply to a certain range of
    intuitions, particularly, because Kant intends
    the 1st part of the Deduction to contain the
    broader claim and Henrichs assertion appears to
    place the broader claim, instead, in the 2nd
    part. (Note 7, p.476)
  • Hence, Allison assumes a different interpretation
    from that of Henrich.

7
Introduction (cont.)
  • Allison, contrary to Henrich, interprets the 1st
    part of the B-Deduction to show that the thought
    of objects stands under the categories, while
    the 2nd the further claim that the perception of
    objects is also linked to the categories. (162)
  • A Foreshadowing

8
Apperception, Synthesis, and Objectivity
  • (t)he I think must be able to accompany all
    my representations for otherwise something would
    be represented in me that could not be thought at
    all, which is as much as to say that the
    representation would either be impossible or else
    at least would be nothing to me. That
    representation that can be given prior to all
    thought is called intuition. Thus all manifold
    of intuition has a necessary relation to the I
    think in the same subject in which this manifold
    is to be encountered. (Critique of Pure Reason,
    B131 132)

9
I. (cont.)
  • Allisons 3 claims
  • For any representation to be anything to me,
    that is, to represent anything for me, it must be
    possible to think it as mine. Since a
    representation for which this is not possible
    could not represent anything for me, it wouldbe
    nothing to me. (163)
  • One just means that the I think must be able to
    (but need not actually) accompany all my
    representations. (164)
  • The Principle of the Necessary Synthetic Unity of
    Apperception (the fundamental premise of the 1st
    part of the argument in the B-Deduction) (164)

10
I. (cont.)
  • The Principle of the Necessary Synthetic Unity of
    Apperception (PNSUA)
  • the components of a complex thought must be
    connected in such a way as to allow for the
    possibility of their ascription to a single
    thinking subject, which entails that they
    constitute a synthetic unity. (164)
  • (Argument for PNSUA derives from the idea that
    a single complex thought logically requires a
    single thinker) (164)

11
I. (cont.)
  • The Principle of the Necessary Unity of
    Apperception (PNUA)
  • all representations in any given intuition must
    stand under the condition under which alone I can
    ascribe them to the identical self as my
    representations, and thus can grasp them
    together, as synthetically combined in an
    apperception, through the general expression I
    think. (Critique of Pure Reason, B 138)
  • This principle, which Kant claims to be an
    analytic proposition, is a claim about how the
    thinking subject must be thought (or conceive of
    itself) qua engaged in such activity. (167)

12
I. (cont.)
  • Note PNUA is an analytic proposition because it
    is derived by abstracting from the nature of
    sensibility, which leads thought to be related
    to the concept of sensible intuition in
    general. (167)

13
I. (cont.)
  • The analytic unity of apperception presupposes a
    synthetic unity, as
  • The consciousness of the identity of the I think
    contains a synthesis, and
  • The consciousness of the identity of the I think
    is possible only through a consciousness of this
    synthesis
  • This follows because a subject cannot think its
    own identity with respect to distinct
    representations without in the same act bringing
    them into a synthetic unity. (169 - 170)

14
I. (cont.)
  • Argument for the connection between the doctrine
    of apperception and the necessity of a
    consciousness of synthesis
  • A single complex thought (formed by a A and B)
    requires both a single thinker, as well as a
    unified act of thinking (in which A and B are
    thought together).
  • The I think lacks content apart from the
    consciousness of the identity of this unifying
    action through which the thinking subject becomes
    aware of his or her own identity. (171)

15
I. (cont.)
  • This connection results in Kant viewing
  • all general concepts as analytic unities,
  • the I think(as) itself the thought of what is
    common to all conceptualization, and
  • the act of becoming aware of this identical I
    think(as) themeans (by)which the mind grasps
    the identity in difference in the formation of
    general concepts. (172)

16
I. (cont.)
  • According to Allison, from the connection of
    apperception to the understanding, Kant derives
    the claim that in so far as the manifold of a
    given intuition is grasped as a manifold or
    brought to the synthetic unity of apperception,
    it is by this very act, also unified in a
    judgment (which is the way to bring given
    cognitions to the objective unity of
    apperception B 141 - 142). And, further, that
    as the logical functions of judgment are the
    forms of such unificationthat the manifold is
    also determined with regard to them. That is,
    for a discursive understanding to think the
    manifold of a given intuition just is to unify it
    in a judgment by means of the logical functions.
    (177)

17
I. (cont.)
  • This claim ties apperception to the categories,
    establishing their necessity, as the categories
    just are(the mentioned) logical functions.
  • Allison maintains that Kant shows how the
    manifold, insofar as it is thought together in a
    single consciousness, is necessarily subject to
    the categories. (177)

18
II. The Problem of Subjective Unity
  • Here Allison presents a problem of Kants
  • According to Allison, by Kant claiming that the
    empirical unity of apperception is derived from
    the transcendental or objective unity under
    given conditions in concreto, he must mean that
    though the content of such consciousness is
    determined by contingent empirical factorsits
    form as a mode of consciousness is subject to the
    transcendental conditions of unity. (184)
  • But how is a non-objective form of consciousness
    possible?

19
III. Imagination, Perception, and Experience
  • According to Allison, Kant introduces the idea of
    the imagination in Sec. 24 under the name
    figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa) and
    makes two claims about it.
  • Kant claims
  • That this synthesis, under the name of the
    transcendental synthesis of the imagination, has
    both an a priori dimension and a transcendental
    function in the determining of time as the form
    of inner sense
  • That since this function must accord with
    conditions of the synthetic unity of
    apperception, it is subject to the categories
    (189)

20
III. (cont.)
  • Allison notes that Kant furthers his project of
    establishing the necessity of the categories by
    demonstrating that the transcendental synthesis
    of the imagination connects the categories with
    the forms of sensibility.
  • However, Allison also notes that such move is not
    sufficient for Kant to meet his goal, as to meet
    his goal he must also demonstrat(e)that the
    categories stand in a necessary connection with
    empirical intuition. (193)

21
III. (cont.)
  • According to Allison, Kant attempts to solve this
    problem by linking the categories to the
    synthesis of apprehension, which he defines as
    the composition of the manifold in an empirical
    intuition, through which perceptionbecomes
    possible. (193)

22
III. (cont.)
  • In other words, according to Allison, Kant
    attempts to resolve his problem by claiming that
    even perception must stand under the categories.
  • But a further problem arises
  • Namely, that linking the categories to
    perception cannot account for the epistemic
    function of all the categories. (200)
  • And an argument must incorporate this point,
    because the different category types have
    significantly different experiential functions.
    (201)

23
Conclusions
  • Allison maintains that Kants project in the
    B-Deduction to link the deliverances of
    sensibility to the a priori rules of thought
    (that is, toconnectthe intellectual and
    sensible conditions of human cognition) though
    begun is not completed. (201)
  • It is begun as Kant in the B-Deduction does
    effectively link the categories to thought and
    then, subsequently, to perception.
  • However, it is not completed as Kant cannot
    account for the epistemic function of all the
    categories. (200)
  • So while there is no complete vindication of
    Kants account, it must also be noted, as Allison
    does, that Kants account lacks intrinsic
    incoherencies in it. (201)
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com