Factors Influencing The Effectiveness of Defensive Measures in CounterTerrorism

1
Factors Influencing The Effectiveness of
Defensive Measures in Counter-Terrorism

• Arie Perliger
• Ami Pedahazur

2
Theoretical Framework
3
The Need to Broaden the Concept of
Counter-Terrorism

• Since the appearance of early academic debates on
  the subject of countering terrorism, the overall
  focus has generally been on the offensive
  response to terrorism.
• The changes in terrorism trends in the last two
  decades, and mainly the aspiration of terrorist
  organizations to execute mass casualty attacks
  by well hidden cells, internationally widespread,
  emphasized the need for adaptation in the
  traditional models of counter terrorism.
• As a way out, Sharkansky (1995, 1997) and Pape
  (2003) suggested a new view of the problem
  through the notion of Coping with terrorism
  where the main focus is on the prevention and
  response to terrorism within the municipal and
  state frameworks using defensive measures. Hence,
  we should try and broaden the traditional
  discussion on counter-terrorism to the defensive
  dimension.

4
The Growth of Mass Casualty Terrorism Number of
Suicide Attacks By Year
5
The Growth of Mass Casualty Terrorism No. of
Victims by Year
6
The Differences Between Offensive and Defensive
Counter-Terrorism Measures

• In contrast to the offensive dimension of
  counter-terrorism, in the defensive example we
  should add to the state response that of the
  local municipality and other sub-state
  authorities.
• In the traditional offensive models of countering
  terrorism there is a relatively small number of
  agents at the state level combating terrorism. In
  the defensive model, there are innumerable agents
  participating in the struggle against terrorism
  therefore, coordination becomes much more
  crucial.
• While the focus of the offensive models is on the
  terrorist himself, defensive measures center on
  treating civilians, hence requiring a higher
  level of sensitivity from all forces involved in
  executing defensive measures in the fight against
  terrorism.

7
Model of Defensive Counter-Terrorism
8
The Challenges of Defensive Counter Terrorism

• The need for coordination between different
  agents with different methods of operation,
  supervisors and goals.
• The implementation of several of the defensive
  measures need not only coordination, but also
  cooperation between different agents in order to
  be executed effectively.
• The incidents which the agnates have to react to
  are unpredictable (in parameters of time and type
  of attack).
• The need for comprehensive policy of defensive
  counter-terrorism.
• Many of the defensive measures are inherently
  limiting the civil rights of the innocent public
  (while the offensive models do this mainly to the
  terrorists).
• Most of the defensive measures require large
  resources and should be implemented for long
  periods of time, without apparently immediate
  results.

9
Study Goal

• The goal of this study is to locate the factors
  that help or hinder the ability to effectively
  use defensive measures against terrorism and
  overcome the mentioned challenges. First we will
  present the factors influencing the effectiveness
  of defensive counter-terrorism and then we will
  demonstrate their importance by using examples
  from the Israeli case.

10
Factors Influencing The Effectiveness of
Defensive Measures
11
The Israeli Case
12
Prevention Stage Quality of Security Forces

• While in the last decade there were more than 58
  suicide attacks in buses and bus-stops in Israel,
  there was just one suicide attack involving the
  rail network, although the potential for a higher
  number of victims is far greater when trains are
  attacked. This paradox is a result of the
  superior quality of the security forces in the
  rail network
• Buses Just 4.3 of the buses are guarded by the
  special public transportation guards unit.
  Moreover, during the first 3 years this unit was
  not appropriately trained to locate suicide
  bombers.
• Rail Network All trains and their stations are
  guarded. In fact, the area of every train station
  is sterile, as any person wanting to enter has to
  be fully searched, both bodily and possessions.
  Moreover, the rail authority in Israel at the
  beginning of 1990 has added new gates to every
  train station, which prevent any person without
  tickets from approaching the train.

13
Targets Attacked by Suicide Bombers in Three
Different Periods (percentage)

• The dismantling of the buses guard-unit between
  1998-2002 did not increase the attacks against
  buses, nor did their return to the scene in 2003
  reduce attacks against buses.

14
Prevention Stage Quality of Security Forces
Malls and Restaurants

• In all five suicide attacks in Israeli malls, the
  terrorist failed to enter the mall itself and
  exploded in one of the entrances. Meanwhile,
  attacks against restaurants were more successful.
  This is because most restaurants have just one
  security guard who in most case does not have the
  ability to cover the whole area and is poorly
  trained. In the malls, however, every entrance,
  parking lot, and the inside area are surveyed by
  multiple guards and electronic and optical
  technology.

15
Prevention Stage Creating Sterile Areas

• As shown, creating sterile targets strengthens
  the effectiveness of prevention. Creating sterile
  areas by large physical barriers is also an
  important tool in magnifying the effectiveness of
  the prevention stage. This is important mainly
  because many organizations still recruit most of
  their activists from specific geographical areas
  (LTTE, Chechnya's rebels, Palestinian
  organizations) and find it difficult to
  infiltrate other areas.
• While during the second Intifada more than 93
  terrorists from the West Bank penetrated Israel
  in order to perpetrate attacks against Israeli
  targets, the Palestinian activists in Gaza were
  limited to operations against Israeli military
  and civil targets inside the Gaza strip, due to
  the fence that was built surrounding the entire
  Gaza Strip.

16
The Israeli Separation Fence

• In 2003 Israel finished building the north side
  of the fence surrounding Judea and Samaria (red
  line). From June 2003 to June 2004, there were 19
  suicide attacks in Israel. Only on one occasion a
  suicide terrorist penetrated the fence. All other
  attacks occurred inside the territories or were
  perpetrated in the southern and central parts of
  Israel. Before that epoch, between 1993 and mid
  2003, 34.6 (35 from 101) of the suicide attacks
  were made inside the green line, and occurred in
  Northern Israel, areas that from mid 2003 are
  protected by the separation fence.

17
Prevention Stage - High Quality Intelligence and
the Ability to Act Accordingly

• When high quality intelligence is obtainable in
  advance, routine prevention procedures (such as
  strengthening the security arrangements around
  specific targets) could be highly effective.
• Examples
• On the 22 of July 2001, the Haifa police was
  informed about a suicide bomber heading towards
  Haifa. They immediately reinforced the number of
  patrols in the city, closing off attractive
  targets, and locating unauthorized Arab workers.
  Soon a young Palestinian without an identity card
  was found. After a short investigation he
  admitted that he was on the way to collect his
  explosive belt from a deserted building nearby.
• Just three weeks later, groups of terrorist
  heading towards Haifa found that due to earlier
  information the Haifa police posted checkpoints
  in the northern entrance of Haifa. The terrorists
  decided not to carry out their intentions. A few
  hours later they were caught on their way back to
  the territories.
• On January 19, 2004 the police succeeded in
  preventing the penetration of a suicide female
  bomber into the Hasharon area by posting
  checkpoints on all the roads leading to the area
  from the territories. Similar results were
  achieved in Tel-Aviv in May 2004.

18
Absorption Routine Procedure that Will Promise
Flow of Information and Coordination

• The first step for effective absorption is the
  creation of unified, routine procedure that will
  promise the flow of relevant information. Cases
  in which medical or other forces received lacking
  information illustrate this factor.
• Examples
• On August 21, 1995 in a suicide attack near 'Rene
  Kassen' High school in Jerusalem, medical forces
  were informed about the attack by civilians, with
  no exact details about the number of victims.
  Therefore, too many ambulances were sent to the
  area, blocking the path to the scene and
  interfering with the evacuation of victims.
• On the July 30, 1997, a suicide bomber exploded
  inside the open market of 'Mahane Yehuda' in
  Jerusalem. Because there was no established
  routine about notification of attacks, medical
  forces had no information about the exact
  location or number of victims. Therefore, only
  four ambulances were sent to the site. After
  discovering that there were more the 160 victims,
  another 8 ambulances were sent, and just 20
  minute after the attack a third wave of 11
  ambulances arrived.

19
Absorption - Efficient Synchronization (of the
entrance) of Emergency Forces Into the Scene

• Securing the site of attack, and later guidance
  and synchronization of the entrance of emergency
  forces to the scene are also crucial factors for
  effective absorption. The following examples that
  refer to the need of the emergency forces to
  reach the site as soon as possible illustrates
  the influence of this factor on effective
  absorption.
• Examples
• In the attack in the Bet Israel neighborhood in
  Jerusalem, the absence of coordination caused
  ambulances and other emergency units to block
  each other in the narrow lanes of this old
  neighborhood.
• At the suicide attack in 'Cafe Moment' in
  Jerusalems Gaza Street, police informed the
  medical units about the fastest ways to the site.
  However, fire trucks also used the same roads
  blocking many ambulances. Other routes that
  medical units were informed had been cleared were
  also blocked by civilian and police vehicles. As
  a result, over an hour after the attack, the
  evacuation of victims from the scene was finally
  completed.

20
Absorption - Efficient Synchronization of The
Entrance of Emergency Forces Into the Scene

• At the explosion of a suicide bomber in August
  1995 ,inside bus No. 26A in Jerusalem, all
  emergency forces entered the attack site without
  any coordination and synchronization.
  Consequently, while some police forces searched
  for social care municipal units (units whose
  responsibility is to escort the victims to the
  hospitals at the first stage and locate those who
  need psychological first aid) in order to escort
  them to where they were needed at the scene,
  other police forces evacuated members of those
  units from the site.
• In the explosion of a bomb in the Hebrew
  University cafeteria (1.8.2003), the medical
  units were unaware that there were two assembly
  points for all the injured. Hence, many of the
  wounded did not receive medical treatment for
  long, crucial minutes.

21
The Importance of Coordination and Flow of
Information

• The no. of victims is not the main factor
  influencing the rapidity of the evacuation. For
  example, the longest time of evacuation was at
  the suicide attack in Bet Israel neighborhood
  84 min. where there were 28 victims, while at
  the Sbarro event, with 79 victims, it took just
  26 min. Both in the Bet Israel event and the
  attack at the Hebrew University (second longest
  time of evacuation) medical forces could not get
  to the scene because they were blocked and did
  not have efficient coordination with the police
  forces.

22
The Importance of Coordination and Flow of
Information

• Also the number of medical units are not the main
  factor influencing the rapidity of the
  evacuation. For example, in the April 2002 attack
  in the Mahne Yehuda market fewer ambulances were
  dispatched than to the incident in Cafe Moment,
  however, in the first event the time of
  evacuation was 45 compared with 67 min in the
  later.

23
Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of the
Absorption Stage

24
Reconstruction Stage Efficient and Rapid
Identification of the Damage

• In order to counter the long time effect of
  terrorism by efficient reconstruction, there is a
  need for efficient identification of the damage.
  In Israel both in regard to the social care
  (Human reconstruction) for the victims and the
  families, and the rebuilding of the site of the
  attack, there are effective procedures.
• Physical Damage - Property tax units enter the
  site of attack after it is secured, and in most
  cases the area is returned to normality in 6
  hours or less.
• Human Reconstruction - In Israel, the procedure
  is that the municipality social care department
  units are the first operating in the scene of the
  attack, searching the area for people who need
  psychological care, providing first aid and then
  directing them to more detailed help. At the same
  time, other units of the social care department
  escort the families of the fatalities in the
  first 24 hours, assisting them with all they need
  in the process of identifying the body and the
  funeral arrangements. After that the
  responsibility is delivered to the National
  Security social care workers.

25
General Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of
Defensive Measures

• Although all the former specified factors
  influencing the effectiveness of defensive
  measures are important, most of the problems in
  implementation stem from more general factors
• The political system should shape a complete
  strategic response to terrorism that defines the
  branches responsible for fighting terrorism, the
  resources available to them, their authorization,
  restrictions and the criteria guiding their work.
  Most of the problems mentioned in the
  implementation of the prevention and absorption
  stages in Israel stem from the absence of such
  strategy.
• As noted by others, in order to achieve
  effective defensive response there is a need to
  create a mechanism that will supervise and insure
  coordination and cooperation. Absence of those
  elements as shown in the examples presented could
  cost human lives. In some cases, only
  cooperation between all agencies could restore
  society to normality, as demonstrated in the
  cooperation between the national security
  institute in Israel and the municipalities
  social care departments.
• In all stages, the openness of all agents
  involved and the free flow of information among
  them, could strengthen the effectiveness of most
  defensive measures.