Social Capital and Politics

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Social Capital and Politics
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Outline

• Political theories of social entrepreneurship
• Social capital

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Community Vitality
Revitalization
Communityorganizing
Developing Organizational and Leadership Skills
Capacity forcollectiveaction
Collectiveefficacy
Social capital
Building Social Capital
Social cohesion
Social Interactions
Atomistic
Ref. RAND
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Social Enterprises as Mediating Structures

• Protect individuals from alienation before
  Leviathan by translating social problems into
  personal terms (Berger and Neuhaus 1977)
• Enhance states legitimacy by connecting public
  problems to private means
• Roman Catholic subsidiarity mediating the
  relationship between people and governments ata
  level that favors the individual

Ref. Frumkin (ch 2) 2002
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Nonprofit Links with the Political Process
Least political
1. Social capital building
2. Civic engagement
3. Grassroots organizing
4. Advocacy
5. Lobbying
6. Direct electoral activity
Most political
Ref. Frumkin (ch 2) 2002
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Political Theories of social Enterprise

• Nonprofits counteract the coercive power of the
  state
• Nonprofits are a laboratory for institutions that
  governments later adopt
• Nonprofits provide space between individuals
  and states (Locke)
• Voluntary associations are a force to fragment
  the proletariat (C. Wright Mills)

Ref. Frumkin (ch 2) 2002
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Tocquevilles Model of Voluntary Associations
Civic association
Political association
Equality
Democracy
Ref. Frumkin (ch 2) 2002
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Links Between Government and Social Enterprise

• Moral suasion (Reagan)
• Promotion of national service (GHW Bush)
• Stipended volunteering (Clinton)
• Faith-based initiatives (GW Bush)

Ref. Frumkin (ch 2) 2002
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Public subsidies versus private charity
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Different types of giving
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Volunteering
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Its not just about money
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But its not politics per se
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Some international evidence
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Outline

• Political theories of social entrepreneurship
• Social capital

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Social Capital
Robert Putnam Networks, norms, and social trust
that facillitate coordination and cooperation for
mutual benefits
Francis Fukuyama An institutional informal norm
that promotes cooperation between two or more
individuals
Synthesis The trust and social cohesiveness that
promotes giving, volunteering, and participation
in civil society
Evidence of social capital is more tangible than
social capital itself
Ref. Putnam, Fukuyama
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Two Types of Ties Foster Social Capital
Bonds

• Ties based on homogeneity of identity, demography
  and sense of purpose
• Can promote pursuit of narrow interests at the
  expense of the wider community
• Ties that span social differences (gender,
  ethnicity, SES)
• Build social trust that facilitates cooperation
  for mutual benefit

Bridges
(Putnam, 2000)
Ref. Granovetter (1974)
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Benefits of Social Capital

• Less passive reliance on state
• Proactive citizen intervention into social issues
• Schools, crime, economic development
• Constructive association
• Money for charities
• Lower transaction costs with contracts and laws
• Fewer public resources needed to govern
• Amelioration of excessive individualism
  (Tocqueville 1835)

Ref. Putnam, Fukuyama
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Costs of Social Capital

• In-group trust means out-group distrust
• Some social capital is socially destructive
• Less interchange of ideas between tight-knit
  groups
• Less moral suasion not to cheat out-group members

Ref. Fukuyama
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The Putnam Hypothesis

• Social capital is falling in America
• Evidence lower attendance by many traditional
  groups (e.g. PTA, bowling leagues, church-related
  groups)
• Reasons
• Societal cynicism
• Female labor force participation
• Population mobility and rootlessness
• Less marriage, more divorce, fewer kids
• Technologyindividual consumption of leisure

Ref. Putnam
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Not Everyone Subscribes to the Putnam Hypothesis

• Some groups increase membership, others
  losecant just study the losers
• Group membership was abnormally high in the
  American 1950scant measure from that point

Ref. Fukuyama
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An Economic Theory of Social Capital

• Hypothesis Social capital is a natural
  adaptation to suboptimal non-cooperative behavior

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Prisoners Dilemma Implications

• Without trust, dominant (but suboptimal) strategy
  obtains
• With trust, optimal strategy becomes viable
• Social capital promotes cooperation through trust

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2000 Social Capital CommunityBenchmark Survey

• 30,000 respondents
• 50 communities nationwide
• Supervised by Putnam and Harvard
• Undertaken by local Community Foundations

Ref. SCCBS
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SCCBS Summary (1)
Social trust Groups Political Secular gifts Religious gifts
National Sample -0.05 3.68 2.87 459 889
Central New York 0.07 3.84 3.09 506 702
Chicago -0.09 3.76 2.93 501 825
Houston -0.23 3.29 2.56 424 900
Indiana 0.11 3.59 3.03 456 961
Rochester 0.15 3.57 3.03 542 718
Seattle 0.19 3.82 3.51 783 725
Ref. SCCBS
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SCCBS Summary (2)
Ref. SCCBS
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Lessons for Policymakers and Managers

• Dont assume that social capital is always good
• Example Social capital can push giving and
  volunteering either up or down
• Individual and community-level social capital
  have different impacts
• Create proper conditions for social capital
  creation (e.g. property rights, public safety)
• How does the public sector impact social
  capitaldoes it encourage crowding out?