WHAT CANADIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN THE FUTURE WORLD A MARITIME PERSPECTIVE

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WHAT CANADIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN THE
FUTURE WORLD? A MARITIME PERSPECTIVE
A Conference hosted by the Centre for Foreign
Policy Studies ltwww.cfps.dal.cagt Dalhousie
University, 10-12 June 2005   Multilateralism and
Interoperability Impact on Maritime
Capabilities Commodore Eric Lerhe
(Retd) Dalhousie University, Phd Candidate
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OUTLINE
PART I - OUR PAST MARITIME CAPABILITY PART II
THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE THE STATE OF
MULTILATERALISM PART III - THE CAN - US
BILATERAL SCENE PART IV - THE CANADIAN NATIONAL
SCENE PART V - THE DND SCENE PART VI - WHAT
KIND OF MARITIME CAPABILITY?
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DEFINITIONS

• Multilateralism an institutional form
  that coordinates relations among three or more
  states on the basis of generalized principles of
  conduct (John Ruggie)
• Interoperability The conditions achieved
  among communications-electronic systems or items
  of equipment when information or services can be
  exchanged directly and satisfactorily between
  them and/or their users. (U.S. DOD and NATO)

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INTEROPERABILITY
1.  Technical interoperability concentrates on
an exchange of services (as in the NATO and DoD
definitions). 2.   Operational interoperability
considers whether units from different countries
operating together can complete a mission. 3.
Political/cultural interoperability examines
why and how each country conducts military
operations the way it does.
Kenneth Gause, Catherine Lea, Eric Thompson, Dan
Whiteneck, U.S. Navy Interoperability with its
High-End Allies, Center for Strategic Studies,
Center for Naval Analyses at http//www.dodccrp.or
g/events/2000/5th_ICCRTS/cd/papers/Track3/080.pdf,
3 Jun 2005
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Multilateralism and Interoperability

• the effectiveness of multinational military
  operations now more than ever depends on greater
  attention being given to the interoperability
  imperative. (Middlemiss and Stairs)
• the failure of multilateralism in ASEAN a
  lack of political will, military equipment, and
  interoperability experience.

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PART I - OUR PAST MARITIME CAPABILITY

• NATO - ships
• - and flagships
• CAN US via CVBG deployments
• Maritime lead
• Unified but Not Joint
• Vision
• Parliament
• Funding
• Capital acquisition problems
• Alliances

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PART I - OUR PAST MARITIME CAPABILITY

• Summary
• - Success in a multilateral setting relies on
  interoperability
• - Canada has to meet both NATO standards and
  increasingly more advanced U.S. interoperability
  standards
• - Command of allied maritime formations has
  required high levels of interoperability and
  large communications bandwidths typically only
  resident in a flagship.
• - Our CVBG experience shows that if one provides
  high quality interoperable forces the U.S.
  military will devote the extra energies to
  overcoming their releasability bureaucracy

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PART II THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE THE
STATE OF MULTILATERALISM

• Multilateralism the cardinal organizing
  principle of Canadian foreign policy (Nossal)
• -NATO consultation and veto
• From muscular multilateralism to unilateralism
  with a vengeance. (Sokolsky) -Coalitions of the
  Willing weak consultation
• Issues
• Political/Cultural Interoperability
• Operational Interoperability
• Technical Interoperability

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PART II THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE THE
STATE OF MULTILATERALISM
Why the U.S. Navy needs to be interoperable
1. Interoperability allows the U.S. Navy to
operate with foreign navies during a crisis or a
conflict. 2. Interoperability requirements
between navies result in harmonization programs
that have the political benefit of shaping
foreign navies. 3. Interoperability with
foreign navies is required by U.S. policy.
Kenneth Gause, Catherine Lea, Eric Thompson, Dan
Whiteneck, U.S. Navy Interoperability with its
High-End Allies, Center for Strategic Studies,
Center for Naval Analyses at http//www.dodccrp.or
g/events/2000/5th_ICCRTS/cd/papers/Track3/080.pdf,
3 Jun 2005
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PART II THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE THE
STATE OF MULTILATERALISM

• US Interoperability
• - Achieving interoperability with allies
  remains US policy (Gause et al)
• - Not all allies are the same
• Operation Allied Force naval operations, the
  NATO allies, outside of Britain and Canada, were
  reduced to playing a supporting role. (Gause et
  al)
• - Different missions require different types
  and levels of interoperability. For those allies
  that want to operate closely with the U.S. in
  prominent positions, even in high threat
  environments, the level of interoperability will
  have to be high, possibly bordering on seamless.
  (Gause et al)
• - Bandwidth is key
• - The level of jointness among key U.S. allies
  is lower, thus making it more difficult for them
  to be incorporated into U.S.-led operations.
  (Gause et al).

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PART II THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE THE
STATE OF MULTILATERALISM

• -Coalition of the willing warfare gives
  significantly less political input and
  consultation than does NATO.
• - Coalition command provides a partial offset at
  the tactical and operational level.
• - High levels of interoperability are needed
  before the U.S. will allocate allies coalition
  command.
• - Coalition command alone does not appear to
  offer benefits of political influence with the
  U.S. A militarily significant contribution is
  also needed.
• - As coalition warfare offers few mechanisms for
  consensus building or compromise. When a
  fundamental disagreement arises, the lesser ally
  must be prepared to physically withdraw its
  contribution.
• - Interoperability with the U.S. will
  increasingly require allied forces to take a
  joint posture.

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PART III - THE CAN - US BILATERAL SCENE

• -Canadas search for protection on the cheap
  UK then US
• -NORAD interoperability seamless at the
  zenith
• -Breadth of CAN-US ties
• the United States has a stake in the
  security of Canada in a way it does not have with
  any other NATO ally. (Sokolsky)
• -High political interoperability
• -High stakes
• -Canadian disconnects

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PART III - THE CAN - US BILATERAL SCENE

• -       -Canada appears to enjoy higher levels of
  consultation and political interoperability with
  the US in continental security than it does for
  overseas security.
• -        -Canadian interoperability investments
  have heavily favoured platforms committed to
  overseas operations.
• -        - Differences in interoperability
  standards between home and away forces will be
  seen as illogical and expensive.
• -        - Interoperability with other government
  departments in Canada and the U.S. will be
  increasingly required for continental defence.
• - Our bilateral relationship may provide
  better initial access to U.S. systems than an
  overseas contribution.

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PART IV - THE CANADIAN NATIONAL SCENE

• Post 9/11
• -National Security Policy
• -International Security Policy
• -Anti-Terrorism Act and Public Safety Act
• -Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
  Canada
• - Canadian Border Services Agency
• - 7.7 billion for anti-terrorism, etc
• -Defence Budget is forecast to increase by
  12.8 billion over the period 2005-2010.

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PART IV - THE CANADIAN NATIONAL SCENE

• IPS
• first priority of the Canadian Forces will
  be the protection of Canada
• Our front lines stretch from the streets of
  Kabul and the rail lines of Madrid to our own
  Canadian cities.
• Funding - Backloaded
• - Enough?
• - Ever?

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PART IV - THE CANADIAN NATIONAL SCENE

• The government of Canada will expect the navy to
  maintain a strong continental defence capability
  and a strong overseas capability.
• The funds to pay for these capabilities will
  arrive too late. There are also strong doubts
  now as to whether the funding is adequate and
  whether they will arrive in the promised amounts.
  
• Therefore, capability planning that suggests
  separate home and away fleets is not financial
  realistic.
• - Defence policies in Canada are frequently
  completely reversed.

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PART V - THE DND SCENE

• DPS
• -Strong support for NATO and CAN-US
  interoperability
• -Naval offshore role reaffirmed
• -interoperability with OGD
• -with USCG and their OGD
• -Expeditionary Joint Capability

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PART V - THE DND SCENE

• Expeditionary Joint Capability A response to
  unilateralism and interoperability challenges
• -more visible
• -coalition command
• -own sector
• -national unity of command
• -defence, diplomacy and development
• -reinforcement or withdrawal
• -eases technical intergration
• -can transition to single service TG

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PART V - THE DND SCENE

• -The government endorses even higher levels of
  interoperability with allies.
• -We cannot treat the home game as a lesser
  priority.
• - Joint expeditionary forces with integral
  lift will define our international military
  capability.
• - A joint expeditionary capability is a sound
  response to unilateralism and coalition of the
  willing warfare.
•  

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PART VI - WHAT KIND OF MARITIME CAPABILITY?

• Future maritime capabilities
• unilateral when they can get away from it.
  (Ignatief)
• Holsti
• Future Coalitions of the Willing
• Debates
• -Home versus Away Ships and Systems
• -Big Ships versus Small Ships in the Away Game
• -Naval versus Joint
• -Task Group Concept

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Home versus Away Ships and Systems
USCG Deepwater Project Maritime Security Cutter
Large 421 ft, 4314 ton, 28 knots. 57mm gun and
Gunfire Control System Close-In Weapons System,
SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System, SRBOC/NULKA
countermeasures chaff/rapid decoy launcher
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Home versus Away Ships and Systems
USCG Deepwater Project Maritime Security Cutter
Medium 350 ft, 3200 ton, 26 knots. 57mm gun and
Gunfire Control System, NBCD, Sonar
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Big Ships versus Small Ships in the Away Game
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Big Ships versus Small Ships in the Away Game
Global Security, Systems, Ship Systems, LCS, at
http//www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/shi
p/images/gd-lcs-side-001.jpg dated 4 June 2004.
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USN, PEO SHIPS, LCS peoships.crane.navy.mil/
lcs/GeneralD.htm DATED 3 Jun 2005
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Naval versus Joint
Joint Support Ship
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Naval Task Group Concept
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Questions?