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Title: Hierarchy, Merge, and Truth San Sebastian, June 2006


1
Hierarchy, Merge, and TruthSan Sebastian, June
2006
  • Wolfram Hinzen
  • Universiteit van Amsterdam, University of Durham

2
The deflowering of trees
  • Traditional assumption that linguistic expression
    are hierarchically structured objects.
  • XP
  • XP the
  • XP the book the book
  • Whatever hierarchies exist needs explanation in
    line with the SMT.
  • Does minimalist syntax exhibit phrase structural
    hierarchies? (Chametzky, 2000, 2003 Collins,
    2002)

3
Hierarchy via labels? Hornstein (2005)
  • Merge is concatenation
  • Concat (A,B) def A?B, with A, B atoms
  • A non-hierarchical system
  • Concat (C, A?B) C?A?B
  • Enter labels, the crucial evolutionary
    innovation
  • Concat (C, A?B) C?A A?B, with C, A A?B
    atoms
  • Labeling identifies a complex structure with one
    of its (atomic) inputs.
  • But why should the system be hierarchical?
  • Labels are both unnecessary and insufficient to
    yield it.

4
Labels are lexical items
  • Chomsky (2001, 2005) Labels are the only probes
    and goals, the only thing the syntax ever sees
    only the interfaces ever see phrases.
  • Due to the recursiveness of Merge, labels must be
    lexical items.
  • Collins (2002) three explanatory factors for
    syntax
  • (i) interaction of the properties of lexical
    items
  • (ii) economy conditions
  • (iii) interface (bare output) conditions.

5
Deflating hierarchyThe Minimal Language
experiment
  • Hierarchy ...is automatic for recursive
    operations, conventionally suppressed for those
    that merely enumerate a sequence of objects
    (Chomsky, 2005).
  • Merge is recursive set-formation, n-ary abstract
    from substantive lexical content (meaning), and
    assume LEX?. Then
  • ? 1
  • Merge (1) ? 2
  • Merge (2) ? 3
  • Merge (3) ? 4
  • Etc.
  • Merge applied in this manner yields the
    successor function.

6
Deflating hierarchy (cont.)
  • c0 ? and cn1 cn, for all n.
  • Suc(X) def X ? X
  • X ? 1
  • Succ(1) ?12
  • Succ(2) ?, ?1, 23
  • Succ(3) ?, ?, ?, ? 1, 2, 3 4
  • Etc.
  • It is straightforward to define addition in
    terms of Merge (X,Y), and in familiar ways, the
    rest of arithmetic. (Chomsky, 2005)

7
Emergence of an ontology
  • Ontology emerges by imposing structure on an
    unstructured set (space), which results in new
    spaces, which form a hierarchy, and each of which
    has specific topological and algebraic
    properties.
  • (N,) is a half-group
  • (N,,0) is a monoid
  • groups are monoids with inverses for each element
  • e.g., (Z,) is an (Abelian) group, arising out of
    N through making inverses with respect to
    defined.
  • (Q,) is also a group, arising from Z by adding
    inverses w.r.t. multiplication.
  • R arises from Q through topological completion
  • With two inner operations, we get a ring, and
    with an inner and an outer operation, a vector
    space.

8
Ontology in multiple dimensions
  • Dimension of the vector space that Succ generates
    is 1.
  • Intuitive concept of multiple dimensions a
    series of series of series (Russell 1903)
  • Most general concept of a dimension in
    mathematics chain length. E.g.,
  • length of sub-spaces of a vectorspace contained
    in one another
  • length of prime-ideals in a ring
  • chain of manifolds included in one another (a
    form of recursion)
  • In MP and evolution, number and multiply
    dimensional spaces should simply come for free.
  • Dubischar et al. 1999 One of the main ideas of
    this paper is to use geometrical structures, not
    on the Euclidean space (in which the brain is
    located), but on the cognitive information space
    X (space of ideas).

9
Ontological categories in the parts of speech
  • Abstract objects
  • Objects with a substance/mass
  • Objects with a form/boundary
  • Objects with change potential
  • States
  • Activities
  • Accomplishments
  • Achievements

Entail- ment
Entail- ment
10
Correlations
  • Syntax Semantics
  • NP/DP objects/reference
  • CP truth/judgements
  • TP tensed events
  • vP events
  • (bare) SCs predication
  • internalism
  • externalism

11
Where does the lexical ontology come from?
  • EITHER it might be extra-linguistic i.e., all of
    this is thought, or semantics.
  • But it seems circular to blame much of this
    structure on the nature of the external physical
    world.
  • OR it might be a reflection of structural
    complexity in the concepts denoting the
    respective objects.
  • But there may not be any such structure internal
    to lexical items at all (atomism, Fodor 1998)
  • However, there are systematic interrelations
    between these atoms (in particular, the necessary
    entailments), which moreover seem to be
    structure-driven.

12
An internalist proposal HinzenUriagereka, 2006
  • There is a syntactic structure to these things,
    but it is not accompanied by a compositional
    semantics.
  • This yields entailments if the syntactic
    structuring is such that a hierarchy is built
    into the architecture of the formal system
    itself, i.e. the system is multi-dimensional.
  • Essential intuition (taken from Uriagereka,
    1995) LEX provides unstructured conceptual
    spaces (atoms) through a small-clause adjoined
    predicate this space is structured, giving it a
    particular presentation.

13
Constructing a complex concept the fabric of
reference
Nothing is on top here.
  • Animate SC
  • Count Presentation SC
  • Mass Presentation SC
  • Abstract Presentation Space PREDICATE
    SUBJECT

14
Back to structure-building (Merge) as modeled on
Succ
  • Merge qua set-of is n-ary a form of hierarchy
    follows automatically when n2.
  • Merge(1,2)1, 2
  • Merge(3, 1,2)3, 1, 2
  • Etc.
  • kill, buffalo
  • Hill, kill, buffalo
  • -ed, Hill, kill, buffalo
  • Merge thus construed yields a mono-categorial and
    in this sense non-hierarchical system it never
    produces anything ontologically new (labels dont
    help in this regard).

15
Adjuncts
  • Pure adjuncts exhibit a (particularly simple)
    form of dependency
  • walk quickly
  • ?e walking (e) quick (e)
  • Characterized mainly negatively
  • a. Adjunction of ? to ? does not change any
    properties of ?.
  • b. It behaves as if ? is not there, apart from
    semantic interpretation.
  • c. is not the projection of any head.
  • d. Adjuncts dont receive theta-roles or check
    morphological features.
  • e. Cannot encode the argument-of relation
    correlated with head-complement dependencies.

16
A window into an (almost) syntaxless mind
  • Adjunction is, more positively
  • additive iterative (stackable) unboundedly
  • symmetrical
  • compositional
  • If we wish to motivate anything in syntax from
    conditions imposed by the semantic interface,
    adjuncts (an operation of predicate
    composition, Chomsky, 2004, 2005) are the place
    to look they LACK (MUCH) OF SYNTAX.
  • A proto-language moreover would not need to
    contain anything else than adjunction.
  • But there is no reference or truth in this system
    (that apparently needs more syntax).
  • And there are no categories.

17
A tight correspondence between one-dimensional
Merge (Add) and adjunction
  • Adjunction of A to B does not change any
    properties of B
  • and there is no projection of a new category
    under Merge (with or without labeling).
  • Adjunction is symmetrical and unbounded
  • and so is Merge.
  • The putative asymmetry between the head and the
    adjunct (Chomsky, 2004) is simply not visible in
    a one-dimensional system.

18
What else is on the other side?
  • Most animals think but we are asking for the
    format of their thoughts.
  • C-I incorporates a dual semantics, with
    generalized argument structure as one component,
    the other being discourse-related and scopal
    properties. (Chomsky, 2005)
  • But are propositions waiting there to be
    expressed by language? Is there a pre-linguistic
    ability of intentional reference?
  • Many reasons for scepticism (e.g. Terrace, 2005)

19
What if there is no I-interface?
  • No conceptual necessity that it exists all
    thats needed is that products of CS are usable
  • I.e., some, and not necessarily all, of its
    information lends itself to certain purposes.
  • Intentional reference increases in sophistication
    as structural complexity builds up incrementally.
  • NP Caesars destruction of Syracuse
  • vP Caesar destroy Syracuse
  • TP Caesar destroyed Syracuse
  • CP That Caesar destroyed Syracuse
  • lion
  • I ate D0 lion
  • lions are tasty
  • I ate a lion

20
What if there is no C-interface?
  • Argument structure
  • Semantics is not conjunctive kill Bill does
    not mean ?ekilling(e) Bill(e)
  • Involves integral (part-whole) relations between
    an event and its participants.
  • Highly bounded, and in this sense not recursive.

21
An overall internalist conclusion
  • The semantic or extra-linguistic motivation of
    structural conditions of human thought stops at a
    point, as things get more syntactic.
  • Whatever is beyond this point has to find an
    internalist explanation in the CS of language
    itself.
  • Merge/Add has nothing to say about it.
  • An internally productive syntax can be no more
    based on something with the algebraic properties
    of Succ than arithmetic can, being
    multi-dimensional.

22
Explaining truth
  • Truth is a human universal the best distributed
    good in the world (cf. Descartes, 1637, on the
    bon sens)
  • As a concept unexplainable yet understood by
    everyone theory unneeded (why would a
    conceptual atom have a theory anyhow?).
  • Theres adaptive behaviour, complex computation,
    functional reference, systematicity, etc., before
    any creature has thoughts about existence or
    truth.
  • Applied by humans to anything that has the form
    of a (declarative) sentence, and to nothing that
    doesnt.
  • The universal truth/reference distinction makes
    little semantic sense (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999).

23
The unthinkable?
  • Emergence of the intentional - reference and
    truth through the functional layers of the
    clause?

24
Syntax of integral predication of truth (Hinzen,
Truths Fabric, 2003)
  • be DP
  • Spec D
  • D0 AgrP
  • Spec Agr
  • Agr 0 SC
  • SPACE PRESENTATION

Intent- ional
Conce- ptual
truth
proposition
25
Internalism about truth
  • Truth cannot easily be integrated into the
    internalist framework (PMM Cecchetto 1997)
  • But why?
  • It is language-internally and structurally
    grounded (Hinzen, 2006c)
  • not epistemically, communicatively, perceptually,
    or action-theoretically (as everyone holds).

26
Summary
  • The more we deflate our idea of what syntax does,
    we make ourselves hostage to an inflated idea of
    what externally imposed interface conditions can
    motivate.
  • Return to a (more minimalist) use-theory of
    meaning.
  • Language is not at least not wholly a
    linking system.
  • The idea that structure-building in FL reduces to
    one-dimensional sequencing (Add) is very
    unlikely true, though that operation is part of
    the system, and possibly the true locus of
    recursion.
  • The true locus of hierarchy, the argument
    structure system and the categories, resources
    are extremely limited
  • 3 arguments
  • 3 lexical categories
  • 3 functional categories
  • A derivation bottoms out conceptually
    intentionality comes later, as a function of the
    structure constructed.
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