POS 304404: Great Power Politics 04262006

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POS 304/404 Great Power Politics04/26/2006

• Course Status.
• Paper assignment 3 returned.
• Final exam review guide distributed.
• Research paper due 05/03.
• Hard copy and electronic copy (w/n 24 hours).
• Both have to be submitted.
• Discussion question next week is optional/extra
  credit.
• Final exam, May 10th - paper returned (if not
  returned/graded via e-mail).

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• May 3rd - Research paper due (in class and via
  e-mail).
• Back-up papers, updated virus databases.
• Ideally turn in both, but either hard copy or
  e-copy due in or before class. Both due w/n 24
  hours (05/04 600pm).
• Submit paper as one document/file (not separate
  files for title page, body, bibliography).
• Double check citation style before submitting.
• Run spell/grammar check.
• Do not submit pieces of the assignment -
  assignment graded based on latest component.
• Annotations can be stripped out of bibliography.
• Rough drafts encouraged, feedback guaranteed if
  draft received by morning of 05/02.
• Word Count expectations -
• 12 font - Time New Roman 250 words per page
• 10 page paper 2500, 15 page paper 3750.

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• Class Agenda.
• Presentation.
• Discussion question.
• Video Cases.
• Review Mearsheimer.
• Review/Discuss Johnson.
• 800 - 815 Distribute/discuss final exam review
  guide.
• 815-830 Student Satisfaction Survey
• Note Not course evaluation, which is next week.

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• 21st Century Great Power Politics.
• Iran.
• CNN 04/26/06 Iran Will Harm US.
• US splits w/n elites and w/n military?
• Seymour Hersh New Yorker piece, article.
• William Arkin - Early Warning Blog Washington
  Post.
• Not Just a Last Resort? 05/2005.
• The Nuclear Option and Iran 04/19/2006.
• Video 1 Hersh Interviewed on CNN (04/15/2006).
• Reasons for considering nuclear strike option?
• Splits w/n apparatus, and between civilian and
  military leaders?
• Ideology and messianism (Iran and US).

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• 21st Century Great Power Politics.
• PRC President Hu Jintao in US.
• CNN story re visit (04/19/2006).
• PRC Central Government English Portal.
• Presidency.
• CCTV coverage of Jintao visit.
• Video 2
• Hu/Bush post meeting press conference.
• Protestors at meeting.
• Critical issues of meeting?
• Ceremonial and actual foreign policy duties of
  President?
• Video 3
• MSNBC 04/20/2006.
• Interview with Sean Wilentz - Princeton Amer.
  Studies Dept. Chair.
• Authored Rolling Stone 4/21/06 article Worst
  President in History?

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• Shifting Domestic Political Coalitions and GPP
  US 05/2006.
• Video 3
• MSNBC 04/20/2006.
• Interview with Sean Wilentz - Princeton Amer.
  Studies Dept. Chair.
• Authored Rolling Stone 4/21/06 article Worst
  President in History?
• Decay of Presidential approval shows American
  republic more self correcting than Johnson
  assumes?
• Keep in mind Hersh/Blitzer discussion re splits
  w/n DOD, civilian-military, and w/n Bush II
  advisory network.

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Domestic Politics and Limits of Power
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Domestic Politics and Limits of Power
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Domestic Politics and Limits of Power
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Domestic Politics and Limits of Power
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Domestic Politics and Limits of Power
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Domestic Politics and Limits of Power
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Domestic Politics and Limits of Power
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• 21st Century Great Power Politics.
• PRC President Hu Jintao in US.
• CNN story re visit (04/19/2006).
• PRC Central Government English Portal.
• Presidency.
• CCTV coverage of Jintao visit.
• Video 2
• China Friend or Foe.
• Hu Bush Press Conference.

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• Discussion questions for 04/19/2006.
• Both Mearsheimer and Johnson discuss near-future
  conflict with China and North Korea in the
  chapters assigned for this week.
• Johnson uses US "saber rattling" and planned
  deployment of theater/ballistic missile defense
  against both North Korea and China as examples of
  the "kinds of explosive situations the United
  States, in its guise as the New Rome, creates for
  itself" (88).
• Is Johnson correct in his characterization of US
  motives and intentions in Northeast Asia?
• Would Mearsheimer's recommendations that the
  United States "abandon its policy of constructive
  engagement" with China, to "slow the rise of
  China" (402), only exacerbate the potentially
  "explosive situation" in Northeast Asia?

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• Eisenhower - Military Industrial Complex - 1961
  Farewell address.
• Speech text Eisenhower library.
• Discussion Question
• Is Eisenhowers warning relevant for
  understanding US national and internal security
  policy on April 26th, 2006?
• MIC 2006 Security, Iron Triangles, and
  Corruption.
• Cunningham Scandal MZM Corporation.
• Defense contractor kickbacks to Cunningham for
  earmarks and other forms of interference in
  awarding defense and homeland security contracts.
• Wade Mitchell, CEO of MZM faces up to 11 years.
• Center for Public Integrity Windfalls of War.

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• Discussion questions for 04/26/2006.
• Johnson discusses the domestic impact of the
  national security apparatus' activities (military
  recruitment, secrecy, involvement in domestic
  policing) and the configuration of a globe
  spanning network of bases respectively. 
• Why does Johnson view these two general areas as
  posing dangers to the American republic? 
• Given recent events (e.g. revelations of domestic
  surveillance activity, discussion re US
  superbases in Iraq as possible containment of
  Iran and other geopolitical goals), is Johnson
  exaggerating the potential danger that these
  manifestations of American militarism pose to
  American democracy and global stability?
• Articles to review (not required) for above
  question.
• Newsweek (05/01/2006) Stuck in the Hot Zone,
  Don't dream about full exits. The military is in
  Iraq for the long haul.
• Rolling Stone (04/20/2006) The Pentagon's New
  Spies, The military has built a vast
  domestic-intelligence network to fight
  terrorism.

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• Causes of Great Power War - Mearsheimer.
• Anarchic structure not sufficient explanation.
• Structure sets parameters.
• Non-structural factors.
• Nationalism.
• Ideology.
• Internal Inter-elite competition.
• Disagreement among IR theorists what drives great
  power conflict, up to and including war.
• Polarity and war probability.
• Offensive realism.
• 4 types of polarity.
• Unbalanced bipolarity balanced bipolarity,
  unbalanced multipolarity, balanced multipolarity.

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• Bipolarity most stable.
• Fewer opportunities for conflict.
• Power more likely to be equally distributed.
• Discourages miscalculation.
• Bipolarity does not magnify anxieties.
• War more likely in multipolar system.
• More opportunities for war (more great power
  conflict dyads).
• Imbalances between great powers more likely.
• Miscalculation more likely.
• Unbalanced multipolar systems most war-prone.
• Potential hegemons have advantage which they are
  likely to use.
• Security drives potential hegemon to attempt to
  acquire regional hegemony.
• Mutually reinforcing assessment of belligerent
  intentions on part of both potential hegemon and
  peer competitors.

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• Bipolarity most stable?
• Origins of bipolar Cold War system.
• Mistaken historical analogies?
• Cold War and US/Soviet Rivalry.
• Little mention of clash between competing
  ideological systems.
• United States long running hostility to Soviet
  regime.
• Pattern of ambivalence towards revolutionary
  regimes.
• US ambivalence through 5 revolutionary waves.
• 1) Late 18th early 19th centuries.
• France, Haiti, Latin America.
• 2) Middle 19th century.
• 1848 Europe to 1871 France.
• 3) Early 20th century.
• Chinese, Mexican, Soviet.
• 4) Post-WWII - Decolonization, National
  Liberation.
• 5) Islamic revolutions.

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• Post-WWII Origins of Cold War.
• Soviet Union only potential regional hegemon.
• United States balances against.
• Anti-revolutionary, anti-communist ideology and
  elite enemy perception.
• Foundational moment - established national and
  internal security architecture not changed until
  post-9/11.
• National Security Act of 1947.
• NSC-68 as example.
• Classified document used for Truman national
  security planning.
• Declassified in 1975 by Kissinger.
• Opens with context revolutions and collapsed
  empires.
• Two centers.
• Soviets - fanatical - seeks to impose absolute
  authority over the rest of the world.
• Threatens not just the Republic but civilization
  itself.

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• Balance of Power vs. Balance of Threat.
• Walt elaborates on balance of threat versus
  balance of power.
• Dimensions of threat.
• Power.
• Proximity.
• Offensive power.
• Offensive intentions.
• Threat and Enemy Images.
• Enemy images are durable and effect both elite
  and mass opinion and perceptions.
• Shoon, Kathleen M. Anchors Against Change (1996
  - Univ. Michigan), Shoon and Cowden (1999
  International Studies Quarterly).
• Findings ideology and enemy images as heuristic
  that lag behind changes in international
  environment.

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• Walt Recommendations.
• Strategy of Self-Restraint.
• Maintain US capabilities.
• Mailed Fist, Velvet Glove.
• Random Acts of Self-Abnegation.
• Keep Clients Under Control.
• Israeli, anti-Castro Cuban lobbies.
• Adversaries not monolith.
• Defense not offense.
• Defend legitimacy of US preponderance.

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C -1.
• Assault on optimism post-Cold War.
• Clinton quotes 1992 and 1997 re cynical
  calculus of great power politics.
• Anarchy did not change post-Cold War.
• Great power politics and competition has not
  disappeared from
• Europe.
• Bi-polar US/Russia (EU?).
• Northeast Asia.
• Multi-polar - US/China/Russia.
• Persistence of anarchy.
• Restates assumptions.
• States.
• Great powers offensive military.
• Uncertainty.
• Survival.
• Rational maximization of probability of survival.

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 2.
• Anarchic state of international system will not
  change in foreseeable future.
• Defense of realism.
• Sovereignty at Bay.
• International institutions.
• UN no real influence or autonomous power.
• Globalization.
• Economic interdependence.
• State will not be displaced.
• Nationalism as powerful ideological force.
• EU - not clear (e.g. post publication French and
  other non/no vote on EU).
• Futility of Offense.
• Mueller and others.
• Nuclear weapons not used (except and not used
  yet).
• Great power offensive conventional and covert
  capabilities.

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 3.
• Certain Intentions.
• Democratic peace.
• Strongest challenge to realism yet
• Laynes examination of four demo-demo crises.
• Backsliding.
• Social constructivism.
• Wendt (and others).
• Discourse/discursive formations drive
  international politics.
• Realisms remarkable staying power.
• End of the Cold War - explained by realism not
  discursive/ideational shifts.
• Post-Gorbachev return to realist orientation
  (Mears. writting as Putin consolidates power term
  1).

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 4.
• Survival in the Global Commons.
• States concerned w/prosperity more than survival.
• Serious economic (or resource) crisis always
  possible.
• Economic interdependence not necessarily a
  deterrent to
• Quick decisive wars.
• Limited aims.
• Pre-WWI interdependence did not prevent outbreak
  of great power war.
• Cooperation and Crisis.
• Pandemics, environmental changes (e.g. global
  warming), population growth
• Not severe enough to induce cooperation over
  realism.

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 5.
• Great Power Behavior 1990s.
• Europe and Northeast Asia should be pluralistic
  security communities.
• Optimists.
• Conflict still possible South Asia Persian
  Gulf Africa.
• Mistake periods of relative peace for permanent
  change.
• Security Competition Northeast Asia.
• North Korea.
• Taiwan/China.
• Japan-US threat to China.
• US/China relations worse post-Cold War.
• Burgeoning missile/anti-missile competition.
• US maintains large forces in region.

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 6.
• Security Competition in Europe.
• US/NATO actions viewed with suspicion by Russia.
• Expansion and Russian fears.
• US maintains troops.
• US remains engaged with Europe.
• Structure and Peace in 1990s.
• US not global hegemon, W. Hemisphere hegemon
  (regional).
• Europe stable bipolarity.
• Nukes, US offshore balancer, Russian territorial
  ambitions checked by pol./econ. difficulties
  (2006 - not necessarily the case).
• Northeast Asia.
• Balanced multipolar area.
• Unclear if that is the case 2006.

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 7.
• US Global Hegemonic Aspirations?
• Measheimer (2000-1) no evidence.
• US not capable of sustained offensive military
  operations in Europe or Northeast Asia.
• US security shield also enables control over
  allies (Japan, Germany) - semi-sovereign
  states.
• Taproot of stability.
• Post-Cold War distribution of power.
• Trouble Ahead.
• 2020 as horizon of prediction.
• Power structures in both Europe and NE Asia not
  sustainable.
• Likely US remain engaged, and great power
  relations will deteriorate.

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 8.
• America The Pacifier.
• US focus on precluding the emergence of any
  future competitor.
• America The Peacekeeper.
• US remains engaged to prevent disintegration of
  NE Asian and European peace.
• US might gain from regional wars.
• Possibility of great power conflict in both
  areas, US involved in wars from the start.
• 1990s Anomaly or Precedent?
• Too early to tell.
• Inertia and continued US engagement.
• Distance between US and Allies/fears of US
  disengagement.
• Doubts about seriousness.
• US offshore balancer not worlds sheriff
  (2006?).

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 9.
• Future, Structure, Conflict.
• Europe.
• Germany or Russia likely hegemons.
• US likely to reduce troop deployments.
• Russia - hegemon, or collapse.
• Europe likely to be site of unstable
  multi-polarity.
• NE Asia.
• China or Japan.
• Japan.
• American exit would not change balance of
  multi-polarity.
• China - forces US to remain or return.
• Unstable multi-polarity.
• Conclusion.
• China most dangerous peer-competitor.
• China likely to be more formidable than US.

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• Mearsheimer - Chapter 10 GPP 21C - 10.
• Conclusion (continued).
• US interest in slowing PRC growth.
• Containment not current engagement.
• Not too late but clock is ticking, China
  growing.
• Structural imperatives may force US to abandon
  constructive engagement in near future.
• 2006 unclear Bush II position.
• Grave mistake for US to
• turn back on the realist principles that have
  served it well since its foundations.

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• Johnson - Imperialisms, Old and New.
• Analogy to Rome.
• Roman republic.
• Slow acquisition of empire.
• Collapse of republican institutions due to
  imperial overstretch and linked militarization.
• End of the Cold War.
• Soviet Union an empire that gave up dominion
  voluntarily?
• Realism distorted US perceptions of intentions of
  SU?
• US triumphalism - no demobilization (or
  significant demobilization).
• Revolution in US relation to rest of world,
  1989-2002.
• Acquisition of military empire, network of
  bases, expansion into denied areas (esp.
  Central Asia).

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• Johnson - Imperialisms, Old and New 2.
• Military vs. militarism.
• Why militarism for US according to Johnson?
• Bases as the seat of American Empire.
• Not just physical.
• Military-industrial-entertainment-university
  complex.
• Antiseptic warfare, global death from above
  robots, other technological fetishism of
  super-weapons.
• Imperialism and militarism in US.
• New institutions for a new empire.
• Cold War.
• US and Soviet Militarism/Imperialism, paranoid
  domestic political cultures.
• Bases like micro-colonies, SOFAs.
• Bases subvert democratic institutions in host
  societies.
• Crossed the Rubicon to become an empire with
  global pretensions (Johnson p. 37).

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• Johnson - The Roots of American Militarism - 1.
• Washington and Eisenhower quotes.
• Militarist tendencies appear at end of 19th
  century.
• Spanish-American War.
• Jingoism.
• USS Maine (Lusitania, Pearl Harbor, 9/11, Gulf
  II, Iran 1?).
• Cuban, Philippines.
• Connection between Indian Wars and violence of
  Philippine counter-insurgency (p. 43).
• Inaugurated era of American Imperials and
  militarism.
• 1898 origin of permanent war machine.
• Root - Army War College - Carlisle Barracks.
• National Guard.
• Wilson.
• Mexican Revolution.
• World War I.
• 14 points.

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Johnson - The Roots of American Militarism -2.

• World War I generated ideological basis for
  Amer. Imperialism.
• WWII unleashed growing militarism.
• Highest MPR 12.2.
• Military career and civilian political power -
  unprecedented since Civil War.
• WWII did not create American militarism
  (according to Johnson).
• Why - rapid demobalization - similar to post
  Civil War demob.
• Cold War.
• Fundamentally altered political economy of the
  United Sates.
• Never returned to pre-Cold War, pre-WWII levels.
• Onset of Militarism - political hallmarks.
• Emergence of professional military class -
  glorification.
• Preponderance of military officers/arms
  industries in federal state.
• Military preparedness becomes highest priority of
  state.

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Johnson - The Roots of American Militarism -3.

• American militarism not mono-causal.
• Experience w/military service.
• 20th and 21st centuries - era of total war.
• Cold War containment not imperial ambition but
• Imperial methods.
• Garrisons.
• Subsidies to client governments.
• Subversion and aggression against recalcitrant
  states.
• Army of colonial administrators.
• Naturalization of institutions of imperial power.

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Johnson - Toward the New Rome -1.

• Fleming quote Its the same old dream-world
  domination.
• Empire - normally negative a term of
  opprobrium.
• Embraced by neo-cons. And others.
• Krauthammer, Kaplan.
• Embrace not informed by negative consequence of
  US maintenance of empire during Cold War.
• Intellectual heritage of neoconservatives
  triumphalism.
• Complex amalgam of T. Roosevelt and W. Wilson.
• Anticommunist liberalism.
• Humanitarian imperialism.
• Humanitarian unilateralism could undermine
  ICC/UNSC, worsen relations.
• Post-9/11.
• Rapid and sustained unilateralist drift.

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Johnson - Toward the New Rome -2.

• GWOT.
• Could have been occasion for US multi-lateralism.
• No
• Unilateralist approaches to range of policy
  issues/security threats.
• 21C American militarism
• Dreams of control via earth and near-earth space.
• Afghanistan - touted as success of accurate
  munitions, UAVs, and special forces, outcome
  unclear 2006.
• 04/19/2006 Afghanistan - unstable security
  situation.
• Vision for 2020. Joint Vision 2020.
• DTIC - Future Joint Warfare.
• Weaponization of space, space based arms race.
• Militarist/imperialist clique - Rumsfeld/Cheney.
• Rumsfeld - proponent of RMA and transformation.

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Johnson - Toward the New Rome - 3.

• Mearsheimer/Johnson overlap.
• PRC suspicions of US BMD research and preliminary
  deployments.
• BMD origins SDI.
• Offensive?
• too for global dominance?
• Pre-9/11 Bush II anti-PRC rhetoric.
• April 2001 incident.
• Korean peninsula.
• N. Korea and WMD, esp. nukes.
• Bush II National Security Strategy 2002
  preventive war.
• Tensions re shock and awe model applied to N.
  Korea.
• Iraq II and upcoming Iran I contribute to Korean
  tensions.

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Johnson - Institutions of American Militarism1

• Institutions.
• Recruitment.
• Americas Army.
• Demographics of national security personnel.
• Depleted Uranium and blowback re
  health/environmental effects.
• Military-Industrial-Entertainment Complex.
• Various examples DOD/Hollywood cooperation/collusi
  on?
• 24, E-Ring, The Unit etc.
• Countervailing pressures w/n culture industry.
• Syrianna, V for Vendetta, Constant Gardner, Good
  Night and Good Luck, etc.

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Johnson - Institutions of American Militarism2

• Institutions.
• Secrecy.
• SAPs.
• FAS pdf. of US Army manual on SAPs.
• Overclassification.
• Compartmentalization and difficulties/limits of
  oversight.

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Johnson - Institutions of American Militarism 3

• Institutions.
• Domestic expansion of DOD role.
• Posse Comitatus.
• NORTHCOM.

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• Video Case Domestic Political Coalitions,
  Contagion Fears, Politicization of Intelligence
  and Special Access.1
• 1950s.
• Clip 1) AE Biography Channel 1996 J. Edgar
  Hoover Private and Confidential.
• Key Domestic Actors
• Congress
• House House Un-American Activities Committee.
• Senate Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.
• Senator Joseph McCarthy.
• FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.
• Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.
• House and Senate internal security committees,
  parallel to counter-terror and homeland
  security today.

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• Domestic Political Coalitions, Contagion Fears,
  Politicization of Intelligence and Special
  Access.2
• Questions?
• Types of activity Eisenhower concerned about in
  speech?
• Mearsheimer, Haas, Johnson, how would they
  explain or consider important?
• Declassified archives.
• Army Signals Intelligence Service (predecessor to
  NSA).
• Venona Project. Decoding Soviet
  intelligence/espionage SIGINT.
• Analogous to current debates.
• Plamegate/CIA leak investigation.
• Iraq II/Rumsfeld.
• Iran upcoming.
• 9/11 and WMD in Iraq Intelligence Failures.

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Johnson - Empire of Bases.

• Cold War - Mission/Function of Bases.
• Project conventional power.
• Prepare for nuke war.
• Tripwires.
• Symbols of power.
• Post-Cold War - Mission/Function of Bases.
• Military preponderance.
• Eavesdropping.
• Geo-petro-politics.
• Map Central Asia.
• Income for MIC.
• Comfortable bases for US mil. personnel.

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• Discussion Question for 05/03/2006.
• Question is optional/extra credit.
• Will make up for one missed weekly discussion
  question.
• If no weeklies missed points, added to weekly
  discussion question grade.
• 11 weekly assignments - could raise average
  weekly grade by almost one grade (110possible
  10).
• Posted in course website, under announcements,
  w/n next several days.
• Course Status
• Research paper due 05/03.
• Hard copy and electronic copy (w/n 24 hours).
• Both have to be submitted.
• Final exam, May 10th, 600-830.
• Remember to bring blue book.