Informing the role for North Africa in preparing the regional and international agendas'

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Informing the role for North Africa in preparing
the regional and international agendas.
International Solidarity Conference on Climate
Change Strategies for the African and
Mediterranean Regions

• Johnson Akinbola Oguntola,
• Snr. Regional Adviser (Integrated Water Resources
  Management),
• UN Economic Commission for Africa,
• Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

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The Problem Context IPCC Assessment Reports.

• Natural systems are vulnerable to climate change
  and some will be irreversibly damaged
• Many human systems are sensitive to climate
  change, and the potential for large-scale and
  possibly irreversible impacts poses risks that
  have yet to be reliably quantified
• Five major reasons were given for concern, as
  follows
• Risks to Unique and Threatened Systems
• Risks from Extreme Climate Events
• Distribution of Impacts
• Aggregate Impacts
• Risks from Future Large-Scale Discontinuities.
• The key output is the relationship between
  vulnerability and global warming, where
  vulnerability increases with climate change.

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The Problem Context IPCC Assessment Reports
(contd).

• Different impacts such as snowfall, coral
  bleaching, most bioclimatic envelopes, heat and
  cold stress-related impacts are all related to
  warming.
• Impacts to crops, pastures and forests are
  affected more by higher CO2, and rainfall change
  more than temperature change.
• Water resources are mostly affected by rainfall
  change, and very little by warming, except for
  water demand.
• Impacts such as storm damage, flooding,
  climate-driven disease outbreaks, and drought,
  are affected by changes in extreme events.
• In some situations, climate variables may
  interact, where the magnitude of change in one
  variable affects the response of the system to
  the other.

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The status-quo Two different policy positions.

• Two different positions or views have emerged on
  how to act on climate change, which influence the
  bargaining for an agreement on Climate Change
• On the one hand, an aversion to economic loss
  focuses on the damage that action on climate
  change may cause to the economy in the short
  term. These economically risk averse prefer
  quantified economic estimates, most often based
  on cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
• On the other hand, an aversion to environmental
  loss are highly sensitive to long-term threats to
  natural and human systems, believing that
  significant economic intervention is warranted to
  prevent such losses. The environmentally risk
  averse rely most on scientific advice that
  assesses the possibility of critical
  environmental or socio-economic thresholds being
  exceeded at some time in the future.

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The status-quo Two different policy positions
(contd.).

• These two positions in turn gave rise to two
  policy positions
• market-based and technology-driven strategies
  initiated with a wait and see approach to how
  serious climate change may become before applying
  any irreversible actions to the economy. The
  protagonists argue that deep cuts may visit
  harmful and irreversible impacts on the economy,
  which may limit societys capacity to adapt and
  mitigate at later stages, and would be mistaken
  if impacts were less than anticipated.
• Targets for warming and atmospheric CO2
  concentrations being set with pathways towards
  those targets, designed to minimize the risk of
  dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
  climate system occurring. Protagonists argue that
  the consequences of dangerous anthropogenic
  interference are so severe that immediate and
  deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are
  required.

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The status-quo Two different policy positions
(contd.).

• The policy dichotomy points to a variant of Type
  I and Type II errors, where
• A hypothesis is thought to be true, but is in
  fact false (Type I), or
• Thought to be false, but is in fact true (Type
  II)
• If the science surrounding greenhouse gas warming
  is contested, then engaging in Type I actions is
  posited as a significant policy risk. However, if
  the science is accepted, the risk of committing a
  Type I error becomes negligible, and the argument
  is not about whether to take action, but when and
  how much.
• It is recognized that dangerous anthropogenic
  interference may be breached within the range of
  warming projected for 2100, subject to two major
  uncertainties
• The climate sensitivity to radiative forcing, and
• The sensitivity of key vulnerabilities to the
  resultant warming.

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The status-quo Two different policy positions
(contd.).

• A Type II error is possible if dangerous
  anthropogenic interference is preventable but too
  little is done too late. However, the fear
  remains that early action may be regretted if
  dangerous anthropogenic interference turns out to
  be less likely than thought, if there is a
  technological magical bullet developed by
  mid-century that can drastically reduce emissions
  in time to avoid dangerous anthropogenic
  interference or that early actions serve to
  reduce future mitigative and adaptive capacity.
• The decision on how to address climate change is
  therefore not a simple problem, and four
  strategies have clearly emerged

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Strategies for managing risks related to
mitigation costs and likelihood of dangerous
anthropogenic interference

• Strategy I
• Wait and see on everything.
• Reduce uncertainty through experience.
• Reactive adaptation (min. loss/max. benefit).
• Modest mitigation known low cost options.
• Strategy II
• Wait and see on climate and impacts.
• Research economic, technical uncertainty
• Reactive adaptation (min. loss/max. benefits).
• Make efforts to reduce mitigation costs.

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Strategies for managing risks related to
mitigation costs and likelihood of dangerous
anthropogenic interference (contd.).

• Strategy III
• Act early to stabilise.
• Research climate and impact uncertainty.
• Embark on anticipatory adaptation.
• Strong mitigation develop low cost options.
• Strategy IV
• Act on everything.
• Research everything.
• Undertake anticipatory adaptation and cost
  reduction.
• Undertake anticipatory mitigation and cost
  reduction.
• However, it is not yet possible to estimate the
  relative likelihoods of success for these
  strategies, or to articulate the outcomes if one
  strategy is followed, and another eventuates
  (Type II error).

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process.

• The High Level Event on Climate Change convened
  by the Secretary-General at UNHQ on 24 September
  2007, has unequivocally committed the world
  leaders to tackle climate change through
  concerted action.
• The forum at which this issue can be decided upon
  is the United Nations Framework Convention on
  Climate Change (UNFCCC).
• The current intergovernmental negotiations under
  the UNFCCC are based on four key areas
• Adaptation
• Mitigation
• Technology and
• Finance.
• Adaptation and mitigation are goals, financing
  and technology are tools for achieving those
  goals.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
General considerations.

• There will be need to improve realism and policy
  relevance in future climate negotiations.
  Possible ways to achieve such realism include the
  realization that
• Changes take the form of smooth trends and smooth
  substitution process, rather than sudden breaks.
  Economic change in particular is governed by
  prices signaling relative scarcity, including
  those of natural resources.
• Prices coordinate economic choices, including
  demand, supply, investment in capital and outlays
  on Research and Development (RD).
• Negative externalities due to environmental
  pollution and positive externalities of RD and
  innovation need to be internalized.
• Old, obsolete techniques need to be replaced by
  new more efficient techniques.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
General considerations (contd.).

• The ecological explanation that linked the
  Industrial Revolution to natural resource factors
  confirm the importance of resource scarcity for
  human development.
• Sustainable development depends on both good
  environmental regulation and resource management.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Adaptation.

• Adaptation increases the ability of a system to
  cope with climate variability and extreme events.
• It will be required to manage climate risks that
  are already committed to by historical emissions
  and those expected in the near future.
• It is most urgent for risks that are already
  being experienced and those that are sensitive to
  only small changes adaptation to higher levels
  of warming will be difficult and costly,
  requiring a great deal of accepted loss.
• Adaptation reduces the consequences of
  climate-related hazards, manages the experienced
  or more probable changes occurring at the lower
  limit of the plausible range.
• Its benefits are short to medium term, especially
  if designed to manage current climate risks. It
  is specific to local conditions.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Adaptation 2.

• Issues that need to inform an African position
  during negotiations
• The total cost of global climate change need to
  be seen as the sum of mitigation, residual
  damage, and adaptation costs. The UNFCCC is
  primarily concerned with a need for limiting and
  ultimately stabilizing future concentrations of
  greenhouse gases in the earths atmosphere, and
  the role of industrialized countries in
  greenhouse gas mitigation. Fairness has therefore
  been limited to how costs of greenhouse gas
  mitigation are distributed across countries.
  Climate impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to
  climate change need to be accorded equal
  importance.
• Even if fully implemented, the Kyoto Protocol
  will not prevent the occurrence of negative
  impacts due to a warmer climate. Climate damages
  are unevenly distributed between the
  industrialized countries and the developing
  countries, which are most vulnerable. Fairness
  requires that economic, social and environmental
  losses in developing countries be taken into
  consideration in global climate policies.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Adaptation 3.

• Funding mechanisms established for adaptation
  since CoP-6 in 2001 are insufficient to meet
  future needs for adaptation. The World Bank
  estimate of annual cost of US10-40 billion to
  climate-proof development in low-income
  countries shows the magnitude of the problem and
  the urgent need for additional resources to be
  mobilized. The Nairobi Work Programme on impacts,
  vulnerability and adaptation to climate change,
  adopted in November 2006, offers services such as
  synthesis reports, technical papers, progress
  reports and a web-based interface, but does not
  engage in concrete activities. The adaptation
  fund under the KP, replenished by a 2 levy on
  CDM transactions is not operational, and
  according to WB estimate, could generate
  US100-500 million up to 2012, far short from the
  US10-40 billion required annually. A fund filled
  by mandatory contributions from industrialized
  countries, with a charge of 1 for each ton of
  CO2 equivalent emission, would generate 40
  billion per annum.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Adaptation 4.

• The current rules for funding adaptation through
  GEF, which include incremental costs and global
  benefits criteria for project approval, need to
  be modified to enable adaptation projects to be
  undertaken that result largely or exclusively in
  local benefits.
• Innovative insurance schemes, such as the Turkish
  catastrophe insurance fund, combining risk
  transfer with risk reduction strategies in
  disaster-prone communities, need to be explored
  and piloted for climate risk management at local,
  national regional and international levels.
• Binding obligations for Parties to fund
  adaptation could be crucial in order to keep
  commitment and pressure on them to put efforts
  into mitigation. Furthermore, an obligation to
  finance adaptation under a multilateral agreement
  would prevent countries regarding their
  contribution to other development goals, such as
  ODA, as an effort to finance adaptation.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Adaptation 5.

• The adaptation agenda needs further honing and
  clarity, and attempts to differentiate between
  countries on the basis of how intensely they
  would require adaptation, with LDCs and AOSIS
  countries claiming first rights, may fissure the
  unity in the larger group of developing
  countries. The developing countries are largely
  devoted to multilateralism and also find comfort
  in the numbers to be able to negotiate better.
• There is need for capacity building at different
  levels and in many areas for adaptation purposes
  capacity building to sensitize policymakers to
  the impacts of their decisions on adaptive
  capacity, sector-specific capacity building on
  viable adaptation strategies and options,
  capacity building of countries ability to
  develop negotiating positions based on country
  priorities, etc.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Mitigation.

• Mitigation reduces climate change impacts by
  reducing the rate and magnitude of global
  warming. This increases the chance that the
  remaining risks can be adapted to. Mitigation
  reduces the uppermost possibilities of climate
  change by reducing the potential volume of
  accumulated future emissions. Where the limits of
  adaptation are exceeded, for example because
  adaptation is too expensive, impractical, or
  unfeasible, mitigation may be the only realistic
  approach.
• Mitigation reduces the likelihood and magnitude
  of climate-related hazards and their resultant
  impacts. Its benefits are long-term because of
  the delayed response of climate change.
• Mitigation reduces climate change at the global
  scale because greenhouse gases are well mixed in
  the atmosphere.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Mitigation 2.

• The EU and US-Australian positions on global
  climate policy differ on the urgency of
  responding to climate change, they both concur on
  two of the most fundamental issues in post-Kyoto
  policy on climate change
• Neither side is arguing for a quantified ceiling
  on CO2 levels in the atmosphere, and
• Neither is arguing for developing countries to
  take-on quantified targets.
• The US announced just before the 2007 Heiligendam
  G8 Summit, that it recognized the need for a
  global climate policy framework, and that it
  would convene the major emitters and energy
  consumers to advance and complete the new
  framework by the end of 2008.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Mitigation 3.

• This clearly shows that the exact specifications
  of the details of negotiation (timing of moves,
  information available, commitment devices,
  outside options and threats) will be dictated by
  these two coalitions.
• The EUs proposal is essentially another round of
  Kyoto tougher targets for developed countries
  no formal targets for developing countries,
  though there would be incentives for them to
  become more engaged through national plans or
  sectoral approaches and a greatly expanded Clean
  Development Mechanism (CDM) to reduce emissions
  and transfer technology.
• The US on the other hand favours a pledge and
  review approach centered around the informal
  AP6 group of Asian economies, with Australia.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Mitigation 4.

• The US approach is based not on targets and
  timetables, but instead on technology
  partnerships and national targets with no formal
  international status. Its long-held position is
  that it will not take on formal targets unless
  developing countries do so too.
• This basic difference of approach between the US
  and EU reflects divergence about how urgent
  climate change is. Europe thinks that time is
  short, and that it is cheaper to act now than
  later. The US believes the opposite. In the
  middle are developing countries, especially key
  emitters such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico.
• For the US, action is not urgent and so,
  mandatory targets now would be too expensive.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Mitigation 5.

• Suggested actions on mitigation at the
  international level include the following
• The need to reach agreement on a long-term
  greenhouse gas trajectory for global emissions,
  stretching to 2050 at least, and to encourage
  participation in global greenhouse gas markets.
• Ensure national governments recognize their own
  national contribution to such a trajectory and
  commit themselves to developing national energy
  and greenhouse gas mitigation policy aligned with
  their national contributions.
• Recognize the industrial sector approaches to
  greenhouse gas mitigation.
• Include carbon capture and storage (CCS) in all
  greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes, and to
  coordinate the development of standard accounting
  and measurement protocols for CCS projects.
• The issue of long-term liability for stored CO2
  should be addressed.

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Climate Change Negotiation Framework and Process
(contd.) Mitigation 6.

• There is need to encourage demand for low
  emission energy, energy efficiency, and energy
  conservation.
• Four potential post-2012 negotiation approaches
  have been proposed
• Contraption and convergence,
• Common but differentiated convergence,
• Triptych, and
• Multistage approach.
• Though also qualify for adaptation measures
  against soil erosion and flooding, reforestation
  and afforestation need to be included under
  mitigation options because of positive effects on
  greenhouse gas emissions resulting from carbon
  sequestration. Forest valuation studies need to
  be done for a fair forest trade.

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Informing specific roles at the national level

• Climate change policies at the national level
  need to consider the following
• Think globally, plan nationally and act locally.
• Link development to both adaptation and
  mitigation.
• Change consumer preferences through public
  discussions on ethical consumption and
  sustainability.
• Integrate use of renewable energies like solar,
  wind and biomass, and fuel-switch in households
  to more efficient cooking and heating methods, as
  part of rural development programmes.
• Consider adaptation measures such as integrated
  river basin and coastal zone management, as a no
  regret strategy because it has a purpose both
  now and in the future.

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• Thank You