The God of War and The Vale of the Passion

1
The God of War and The Vale of the Passion

• British Artillery During the Third Ypres
  Campaign, 1917

2
Passchendaele or Third Ypres?It will help
to discard the very name, with its emotional
associations and to call the battle by its
official title, the Third Battle of Ypres.John
Terraine, 1959

• The Vale of the Passion
• Passchendaele - A Context-Free Canvas
• Displacing History and Meaning

3
The Deep and Empty Battlefield

• Range
• Lethality
• Power of Defence
• The Baroque War

4
We Need Guns. Lots of GunsArtillery Expansion
1914 - 1917

• 1 April 1915
• 18 Pounder 625
• 4.5 Howitzer 116
• 60 Pounder 28
• 6 Howitzer 32
• 8 Howitzer 0
• 9.2 Howitzer 8
• 12 Howitzer 0
• 15 Howitzer 0

• 28 July 1917
• 18 Pounder 3,061
• 4.5 Howitzer 948
• 60 Pounder 480
• 6 Howitzer 792
• 8 Howitzer 234
• 9.2 Howitzer 190
• 12 Howitzer 42
• 15 Howitzer 10

5
State of the Art IThe Guns

• Depth and Power of Defences
• Defence-in-Depth
• OTH Howitzers
• Field
• Medium Heavy
• Superheavy

6
State of the Art IIControlling the Guns

• Signals
• No Voice Control
• The FOO on the Hill
• Telephones
• Visual Signals
• Wireless

• Command
• Expanding Role of Corps and Army
• The GOCRA
• Centralisation Commensurate With Scale of
  Operations

7
Messines The Big Bang

• Essential Preliminary to Third Ypres
• Highest Part of Ridge System
• Must Be Taken to Deny German Observation and
  Protect Right Flank of Main Assault
• Task Given to General Herbert Plumers Second Army

8
Messines A Limited Operation

• Directly Based on Vimy Ridge, April 1917
• Frontage 17,000 yards
• Depth of Assault 3,000 yards in 2 Stages
• Stage 1 Messines Ridge 2,000 yards
• Stage 2 Oosttaverne Line 1,000 yards
• II ANZAC Corps, IX Corps, X Corps
• 9 Divisions Assault
• 3 Divisions in Reserve

9
Messines Artillery Preparation

• Preparatory Bombardment
• 11 Days
• 26 May 6 June 1917
• 2,266 Artillery Pieces
• 756 Heavies
• 1,158 18 Pdrs
• 352 4.5 Howitzers
• 144,000 Tons Ammo Dumped

• 3,561,530 Shells Fired
• 120,000 gas shells
• 60,000 smoke shells
• Denotes Increasing Sophistication
• Gas Shells A Form of Neutralising Fire
• Smoke Shells Hides Movement and Denies Enemy
  Observation

10
Messines The Assault7 June, 1917

• The Need for Surprise
• Preparation
• Registration
• 310 a.m. Mines Exploded
• Shock Wave Felt in London
• German First Line Annihilated
• The Surprise Element
• Simultaneously Artillery Opens Up At Maximum Fire
  Rate
• Creeping Barrage
• Counter-Battery Fire
• Interdiction Fire on Specific Targets

11
State of the Art IIIAssault Barrages

• Creeping
• Standing
• Combing

• It must be realised that this year the attacking
  Infantry must keep even closer to the barrage
  than last year, since it now takes less time for
  the hostile M.G. to get into action after our
  barrage has lifted off it.
• There should always be searching fire up to
  2,000 yards in front of our advancing Infantry.
• GOCRA, Fifth Army
• 25 August, 1917

12
Hostile Batteries Attacked by Counter-Battery Guns
6, 8 9.2 Hows Shell Special Points
E2 Barrage 60 Pdrs
E1 Barrage 8 9.2 Hows
D Barrage 6 Hows
A D Barrages 100 yd Gap
D E Barrages 200 yd Gap
C Barrage MGs
B2 Barrage 4.5 Hows
B1 Barrage 33 of 18 Pdrs
A Barrage 66 of 18 Pdrs
13
Messines Total Victory for the All-Arms Battle

• never since the early battles of 1914 had the
  bond between Gunners and Infantrymen been so
  strong at last, a weapon had been forged to win
  the war, a human weapon based on experience,
  confidence and, above all, skill.
• General Sir Martin Farndale
• History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery

14
Goughs CampaignPlans Preparation

• 15 mile front
• 17 Divisions
• 18 day preparatory bombardment firing
• Gough Seeks Breakthrough
• Depth of Assault 5,000 yards in a Single Bound
• Goes Against All Previous Experience
• Preparatory Conditions Far From Ideal
• Victory at Messines is Part of the Problem
• The Rubik's Cube Problem - Congestion
• Wear Tear
• Bad Weather
• Surprise Not Possible
• Battle of Annihilation

15
Plumers Advantages at Messines

• A Limited Operation
• Plumer Has the Advantage of Attacking a Salient
• 19 Pre-Prepared Mines
• Good Weather
• Excellent Observation From Mt Kemmel
• Pre-Existing Logistic Communications Particularly
  Good in This Area
• Extravagantly Supported Operation

Wytschaete
Messines
16
Goughs CampaignThe Preliminary BombardmentA
Comparison

• Pilckem Ridge
• Frontage 26,400 yards
• Depth 5,000 yards
• Preparatory Bombardment
• 18 Days
• 14 July 31 July 1917
• 2,174 Artillery Pieces
• 752 Heavies
• 1,422 18 Pdrs
• 324 4.5 Howitzers
• 4,283,550 Shells Fired
• 1 Gun per 12 yards

• Messines
• Frontage 17,000 yards
• Depth 3,000 yards
• Preparatory Bombardment
• 11 Days
• 26 May 6 June 1917
• 2,266 Artillery Pieces
• 756 Heavies
• 1,158 18 Pdrs
• 352 4.5 Howitzers
• 3,561,530 Shells Fired
• 1 Gun per 7½ yards

17
State of the Art IVScientific Artillery

• Counter-Battery Fire
• Enemy Guns Must Be Suppressed
• A Critical Part of the Battle
• Locating the Enemy
• Maps
• RFC Aerial Photography
• Flash Spotting Sound Ranging
• The Problem With Sound Ranging Intelligence
• Calibration and the Meteor
• Predicted Fire The Apogee of Surprise
• Camouflage

18
Goughs CampaignPilckem Ridge Langemarck

• Pilckem Ridge 31 July 2 August 1917
• Initial Results are Good 3,000 yard Advance
• Infantry Overreach Themselves
• Guns Cannot be Moved Forward
• Compounded by Heavy Rain
• Protective Barrages Lack Depth and Strength
• German Guns at Gheluvelt Not Suppressed
• Battle Bogs Down
• Langemarck 16-18 August
• Langemarck Captured but Not a Success
• Artillery Preparation Hurried
• Lack of Observation

19
A Change in Command

• Failure of Gough to Achieve Concrete Results
• Heavy Casualties Increasing Discontent
• 25 August 1917 - Plumers Second Army Takes Over
  Primary Role
• Need to Deal With German Artillery on Right Flank
  at Gheluvelt
• Therefore Concentrates Assault on Southern
  Portion of Sector
• Proposes a Series of Sequential Limited
  Operations
• First Assault - Menin Road
• Given 3 Weeks to Prepare
• Fine Weather Conditions
• Observation
• Movement of Guns Ammunition

20
State of the Art VFeeding the Guns The Chain

• The Chain
• Railhead
• Corps Sub Park
• DAC Echelon A
• DAC Echelon B
• Sections
• Battery
• Light Railways
• Heavy Medium Shells
• Direct From Railhead to Gun Where Possible

21
State of the Art VFeeding the Guns BACs DACs

• The Ammunition Sub-Park
• Previously Located on Lines of Communication
  (LoC)
• Now Held at Corps for Greater Operational
  Flexibility
• 1 Per Division
• Motorised
• From BACs to DACs
• Brigade Ammunition Columns (BACs) Abolished 1916
• Replaced by Divisional Ammunition Column (DAC)
• 2 Echelons DAC A DAC B Held at Division
  and Corps Respectively
• Gives Corps Greater Operational Flexibility Over
  Supply

22
State of the Art VFeeding the Guns The Pack

• The Problem of the Devastated Zone
• Ammo Dumps 9 Miles Behind Battery
• Wagon Lines 6½ Miles Behind Batteries
• Pack is Only Means of Supply
• Each Pack Animal Carries 8 x 18 Pdr Shells
• Requires Thousands of Animals
• 1st Canadian Division Artillery at Ypres
• 640 Pack Animals
• 2 x Echelons
• 4, 682 Trips

23
State of the Art VIMoving the Guns

• The Gun is Not A Weapon
• Traffic Control Road Space
• Divisional Artillery (less DAC) occupies 5
  miles of road space
• 1 x Field Artillery Brigade (less DAC) 2090
  yards
• 1 x 4.5" Howitzer Brigade (less DAC) 2505 yards

24
Menin Road and Polygon WoodInexorable Victory

• 20 September 26 September Respectively
• Menin Road Artillery Concentration Double That
  of 31 July
• Depth of Assault 1,500 yards
• Frontage 4,000 yards 4 Divisions
• Fine Weather Allows Good Observation for CB Fire
• Overwhelming Artillery
• 3,125 Artillery Pieces
• 3.5 Million Rounds for 7 Day Preliminary
  Bombardment
• 3.5 Million Rounds for First Day of Assault
• Medium/Heavy Field Gun Ratio 11½
• 1 Gun per 5 yards
• Neutralising (Area) CB Bombardments of German
  Batteries
• Switching to Destructive CB Fire 24 hours Before
  Zero
• Complete Victories

25
Broodseinde4 October 1917An Overwhelming Blow

• Menin Road Polygon Wood Very Encouraging
• Two More Blows Should Break the German Line
• Same System as Before
• Same Result Complete Success
• German Counter-Attack Smashed

26
Poelcappelle 9 October 1917The Church in the
Bog

• Afternoon of 4 October the Rain Begins Again
• Previous Successes Mask a Forward Logistics
  System That is Dangerously Close to Collapse
• Royal Engineers Tried to Warn Infantry Gunners
  Before Broodseinde But No Notice Taken
• 2nd Australian, 49th and 66th Divisions Attack
• 66th Division Have Only 25 x 18 Pounders in
  Support!
• Hellish Conditions and Abject Failure
• Failure Repeated on 12 October First
  Passchendaele

27
The Bitter EndCurries Battles

• Third Ypres Now a Tactical Battle for Possession
  of Passchendaele Ridge
• Currie Proposes a Series of 500 yard Depth
  Assaults
• Demands Time, Manpower and Materials to Repair
  Roads and Tracks
• A Slow but Realistic Approach
• Assaults Begin on 26 October 1917
• Assaults End on 10 November

28
So What Went Wrong?

• The Mud
• Congestion
• No Roads - No Movement
• The Inherent Problem of Sequential Limited
  Operations
• Structural Engineering Failure
• Artillery Fail to Understand Needs of Engineers

29
The Mud

• The Accepted Reason for the Failure of the
  Campaign - the Battle Bogged Down in the Mud
• The British Official History Cites unanimous
  Opinion of Corps and Divisional engineers
• up to 4th October there had been no serious
  difficulty in maintaining communications to the
  front, weather and ground conditions being
  tolerable and damage done by the enemy being
  readily repairable. Some even say this was the
  case until the 12th. (Edmonds, 1948).
• Is This Really the Case?
• No
• G.C. Williams 66th Division CRE
• A.H. Russell New Zealand Division CO
• H.O. Clogstoun 3rd Australian Division CRE
• W.B. Lindsay Canadian Corps CE

30
Failure of Operational Engineering

• Not the Mud
• An Engineers War in the Most Profound Sense
• Command Control of Operational Engineering
  Located at Division
• Incoherent Operational Engineering Command
  Control
• Needed an Operational Structure Similar to
  Artillery
• Compounded by Sequential Limited Assault System
• A Problem Long Before Third Ypres

31
Unmade Arrangements BEF Operational Engineering

• The damage to roads effected by the general
  bombardment has proved to be a serious obstacle
  to the subsequent advance.
• Artillery in Offensive Operations,
• February 1917, Section V(2)
• It has often been found that the state of the
  ground after a bombardment makes it impossible to
  supply ammunition, except by pack transport, to
  those batteries that have advanced. Arrangements
  must be made beforehand to deal with these
  conditions if there is any possibility that they
  will arise.
• Artillery in Offensive Operations,
• February 1917, Section IV (10)

32
Sequential Limited Assaults

• Success of Limited Assaults Entirely Dependent on
  Moving the Guns Forward Within 2-3 Days
• This is Unrealistic Especially for Medium/Heavy
  Guns
• Overwhelming Firepower Annihilates Forward Area
• Area has to be Rebuilt An Enormous Undertaking
• Engineers Do Not Have Command, Control or
  Manpower to Do This
• Roads Tracks Not Built
• Guns Cannot Move Supply Becomes Tenuous
• Assault Fails

33
Some Understanding Must Be Come ToGunners
Sappers

• Before a road is near completion orders are
  given that it must be opened. The chief offenders
  are the Artillery who almost invariably destroy
  or delay the construction of the road one is
  endeavouring to provide for them.
• Most rigid instructions should be issued that
  the Artillery may not use roads until they are
  thrown open by the Chief Engineer
• Canadian Corps Chief Engineer War Diary
• Methods of Distribution of Ammunition Employed
• 14 November 1917

34
Tyne Cott 16 June 1917
35
Tyne Cott 2 October 1917
36
Tyne Cott 10 October 1917
37
The Lindsay Report 1917

• Major-General William Bethune Lindsay, Chief
  Engineer, Canadian Corps
• Current Operational Engineer Resources Inadequate
• Chronic Lack of Manpower and Incoherent Structure
• Working Party System Seriously Interferes With
  Infantry Training and Leads to Poor Quality Work
• Proposes Enormous Expansion of Engineer Resources
• Standard Engineer Complement 1,500 (3 Field
  Coys. and a Pioneer Battalion Per Division)
• Proposes Formation of Engineering Brigades (3000
  men)
• Controlled by Corps
• Effectively Creates a Fifth Engineering
  Division
• 1922 RE Report Comes to Same Conclusion
• Still a Problem Today

38
The Need For Engineering Centralisation

• Lindsay Report Articulates Need For
  Centralisation and Command Control at Corps
  Level
• This Was Done For Artillery 1916-1917
• British artillery fought on a corps level This
  centralisation of control at the higher level
  made possible considerable flexibility in
  delivering a heavy weight of fire on any desired
  portion of the front
• G.W.L. Nicholson
• Canadian Official History
• Operational Engineering Vital to Success of
  Artillery
• Artillery Vital to Success of Infantry
• But Engineering Left With Divisions
• Operational Engineering Therefore Fragmented and
  Incoherent
• Leads to Operational Failure

39
The Mud in Context

• Another ICON of the Vale of Passion
• An Integral Part of the Litany of Horror and
  Suffering
• THE Universally Accepted and Definitive FACT of
  the Third Ypres Campaign
• Mud is a Feature of Many Battles Especially in NW
  Europe
• Waterloo Napoleon and the Fifth Element
• Somme
• Battle of the Bulge Ardennes WW2
• Even sunny Italy! Winter 1944 The Campaign
  of Mud
• The Passchendaele Mud was BAD but Not Visited by
  God and Against Which No Man Can Stand Opposed
• An OBSTACLE to be dealt with.
• An OBSTACLE the BEF Had Met Before
• Essentially an ENGINEERING MATTER

40
All-Arms Co-Operation?

• Much-Vaunted Critical Element of the Learning
  Curve
• The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the Whole
• Limited Operations Victim of Their Own Success
• Missing Dimension Operational Engineering
• Failure to Understand Central Operational Role of
  Engineering and Act Accordingly
• Without This the Artillery Cannot be Used to Best
  Effect
• Primary Reason for Failure at Third Ypres