GIC research in Finland and Europe

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GIC research in Finland and Europe Risto
Pirjola Finnish Meteorological Institute,
Helsinki, Finland Space Weather EU-FP7
Meeting Paris, January 23, 2007
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Ground Effects of Space Weather Geomagneticall
y Induced Currents (GIC)
in -electric power transmission systems -oil and
gas pipelines -telecommunication cables -railway
equipment -in principle all long conductors
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Effects of GIC on power systems-depend much on
technological details of the grid, on transformer
types, etc-experiences in one country cannot
directly be extrapolated to another

• Possible GIC problems are due to saturation of
  transformers, which may lead to
• Production of harmonics
• Relay trippings
• Increased reactive power demands
• Voltage fluctuations
• Unbalanced network, even a collapse
• Magnetic stray fluxes in transformers
• Hot spots in transformers, even permanent damage

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• Québec blackout -- March 13, 1989
• Harmonics (created by transformer saturation due
  to GIC) caused, by a domino effect, a collapse
  of the whole system in about one and a half
  minutes.
• Six million people were without electricity for
  several hours.
• Total costs 13.2 MCAD
• --------------------------------------------------
  ------------

• Malmö blackout -- October 30, 2003
• About 50000 customers were without electricity in
  Malmö, southern Sweden, for 20-50 minutes.
• The first (and so far only?) known power grid
  blackout due to GIC in Europe
• An overcurrent relay was too sensitive to the
  third harmonic of 50 Hz. It has been replaced by
  a less sensitive relay later.

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• GIC research in Finland
• High-Voltage (400 220 kV) power system
• Collaboration between FMI and the Fingrid Oyj
  power company
• Started in 1976
• GIC recordings in earthing leads of 400 kV
  transformer neutrals since 1977 (Fingrid, FMI)
• At present at three sites
• Also a one-year campaign of GIC recordings in a
  400 kV line in the 1990s
• Theoretical modelling of geoelectric fields and
  GIC (FMI)
• Several statistical studies of GIC occurrence
  based on model calculations, geomagnetic data and
  GIC recordings (FMI)
• Tests of the effects of dc currents injected into
  transformers (Fingrid)

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• GIC research in Finland
• High-Voltage (400 220 kV) power system
  (continues)
• Conclusions
• GIC are a potential risk in Finland due to the
  high-latitude location, so contacts between
  Fingrid and FMI continue.
• Largest measured GIC 201 A (March 24, 1991)
  only 42 A on October 30, 2003
• Only one GIC disturbance so far A protective
  relay caused an unwanted tripping in northern
  Finland in January 2005 because the relay had
  been configured erroneously.
• The resistances provided by neutral point
  reactors efficiently reduce GIC.
• Series capacitors block the flow of GIC.
• The transformer structures and design
  specifications efficiently prevent overheating
  and gassing problems.
• The Swedish high-voltage system is clearly more
  sensitive to GIC, so FMI and IRF continue
  research together with Swedish power industry.

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• GIC research in Finland
• Natural gas pipeline
• Collaboration between FMI and the Gasum Oy
  pipeline company
• Started in 1981
• Theoretical modelling of geoelectric fields, GIC
  and pipe-to-soil voltages (FMI)
• Statistical studies of GIC occurrence based on
  model calculations and geomagnetic data (FMI)
• Pipe-to-soil voltage monitoring at several sites
  (Gasum)
• Recording of GIC at one site since 1998 (FMI)
• Web-based service GICNow! developed for Gasum
  in the ESA Space Weather Applications Pilot
  Project in 2003 to 2005 (FMI)

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• Facts to be remembered in the estimation of GIC
  risks in the European high-voltage power system
• The society is more and more dependent on
  reliable power supply.
• Electric energy is much transported from one
  country to another.
• A local disturbance in the power grid may
  propagate as a domino effect to other parts of
  the network, possibly resulting in a collapse of
  the whole system.
• The blackout in central Europe in November 2006
  was a good example though not caused by GIC.
• On the other hand, GIC may also impact many sites
  simultaneously.
• Use of higher voltages implies smaller line
  resistances and larger GIC.
• Longer transmission lines imply larger induced
  geovoltages.
• GIC magnitudes do not only depend on the latitude
  but power system configuration details also
  affect.
• Problems caused by GIC depend on transformer
  types and other technological matters, so power
  engineering expertise is needed.
• The next sunspot maximum approaches.

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• EU FP6 STREP Pre-Proposal (GREPON) in 2004
• NEST INSIGHT area Call FP6-2003-NEST-B-3 closed
  on September 15, 2004
• Title Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC)
  Risk in the European Power Network (GREPON)
• Duration 24 months (about July 2005 to June 2007)
• Budget 1600 kEuros (request from EU 800 kEuros)
• 8 consortium partners (with 150 man-months)
• FMI, Finland
• BGS-Edinburgh, UK
• LPCE/CNRS-Orleans, France
• DMI, Denmark
• IRF-Lund, Sweden
• Natural Resources Canada
• University of Sheffield, UK
• Power industry ANF Energy Solutions (Canada),
  RTE/EDF (France)

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• GREPON evaluation on December 23, 2004
• Relevance to the objectives of the programme
  4.0 (threshold 4)
• Scientific and technological excellence 3.2
  (threshold 4)
• Potential impact 2.5 (threshold 3)
• The panel considers that GREPON addresses a true
  risk to society which is relevant to INSIGHT but
  of moderate novelty and impact.
• The panel considers that the potential impact of
  the proposed work is limited since the frequency
  of GIC storms and the breakdowns of electrical
  power networks is quite low.
• More integrated power networks might not
  increase the risk because a more integrated
  network has also more connecting nodes that
  receive energy from other plants.
• The panel has therefore decided to recommend
  that the proposal should not be retained for the
  second stage evaluation.

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• EU FP6 STREP Pre-Proposal (GREPON-2) in 2005
• NEST INSIGHT area Call FP6-2004-NEST-C-1 closed
  on April 13, 2005
• Title Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC)
  Risk in the European Power Network (GREPON-2)
• Duration 24 months (about July 2006 to June 2008)
• Budget 1860 kEuros (request from EU 960 kEuros)
• 8 consortium partners (with 186 man-months)
• FMI, Finland
• LPCE/CNRS-Orleans, France NRCan (Canada),
  CETP (France)
• IRF-Lund, Sweden
• DMI, Denmark
• BGS-Edinburgh, UK
• University of Sheffield, UK ANF Energy
  Solutions (Canada)
• RTE/EDF power company, France
• NGT power company, UK

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• GREPON-2 evaluation on July 18, 2005
• Relevance to the objectives of the programme
  3.5 (threshold 4 GREPON 4.0)
• Scientific and technological excellence 3.9
  (threshold 4 GREPON 3.2)
• Potential impact 3.0 (threshold 3 GREPON
  2.5))
• The panel considers that the phenomenon
  addressed is not really that new and does not
  seem to be of such high concern with a relevant
  potential for serious problems or risks to
  European society.
• The panel has therefore decided to recommend
  that the proposal should not be retained for the
  second stage of the evaluation.
• 50 pre-proposals out of 330 were accepted for the
  second stage.

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Evaluation summaries of SWEET and SW-RISK

• Relevance st- 4, sr- 2 (threshold 3/5)
• Potential impact st- 3, sr- 2 (threshold 3/5)
• S T excellence st- 3, sr- 3 (threshold 4/5)
• Quality of the consortium st- 2, sr- 3
  (threshold 3/5)
• Quality of the management st- 2, sr- 3
  (threshold 3/5)
• Mobilisation of the resources st- 3, sr- 2.5
  (threshold 3/5)
• --------------------------------------------------
  -------------------------------------
• gt total SWEET 17 (threshold 21/30)
• SW-RISK 15.5 (threshold 21/30)