Title: THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA
1THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISIONRisky Technology,
Culture, and Deviance at NASA
By Kelley Wolff
2Introduction
- Define Bureau pathology
- Discuss the organizational structure of the
launch decision process (Washington, D.C. to
Morton-Thiokol) - Summarize the structural failures of the
pre-launch findings (weather factors what they
found) - Review the developments leading to Structural
Failure
3What is Bureau Pathology?
- Bureau pathology is the study of the primary
structure or processes of an organization and the
pathologies to which organizations are prone.
4Decision Makers Involved in The Challenger Launch
- Space Flight, NASA National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Headquarters (Washington,
D.C.) - Johnson Space Center (Houston, TX)
- Marshalls Space Center (Huntsville, AL)
- Morton Thiokol (Utah)
5Organizational Structure Four Tier Level of the
Decision-making Process
6Space Flight NASA Headquarters
- Based in Washington, D.C
- NASA- established in 1958 - government agency
responsible for the flights - Manages space flight centers, research centers,
systems constituting NASA - Supervises the establishment of policies, and
performance criteria
7Johnson Space Center
- Based in Houston, TX
- Arnold Aldrich, Program Manager (Level II)
- Accountable for the development, production and
testing of spacecraft
8Marshall Space Flight Center
- Based in Hunstville, Alabama
- Opened in 1960, made responsible for the
propulsion system - Responsible for the technical breakthroughs
behind the success of Apollo. - Marshalls on the 3rd tier in regards to the
Challenger Launch Decision - Participated in both teleconference calls that
took place the day before the Challenger launch. - Many of Marshalls supervisors were not available
for the second conference call that took place at
815p.m. EST
9Morton Thiokol
- Acquired a 800 million contract with NASA to
manufacture the SRBs decision to select this
company was cost - Contractor is responsible for the Solid Rocket
Motors (SRMs) found on the SRBs of the
Challengers - Morton-Thiokol's Website
10Morton - Thiokol Organizational Structure
11Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns
- At HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA
- At 100p.m. January 27, 1986 Larry Wear SRM
initiates initiates the first concern of the
predicted low temperature factor - Thiokol is advised to have their engineers review
low temperature effects - Thiokol engineers gather, discuss, and
- conclude that low temperature could
- affect o-ring procedure of sealing
12Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns
- At CAPE CANAVERAL, FL
- Contractors (Marshall Space Launch Center) of
Main Engine, SRBs and External Tank agreed there
was no SRB constraints for the launch at 938am.
- Marshall strongly believed that low temperature
was not a reason for a SRB delay - Engineers for Thiokol did not express any concern
for low temperature - Marshall manager (L.Wear) initiates a second
concern when he recalls Thiokols concern on low
temperature during the January 1985 launch.
13Structural Failure of Pre - Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
- Thiokol SRB managers do not recall any concerns
during the January 1985 STS-51-C launch - After denying January 1985 concerns, Thiokol
calls for a meeting to discuss the blow-by
effects on the January 1985 launch. - Thiokol concludes the possibility of it could
happening again - Thiokols O-ring Task Force meet conclude that
O-rings were not flexible to low temperature
weather - The predicted weather for Jan. 28th launch was 26
14Structural Failure of Pre - Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
- At 545 p.m. EST, the first teleconference call
took place - managers and engineers of Thiokol,
Marshall and Kennedy Space Center - During a 45 minute teleconference call, Thiokol
recommended the launch be delayed for 12 noon or
later - At 815 p.m. EST, a second teleconference call
was placed - Purpose
- To discuss delaying the launch
- due to weather conditions
- To give ample time for Thiokol
- to fax their data to Kennedy
- Marshall Space Centers
15Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
- At 815p.m. EST second teleconference call began
- Thiokol argued o-rings ability to seal the
booster joints at time of ignition would be
slower due to the predicted temperature. - Demonstrated several hand written charts to
explain the effect of low temperatures - Blow-bys occurred at 75 degrees
- weather Marshall excluded
- temperature as a factor
16Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
- Marshall confronted Thiokol for a management
recommendation - Kilminster (VP of Thiokol) recommended to delay
that launch - Marshall immediately challenged data on charts
- Robert Lund then made a management decision (due
to performance pressure - State of the Union Address
- first teacher in space)
17Structural Failure of Pre -Launch Findings
Temperature Concerns contd
- Thiokol engineers could not assess the link
between cool temperatures o-ring damage on
previous flights - Thiokol did not effectively present the relevant
data to show high risk - Teleconference Call ended at 1115p.m. EST
- Launch was scheduled for 930a.m. EST
18Positioning of O-Rings
Correct positioning of O-Rings
incorrect positioning of O-Rings
19Diagrams Created by Thiokol Engineers
Previous Launch
Focused only on 2 launches
20Four Reasons for Launch Disaster
- Presentation was lousy
- Engineers were out numbered
- Engineers were out shouted
- Engineers were subordinates
21History of O-Ring Temperatures Diagrams Created
by Thiokol Engineers
22History of O-Ring Conditions on Previous Launches
By Edward Tufte, Yale University, Evidence
Info. Design
23Statistics on Previous Launches
- Above 65
- 20 launches 3 had erosion problems
- Below 65
- 4 launches 4 had erosion problems
24Footage of the Actual Challenger Launch
- The Challenger Launch
- The LAUNCH