NSIS Transport Layer draft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-00.txt Slides: http://nsis.srmr.co.uk/~reh/draft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-00.ppt - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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NSIS Transport Layer draft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-00.txt Slides: http://nsis.srmr.co.uk/~reh/draft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-00.ppt

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NSIS Transport Layer. draft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-00.txt ... Robert Hancock, Henning Schulzrinne (editors) IETF#58 Minneapolis. November 2003 ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: NSIS Transport Layer draft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-00.txt Slides: http://nsis.srmr.co.uk/~reh/draft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-00.ppt


1
NSIS Transport Layerdraft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-00.txt
Slides http//nsis.srmr.co.uk/reh/draft-ietf-nsi
s-ntlp-00.ppt
  • Robert Hancock, Henning Schulzrinne (editors)
  • IETF58 Minneapolis
  • November 2003

2
Overview
  • Purported Status (by section)
  • Major Issues
  • Explicit messaging association approach
  • Intermediary issues
  • Less Major Issues
  • From section 8
  • Openings for specific inputs

3
Status Outline (1/2)
  • 1. Introduction ( 2. Terminology)
  • Basically follows from f/w assumed ?
  • 3. Design Methodology
  • How 2205-like transport is extended with real
    transport/security protocols to provide
    2747/2961-like functionality basically an
    extended strawman
  • 4 Overview of Operation 5 Formats mainly
    provide more discussion of the implications of
    3.1
  • WG needs to commit to the approach of 3.1, or
    some alternative (in scope of the charter)

4
Status Outline (2/2)
  • 6. Advanced Protocol Features
  • Covers NATs, routing, transition etc.
  • At current level of detail, follows directly from
    f/w (if you believe 3/4/5)
  • 7. Security Considerations
  • Allocation of threats and solutions
  • At current level of detail, follows directly from
    f/w (if you believe 3)
  • 8. Open Issues
  • Basically questions about detailed aspects of 4/5

5
Design Approach (1/4)
  • Various ways to get required additional
    functionality into 2205-like approach
  • Currently build a new messaging framework which
    incorporates 2205 functions and existing
    transport/security protocols

6
Design Approach (2/4)
  • Message flows within a node

7
Design Approach (3/4)
  • Routing state isset up as in 2205
  • When rtg. state exists, policy dictates when
    messaging associations areset up and used
  • (and what sort,and how many,and when theyare
    torn down again)

8
Design Approach (4/4)
  • Implications (among others)
  • Re-use existing transport/security technology
  • No new protocol development
  • Additional functionality scales like peers, not
    flows/sessions
  • Time/space overhead little/no impact (given the
    functionality that is being achieved)
  • Nodes have to implement (non-trivial)
    transport/security protocols
  • Processing at intermediaries gets harder
  • Routing state maintenance stops being free
  • ?

9
Formats
  • General approach a message is a header a
    bundle of TLV-encoded objects
  • Some objects can be signalling application
    payloads
  • No fundamental difference between
    connection/datagram modes
  • Some datagram messages need IP Router Alert
    Option setting
  • Preferred (?) method for message interception
  • Reality check would be nice
  • Some transport protocols need additional header
    information

10
Intermediary Issues (1/3)
  • If full NSLP peers communicate directly over 1
    GIMPS hop, life if beautiful
  • It is trivial for GIMPS to provide a
    well-defined, transport security service for
    the signalling application
  • As soon as partly dumb intermediaries want to
    read/modify objects, life is ugly
  • Channel security terminates half-way
  • Its practically impossible to exercise flow
    control except in trivial topologies
  • Overload turns into message drops (i.e.
    unreliability)

11
Intermediary Issues (2/3)
  • Ideally the messaging association would go from
    node 1 node 2 its broken by, for example
  • GIMPS-aware NATs (to re-write flow-id)
  • NSLP nodes implementing a functionality subset
  • (PBFs handled as part of discovery process)

12
Intermediary Issues (3/3)
  • Possible solutions
  • Ban intermediaries
  • All NSLP nodes implement complete functionality
  • NATs are GIMPS unaware (use STUN or explicit
    midcom NSLP)
  • Replace channel security (use CMS partial
    signing between outer peers)
  • Drop strict requirement for flow control and
    reliability
  • NSLPs have to be able to receive always (and load
    shed) intermediaries can drop packets
  • Hope that this only happens in pathological
    scenarios
  • Tunnel mode encapsulations (draft section 5.3)
  • Cure worse than the disease

13
Other Open Issues
  • See Section 8!
  • 8.1 Protocol Naming
  • 8.2 General IP Layer Issues
  • 8.3 Encapsulation and Addressing for Datagram
    Mode
  • 8.4 Intermediate Node Bypass and Router Alert
    Values
  • 8.5 Messaging Association Flexibility
  • 8.6 Messaging Association Setup Message
    Sequences
  • 8.7 Connection Mode Encapsulation
  • 8.8 GIMPS State Teardown
  • 8.9 Datagram Mode Retries Single Shot Message
    Support
  • 8.10 GIMPS Support for Message Scoping
  • 8.11 Mandatory or Optional Reverse Routing State
  • 8.12 Additional Discovery Mechanisms

14
Openings for Specific Inputs
  • Routing/mobility/multihoming analysis
  • See Thursday, also network multihoming
  • NSIS-unaware NAT traversal analysis
  • STUN or alternative NSIS datagram modes?
  • v4/v6 transition analysis
  • Especially 6to4 details, anycast tunnels
  • Can section 7 be made more precise?
  • Validation against NSLP work
  • Including proxy operations, receiver initiation
    scenarios
  • Stack analysis (for messaging associations)

15
The End
16
Origins
  • Starting NTLP work (Slide _at_ IETF56)
  • Framework (and Requirements) I-Ds
  • 2 initial drafts at IETF57
  • Some discussion in Vienna and on list
  • Some expert review
  • Detail from one used to expand conceptual
    description of the other
  • Plus a lot more explanation and examples
  • Still not yet a complete protocol design

17
8.1 Protocol Naming
  • GIMPS (General Internet Messaging Protocol for
    Signaling)
  • GIST (Generic Internet Signaling Transport)
  • LUMPS (Lightweight Universal Messaging for Path
    associated Signaling)
  • Other combinations of G/C, I, P, S, M, R, T, S
    (again)
  • Remember Atlanta NTLP is a stupid name and we
    promise not to use it for the real protocol

18
8.2 General IP Layer Issues
  • UDP or raw-IP
  • Interception on protocol number (raw-IP) or
    assume RAO (either)
  • Rely on UDP checksum or include our own
  • Getting through NSIS-unaware NATs
  • Implementation issues (can't easily do raw IP
    i/o, or cant control TTLs via UDP)
  • Aim for one choice?

19
8.3 Encapsulation and Addressing for D-Mode
  • Assume UDP (or raw-IP) only
  • No DCCP, IPsec,
  • Flow sender or signalling sender as source
    address?
  • Or implementation issue?
  • Need a well-known port?
  • Details on traffic class, flow label

20
8.4 Intermediate Node Bypass and RAO Values
  • Assume interception on RAO present (and RAO
    value)
  • Reality check?
  • How to assign values to protect routers from high
    volumes of irrelevant signalling messages?
  • 2 aggregation options need input requirements
    from NSLP work
  • Cf. 3175 considerations (message rewriting)

21
8.5 Messaging Association Flexibility
  • How many to allow and how many different sorts?
  • Many different possible stack configurations
  • Policies for using different parallel
    associations
  • Which should be the MUST to implement?
  • (decision needed eventually)
  • Do we end up with another ISAKMP?

22
8.6 Messaging Association Setup Message Sequences
  • Allow the MA to be setup upstream as well as
    downstream?
  • When to propagate the GIMPS-query
  • Relative to other stages in the process
  • When to propagate the MA setup
  • Relative to other stages in the process
  • Interactions between MA setup and discovery
    exchange

23
8.7 Connection Mode Encapsulation
  • See above (main slides on intermediary issues)

24
8.8 GIMPS State Teardown
  • Is this needed explicitly?
  • What is the cost of leaving it up?
  • How do you know when it is no longer needed?
  • E.g. to send NSLP teardowns (more important)
  • Potential race conditions in mobility scenarios
  • RSVP comparison what is the value of PATH TEAR?
  • Is there any fate sharing between GIMPS and NSLP
    state?

25
8.9 Datagram Mode Transport
  • How to control retransmission in d-mode
  • Needed if downstream message is lost
  • Congestion issue
  • Should it be extended to provide one-shot message
    transfer to NSLP?
  • Or c-mode or nothing
  • Congestion control in general (rate limits?)

26
8.10 GIMPS Support for Message Scoping
  • Which layer knows about network edges?
  • Some applications need this
  • Should it be a service provided by GIMPS?
  • Rationale its the GIMPS layer which has better
    access to clues about infrastructure
    configuration
  • Aggregation boundaries, IP TTL, GHC

27
8.11 Mandatory or Optional Reverse Routing State
  • To do

28
8.12 Additional Discovery Mechanisms
  • To do
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