Institutional Reform in Palestine A Foreign/Donors

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Institutional Reform in PalestineA
Foreign/Donors Perspective

• Developments until 2005

Training Young Leaders Democratization and
Reform Day two Sunday, 9 December 2007 Ingo
Büttner Covernance Coordination Officer, Local
Aid Coordination Secretariat (www.ldf.ps)
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Addressed issues

• Nomenclature of Reform
• Framework conditions for Reform
• Dynamics of Reform
• Evolution of the aid management system (Annex)

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Nomenclature

• Defining Institutional Reform
• Institutional Reform in Palestine figured under
  various exchangeable Notions only the emphasize
  is slightly different with each notion
• State / Institution Building
• PNA Reform
• Governance
• State apparatus as a tool to govern the
  population and to deliver services to the
  population.
• The Term Governance should not be seem in this
  context as an equivalent of the term good
  Governance

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Framework conditions for Reform

• The Oslo Agreements
• The Role of Israel
• Heritage of the PLO
• The influence of the Donor community
• Social fabric of the Palestinian society
• Complex legal framework
• Territorial Fragmentation (Gaza West Bank)
• Demographic factor

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Framework conditions for Reform The influence of
the Donor community

• Due to the high international profile of the
  Israeli-Palestinian conflict development
  cooperation is extremely politicized. In the oPt
  development cooperation has always to answer the
  question of its contribution to a conflict
  solution.
• On the surface the international Community as
  reflected in the Quartet presents a joint
  position. However, the interpretation of this
  position varies amongst the international
  Community.
• Internal conflict between the long term strategic
  goal of sustainable development and politically
  motivated tactic short term measures to promote a
  conflict solution. (e.g. creation of the position
  of a Prime minister)
• The density of donors is exceptionally high both
  in the sheer number of active donors and
  regarding the level of support. This makes donor
  coordination in a highly competitive environment
  for political visibility a complex and difficult,
  but an even more important issue.
• Donor competition for example led in some cases
  to the support of competing PNA-Institutions and,
  hence, aided and abetted the fragmentation of
  PNA-Institutions
• The weak planning, adsorption and enforcement
  capacities of the PNA undermined ownership
  particularly in the first years after the
  establishment of the PNA. This led to a donor
  driven development agenda.

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Framework conditions for Reform The influence of
the Donor community

• Donor activities that undermine sustainable
  Institution Building - some examples
• Payment of excessive salaries gt brain drain of
  highly qualifies Public Servants
• Use of international short term experts
  consultants (a) often the necessary skills
  are available on the local labour marked, (b) if
  used in masses they could paralysing institutions
  during their inquiries, (c) no proper fallow up
  on the analytical work to implement
  recommendations, (d) asymmetric relationship
  between the expert/donor and recipient
  (scientific jargon / reports in foreign language)
• Creation of parallel implementing structures for
  Projects when local structures are available
• Funding of departments within Institutions or
  payment of salaries or add on to the salaries of
  civil servants endangers the sustainability of
  intended changes
• OECD / DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
  (March 2005)
• Key Words Ownership Alignment Harmonisation
• Good donor engagement in fragile States

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Dynamics of Reform

• Phases
• Formation of the PNA 1994-1996
• During this phase little attention was paid on
  the integrity of the emerging PNA and
  PNA-Agencies started to mushroom
• Internal push for Change - The GCI report and the
  aftermath 1997-1998
• The Report of the General Control Institute for
  the year 1996 steered up a strong internal call
  for change. However, nobody was hold accountable
  and no chance occurred.
• During the same time efforts were made for a more
  coherent institutional development of the PNA. A
  Core Group on Public Administration was formed.
  It interacted with the Sector Working Group on
  Public Administration. However, this structure
  did nor bear tangible results except a plan for
  the Development of the Sector as part of the
  National Palestinian Development Plan 1998
  2000)
• In the frame of the cabinet reshuffle in August
  1998 with the formation of the Public Sector
  Reform Committee for the first time the Term
  Reform was used. However, the PSRC met only one
  time.
• External push for Reform - Rocard/Siegmann Report
  1999-2000
• The next push for Reform came in the vague of the
  anticipated Statehood at the end of the Oslo
  interims period and was driven by the
  International Community (particularly the EU).
• An Independent Task Force was able to issues
  after some back and forth with President Arafat
  in June 1999 the fist comprehensive analysis of
  the Public Administration of the PNA entitled
  Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions.

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Dynamics of Reform

• Phases
• External push for Reform - Rocard/Siegmann Report
  1999-2000
• Due to internal and external pressure to advance
  on the reform Agenda a Higher National Committee
  for Institutional Development (HNCID) was formed
  in August 2000. However, the reform enthusiasm of
  the PNA lost soon in 2000 its impetus despite
  strong donor efforts to support it at the
  technical/project and international level.
• Despite strong external and internal pressure for
  change this reform attempt failed because
  necessity of reform was not internalized by the
  upper echelons of the PNA
• Hiatus form the outbreak of the 2nd Intifada to
  the reoccupation of Area A and the destruction of
  major PNA Infrastructure Fall 2000 Spring 2002
• All reform efforts were effectively paralyzed by
  the outbreak of the second Intifada, because the
  internal as well as the external attention
  shifted.
• The disastrous results of the Israeli military
  Operations in Spring 2002 let to a forceful
  renewal of internal calls for reform in Mat 2002.
  This coincided with a strong external call for
  reforms in June 2002
• Internal and External push for Reform 100 Days
  Plan and the TFPR Summer 2002 Winter 2005
• Based on the 100 Days Plan of the PNA the
  international Community formed a Task Force on
  Palestinian Reform (TFPR) to support and monitor
  the PNA Reform process which interacted with the
  Ministerial Reform Committee that had been formed
  in June 2002.

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Dynamics of Reform

• Phases
• Internal and External push for Reform 100 Days
  Plan and the TFPR Summer 2002 Winter 2005
• Differences to former Efforts
• Capacitated secretariat (RCSU),
• Strong follow up of the donor community (on a
  capital and local level)
• Development
• Strong push until Spring 2003 helped to
  overcome the usual reform setup and its
  weaknesses
• Culminated in the change of the Basic Law and the
  release of the Road Map
• Reform as integral part of the Road Map (Spring
  Fall 2003) externalization of reform demands
• Steady decline of the Impetus of reform Fall 2003
  Winter 2005) resignation of the Abu Mazan
  cabinet, Crumbling of the Road Map and shift
  towards Disengagement, lost of comprehensive
  reform focus and emerging parallel reform
  efforts, discussion on restructuring of the Aid
  management System

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Evolution of the aid management SystemAid
Management System (2005) - Overview
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Evolution of the aid management SystemSector
Coordination (until 1998)
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Evolution of the aid management SystemSector
Coordination (until 1998)
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Evolution of the aid management SystemReform
support mechanism (2002-2005) - Overview
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Evolution of the aid management SystemReform
support mechanism (2002-2005) - Interaction