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Lecture 6 Confirmation

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The ravens paradox. Carl Hempel showed that there are problems with that idea too. ... His problem is called the 'ravens paradox'. Nicod's Condition (NC) ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Lecture 6 Confirmation


1
Lecture 6Confirmation
2
Inductive logic?
  • Logic is about evidence or good reasons. In
    deductive logic, it is all clear and simple a
    good reason is something that guarantees the
    truth of the conclusion.
  • But in inductive logic we deal with weaker
    reasons, weaker type of evidence. If e is
    inductive evidence for h, it is not guaranteed
    that if e is true, h will also be true. It only
    means that with e we will have more reason to
    believe that h is true than before.
  • Someone might think that if h deductively implies
    e, then we can take e to be inductive evidence
    that h is true.
  • For example, if hypothesis h (all metals expand
    when heated) deductively implies e (this piece of
    metal will expand when heated), an observation
    that e is true will confirm h.
  • But this is a logical fallacy, known as affirming
    the consequent.
  • Wesley Salmon once joked that in deductive logic
    we learn how to avoid fallacies, and in inductive
    logic we learn how to commit these fallacies!

3
What confirms what?
  • In fact, no one thinks that for any hypothesis h,
    every deductive consequence of h confirms h. If
    this were true, every hypothesis would be
    confirmed by every observation.
  • Proof
  • Take a hypothesis h. Now, h deductively implies
    (h v p), where p is any statement. (This is an
    application of the rule of addition in natural
    deduction.) Or, symbolically h ? (h v p).
  • Take any observational statement o. If h is true,
    then (h v o) must also be true. In other words, h
    ? (h v o).
  • But if o is true, then (h v o) is true as well.
    But then o makes true one of the deductive
    consequences of h, and this means that o confirms
    h.
  • How about limiting confirmation to instances of
    generalizations? That is, maybe should take
    statement All Fs are G to be confirmed only by
    observations of things that are both F and G.

4
The ravens paradox
  • Carl Hempel showed that there are problems with
    that idea too. He showed that two intuitively
    very plausible assumptions lead to the conclusion
    that sounds unacceptable. His problem is called
    the ravens paradox.
  • Nicods Condition (NC)The proposition that a
    given object a has both characteristics F and G
    confirms the proposition that every F has G.
  • Equivalence Condition (EC)If proposition P
    confirms Q, and Q is logically equivalent to Q,
    then P confirms Q.
  • Paradoxical Conclusion (PC) The proposition (E)
    that a is both non-black and a non-raven confirms
    the proposition (H) that every raven is black
    (because All R are B All B are R).
  • A white shoe confirms that all ravens are black!

5
All ravens are black All non-black things
are non-ravens
Ravens
Black things
R B Empty!!!
R B
R B
R B
6
Solutions to the ravens paradox
  • The argument is valid. PC deductively follows
    from NC and EC (assuming the equivalence of All
    R are B and All B are R).
  • There are three possible strategies to solve this
    paradox
  • One can reject NC deny that every generalization
    is confirmed by any of its instances.
  • One can reject EC claim that an observation may
    confirm h, but not a logically equivalent
    hypothesis h.
  • One can accept the conclusion claim that
    observing a brown shoe confirms that all ravens
    are black (indoor ornithology!).
  • Hempel opted for strategy 3. He thinks that it
    just seems that a white shoe does not confirm
    All ravens are black. The reason is that we
    tacitly introduce some information, and we are
    therefore no longer looking at the relation only
    between the evidence and the hypothesis.

7
Hempels idea
  • Hempel thought that since we assume that there
    are so many more non-black things than ravens,
    then if we take a non-black thing we expect it to
    be a non-raven.
  • This explains why we do not take a non-black
    (white) thing that is a non-raven (shoe) as
    significantly confirming h. He thinks that
    finding a white shoe actually does confirm h, but
    to a very small degree, which we mistake for no
    confirmation at all.
  • Non-black thing is a falsification opportunity
    for h, so if this thing turns out not to be a
    raven, this slightly confirms h.
  • Hempels idea is that if we remove all tacitly
    introduced information that is influencing our
    judgment of the degree of confirmation of h, and
    if we focus only on the relation of the evidence
    and hypothesis, we will see that a black raven
    and a white shoe both confirm All ravens are
    black.

8
Against Hempel
  • Hempel was searching for the pure relation
    between e and h. The goal was to discover a
    degree of confirmation that e give to h,
    abstracting from all other information.
  • But many contemporary philosophers think that
    there is no pure degree confirmation. They
    believe that confirmation is not a binary
    relation between e and h, but a relation between
    three things e, h, and the background knowledge.
  • They think that without knowing anything else we
    simply cannot know whether e confirms h or not.
  • There is a possibility that e confirms h, or that
    e is irrelevant for h, or that e even disconfirms
    h.
  • Without more information the degree of
    confirmation is simply undefined.

9
NC is false!
  • An instance of a generalization does not
    necessarily support it. Object a that is F and G
    may not be evidence for All F are G.
  • Example All humans are shorter than 2.5
    meters. But finding an instance of that
    generalization can actually decrease our
    confidence in that generalization.
  • Let H be human, and S be shorter than 2.5
    meters. Now imagine that we find a person who is
    2.48 meters tall. We found a person who is H and
    S. But now we would be less ready to believe that
    all H are S!
  • Another example There are three people (a, b and
    c) who just left (L), and there is a hypothesis
    that each left wearing someone elses hat (H)
    All L are H.
  • Suppose that a left with bs hat, and b left with
    as hat. So, these two instances of All L are
    H refute the generalization.

10
I. J. Goods counter-example
  • I. J. Good invented the following possible
    situation, in which observing a black raves seems
    to disconfirm that all ravens are black.
  • We observe a black raven. Our background
    knowledge K says that exactly one of the
    following hypotheses is true (H) there are 100
    black ravens, no non-black ravens, and 1 million
    other birds, or else (H) there are 1,000 black
    ravens, 1 white raven, and 1 million other birds.
    And K also states that an object a is selected at
    random from all the birds.
  • Observing a black raven in a random selection is
    much more likely if H is true (than if H is
    true), because there are more ravens under H
    than under H.
  • Under the conditions, observing a black raven
    gives you a reason to believe that not all ravens
    are black.

11
The Wason Selection Task
These four cards have a letter and number on two
sides.
D
F
7
3
If a card has a D on one side, the other side
must have a 3.
Which card or cards must you turn over in order
to test this rule?
12
Solution
  • Card D (a) if it has 3 on the other side, no
    problem. (b) if it doesnt have 3
    on the other side, the rule falsified.
  • Card F (a) if it has 3 on the other side, no
    problem. (b) if it doesnt have 3
    on the other side, no problem.
  • Card 3 (a) if it has D on the other side, no
    problem. (b) if it doesnt have D
    on the other side, no problem.
  • Card 7 (a) if it has D on the other side, the
    rule is falsified. (b) if it
    doesnt have D on the other side, no problem.
  • Cards 1 and 4 give different outcomes, depending
    on what is on the other side, so they have to be
    turned over.
  • Cards 2 and 3 always have the same outcome (no
    problem), independently on what is on the other
    side, so they are useless.

13
Application to the raven paradox
  • Whether a black raven confirms All R are B,
    depends not only on the background information
    but also on which characteristic is first
    discovered.
  • If I have a raven behind my back and ask you
    whether you would like to see it (and check
    whether it is a black), you should say yes (if
    you want to get more evidence about whether all R
    are B).
  • But if I have a black thing behind my back and
    ask you whether you would like to see (and check
    whether it is a raven) you should say that you
    are not interested, because whatever it is, it
    cannot disprove that all R are B.
  • Notice, however, that the two situations may be
    the same, in the sense that in both cases what I
    actually have behind my back is a black raven.

14
Four ways of observing R and B
  • If we put an asterisk for an information that is
    obtained first (out of the two pieces of
    information), here are four possibilities
    (similar to 4 cards in the Wason selection task)
  • RB - Confirming All R are B (For example you
    see a raven in a dim light and cannot recognize
    the color. But then you realize its black. There
    was a possibility of falsification, so the result
    is confirmation.)
  • BR - Useless
  • RB - Useless
  • BR - Confirming All R are B (You see
    something white in a tree, and you are not sure
    what it is, a bird or something else. Then you
    realize it is a shoe. Again, there was a
    possibility of falsification, so the result is
    confirmation. White shoe confirms that all ravens
    are black.)

15
Four ways of sampling
  • We can apply the same way of thinking to the
    problem of sampling. There are four categories
    that can be sampled ravens, non-ravens, black
    things, non-black things.
  • Ravens Finding that all sampled ravens are black
    supports the generalization All R are B.
  • Non-ravens Finding that all sampled non-ravens
    are non-black does not support the generalization
    All R are B.
  • Black things Finding that all sampled black
    things are ravens does not support the
    generalization All R are B.
  • Non-black things Finding that all sampled
    non-black things are non-ravens support the
    generalization All R are B.

16
Sampling options graphical representation
(1) R B Empty!!!
(2) R B
(3) R B
(4) R B
Ravens (1,2) Useful because it includes area
1.Black things (2,3) Useless because it does
not include area 1.Non-ravens (3,4) Useless
because it does not include area 1.Non-black
things (1,4) Useful because it includes area 1.
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