THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA

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Title: THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA


1
THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISIONRisky Technology,
Culture, and Deviance at NASA
By Kelley Wolff
2
Introduction
  • Define Bureau pathology
  • Discuss the organizational structure of the
    launch decision process (Washington, D.C. to
    Morton-Thiokol)
  • Summarize the structural failures of the
    pre-launch findings (weather factors what they
    found)
  • Review the developments leading to Structural
    Failure

3
What is Bureau Pathology?
  • Bureau pathology is the study of the primary
    structure or processes of an organization and the
    pathologies to which organizations are prone.

4
Decision Makers Involved in The Challenger Launch
  • Space Flight, NASA National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration Headquarters (Washington,
    D.C.)
  • Johnson Space Center (Houston, TX)
  • Marshalls Space Center (Huntsville, AL)
  • Morton Thiokol (Utah)

5
Organizational Structure Four Tier Level of the
Decision-making Process
6
Space Flight NASA Headquarters
  • Based in Washington, D.C
  • NASA- established in 1958 - government agency
    responsible for the flights
  • Manages space flight centers, research centers,
    systems constituting NASA
  • Supervises the establishment of policies, and
    performance criteria

7
Johnson Space Center
  • Based in Houston, TX
  • Arnold Aldrich, Program Manager (Level II)
  • Accountable for the development, production and
    testing of spacecraft

8
Marshall Space Flight Center
  • Based in Hunstville, Alabama
  • Opened in 1960, made responsible for the
    propulsion system
  • Responsible for the technical breakthroughs
    behind the success of Apollo.
  • Marshalls on the 3rd tier in regards to the
    Challenger Launch Decision
  • Participated in both teleconference calls that
    took place the day before the Challenger launch.
  • Many of Marshalls supervisors were not available
    for the second conference call that took place at
    815p.m. EST

9
Morton Thiokol
  • Acquired a 800 million contract with NASA to
    manufacture the SRBs decision to select this
    company was cost
  • Contractor is responsible for the Solid Rocket
    Motors (SRMs) found on the SRBs of the
    Challengers
  • Morton-Thiokol's Website

10
Morton - Thiokol Organizational Structure
11
Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns
  • At HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA
  • At 100p.m. January 27, 1986 Larry Wear SRM
    initiates initiates the first concern of the
    predicted low temperature factor
  • Thiokol is advised to have their engineers review
    low temperature effects
  • Thiokol engineers gather, discuss, and
  • conclude that low temperature could
  • affect o-ring procedure of sealing

12
Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns
  • At CAPE CANAVERAL, FL
  • Contractors (Marshall Space Launch Center) of
    Main Engine, SRBs and External Tank agreed there
    was no SRB constraints for the launch at 938am.
  • Marshall strongly believed that low temperature
    was not a reason for a SRB delay
  • Engineers for Thiokol did not express any concern
    for low temperature
  • Marshall manager (L.Wear) initiates a second
    concern when he recalls Thiokols concern on low
    temperature during the January 1985 launch.

13
Structural Failure of Pre - Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
  • Thiokol SRB managers do not recall any concerns
    during the January 1985 STS-51-C launch
  • After denying January 1985 concerns, Thiokol
    calls for a meeting to discuss the blow-by
    effects on the January 1985 launch.
  • Thiokol concludes the possibility of it could
    happening again
  • Thiokols O-ring Task Force meet conclude that
    O-rings were not flexible to low temperature
    weather
  • The predicted weather for Jan. 28th launch was 26

14
Structural Failure of Pre - Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
  • At 545 p.m. EST, the first teleconference call
    took place - managers and engineers of Thiokol,
    Marshall and Kennedy Space Center
  • During a 45 minute teleconference call, Thiokol
    recommended the launch be delayed for 12 noon or
    later
  • At 815 p.m. EST, a second teleconference call
    was placed
  • Purpose
  • To discuss delaying the launch
  • due to weather conditions
  • To give ample time for Thiokol
  • to fax their data to Kennedy
  • Marshall Space Centers

15
Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
  • At 815p.m. EST second teleconference call began
  • Thiokol argued o-rings ability to seal the
    booster joints at time of ignition would be
    slower due to the predicted temperature.
  • Demonstrated several hand written charts to
    explain the effect of low temperatures
  • Blow-bys occurred at 75 degrees
  • weather Marshall excluded
  • temperature as a factor

16
Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
  • Marshall confronted Thiokol for a management
    recommendation
  • Kilminster (VP of Thiokol) recommended to delay
    that launch
  • Marshall immediately challenged data on charts
  • Robert Lund then made a management decision (due
    to performance pressure
  • State of the Union Address
  • first teacher in space)

17
Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
  • Thiokol engineers could not assess the link
    between cool temperatures o-ring damage on
    previous flights
  • Thiokol did not effectively present the relevant
    data to show high risk
  • Teleconference Call ended at 1115p.m. EST
  • Launch was scheduled for 930a.m. EST

18
Positioning of O-Rings
Correct positioning of O-Rings
incorrect positioning of O-Rings
19
Diagrams Created by Thiokol Engineers
Previous Launch
Focused only on 2 launches
20
Four Reasons for Launch Disaster
  • Presentation was lousy
  • Engineers were out numbered
  • Engineers were out shouted
  • Engineers were subordinates

21
History of O-Ring Temperatures Diagrams Created
by Thiokol Engineers
22
History of O-Ring Conditions on Previous Launches
By Edward Tufte, Yale University, Evidence
Info. Design
23
Statistics on Previous Launches
  • Above 65
  • 20 launches 3 had erosion problems
  • Below 65
  • 4 launches 4 had erosion problems

24
Footage of the Actual Challenger Launch
  • The Challenger Launch
  • The LAUNCH
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